La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

22. EVOLUTION AND DISTINCTION.—As we have already seen, evolution or progress, in general, is the same as increase of something that already existed. There can be no increase without the acquisition of something new. Now, since nothing is new except insofar as it is distinct from what already existed, it follows that, according to the degrees of distinction between the newly acquired and the old that was already possessed, so will be the degrees of evolution or progress.

23. THREE DEGREES OR KINDS OF DISTINCTION.—Every distinction either exists in the object itself prior to any operation of the subject, or is made by the subject without existing in the object. The first is called objective or real distinction; the second, subjective or rational distinction. In turn, the subject can make the distinction with a foundation in the object or without a foundation in it. The first is called a distinction of reasoned reason, and the second, a distinction of reasoning reason. Hence the three degrees or species of distinction that everyone knows: a) real or objective distinction; b) distinction of reasoned reason, which is also called virtual or conceptual distinction; c) distinction of reasoning reason, which also receives the name logical or nominal distinction. The first is a distinction of real objectivity; the second is only a distinction of aspects or partial concepts within the same and unique objectivity; the third is a pure distinction of names or formulas not only within the same and unique objectivity, but also within the same and unique concept or aspect of that objectivity. The first is purely objective, and completely independent of the subject. The second is subjective, although with a foundation in the object. The third is also subjective, but so purely subjective that it has no foundation at all in the object and is a pure product of the subject¹

The third distinction is a distinction improperly so called, since it is purely nominal, and teaches us nothing new about the object. The second and the first are proper distinctions, since both supply us with some new knowledge. The second supplies us with new aspects or partial concepts of the same object, and the first with a new objectivity or reality.

As an example of nominal distinction we will point out that which exists between the concepts of man and rational animal. As an example of virtual distinction, the concepts of immateriality and intellectuality. As an example of objective-real distinction, the concepts of soul and body, or of accident and actual inherence in the subject.

In the nominal distinction, concepts or propositions are, not only really, but also logically or formally identical. In the real distinction, concepts or propositions are, not only logically or formally, but also really distinct; in the virtual distinction, concepts or propositions are logically or formally distinct, but really or objectively identical.

The reader may excuse our having dwelt on such elementary matters, for upon their correct understanding depends in large part the question of the nature—homogeneous or transformist—of all evolution.

24. THREE KINDS OF CONCLUSIONS AND REASONINGS.—Since, then, there are three kinds of distinction, there will also be correspondingly three kinds of conclusions, namely: a) nominal conclusions; b) conceptual conclusions; c) objective-real conclusions, according to what is between the conclusion and²

the principle from which it is deduced that there is nominal distinction, conceptual distinction, or real distinction.

There will, therefore, also be three classes of reasonings, namely: a) nominal reasonings; b) conceptual reasonings; c) real reasonings, according as their conclusions are nominal, conceptual, or real.

25. THREE CLASSES OF VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE.— Since “virtual or mediate” is the same as “conclusion,” there will also be three classes of virtual or mediate, corresponding exactly to the three classes of conclusions, namely: a) nominal virtual or mediate; b) conceptual virtual or mediate; c) objective-real virtual or mediate.

26. THREE KINDS OF PROGRESS OR EVOLUTION.—According to those three kinds of distinction, of reasoning, of conclusion, or of virtuality, there are correlatively three kinds of progress or evolution, namely:

1st Nominal progress or evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another nominally distinct, e.g., the passage from "N. is a man" to "N. is a rational animal". It is progress of pure formulas, without progress of any new concept or aspect.

2. Progress or conceptual evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another conceptually distinct one, for example, the passage from "N. is spiritual" to "N. is immortal". It is progress, not only of formulas, but also of concepts or aspects virtually distinct from one another, but really and objectively identical to one another.

3rd Progress or objective-real evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another really distinct, e.g., "N. is an accident" to "N. has actual inherence in its subject". It is progress, not only of formulas, nor only of concepts or aspects, but also of objective reality, progress of substance or real objectivity.

The first progress is purely subjective progress, just as the nominal distinction on which it is founded is purely subjective. The second is also subjective, but founded in the object, as is the conceptual distinction. The third is purely objective, as is the real distinction (23).

27. PROPER AND IMPROPER DISCOURSE.—Of the three classes of reasoning of which we have spoken (24), the first reasoning, in which between the conclusion and the principle there is only a nominal distinction, is called and is improper reasoning. On the other hand, the second, in which there is a conceptual distinction, and the third, in which there is a real distinction, are called and are proper discourses.

The discourse of nominal distinction is called improper discourse because, although between the beginning and the conclusion there may be a diversity of names or formulas, there is only one concept or idea. There are, consequently, in it many oral acts, but a single intellectual act. Therefore, there is no true discourse, for discourse requires diverse intellectual acts.

By contrast, both the discourse of conceptual distinction and that of real distinction are proper discourses, because in them there is a multiplicity of realities or at least of concepts; and our intellect, unlike that of the angels, cannot grasp in a single act diverse realities or even diverse concepts. Therefore, when there is a distinction, whether conceptual or real, between the conclusion and the principle, the discourse is proper³.

