La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

60. UNITY OF FORMULAS AND DIVERSITY OF MEANING.—As we said elsewhere (3), Catholic doctrine comprises four degrees: a) revealed datum; b) dogmas of faith; c) infallible truths; d) theological conclusions.

When it comes to determining the nature of each of these four degrees, all theologians agree on these four formulas or criteria: a) in Catholic doctrine there are truths revealed formally or immediately and truths revealed virtually or mediately; b) truths formally or immediately revealed constitute the proper or intrinsic object of divine faith; c) truths virtually or mediately revealed constitute the proper or intrinsic object of theology; d) the infallibility of the Church has as its primary object the truths formally or immediately revealed, and as its secondary object, the truths virtually or mediately revealed.

To avoid useless repetitions of synonymous names, we state once and for all that, in this matter, formal is the same as immediate, and virtual, the same as mediate¹.

On those four formulas or criteria that express the nature of the objects of divine faith, of sacred theology, and of the infallibility of the Church, there is complete unanimity among theologians, both ancient and modern. But unanimity in the formulas matters little if there is divergence in meaning.

Indeed, as the reader will have noticed, divine faith, theology, and infallibility are all defined in these formulas in terms of two objects: the formally revealed and the virtually revealed. Accordingly, depending on how the immediate and formal revealed and the mediate or virtual revealed are distinguished from or identified with each other, faith, theology, and infallibility will be distinguished from or identified with each other. The slightest variation in the nature or extension of these objects will necessarily carry with it the same variation in their respective habits. Under identical formulas, each author may say or understand different things simply by having a different idea of the meaning of those two names, immediate or formal and mediate or virtual.

Thus, when it is a question of knowing what a given author thinks about the nature or extent of divine faith, theology, or infallibility, it is useless to look at whether that author employs those formulas; rather, one must look at in what sense he takes the names formally or immediately revealed and virtually or mediately revealed, which form the basis of the four formulas. Everything depends on that.

Well, then: in this section we propose to show that, from Suárez to the present, the generality of theologians give to the names “immediately or formally revealed” and “mediately or virtually revealed” a meaning completely different from that which traditional theology, and especially St. Thomas, gave to them and understands; that, having a different idea of those two objects, they consequently also have a different conception concerning the nature and extent of divine faith and of sacred theology; that, by having modified the sense of those two objects, they have modified the true sense of the formulas, as a result of which there occurs the curious phenomenon of which I speak².

There are authors who, using identical formulas, understand radically different things, while others, using different formulas, understand exactly the same thing; and, in short, from that variation introduced by Suárez in the meaning of the terms “formal” or “immediate” and “virtual” or “mediate” proceeds that persuasion of many that no true dogmatic evolution is possible by way of virtuality or theological conclusion, and that exasperating difficulty which certain theologians and apologists find in reconciling the teachings of common theology with the evident facts of the history of dogmas.

To make this clear with all possible clarity, we will briefly set out four points: a) St. Thomas's doctrine on what is meant by properly virtual or mediate revelation; b) Suárez's innovation; c) the consequences of that innovation; d) the root of the modern confusion on this question.

I.—THE VIRTUAL REVEALED ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS

61. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.—To understand well what St. Thomas means by immediate or formal and by mediate or virtual, one must understand well the difference between simple intelligence and reason, or between intuition and discourse.

Indeed, our faculty of intellectual knowledge, although it is a single power, encompasses, unlike that of God and of the angels, two distinct functions or ways of knowing. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, gives them two distinct names: a), simple intelligence, which in Latin is called understanding; b), reasoning or discourse, in Latin reason.

By the first of those two functions of our one and only intellectual power we know through a single and simple act of intuition, immediately, without discourse properly so called. By the second, we know through successive acts, mediately, by discursive reasoning.

The fact of needing or not needing discourse proper marks the dividing line between simple intelligence and reason, between intuition and science, between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual.

When it is knowable by us without true discourse, it is simple intelligence, it is intuition, it is immediate or formal. When we cannot know it except through discourse properly so called, it is for us not simple intelligence but science; not immediate or formal, but mediate or virtual.

Therefore, when our intellect perceives the truth or falsity of a proposition merely by hearing it or by the simple exposition of the terms, without employing any new idea, the knowledge is immediate or formal, of simple intelligence. In that case there is no step or transition (discursive reasoning) from one concept to another, but rather an instantaneous perception of the relation between the predicate and the subject or, at most, a passage from the name to the idea, not from one idea to another. Thus, for example, to assent to the proposition that the whole is greater than the part, it is enough to hear the proposition or, at most, to define or explain the simple meaning of the terms whole and part, without the intervention of any other concept whatsoever.

From this follows the following corollary, of the utmost importance in Thomistic doctrine, namely: “For a proposition to be for us immediate or formal, and not mediate or virtual, two things are required and suffice: a) that to know its truth or falsity we need no reasoning whatsoever; b) that, if we do need reasoning, it be reasoning improperly so called, that is, reasoning ordered solely to ascertaining the formal meaning of the terms.”

Essentially different is the other function of our intellectual knowledge, called reasoning or science. Many times, in order to perceive the truth or falsity of a proposition, it is not enough for us to know or ascertain the formal meaning of the two terms, that is, of the predicate and the subject, but rather we need the intervention of a new term or concept, the intervention of a third term, virtually distinct from the two original ones. By means of that new concept, with which we compare the concepts of the subject and predicate, and only by means of it, can we know the truth or falsity of said proposition, by virtue of the principle of all reasoning which says: those things that are the same as “a third” are the same as “each other”.

This second manner of knowing is what is called, in the language of St. Thomas, mediate or virtual, because the truth or falsity of the proposition is not seen in itself, but through or by virtue of another concept. The function of our reason, which knows in this way, is called reasoning or science; the truths thus known are called virtual or mediate, and the discourse thus employed is called proper discourse, whether the new term is only conceptually distinct, without being really distinct, as happens, for example, in the mathematical sciences; or whether it is really distinct, as happens in the physical sciences.

62. COROLLARIES.—From which these two corollaries are also deduced, no less fundamental in the doctrine of St. Thomas, namely: a) for a conclusion or truth to be for us virtual or mediate and not immediate or formal, it suffices that we cannot know it without reasoning properly so-called; b) for there to be reasoning properly

That said, it is not required that the new formula or deduced conclusion be really distinct, but rather it suffices that it be virtually or conceptually distinct.

