La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

83. The THEOLOGIANS BEFORE MOLINA.—Before undertaking to examine whether or not there exists true revealed virtuality, and in what that virtuality consists, it is fitting to give first a brief summary of the different opinions of Catholic theologians on this matter.

All theologians before Molina, without a single exception that we know of, maintain that the true revealed virtuality or true theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith, which is the same as maintaining that true evolution in dogma is possible.

There is no more difference between these theologians except that the Thomist theologians, who have always specifically distinguished faith from theology, are careful to note that, although the theological conclusion may be definable as of divine faith, it is not, however, formally of divine faith, but purely theological, before the definition of the Church. Whereas the Scotists and the nominalists, who have not distinguished or have not been clear in distinguishing specifically faith from theology, are content to say that every theological conclusion is of divine faith, without distinguishing between before and after the definition.

But all, Thomists and Scotists, agree that it is definable as a truth of divine faith, and, therefore, it is a true dogma of faith if the Church defines it. Hence Suárez, who knew well the tradition of the School, said without hesitation: "This opinion seems to me certain, and to be held from the common consensus of theologians, nor in this do I find any theologian contradicting"¹. And with no less reason and historical judgment, Lugo added: "That, besides the arguments adduced by Suárez, the practice and use of all confirm it"². On this point no historical doubt is possible.

84. MOLINA'S INNOVATION.—Molina was the first among the theologians to affirm that no true theological conclusion, however inclusive or implicit it may be, such as the conclusion that there are two wills in Christ, is or can be of true divine faith, either before or after the definition of the Church. If, then, the Church defines such conclusions, even though she defines them with the dogmatic formula of anathema, as she defined the two wills in Christ at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, they do not merit the assent of true divine faith, but a theological assent founded on reasoning, since it is by reasoning that the Church knows and defines them. There can, therefore, be no growth in dogma or truly dogmatic evolution³.

This truly innovative opinion of Molina was defended with no less ardor than talent by Granados and later followed in part by Ripalda, and in its entirety by Kilber or the so-called Wirceburgenses with some others. This is also the opinion that, at least in appearance, the Salmanticenses and Billuart followed, because they failed to notice the Suarezian confusion concerning the virtual revealed.

On the other hand, that innovation of Molina was vigorously opposed not only by all the Thomists before the Salmanticenses, including John of St. Thomas, but also by Suárez and Lugo and by the vast majority of theologians, without distinction of schools, prior to the introduction of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

That innovation of Molina, destructive of all dogmatic evolution, merited the following judgment from the illustrious Navarrete: “This opinion contains many false things, which for now we do not wish to mark with censure, because it is not sufficiently clear what that author thought... Therefore the aforesaid author (Molina) errs greatly in that he asserts that the theologian, by the habit of theology, assents to that truth, as the Church deduces it: for although the Fathers who were present at the said councils deduced that conclusion by the habit of theology, nevertheless, with the definition presupposed, they gave their assent to it by the habit of faith” ⁴. The Thomist Nazario labeled it, without mincing words, Molina's error ⁵.

That is that innovation of Molina which caused such astonishment in Suárez that he could not help exclaiming: It is to be wondered at ⁶. Finally, concerning this innovation, the Jesuit Schiffini has said in modern times: “Suárez marvels at the novelty of that (Molina’s) opinion, and censures it as contrary to the common consensus of theologians” ⁷.

85. THE POSITION OF VÁZQUEZ AND VEGA.—For Vázquez and Vega, every true theological conclusion is not only definable as of divine faith, in which they agree with the traditional opinion against Molina, but it is in itself of divine faith, even before being defined, and every theologian who deduces it by evident reasoning must or can give that assent of divine faith, in which Vázquez and Vega follow the Scotist or nominalist line against the Thomist.

