La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

42. TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCLUSION.—The classical formula with which Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy defines the scientific conclusion properly speaking, and therefore the proper and rigorous theological conclusion, is the following: Deduction of property from essence, or effect from cause.

Upon the true or false understanding of that definition depends, then, the true or false idea about the nature of evolution made by way of scientific or theological conclusion.

In this section we will study the nature of the passage from essence to its properties, and in the next, the nature of the passage from cause to its effects.

43. THREE SENSES OF THE WORD “ESSENCE”.—The essence of any thing can be taken in three very different senses, namely: a) pure essence or in the abstract; b) integral essence or in a connatural state; c) completely perfect essence.

The pure or abstract essence implies only the essential predicates. The integral or connatural essence embraces, in addition, all connatural predicates or integral parts that the essence requires to have according to the laws of nature. Finally, the completely perfect essence also comprises all the accidental perfections of which such an essence is capable.

Thus, he who has the essential predicates of “animal” and “rational,” or of “rational soul” and “body,” already has the pure or true essence of man, even if he lacks this or that member or faculty; for example, even if he is lame or maimed, deaf or blind. He who has not only the essential predicates, but also all the integral parts, already has the whole or connatural essence, although he may lack accidental or acquirable perfections, for example, although he lacks knowledge or virtue. He who has all perfections without exception, that is, both the essential, the connatural, and the acquirable ones, has the completely perfect essence.

We beg the reader never to forget those three states of essence if he does not wish to become entangled in the question of the evolution of dogma. These three senses of essence are not only distinct, but are perfectly stepped or graded among themselves. The third includes the second, and the second the first. Therefore the first is implicit in the second, and the second in the third, but the third is not implicit in the second, nor the second in the first.

Thus, when God reveals to us that “N. is man,” he could have done so in three distinct senses, namely: a) essential or true man; b) integral or connatural man; c) completely perfect man. Since explicit divine revelation is the starting point of every conclusion or progress according to each of these three senses, the conclusions that may be deduced implicitly or in the same sense will be very different; and therefore their homogeneity or heterogeneity with the starting point or revealed datum will also be very different.

The same thing that we have said of the word “man,” there is

what can be said about any other predicate contained in divine revelation.

44. TWO SENSES OF THE WORD "PROPERTY".—There are two completely distinct kinds of properties: a) essential properties, which are also usually called metaphysical, "aptitudinal" or radical; b) accidental properties, which also receive the names physical, actual or formal.

The first are truly identical with the essence, and not even by divine power can the essence exist without them. The second are really distinct from the essence, and without them the essence of a thing can be preserved absolutely.

These two kinds of properties are easy to distinguish. One thing, for example, is the aptitudinal inherence of an accident in its subject, which exists even in the Eucharistic accidents, and another is actual inherence. One thing is the radical capacity to see, which exists even in the blind man and not in a stone, and another is the actual capacity, which both the blind man and the stone lack. One thing is radical risibility, which is preserved even in one whose facial muscles are all paralyzed, and another is actual risibility. One thing is radical peccability, which every pure creature possesses, and another is actual peccability, which the Blessed Virgin did not possess. One thing is the radical capacity to die, which existed even in the state of innocence, and exists in Elijah and Enoch, and another is actual death. One thing is the requirement to burn, which existed in the fire itself of the Babylonian furnace, and another is actually burning.

And thus infinite examples could be given. Precisely in the distinction between radical or metaphysical properties and actual or physical properties is founded the possibility of the miracle or of the supernatural order as regards efficient causality. God cannot suspend metaphysical properties, since they are essential; but He can suspend physical properties, because they are accidental¹.

45. SIX TYPES OF REASONING OR PASSAGE FROM ESSENCE TO PROPERTY.—Since, then, the word essence has three different senses and the word property two, there are six (3 X 2 = 6) combinations: three from combining the three senses of essence with the first sense of property, and another three from combining those same three senses of essence with the second sense of property.

Thus, if we take as the type of essence the essence of man (essential or true man—connatural or integral man—perfect man) and as the type of property risibility (radical risibility—actual risibility), the following six types of reasoning between essence and property result:

First type: reasoning from pure essence to radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a true man): therefore he is radically laughable.

Second type: reasoning from the connatural or integral essence to the radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a whole man): therefore he is radically risible.

Third type: reasoning from the completely perfect essence to the radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a perfect man): therefore he is radically laughable.