The reader will pardon us for having dwelt on explaining so obvious a thing and one which we had already indicated elsewhere (24-27), since it is a most fundamental point for anyone who wishes to understand the doctrine of St. Thomas on the nature and distinction of divine faith and theology and to penetrate well how dogmatic evolution is possible without an increase in real objectivity³

63. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR SUPERNATURAL KNOWLEDGE.—Just as the ideas of simple intelligence and reason relate to each other in the natural order, exactly in the same way do the ideas of divine faith and theology relate in the supernatural or revealed order. The reason for this is that revelation is, in the supernatural order, what intrinsic evidence is in the natural order.

The starting point in the natural order is the first principles.

Principles of reason known by pure intuitive evidence, immediately, without discourse strictly speaking. Likewise, in the supernatural order, the point of departure is the first principles of faith or the propositions that compose the primitive or revealed datum, known by simple revelation, immediately, without any discourse (31).

Everything that our intellect perceives in the first principles of reason without any discourse, or with discourse improperly so called, such as all discourse ordered to knowing the meaning of terms, is immediate or formal, not mediate or virtual. In the same way, everything that our intellect finds in the revealed datum without any discourse or with discourse improperly so called is revealed immediate or formal, not mediate or virtual.

Everything that in the natural order our intellect cannot see without its own reasoning or without the intervention of a new concept is for us science or reason, not simple intelligence or intuition. In the same way, everything that in the revealed datum or revealed premise we cannot see without our own reasoning or without the intervention of another new concept is for us theology or theological science, not simple intelligence or divine faith.

As can be seen, the whole doctrine of St. Thomas on the distinction between faith and theology, or between what is immediately or formally revealed and what is mediately or virtually revealed, in the supernatural order, is perfectly based on the distinction between simple intelligence and reason, or between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual in the natural order⁴.

The parallelism could not be more complete. Intrinsic evidence is the formal motive of both understanding and reason in the natural order; revelation is the formal motive,

Both of faith and of theology, in the supernatural. Natural evidence is divided into evidence in itself and evidence in another; the former is immediate or formal evidence; the latter, mediate or virtual evidence; the former is the formal motive of simple intelligence or intuition; the latter, the formal motive of science or reason. In the same way, supernatural revelation is divided into revelation in itself and revelation in another; the former is immediate or formal revelation; the latter, mediate or virtual revelation; the former is the formal motive of faith; the latter, the formal motive of theological science.

St. Thomas does not have two philosophies or two nomenclatures, one for the natural order and another for the supernatural, but rather the same philosophy and the same nomenclature that he uses in the natural order for simple intelligence and reason and for immediate or formal and mediate or virtual evidence, which are the two cognitive habits and their two specific objects in the natural order, that same nomenclature, and in the same sense, he applies to divine faith and to sacred theology, and to immediate or formal and mediate or virtual revelation, which are also the two cognitive habits and their two specific objects in the supernatural order.

64. COROLLARIES.—Whence there likewise follow two other parallel corollaries, no less fundamental in the doctrine of St. Thomas, and which he who does not wish to become entangled in these questions must not forget, and they are: a) it is, for us, virtual or mediate revelation, and not formal or immediate, every truth that we cannot deduce from the revealed datum or revealed premise except by means of our own reasoning; b) it is, for us, our own reasoning, and, therefore, virtual or mediate revelation, every reasoning in which the new formula or deduced conclusion expresses a distinct concept, although it does not express a distinct reality from the revealed datum or revealed premise from which it is deduced (27).

Everything said thus far is the ABC of St. Thomas's doctrine, as every Thomist knows; if anyone, however, still desires a broader study of the difference between immediate and mediate revelation, he will find it later in the fourth section of the third chapter of this work, nos. 157-169, where we will examine the relations between the authority of the Church and mediate or virtual revelation.

II.—SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION ON THE VIRTUAL REVEALED

65. The eleventh section of the third disputation of Suárez's treatise On Faith is epoch-making in the history of theology. The title of that section is: "Whether virtual or mediate revelation suffices for the formal object of faith." To this title, so important for the question of the development of dogma, Suárez added this other subtitle: "Wherein is treated the formal distinction between the objects of faith and theology"⁵.

66. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION.—The subtitle of the question very clearly indicates that Suárez fully recognized the importance of what he intended to treat, and that the distinction or formal identification between divine faith and theology depended entirely on the nature of what is revealed virtually or mediately.

Suárez begins by observing, and rightly so, that the question proposed in the title amounts almost to this: “Whether a proposition elicited by discourse from two principles of faith, or from one premise of faith and another natural one, is to be believed as a matter of faith.”⁶ Under this rubric, seemingly without consequence, and which many manuals dispatch in four words, as if it were some antiquated question, lies hidden the entire modern problem of the homogeneity or transformism of Catholic dogma.

That question, translated into modern terms, is exactly the following: When over the course of the centuries divine revelation (premise of faith) comes into contact or combination with what we call human civilizations or philosophies (premise of reason), is the result (conclusion) of that contact the corrupting or transforming of the primitive gospel, or only the developing of it homogeneously? Does that result, which the ancients designate by the name of conclusion, have the same value as the gospel, for that means being of faith, or does it have only human value, for that means not being of faith, but a pure theological conclusion?

We make these observations, which will be commonplace to theologians of the true stamp, because there is no lack of superficial theologians who seem to understand only the outer shell of scholastic nomenclature and who, when treating the development of dogma, say quite calmly that the ancients dealt little or not at all with this question. There is scarcely any modern question related to dogma that the ancient masters of Scholasticism did not treat, and treat very thoroughly; and to them the theologian must turn if he wishes to find truly fundamental principles for resolving it. But let us return to Suárez.

67. SUBDIVISION INTO TWO QUESTIONS.—Suárez, following in this the Thomistic tradition, subdivided the proposed question into two others: first, whether that conclusion, deduced from a

premise of faith and another of reason, it is of faith before the definition of the Church; second, whether it is of faith after the definition. The first question he treats from number 2 to number 11, and the second in numbers 11 and 12.

68. UNANIMITY REGARDING THE SECOND QUESTION.—Regarding whether the theological conclusion is of divine faith after the Church’s definition, Suárez notes that the affirmative answer is unanimous among theologians, to such an extent that, among all the great theologians who preceded him, there is only one who has said the contrary, and that one is Molina.