Indeed, for Vázquez every evident theological conclusion can be considered, even before the definition of the Church, under two aspects: a) formally, or insofar as it is a conclusion; b) materially, insofar as it is contained in the revealed premise or premises. Under the first aspect, it merits theological assent; under the second, assent of divine faith, even before the definition of the Church. These are the two celebrated assents which Suárez later applied (and which almost all modern theologians apply) to the formal-confused or metaphysical-inclusive conclusions, and which the Salmanticenses, against all Thomistic tradition, later applied to conclusions deduced from two revealed premises⁸.

The reason on which Vázquez bases his claim that conclusions known by evident reasoning are for the theologian an object of divine faith even without a definition by the Church is that reasoning stands in relation to the theologian’s private reason as the definition of a Council stands in relation to the whole Church. “Theological demonstration is related to the theologian who demonstrates it in the same way as a Council, when it declares that something is a matter of faith, is related to the whole Church. The only difference is that the Council proposes to all what it defines as something to be believed, so that all may be bound to believe: but theological reason only for those for whom the consequence from the articles of faith is evident⁹.

From this theory of Vázquez have arisen both the distinction currently made between dogmas of divine faith and dogmas of Catholic faith, and the theory that the authority of the Church is absolutely necessary for the faith of simple believers, but not for the faith of learned theologians; a distinction and theory that are false and with which we will deal later (135-156).

In short, it is concerning this theory of Vázquez that the ordinarily so moderate John of St. Thomas says the following: "But that the opposite opinion seems to equate the certainty of a theological conclusion with the definition of the Church, cannot be tolerated at all... Otherwise, a conclusion derived theologically would not need the definition of faith as confirming it and as the rule of its certainty, if it has in itself as much certainty, with respect to the theologian who infers it, as the definition of the Church; and thus the theologian would be a sufficient rule for himself in the certainty of matters of faith, without recourse to the Church, which would be a most pernicious error"¹⁰.

86. THE THEORY OF SUÁREZ AND LUGO.—The reader already knows the theory of these two distinguished theologians. It consists in distinguishing two virtual revealed truths: the metaphysical-inclusive and the physical-connexive. With respect to the first, they affirm the same as Vázquez and Vega, namely, that it is not only definable as a matter of faith, but that it is of divine faith, even before being defined, for every theologian who knows it with evident reasoning. Consequently, they applied to this virtual truth or conclusion the two assents of Vázquez.

Regarding the second, they believed that that was the proper virtual itself and the proper theological conclusion itself, and they applied to it the same doctrine that the Thomist tradition applies to every true revealed virtual, namely, that it is not of divine faith, but purely theological, before the definition; but that it is of true divine faith after the definition. Only that, having considered as a proper virtual a non-implicit virtual and, therefore, the non-revealed virtual, they had to resort, as we have already seen, to the theories of new revelations or of indefinite and transformed assistance (72-79).

87. THREE THEORIES, NOT TWO.—With regard, then, to whether theological conclusions or the virtually revealed are or are not of faith, there are not, as the manuals commonly say, two opinions: one of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega, and another of the remaining theologians; rather, there are three essentially distinct theories: two diametrically opposed to each other, namely those of Molina and Vázquez, and one that occupies the middle ground between them, which is the Thomistic.

The first, which is Molina's, denies that they are of divine faith either before or after the definition. This theory, followed by few theologians and censured or abandoned by most, is what later gave rise, as we shall see in due course (233), to the so-called ecclesiastical faith, applying to dogmatic facts almost the same thing that Molina had applied to theological conclusions.

The second, which is that of Vázquez and Vega, takes the opposite pole, affirming that they are of divine faith not only after, but also before, the definition. Melchor Cano never followed this opinion, although the contrary is commonly said, as we hope to demonstrate fully later on (449-464). But Suárez and Lugo did follow it, with respect to the metaphysical-inclusive conclusions, and the generality of modern manuals follow it, scarcely realizing it, under the name of confused formal or of virtual identical-real.