28. OBSERVATION.—It is fitting, therefore, to distinguish well not only between proper and improper discourse, but also, and even much more, between the two kinds of proper discourse. Whoever confuses conceptual proper discourse with real proper discourse confuses the subject with the object and subjective evolution with objective; for, as we have seen, the conceptual distinction, although founded in the object, is formally subjective, whereas the real distinction is completely objective. On the other hand, both the conceptual distinction and the nominal or logical one are subjective, with no other difference than that of having or not having a foundation in the object.

For the question, then, of knowing whether this or that evolution of a doctrine is objective or subjective, it is much more serious to confuse the two kinds of proper discourse, one of which is objective and the other subjective, than to confuse proper conceptual discourse with improper discourse, which are both subjective. And yet, while all modern authors speak of the distinction between proper and improper discourse, there is scarcely one who speaks of the distinction between those two kinds of proper discourse.

29. PROPER AND IMPROPER VIRTUALITY.—Since there is one improper kind of reasoning and two proper kinds, there are correspondingly one improper virtuality, which is nominal virtuality, and two proper virtualities, which are conceptual virtuality and real virtuality.

The same caution we have given about properly distinguishing the two proper reasonings, the conceptual and the real, we give regarding properly distinguishing between the two proper virtualities. The reasons are exactly the same.

30. THE SCALE OF DOCTRINAL PROGRESS.—From what has been said, it is easy to form a true scale with which to measure and classify the different possible degrees of progress or evolution in the intellectual or doctrinal order. This scale consists of a starting point and three ascending and perfectly delineated degrees.

31. THE STARTING POINT is constituted by those truths which our intellect possesses before beginning to move (to discourse) or reason. It possesses them, then, without any reasoning, proper or improper; that is, by simple intuition in the natural order or by simple revelation in the supernatural order. That starting point in the natural order consists of the first principles self-evident or intuitive; in the supernatural order, they are the revealed statements just as they came from the mouth or pen of the Apostles and inspired writers.

The starting point of all progress receives the names immediate-explicit, or formal-explicit, or explicit plain and simple. It receives these names because there has not yet been any reasoning about it or any explanation of human reason, but only simple intelligence or simple revelation.

32. THE FIRST DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the new formulas that have come out of that starting point, but which are distinguished from the primitive ones only by a nominal distinction. It receives the names of: a) immediate-implicit or formal-implicit; b) virtual-improper or mediate-improper.

It is called and is virtual or improperly mediate and, therefore, properly immediate or formal, because there is not yet a virtual distinction, but only a nominal one; it is called implicit, and not explicit, because some explanation of the formulas of the starting point has already intervened⁴.

To this first degree belongs everything contained in the point of departure of one of these four ways: a) as definition in the defined; b) as essential part in the whole; c) as particular in the unconditioned universal; d) as one correlative in another. It is evident that to pass from one extreme to the other in any of these four cases, a simple explanation of terms or improper reasoning suffices, since each of the extremes enters into the definition of the other.

33. THE SECOND DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the new formulas that have come out of the primitive formulas of the starting point, but which are already distinguished from them, not only by nominal distinction, but conceptually. It receives the names: a) virtual implicit or mediate implicit; b) virtual identical-real. It is called virtual or mediate in the proper sense, because there already exists a conceptual or proper distinction, and not merely a nominal distinction, which is a distinction improperly so called. It is called implicit or inclusive because, although there is a passage from concept to concept, it remains within the same and only objectivity of the starting point. It is called identical-real because between this degree and the starting point there is not yet a real distinction, but a conceptual one or of aspects within the same objectivity of the starting point.

34. THE THIRD DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the formulas that have issued from the primitive ones but are distinguished from them not only by a nominal distinction or by a conceptual distinction, but also by a real distinction. It receives the names: a) non-implicit virtual or non-implicit mediate; b) purely virtual, or purely mediate, or purely connective (virtual "only", mediate "only", connective "only"). It is called virtual or mediate because there is already a distinction properly so-called. It is called non-implicit or non-inclusive because, being really or objectively distinguished from the point of departure, it is outside and not inside it, so that the conclusion is an addition of objectivity over the point of departure. It is called, finally, purely virtual, or purely mediate, or purely connective, because between it and the point of departure there is a pure connection, without inclusion or implicitness.

35. OBSERVATION.—As the reader sees, the three degrees of this scale are perfectly characterized by the three⁵

degrees of nominal, conceptual, and real distinction; and these degrees of distinction have the advantage of not lending themselves to confusion, since everyone knows and admits them, giving them the same meaning.

Every philosopher or theologian is free, then, to give those three degrees of progress whatever names he wishes, provided that he does not confuse the content or meaning of one degree with another. He who confuses the first degree with the second will necessarily confuse simple intelligence with reason in the natural order, and, consequently, faith with theology in the supernatural or revealed order. He who confuses the second degree with the third will confuse subjective progress with objective progress, since the conceptual distinction is subjective and the real one is objective, and, therefore, he will confuse homogeneous or explicative evolution with transformist evolution.