69. TRADITIONAL SPIRIT OF SUÁREZ.—Unlike his predecessor Molina, his contemporary Vázquez, or his successor Ripalda, Suárez is an eminently traditional spirit, and when an opinion is common among theologians, he very rarely takes the contrary side. Thus, despite the affection and almost respect with which he always treats Molina, Suárez cannot, in the present question, contain his astonishment (it is to be wondered at, he says in no. 3) that Molina has dared to deny, against all tradition, that the theological conclusion, even after its definition by the Church, is of faith; and against Molina he establishes, not as probable doctrine but as certain, the following thesis: “Thirdly, it must be said that a theological conclusion, after it is defined by the Church, is formally and most properly of faith, not only mediately but immediately. This opinion seems to me certain and to be held from the common consensus of theologians. Nor in this do I find a theologian contradicting”⁷

Thus far Suárez moves on firm ground, as does everyone who follows an opinion common to all the great masters of theology. That this opinion was not only common but completely unanimous before Molina seemed so clear to Suárez that he did not even wish to linger over citing the texts of those theologians. We will cite them later, classified by centuries, in the final chapter of this work (352-398).

70. ECLECTIC SPIRIT OF SUÁREZ.—Highly traditional when it comes to common doctrines, Suárez is one of the most eclectic spirits when it comes to questions in which his predecessors are divided. Between two opposing schools, Suárez rarely declares himself unconditionally for either of them. His most frequent approach is to make some distinction or observation of his own devising, with the laudable intention, no doubt, of shortening the distances between adversaries. An end, no doubt, very laudable in intention, but not always philosophical and frequently dangerous; for when one seeks to harmonize heterogeneous or contradictory systems, one runs the danger of, instead of settling anything, entangling everything. That is the danger of all eclectic or concordist spirits, and Suárez fell into it, as we shall see, when treating the first question of whether the theological conclusion was a matter of faith before its definition by the Church.

71. TWO OPPOSITE OPINIONS REGARDING THE FIRST QUESTION.—Regarding that question, Suárez found that theological opinions were divided.

A first opinion affirms that the virtually revealed or theological conclusion is of divine faith by itself or before the definition of the Church, and that anyone who deduces it by evident reasoning can give it the assent of divine faith. Such, says Suárez, is the opinion of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega, although we hope to show elsewhere (449), and Suárez himself later acknowledges ⁸, that Cano is not of that opinion. Finally, Suárez notes, and very rightly, that all those who do not specifically distinguish the habits of divine faith and theology have to follow that opinion of Vázquez and Vega.

A second opinion, which Suárez qualifies as radically contrary (extremely contrary), holds the negative view, namely, that before the Church's definition the virtually revealed or theological conclusion is not of divine faith, but a mere theological conclusion, and no other assent can be given to it than theological assent. This is the opinion, says Suárez, followed by Capreolus, Cajetan, all the Thomists, and clearly St. Thomas: Which is commonly held... by Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Thomists, and "clearly St. Thomas" ⁹

72. SUÁREZ'S ATTITUDE.—If Suárez had been a faithful Thomist, in the manner of Capreolus or Cajetan, Báñez or Medina, John of St. Thomas or Gonet, Gotti or Billuart, one could already calculate in advance what opinion he was going to follow. Having just confessed that the two opinions in question were irreconcilable with each other (extremely contrary), and that St. Thomas clearly followed the second opinion (and plainly St. Thomas), a dyed-in-the-wool Thomist would have declared himself without hesitation for that second opinion.

But Suárez, rather than a Thomist, is, as we have said, one of those eclectic minds who have never sworn on the word of the master, even if that master is called Saint Thomas.

Thus, instead of declaring himself wholly and frankly for neither of these two opposed opinions, Suárez prefers to declare himself partly for one and partly for the other, that is, to agree in part with Vázquez and Vega and in part with St. Thomas. To that end he introduces into this question an element of his own invention, to which he gives the name of the "formal-confused" revealed. In our judgment, this formal-confused has been the true cause of all the confusion that reigns in post-Suarezian theology regarding the definability of the true and proper theological conclusion as a matter of divine faith—or, what amounts to the same thing, regarding the development of dogma by way of a proper and strict implicit virtuality. The notions of the formal revealed and of the virtual revealed are correlative, and the slightest modification introduced into the understanding of one of them flows back upon the understanding of the other, modifying in parallel the notions of divine faith, theology, and dogmatic progress, which are notions correlative to those of the formal and virtual revealed.

73. THE CONFUSED FORMAL AND THE PROPER VIRTUAL, ACCORDING TO SUÁREZ.—In philosophy, two genera of properties are distinguished, and, consequently, two classes of virtuality and of conclusions. The properties of the first genus are those that express only a concept distinct from the essence or principle from which they are deduced; those of the second genus express not only a distinct concept, but also a distinct reality or objectivity. The former are really identical with the starting point, and, therefore, inseparable from it even by divine power; the latter are really distinct and absolutely separable. The former are called metaphysical, or essential, or radical properties, and constitute the implicit virtuality of the metaphysical and mathematical sciences; the latter are called physical, accidental, or formal properties, and constitute the virtuality that is not implicit, but purely connective, of the physical sciences (44).

Now then; Suárez considers that first kind of properties or virtuality not as virtual properly speaking, but as truly formal, albeit confused formal; and he regards as proper virtual only the second kind of properties, or virtuality, or conclusions.

Therefore, under the new name of formal-confused revealed, Suárez includes two classes of conclusions: a) conclusions deduced through improper reasoning or a simple explanation of terms, such as the conclusions in which the defined is deduced from the definition, the parts from the whole, the particular from the universal, or one correlative from another, and which modern theologians usually call formal implicit; b) conclusions conceptually distinct from the revealed premise, and which therefore are really identical with it and absolutely inseparable from it, which is what today is usually called virtual implicit, or virtual identical, or virtual connective-essential (32-33).

By contrast, under the name of proper virtual, or of theological conclusions properly so-called, he understands only those conclusions that express something really distinct and in no way separable from the revealed premise from which they are deduced. This is what modern authors call purely virtual, purely mediate, purely connexive (“only” virtual, “only” mediate, “only” connexive), and what we always designate as non-implicit virtual or physical-connexive virtual ¹⁰. This is for Suárez the true and proper revealed virtuality, the true and proper theological conclusion, the proper and rigorous theology ¹¹.