The third, midway between the two preceding ones, is the traditional Thomist theory, which distinguishes between before and after the definition. Before the definition, no true theological conclusion, not even one deduced from two revealed premises, is of divine faith, nor can it merit an act of divine faith; rather, it is purely theological and can merit only theological assent, the same for the learned theologian as for the simple faithful. But after the dogmatic definition of the Church, every true theological conclusion (and only the metaphysically inclusive one is a true theological conclusion, as we shall soon see) is as much of divine faith as the articles of faith themselves.

These three theories concern the true theological conclusion, that is, the metaphysically inclusive conclusion; for before the Suarezian conclusion, no theologian had thought to call the physically connective one a true theological conclusion. Therefore, if we were to include that physically connective virtual under the name of theological conclusion or of the revealed virtual, one would have to say that there is a fourth opinion, namely, the opinion of Suárez and Lugo, who say about that false virtual or theological conclusion exactly the same thing that the third opinion says concerning the true conclusion or true virtual. This fourth opinion is the one that the Salmanticenses actually combat, and with irrefutable logic, by denying that the pure virtual (only virtual) is definable as a matter of faith; although in appearance they seem to combat the definability of every virtual, because they did not distinguish between the true virtual and the physically connective virtual.

The third of those theories, which is the traditional Thomistic one, John of St. Thomas expounds it thus: "The third opinion is that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, if they are defined by the Church, immediately pertain to faith... The Thomists commonly follow this opinion, as can be seen in Master Navarrete and Master González"¹¹. And in the treatise On Faith, alluding to this same passage, he expresses himself thus:

"From the aforesaid it is inferred that virtual or mediate revelation, or that deduced by reasoning, such as is found in theology, is distinguished specifically from immediate revelation, which is obtained from the testimony of the speaker, and attains that which is to be believed as a matter of faith, as we have handed down more fully in the first part, first question, second disputation, fourth article, where we rejected two extreme opinions: one, that of Vázquez, who thinks that a conclusion drawn from the premises of faith is so certain with respect to one who knows the arguments just as a proposition defined by the Church: the other, that of Molina, who thinks that even if a definition of the Church should supervene upon some proposition that previously was not a matter of faith, it would not make it a matter of faith: but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not, however, so as to make matters of faith those things that previously were not matters of faith. These opinions in the cited place can be seen impugned"¹².

As the reader will have noticed, of those three theories about the metaphysical-inclusive conclusion, the third, which is the Thomist one, defends its definability as a matter of faith, and, therefore, defends the evolution of dogma by way of a true theological conclusion. The second, which is that of Vázquez and Vega, of Suárez and de Lugo, not only defends it, but defends it excessively by making such conclusions not only definable as a matter of faith, but also formally of faith in itself or without definition. Only the first, which is that of Molina, of Kilber, and of a few others, is the one that denies its definability as a matter of faith and, therefore, the true evolution of dogma.

It may, therefore, be said that the definability of faith of inclusive or conceptual conclusions and, hence, the evolution of dogma by way of implicit virtuality, is common doctrine among theologians, even among those of today, although many manuals seem to say the contrary because they do not distinguish between an inclusive conclusion and a physical-connective conclusion.

88. INTRINSIC STUDY OF THE PROBLEM.—Leaving aside, then, this question of the opinions of theologians—all the more so because at the end of this work we shall cite the literal texts of almost all of them (353-448)—let us now examine in itself the question of the evolution of dogma, which is not, at bottom, anything other than the question of the existence and nature of the virtuality of the revealed deposit, together with the question of the nature and extent of the authority of the Church with respect to that virtuality.

As we have already seen (46), the six types of virtuality or of reasoning are reduced to two: physical-connective virtuality, which is that of the fourth type of reasoning, and metaphysical-inclusive virtuality, which encompasses the other five types. In the following sections we are going to examine whether these two virtualities, or either of them, are truly revealed and capable of dogmatic evolution, and whether for that dogmatic evolution the definition of the Church is required or not. These are extremely important questions, for they are the center and the key of the existence of dogmatic evolution and of the specific distinction between dogmatic evolution and theological evolution.