La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

50. TWO KINDS OF CAUSES.—There are two kinds of essentially distinct causes, namely: a) causes really identical with their effects and distinguished from them only conceptually; b) causes really distinct from their effects.

Examples of the former we have in absolute immutability with respect to eternity, or in immateriality with respect to cognoscibility, or in spirituality with respect to immortality. Absolute immutability is called and is the cause of eternity, because the latter follows from the former, and the former is the reason for being of the latter. And yet they are not really distinct, but two aspects of the same thing. The same happens in the other two examples given and in infinite ones that could be given.

Examples of the second kind we have in fire with respect to the effect of burning, or in the gravity of the stone with respect to its effect of falling, or in the debt or cause of original sin with respect to the act of contracting guilt. Between fire and the burn, or between the gravity of the stone and its fall, or between the debt and original guilt, there is not only virtual causality or reason for being, but also a real distinction.

The first kind of causes are called metaphysical, or virtual, or in knowing causes; the second, physical, or real, or in being causes.

In the former, the cause contains in itself really not only the power of producing the effect, but the effect itself. Thus, in absolute immutability, eternity is really contained, and not merely the power of producing it. If we distinguish between immutability and eternity, or between immateriality and cognoscibility, or between spirituality and immortality, this is a distinction not real or objective, but our or subjective, for it is only a distinction of concepts or aspects, although grounded in the object itself.

In secondary causes, the cause truly contains the power to produce the effect, but it does not contain the effect itself. Fire contains the power to burn, but not the very act of burning, which is a thing really distinct from it and even entirely separable from it. It is a distinction not subjective or ours, but objective, or of the object itself.

51. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—The progress or reasoning from the virtual or metaphysical cause to its effects evidently belongs to the second degree of the scale, or implicit virtual. It does not belong to the first, because its distinction is not merely nominal, but conceptual. Not to the third, because between the metaphysical cause and its effects there is no real or objective distinction, but subjective or of aspects.

On the other hand, the progress or passage from the physical or real cause to its effects clearly belongs to the third degree of the scale for the contrary reason. It is virtual, purely connective, without objective inclusion or implicitness.

52. FIRST COROLLARY.—Of the definition deductio effectus ex causa we must say exactly the same as we said (49) of the definition deductio proprietatis ex essentia. It is an ambiguous definition. If in that definition by cause is meant the metaphysical or virtual cause or in cognoscendo, such a conclusion was already objectively implicit in the starting point. If by cause is meant the physical or real cause or in essendo, the conclusion is not implicit but purely connective. The reason for this is that the physical cause contains the virtue of producing the effect, but does not contain the effect itself. On the other hand, the metaphysical cause contains the effect itself and not merely the virtue of causing it.

53. CONFIRMATORY TEXTS.—Although what has been said seems quite clear to us, we shall cite some texts in confirmation of it, above all so that the distinction between the physical cause and the metaphysical cause may be well understood.

Let us hear the Ferrariense:

"Ad huius evidentiam considerandum est quod dupliciter loqui possumus, de demonstratione a priori (seu per causam): Uno modo, de ea cuius medium est vere et realiter causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum de quo demonstratur. Alio modo, de ea cuius medium non est vere et realiter causa, sed est tantum medium secundum rationem... Dicitur ergo primo: quod de Deo (theological sciences) nullo modo potest esse demonstratio primo modo accepta, cum in Deo nihil sit vere causatum... Dicitur secundo, quod utique neque entis neque generum generalissimorum (metaphysical sciences) est demonstratio isto modo, propter eamdem rationem. Dicitur tertio, quod non sequitur metaphysicam et mathematicam non esse scientias, quia licet per primum genus demonstrationis non possit aliquid de ente et generalissimis generibus demonstrari, potest tamen de ipsis aliquid demonstrari per secundum modum" ¹

Let us hear John of St. Thomas and Cardinal Cajetan: “It is answered that for a demonstration it is not required that it always proceed from a cause that is a cause formally and physically; but it suffices that it be so virtually and metaphysically, so that one stands as the reason of the other, even if it is not causing it, just as immutability is the reason of eternity and the perfection of goodness” ². “Hence, speaking in formal language, it is not incongruously said that immutability is the cause of eternity, and immateriality of immortality, and so on” ³.