Perhaps to one who, without being versed in these matters, reads Suárez for the first time, it will not seem clear that Suárez understands under the name of confused formal all that we have just attributed to him. But we are sure that all the true disciples of Suárez, and even anyone who reads with attention all that eleventh section of the third disputation of the treatise On Faith that we have been examining, will agree with us that this is the true mind of Suárez. Suffice it to cite in confirmation a by no means suspect testimony, that of Ripalda: “The third opinion is middle (that is, middle between the opinion of Vázquez and Vega and the opinion of St. Thomas and the Thomists), namely, that the object of such a conclusion is believable by faith when it is really identified with the revealed object, but not if it is really distinct and separable from it: and therefore the metaphysical property of the nature is credible by faith as the revelation of the nature itself, but not the physical property. And hence the radical risibility, and remote, of Christ pertains to the faith by which we believe Christ to be a man; but not the formal risibility, and proximate, which we suppose to be separable and distinct from the nature, although the conclusion of both is deduced from the revelation of the humanity and at the same time from evident knowledge, by which humanity is radically and proximately risible. Thus Suárez and Lugo” ¹².

One may likewise see Lugo¹³, Haunoldo¹⁴, Cardinal Mazella¹⁵ or any other Suarezian author.

74: SUÁREZ'S SOLUTION.—Once that distinction between the confused formal and the proper virtual has been made, Suárez is already perfectly logical and traditional, and he does nothing more than apply Thomistic principles to the solution of the question. According to Thomistic doctrine, everything formally revealed is of faith, and everything virtually revealed is in itself a matter of theology.

Thus, then, to the question of whether the revealed virtuality or theological conclusion is of divine faith in itself or without definition by the Church, he very logically answers with the following two conclusions:

1st. If it is a question of that virtuality or conclusions called formally confused, they are in themselves of faith or before the Church’s definition, and the theologian can give them the assent of divine faith provided only that he knows them through evident reasoning. “On this—says Suárez—I agree with the first opinion, that is, with Vázquez and Vega.”

2. If we are dealing with conclusions qualified as properly virtual or purely virtual, they are not in themselves of divine faith, nor can they be given the assent of divine faith, but only theological assent. “In this—says Suárez—I follow Capreolus, Cajetan, and St. Thomas.” It is worthwhile to cite, in Latin and literally, the text of Suárez:

“I say therefore first: Formal revelation, even if confused, suffices for the formal object of faith and consequently for assenting by faith to the particular contents contained under such revelation, if it is sufficiently applied to them and a person uses reasoning in a suitable manner for assenting. In this assertion I agree with the first opinion... I say second: Merely virtual or mediate revelation does not suffice for the formal object of faith, and consequently an assent founded on it, with the help of some naturally evident principle, does not suffice for a proper assent of faith, but only for theology. Besides the cited authors... Cajetan holds this opinion not obscurely... and St. Thomas likewise thinks the same... where also Capreolus”¹⁶

75. TRADITION AND INNOVATION.—In this position taken by Suárez, one should carefully distinguish the part that Suárez has preserved from the Thomistic tradition and the part in which he has innovated.

Suárez has remained traditional in four things: a) in preserving the division of the revealed into immediate or formal and

mediato or virtual; b) in affirming that the former is of itself the object of divine faith, and the latter of itself the object of theology; c) in denying, against Vázquez and Vega, that what is virtually revealed is a matter of faith of itself, or without a definition by the Church; d) in maintaining, against Molina, that it is a matter of faith after the definition.

In contrast, Suárez has been innovative in two respects: a) in not considering as virtual properly speaking anything but the non-implicit or physical-connective virtual, really distinct from the formal and absolutely separable from it; b) in considering as formal, although with the qualifier of confused, the implicit or essential virtual, that is, all conclusions really identical with the revealed premise, although conceptually distinct from it.

Thus, in Suárez's theory the division between formally revealed and virtually revealed is nominally preserved, which are the two specific objects of faith and theology. But under the new label of confused Suárez has furtively transferred to the department of the formally revealed or of divine faith all implicit virtuality, that is, all theology strictly speaking; for, as is evident and as we shall see in the following sections, no rigorous theological conclusion is possible, just as no rigorous metaphysical or mathematical conclusion is possible, except through that implicit or essential virtuality.

76. GRAVITY OF SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION.—To understand the immense significance of this innovation of Suárez, it suffices to reflect on three things.

1.ª That implicit virtuality, in order to be deduced or explained by our weak human reason, always requires reasoning of its own, and frequently complicated and profound, as is seen in the mathematical or metaphysical sciences. Now then: to qualify such virtuality as formal or immediate, making it in itself of divine faith, is to overturn completely the whole doctrine of St. Thomas, who excludes from the domain of divine faith, which is simple understanding, everything that our reason cannot know without reasoning of its own.

2nd. That the implicit virtuality encompasses all conclusions really identical and objectively homogeneous with the revealed premise or deposit of faith. Therefore, to exclude that virtuality from the properly theological domain, in order to transfer it to that of faith, is to leave theology without any homogeneity or objective continuity with the revealed deposit, opening a hiatus or objective abyss between the dogmatic material and the properly theological material.

3rd. That the implicit virtuality, because it is based on a

real identity and the inability to fail without the very principle of contradiction failing is the only thing that can give reasoning or conclusion an absolutely certain certainty, which not even God himself can cause to fail. Therefore, to remove that virtual from theology is to leave theology properly so-called without absolute certainty, with a certainty inferior to metaphysical or mathematical certainty, with only the certainty of the absolutely fallible and contingent physical sciences (37).

III.—THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION

77. This innovation of Suárez gave rise to an interesting historical-theological episode of incalculable consequences for the question of dogmatic progress, and one which, as far as we know, has not been noticed until now. Three first-rate theologians took part in it: Suárez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses.

Before Suárez, no renowned theologian, with the sole exception of Molina, had denied the definability of faith of what traditional theology called virtual revelation. Consequently, none had denied the definability of faith of the third and fourth degrees of Catholic doctrine. Understanding, as they did, by virtual the inclusive virtuality, its definability offered no difficulty, since such virtual is in itself or objectively identical with what is formally revealed. In defining it, therefore, as of divine faith, the Church thereby taught us nothing other than what was from the beginning objectively implicit in the revealed deposit.