Tipo cuarto: raciocinio de la esencia pura a la propiedad actual; v. gr.: N. es hombre (hombre verdadero): luego es actualmente risible.

Fifth type: reasoning from the complete essence to the actual property; e.g.: N. is a man (a complete man): therefore he has actual risibility.

Sixth type: reasoning from the perfect essence to the actual property; e.g.: N. is a man (a perfect man): therefore he has actual risibility.

It is evident that no more types of reasoning about the essence of property are possible than those six, and that any other type reduces to one of them.

46. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—Of these reasonings, the six are a true passage from essence to property, and therefore the six are proper reasonings. None, then, of them belongs to the first degree of the scale.

All of these, except the fourth, are reasonings of inclusion or implicitness. They belong, therefore, to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the virtual implicit. As for the first three²³, the matter is evident, for they are essential properties included in the essence itself. As for the fifth and sixth, it is no less evident, for although the actual properties or accidental perfections are not included in the concept of the pure essence, they are included in the concept of the integrity or perfection of the essence. For something to be "perfect," it is necessary that it have the form (essence) and the things that pre-exist, and the things that follow (the properties) from it ⁴.

On the other hand, the fourth type is evidently reasoning of real distinction or accidental connection. It corresponds, therefore, to the third degree of the scale. It is the reasoning proper to the physical sciences.

In reality, all these six types of reasoning reduce to two: a) reasoning of real distinction or of pure connection without implication, and that is the fourth; b) reasoning of real identity or true implication, and those are the other five.

47. THE ATTRIBUTES IN GOD.—What in other beings are called properties, and which the ancients also called passions, receive in God the name of attributes. Now, between the divine essence and its attributes or between the different divine attributes the distinction is not real, but conceptual. Therefore, in the treatise On God the fourth type of reasoning does not apply. All progress, then, from the divine essence to its attributes or from one attribute to another belongs to the second degree of the scale, or virtual implicit.

48. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL RELATIONS.—Everything that has been said about the passage or progress from essence to its properties applies equally to the passage or progress from essence to the relations that this essence or starting point may have with other things, for it is the same for properties as for relations. "Properties are also said to be whatever can be predicated of another, whether they are negations or "habitudes" (relations) to other things. And many such things can be proved about God both from naturally known principles and from principles of faith." ⁵

The passage, then, from the starting point to any of its essential or aptitudinal relations belongs to the second degree of the scale, or implicit virtual. The passage to its accidental or actual relations belongs to the third degree, or purely connective virtual.

CONFIRMATION.—Among the many texts that we could add in confirmation of what we have been saying, we will choose the following three:

"Therefore, when that by which the nature of a thing is constituted—by which the nature itself is understood—has an order and dependence on something else, then it is clear that that nature cannot be understood without it: whether it be joined by that union by which a part is joined to the whole... or also joined in the manner by which form is joined to matter... or also separated in reality; just as a father cannot be understood without the concept of a son, although those relations are found in different things"⁶.

"For that inclusion is indeed called identical and essential when certain things are so related that one essentially includes the other, and conversely, as is clear in divine matters, where the divine essence essentially includes every attribute and, conversely, every attribute includes the divine essence itself; or when two things essentially agree in some third thing, as passions and affections do in being itself."⁷

There exist, on the contrary, relations, not accidental but essential, which are implied in a determinate essence or in one of its faculties. And the concept that expresses this essence expresses at the same time the relations it contains. Thus, being designates that which is related to existence, and this relation is included in the very nature of what exists... What we say of being in general and of its properties we can also say of all the analogous absolute perfections that common sense attributes to God, such as Intelligence, Wisdom, Providence, free Will, Love, Mercy, Justice"⁸.

49. COROLLARY.—The definition, then, of deductio proprietatis ex essentia, which is commonly given of the theological conclusion, as well as its classical example of Christ is a man, therefore he is capable of laughter, are ambiguous and admit of two radically different senses.

If by man is understood the pure essence of man and by risible the actual risibility, then such a conclusion is of the fourth type, and it is not an implicit conclusion, but purely connective, and it belongs to the third degree of the scale.

But if by “risible” is meant radical risibility (types one, two, and three); or even if actual risibility is meant, if by “man” is meant integral or perfect man (types five and six), the conclusion is implicit in the principle and belongs to the second degree of the scale.

To understand, then, the true mind of a theologian,

It is not sufficient to focus on whether he uses that definition and that example or not, but rather one must focus primarily on which of those two senses he uses them.