On the contrary, since with Suárez's innovation the virtual came to be understood as something really distinct from the revealed premise, and therefore not objectively implicit in what is revealed, which is the same as saying not revealed, the problem of the definability of faith and the objective homogeneity of the last two degrees of Catholic doctrine found itself faced with an insoluble difficulty. In his determination to resolve it, Suárez resorts to an unheard-of and dangerous theory: the theory of new revelations. Lugo tries to correct Suárez's slip; but without correcting the starting point, he ends up in another theory, not so dangerous but no less untenable: the theory of indefinite or transforming assistance. Finally, the Salmanticenses realize that the knot, as Suárez and Lugo had left it, was insoluble; and being unable to untie it, because they had not noticed where the tangle lay, they cut it with the bold stroke of their famous nego maiorem, denying, like Molina and against all theological tradition, that the Church has ever defined or can define as of divine faith the revealed virtuality:

Since this episode has had serious consequences for all subsequent theology and we know of no one who has noticed it until now, we are going to describe it, briefly setting out: a) Suárez’s new revelations; b) Lugo’s transforming assistance; c) the famous I deny the major of the Salmanticenses.

A) First consequence: Suárez's new revelations

78. The laws of logic are all the more inflexible the greater the talent of the one who employs them, and once a wrong step is taken, especially in the definition or understanding of primordial notions, the final outcome is always absurd. “A small error in the beginning is great in the end,” St. Thomas had already warned. This is what happened to the great talent of Suárez because he misunderstood the concept of the virtually revealed, which is a most fundamental concept, upon which depend the other concepts of faith, theology, and dogmatic progress.

Indeed, with the new definition that he gave of the virtual revealed properly so-called, Suárez immediately found himself between a rock and a hard place, for he encountered these two propositions: a) the virtual revealed properly so-called comprises only truths really distinct from the revealed truths and, therefore, not revealed; b) the Church has defined as of divine faith truths virtually revealed or properly so-called theological conclusions.

The antinomy between these two propositions is too evident to have escaped a talent such as Suárez. If the virtual properly so-called is objectively distinct from the formal revealed, it cannot be implicitly revealed, and nothing that is not truly revealed, at least implicitly, can ever be defined as of divine faith, unless we suppose that the definition of the Church is a new revelation that makes revealed what before the definition was not revealed. To admit new revelations is something unheard of in Catholic theology, and so far was Suárez from ignoring this that he frequently repeats it in various parts of his works.

However, Suárez rightly saw that there was no other means than that, if one wanted to harmonize the two aforementioned propositions; and of those two propositions, the first was Suárez’s personal doctrine on the virtual revealed, and the second was an undeniable fact of the history of dogmas. What to do? Must we deny the evident facts of history because they oppose certain theories, or should the theories be modified, insofar as necessary, to adjust them to the reality of History?

Suárez does not hesitate, and softening the phrases as much as he can, for he feels the extremely delicate and grave nature of his position, he resolutely affirms that the definition of the Church is a new divine testimony, a new revelation. God, he says, speaks to us anew in every definition of the Church; the testimony that He gives us of a truth through the Church has the same value as that which He gave us through the Apostles or prophets, and therefore amounts to a true revelation. Thus, what was not revealed before the definition becomes revealed through the definition, and is consequently of divine faith. Let us hear the words of Suárez himself:

"The reason, indeed, is that what the Church defines, God testifies through the Church. But the Church defines such a truth (that is, the virtual objectively distinct) in itself and formally: therefore by that very fact it is sufficiently constituted under the formal object of faith. For divine testimony is the same and equally certain, whether it is given through itself, or through the Church or another minister... Therefore it is a sign that the Church has proximate and immediate infallibility, from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is equivalent to revelation, or, so to speak, perfects it"¹⁷

Although Suárez's thought is quite clear from the whole context, it will not be superfluous to cite the testimony of two illustrious theologians, both of Suárezian affiliation: "Therefore, so that it may be believed afterwards as a matter of faith, it is necessary that it be revealed anew by God, and this will happen through the Church's definition, as Suárez held"¹⁸. "Suárez teaches that the theological conclusion is a matter of faith, because he thinks that in that case the Church's definition is a new revelation"¹⁹.

After the Vatican Council, this opinion of Suárez can no longer be maintained. Rightly, Cardinal Mazella, without naming its author, calls it intolerable: It can no longer be tolerated²⁰. Behold to what a false conception of the properly so-called revealed virtuality led a theologian of Suárez's stature"²¹

B) Second consequence: Lugo's indefinite assistance

79. Cardinal Lugo's treatise On Faith is neither less extensive nor less profound than that of Suárez. Lugo treats the question of revealed virtuality, the basis of dogmatic evolution, in the first disputation, thirteenth section, which bears the title: “The difference between the habit of faith and the habit of theology is inferred from what has been said.” Lugo divides the section into three paragraphs, the first of which is entitled “On the conclusion deduced from one premise of faith and another naturally evident”²².

Following Suárez and the entire Thomistic tradition, Lugo begins by subdividing the question into two further questions: a) the theological conclusion before the Church's definition²³; b) the theological conclusion after its definition²⁴. With regard to the first question, Lugo recounts the two completely opposed opinions that we already know: the opinion of Vázquez and Vega, which affirms that it is of faith in itself or without definition, and the opinion of St. Thomas and his school, which affirms that in itself or without definition it is not of faith, but purely theological²⁵.

Before deciding in favor of one of these two opinions, Lugo

According to St. Thomas, no private revelation can ever become a matter of Catholic faith. “Our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not upon any revelation made to other teachers” (Summary of Theology, pt. 1, q. 1, art. 8, reply to objection 2). If the Church ever approves such revelations, that approval requires of us only a pious or human faith. “It must be known that this approval is nothing else than a permission for them to be published for the instruction and benefit of the faithful after mature examination; inasmuch as to such revelations thus approved, although the assent of Catholic faith is neither due nor can be given, yet the assent of human faith is due, according to the rules of prudence, according to which, namely, such revelations are probable and piously credible” (BENEDICT XIV, On the Beatification of the Servants of God, bk. 2, ch. 32, no. 11).

Various ancient theologians, even Thomists, sometimes call the definitions of the Church revelation. But since they expressly say that such definitions extend only to explaining more fully what was already truly implicit in the revealed deposit, they understand by revelation what today we call—and should call, in order to avoid confusion—mere divine assistance. In this sense of the ancient theologians, Valencia says: “However, whether that new assertion or clearer proposition of the Church, because it is infallible through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who likewise assisted the canonical writers, is to be called new revelation, or because it does not contain a new truth unknown to the Apostles, is not to be so called, is a question of name (GREGORY OF VALENCIA. On Faith, d. 1, q. 1, point 6, vol. 3, p. 128).”

Suárez is not censurable, then, precisely for having used the name new revelation, but for having used it with regard to things that he himself confesses were not implicitly contained in the revealed deposit. In this sense Cardinal Mazella is right in saying that it can no longer be tolerated.

He explains the notions of formal and virtual revealed truth in exactly the same way as Suárez. For Lugo, every conclusion really identical, though conceptually distinct, with the revealed deposit is formal, albeit confused, revealed truth. The properly virtual revealed truth embraces only conclusions that are really distinct and absolutely separable by divine power²⁶. Having made this distinction, Lugo maintains with Suárez and the whole Thomistic school that the virtual is not of faith in itself or before definition²⁷, and he answers several objections against that doctrine²⁸.

It remains for Lugo to resolve the second question, which is the most important, namely, whether what is virtually revealed is a matter of faith after the definition. Lugo recounts the negative opinion of Molina and the theory of new revelations that Suárez has employed to support the affirmative opinion. The learned cardinal rejects both as contrary to the whole theological tradition. Against Molina he establishes that what is virtually revealed is truly of divine faith after the definition, and this—he says—is the common opinion of theologians and the constant practice of the Church. “Which, beyond the arguments adduced by Suárez, is confirmed by the practice and usage of all.” Against Suárez he also establishes that, in order to define the revealed virtuality, the Church neither has nor needs new revelations, and that this too is the common sentiment of theologians. “For here seems to be the common sense of theologians”²⁹.

Up to this point the path has been easy for Lugo, but upon arriving here he found, as he was bound to find, the same Gordian knot that Suárez had found. Lugo has just admitted, with Suárez and with the whole tradition against Molina, the definability as a matter of faith of what is virtual. Lugo has understood the virtual as revealed in the same sense as Suárez, that is, as the virtual objectively distinct from what is formally revealed, and therefore not revealed. Finally, he has rejected, with all the theologians, Suárez’s theory of new revelations, which was the only thing by which the difficulty seemed capable of being resolved. How is Lugo going to resolve it? How can something virtual that is not revealed be defined as a matter of faith, and therefore as revealed, if the theory of new revelations is rejected?

If it were a question of an implicit virtual, and therefore revealed, such as that which Suárez and Lugo have qualified as formally confused, its definability would offer no difficulty whatsoever³⁰.

Nor would there be one—adds Lugo—if it were a conclusion deduced from two premises of faith³¹. But it is not a question of that, but of a virtual, the so-called virtual in the proper sense, which evidently is not revealed. That such a virtual is not revealed had already been established by Lugo³² with these beautiful and convincing words, on which the Salmanticenses later relied: «However much revelation and the revealed object may be explained, the object of the conclusion will never be found to have been said by God». Now then: if such a virtual is not truly said by God, which is the same as not being revealed, how can it be defined by the Church as of divine faith, that is, as revealed, without a new revelation?

This is where Lugo gave a very clear demonstration of the skillful flexibility of his wit. Here is his curious solution. It is true—says Lugo—that such a virtual truth is not truly revealed. But it is no less true that the assistance of the Holy Spirit in all definitions of the Church is revealed, and therefore in each one of them. Hence, after the definition of such a virtual truth by the Church, we already have two revealed propositions, namely: a) the Holy Spirit assists the Church in all definitions; b) the Holy Spirit assists the Church in this definition of such a virtual truth. Thus, such a virtual truth, once defined, is deduced not from one premise of faith and another of reason alone, as it was deduced before the definition, but is now deduced from two premises of faith, and therefore is of faith. Let us copy from the literal text of Lugo:

«God could have testified not to the things themselves but only to His assistance, so as not to permit the Church to be deceived by proposing something false; and from this revealed assistance of God we infer that this object proposed by the Church is true: not because God has explicitly revealed this object, but because its truth follows from the revealed assistance of God. It follows, however, not from one revealed proposition together with another unrevealed one, but from two revealed propositions, namely from these: “what the Church proposes and defines cannot be false, with the Holy Spirit assisting her so that she may not err,” and again, “the Holy Spirit assists the Church when she defines that Christ is capable of laughter.” Of these propositions, the first is a matter of faith... the second is also a matter of faith because... (the first proposition) is universal and contains all particular cases, and therefore this one as well... Furthermore, that a proposition which follows from two revealed propositions is also a matter of faith is to be seen in the following points»³³.

Suárez had said: “Such a virtual, unrevealed [thing] is a matter of faith.”

after the definition, because the definition of the Church is a new 'revelation.' Lugo says: "Such an unrevealed virtual truth is of faith after the definition, because the assistance of the Holy Spirit to define it is revealed."

As can be seen, Lugo takes for granted the very thing he had to prove, namely, that the Church can define such a virtual. As we shall see in due time, such a virtual cannot be defined by the Church either as a matter of faith or as infallible. With this theory of Lugo one could equally prove that the Church can infallibly define the number of stars in the sky or the number of drops of water in the sea. Rightly too, Cardinal Mazella, referring to this theory of Lugo, though without naming him, said the following: "Therefore the Church will be able to define whatever it pleases, prescinding from other objects contained in the revelation handed down by the Apostles, and attending only to the promise of assistance that it may not err."³⁴

In these two theories of Suárez and de Lugo the problem of the homogeneity of the evolution of dogma would offer no difficulty whatsoever. However great the apparent changes in doctrine, however deep the hiatus or discontinuity between the primitive datum and subsequent developments, one easily escaped the difficulty by appealing to new revelations with Suárez or to the unlimited and transforming assistance with Lugo. That is where a bad definition or conception of the revealed virtuality properly so-called can lead, even to theologians as eminent as Suárez and Lugo.

C) Third consequence: a famous "I deny the major" from the Salmanticenses

80. Following Lugo and Suárez came the renowned Salmanticenses theologians, and with them the question of the definability, as of divine faith, of the virtual proper, understood in the manner of Suárez and Lugo, ended in lamentable tragedy.

The Salmanticenses treat the question of virtual revelation in Question IV of the first disputation of their notable treatise On Faith, from numbers 124 to 133³⁵.

By virtual revelation properly so-called, the Salmanticenses understand, with all theologians, what is deduced from the revealed deposit as an effect of its cause. But, in the style of Suárez and de Lugo, they understand by cause the natural or physical cause, which is always really distinct from its effect. Consequently, they only regard as virtual revelation

that which is really distinct from the revealed deposit and, therefore, not revealed; with which it is extremely easy for them to establish and prove with numerous reasons the following conclusion: “Thirdly, it must be said that the virtual revelation of some truth in its adequate or inadequate cause—as, for example, that Christ is visible was revealed in the proposition ‘He was made man’—does not suffice for the formal reason under which the habit of faith assents, and therefore the aforesaid truth is not of faith, but a theological conclusion”³⁶. The proofs continue up to number 134; but before finishing them, they warn us that in that cited conclusion they have spoken of the natural cause or in being. “It is answered by denying the major premise concerning the natural cause, whether in being and appearing, of which we have spoken in our third conclusion”³⁷.

Once the causality or revealed virtuality is understood in the sense of Suárez and Lugo, the Salmanticenses had to meet with the same difficulty with which they themselves had met, namely, with the fact that the Church has defined as of divine faith truths that are virtually revealed. That difficulty is all the more serious in that the fact clearly results from the history of dogmas and is admitted without any exception by all theologians before Molina.

The Salmanticenses are aware of it, as Suárez and Lugo had been, and they set it before themselves in the form of an objection, whose major premise is the following: “The Church often defines as matters of faith to be believed several truths that are not formally revealed in Sacred Scripture, but are legitimately deduced from what is made known therein, together with other natural principles”³⁸

To respond to that major premise, which is the basis of the objection, the Salmanticenses cite and reject the Suarezian theory of new revelations as contrary to the truth and to all theological tradition³⁹. They then cite and also reject Lugo’s theory of indefinite and transforming assistance as contradictory and worthless⁴⁰.

Once those two solutions of Suárez and Lugo are rejected, the Salmanticenses realize that it is futile to attempt any new solution. The virtually revealed, as the Salmanticenses together with Suárez and Lugo understand it, is a virtual that is not revealed either explicitly or implicitly, and what is not revealed can never be defined as a matter of faith. Now then: since what the Church cannot do must be supposed from the outset that it has never done, the Salmanticenses cut the Gordian knot with one bold stroke and, with a solemn I deny the major, make a clean sweep of history, denying that the Church has ever defined anything virtually revealed, any theological conclusion properly so-called. Here are their words:

— «Hence, having omitted this and other solutions, we respond to the argument, by denying the major. For the Church never defines as a dogma of faith that which is not presupposed to its definition as formally revealed in Sacred Scripture, at least confusedly (therein is indicated the mind of the Salmanticenses: the confused formal of Suárez) and implicitly... But that which only is included in a revealed proposition as an effect in its cause (the pure virtual or physical-connective of Suárez and Lugo), since it is not said and attested by the Holy Spirit, cannot be defined by the Church as a dogma of faith»⁴¹

Never had any theologian before Molina, whether of the Thomist school or of any other school, dared to hurl that I deny the major of the Salmanticenses, which is a complete denial of everything that the history of dogmas teaches and that the opinion of theologians unanimously admits up to the end of the sixteenth century. And yet, it must be confessed that the Salmanticenses are in this more logical than Suárez and Lugo. Once the non-implicit virtuality is understood as revealed virtuality, as Suárez and Lugo understand it, it is impossible to admit that the virtual is definable as an article of faith; and the Salmanticenses do well to deny it. But if the Salmanticenses showed more logic in this than Suárez and Lugo, Suárez and Lugo showed much more historical sense than the Salmanticenses⁴²

However, in principle, there is no human principle—however universal—that has no exception in particular cases; Homer himself is not so vigilant as never to sleep. Incomparably greater than the authority of the Salamancans is that of the Prince of Commentators, the Cardinal.

IV.—SUMMARY: TWO HISTORICAL DATES AND WHERE THE CONFUSION LIES

81. In the history of theology, as in the history of other sciences, there are facts that form an epoch by being the starting point of a new orientation, good or bad, but on which subsequent developments depend. Now then: in the capital problem of the definability as a matter of faith of the revealed virtuality, which is none other than the problem of the development of dogma, there are two historical epochs marked by two names equally illustrious: Suárez and the Salmanticenses.

Up to Suárez, all the great theologians, with the exception of Molina, had defended or taken for granted as indisputable truth the de fide definability of the virtual. For traditional theology the following equation was evident:

Virtually revealed = definable as a matter of faith.

The only question on which the theologians differed was whether the revealed virtual was a matter of faith before or after the definition. The former was affirmed by Vázquez and Vega and by all those theologians of more or less nominalist affiliation who did not distinguish between the habits of faith and of theology. The latter was affirmed by the Thomists and by all who know how to distinguish between theology and faith. But all were unanimous in defending the definability of the revealed virtual, for by revealed virtual they understood a virtual implicitly, but really and objectively, revealed.

Then comes Suárez, and with the new notion that he gives of the virtual revealed, and which Lugo later accepts, he completely modifies the first member of the equation, for he understands by virtual revealed a virtual that is not implicit, and therefore not revealed, although it continues under the name of revealed.

In every equation, once one of the mem-

Cardinal Cajetan. And a Thomist as conservative and moderate as the learned Father Norberto del Prado does not hesitate to write about him, with regard to the interpretation of a particular point in St. Thomas: "Cajetan, however, like good Homer who sometimes nods, certainly nodded in the interpretation of the corollary that St. Thomas placed at the end of the article" (St. Thomas and the dogmatic bull "Ineffable God" [Fribourg, Switzerland, 1919], p. 196).

Finally, notwithstanding the authority of John of St. Thomas, which is not inferior to that of the Salamanca theologians, a Thomist through and through such as Fr. Santiago Ramírez, O.P., wrote, last year, these words so expressive and ingenious that every Thomist ought to treasure in his heart: "It remains to be seen whether, in John of St. Thomas, everything is from St. Thomas, or whether there is also something of John!" (Thomistic Science, March 1922, p. 183).

The act of criticizing a theologian—however great he may be—on a particular point does not in the least diminish his authority. So that the other schools may be persuaded of the impartiality of the criticisms we direct at one of their theologians—even those as illustrious as Scotus, Suárez, and Lugo—the best means is not to avoid the criticisms, or to disguise them under euphemisms because they are our own theologians, be they called John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, or Billuart.

brothers, the other cannot remain identical. But since the second member is supported by the whole theological tradition and by evident facts in the history of dogmas, Suárez and Lugo, with an excellent traditional spirit, strive to keep it intact, even having to resort for that purpose to theories as singular as that of new revelations and transforming assistance. With Suárez and Lugo, the traditional equation thus becomes converted into the following:

Virtual (not) revealed = definable as a matter of faith.

The word no, placed in parentheses, indicates that Suárez and Lugo still continue to give it the name of revealed, even though, according to the notion they give of it, it is not revealed.

The Salmanticenses come, and with them the traditional equation enters a new phase. These most learned Thomist theologians, who never forgive Suárez and Lugo any lapse, at once perceive the incoherence of that equation of Suárez and Lugo. But the manifest falsity of the theories of new revelations and transforming assistance which Suárez and Lugo have placed in the second member of the equation as props to support it draws all the attention of the Salmanticenses toward that second member; and this makes them fail to notice that the origin of the evil comes to that equation not from the second member, but from the first. Thus, with a solemn I deny the major premise, they correct the defects of the second member, hardly taking notice of the first, and the equation is thereby formulated in this way:

Virtual (not) revealed = not definable as a matter of faith.

As can be seen, the transformation of the traditional equation is complete. The two members, which were positive, have become negative. The first no was surreptitiously introduced by Suárez with his new notion of the virtual. The second no was the fruit of the inexorable logic of the Salmanticenses.

Modern theological writers, in their treatises on faith or theology, almost all depend on one of these three great theologians, as will be noticed at once by looking at their citations. The only difference among them is that, if they are not rigorous Thomists, they usually cite Suárez and Lugo preferably, and if they are, the Salmanticenses. Since these three theologians agree in understanding by "virtually revealed" a virtual that is not implicit and, therefore, not revealed; that is the notion of the virtual that the majority of modern authors give. And since to defend the definability of such a virtual one would have to resort to the inadmissible theories of

Suárez and Lugo, and almost all of them, agree with the Salmanticenses in denying the definability of what they call virtual revealed.

As for all the other theological conclusions—that is, the conceptual or really-identical conclusions—almost everyone, following Suárez and Lugo, conceals them under the name of confused formal, implicit formal, or virtual really-identical, and makes them not only definable as matters of faith, but as faith in itself or without definition.

This is what has confused certain apologists who have wanted to defend the homogeneous evolution of dogma or the homogeneity of the third and fourth degree of Catholic doctrine. They have seen that that third and fourth degree were evidently of revealed virtuality. They have also seen that almost all modern theologians seem to deny the definability of the virtual. From this they have concluded that it was not possible to defend dogmatic evolution without going against the almost common opinion of theologians. All because they fail to notice that in the formulas of formal and virtual, used since Suárez, there is frequently hidden a confusion that makes it appear that what is ultimately admitted is denied ⁴³

The difficulty on this question lies in two things: a) in that many reserve the traditional name of virtual revealed to signify only a non-implicit virtual, which is neither virtual revealed nor virtual theological, but virtual physical, incapable of being the object of true theological certainty or of the infallibility of the Church, as we shall see in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter; b) in that under the name of confused formal they have concealed and still conceal all that is truly and rigorously virtual revealed and theological.

From this there have resulted among modern theological writers two curious phenomena: a) that when they deny the definability of the virtual or theological conclusion, they deny only the definability of the Suarezian virtual or non-inclusive conclusion; b) that when they affirm the definability as a matter of faith of the confused formal or real-identical virtual, they affirm the definability as a matter of faith of the true revealed virtual and the homogeneous evolution of dogma by way of true implicit or conceptual virtuality.

82. CONFIRMATION.—To confirm this, we will cite two modern theologians, chosen from among the many we could cite. First, the learned Cardinal Mazella: “If the question concerns a truth that is implicitly contained in another explicitly revealed truth, with which it is nevertheless identical only really, not formally, Ripalda, the Würzburg theologians, and others hold that it is not revealed; De Lugo, Suárez, etc., however, teach the contrary. And this opinion seems to be the one to subscribe to... But if the question concerns an object that is said to be contained in another explicitly revealed object, insofar as it is only connected with it or follows from it (this they call a properly virtual comprehension), even Suárez, De Lugo, etc., deny that it is in itself spoken by God and believable by divine faith ... I would nevertheless employ here a distinction that seems also to be in accordance with the mind of those Doctors: for if the implicit object follows upon the explicitly revealed truth in such a way that in no hypothesis can it be separated from it, and this becomes known without a new revelation, I would say that it is revealed: for otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object could in no way stand; or it can be separated from it, at least by the absolute power of God, and then the opinion of Suárez, De Lugo, etc., returns, concerning which we will say immediately what we think. Thus our doctrine is established. Proposition XVII: That which is formally and implicitly contained in some explicitly revealed truth is in itself a material object of faith; but that which is contained in it only virtually, inasmuch as, although necessarily connected with it, it is nevertheless distinguished from it both really and formally, indeed can be separated by divine power, does not seem to belong as such to the object of faith.”⁴⁴.

Secondly, another wise theologian, Fr. Sola: “Thesis 76: A truth formally implicitly contained in what is explicitly revealed belongs, in itself, to the material object of faith. The same is more probably to be said of those things which are contained in the explicitly revealed [truth] materially and identically, or essentially connectedly, but not formally. Censure: the first part, that is, that a truth formally contained in what is explicitly revealed is, in itself, the material object of faith, or truly and really revealed, is certain and common against Arriaga... The second part is in reality most common and much more probable, at least if the real identity of both can be certainly known by us without a new revelation. Among the older [authors] Suárez and Lugo hold it... and the more recent [authors] commonly, against Ripalda, the Würzburgers, and others... Thesis 77: Things which are contained only virtually in what is explicitly revealed are not, in themselves, the material object of faith” ⁴⁵

Although expressed in different terms, this doctrine of Cardinal Mazella and Father Sola is found in most theologians after Suárez and Lugo. Anyone who reads them attentively will immediately observe that when they deny the definability of the virtual revealed or theological conclusion, they understand by virtual the false virtual of the fourth type; and when they admit the definability of the formal revealed or affirm that only the formal, or identical, or essential revealed can be defined, they understand by formal, or identical, or essential, the true virtual of the other five types (45-46).

Whatever opinion one follows on this point of the definability of the virtual revelation, it will be impossible to interpret the true thought of theologians after the sixteenth century, unless one clearly distinguishes between the false virtual of the fourth type—introduced into theology after Suárez—and the five remaining types of true virtual revelation.