La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

17. EVOLUTION IN GENERAL.—The name evolution, just like the synonymous names development, unfolding, and progress, taken in general, signifies nothing other than growth or increase of any being whatsoever. Hence the problem that today we discuss under the modern names of progress or development or evolution of dogma or of faith, the ancient Scholastics discussed under the title of growth or increase of faith: Whether the articles of faith have "grown" according to the succession of times; "Whether through the succession of times faith has 'advanced'"¹

18. HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMIST EVOLUTION IN MATERIAL BEINGS.—In every material being there are two things: its matter and its specific nature.

Therefore, the growth or evolution of material being can occur in two ways: 1st, growth in matter, without changing its specific nature; 2nd, growth in matter, while at the same time changing its specific nature.

The first growth is called homogeneous evolution; the second, transformational evolution. The reason it is called transformational is because the change of nature entails a change of substantial form and not merely of matter.

Clear examples of homogeneous material evolution are found in the small shrub, which grows and becomes a leafy tree, or in the child, who develops and becomes an adult. There is an increase or evolution of matter, while the same specific nature remains.

No less clear examples of transformist evolution we have in the ape that, according to Darwin's theory, became man; in the clay that God transformed into the body of our first father Adam; in the tree onto which the gardener grafts a branch of a different species; in the living being that dies. In all these examples, the change is not limited to matter, but also extends to the specific nature or substantial form.

Preserving, then, or not preserving the same specific nature is the distinguishing feature between homogeneous evolution and transformist evolution in material beings.

19. APPLICATION TO DOCTRINES.—Just as in material beings there are two elements, namely: matter and specific nature, so also in every doctrine there are two things: first, the words or formulas; second, their sense or signification. What matter is in material beings, words or formulas are in doctrines. What specific nature or substantial form is in material beings, sense is in doctrines. Hence the common saying that in doctrines the words are the material element and the sense is the formal element.

Therefore, growth or evolution in doctrines can also be of two kinds: 1st, growth or evolution of formulas, but with the same meaning remaining; 2nd, with the same meaning not remaining.

In the first case, evolution is homogeneous. In the second, evolution is transformist.

Therefore, preserving or not preserving the same meaning is the distinction between homogeneous evolution and transformist evolution in doctrines.

Hence comes the traditional formula of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma given by the Lérins author and consecrated by the Vatican Council: "Let it grow, therefore... but "in the same sense". Development, yes, but in the same sense.

20. WHEN THE SAME MEANING REMAINS.—The meaning of a doctrine through the various formulas remains the same when the meaning of the later formulas does not come from outside, but was already implicitly contained in the earlier formulas. The meaning does not remain the same in the contrary case, that is, when the meaning of the later formulas was not implicitly contained in the earlier formulas, but is a contrary or, at least, diverse meaning from that which the earlier formulas contained.

To clearly understand when the sense of one formula is or is not implicitly contained in the sense of another, it is appropriate to distinguish well, with St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, three kinds of senses or concepts: a) explicative concepts; b) diverse concepts; c) contrary concepts.

They are called explicative concepts those that emerge entirely from one another provided our intellect fully penetrates all their content.

They are called diverse concepts those that do not and cannot derive one from another, however much they interpenetrate, although they also do not oppose or destroy one another.

Concepts are called contrary when they not only do not arise from one another, but rather mutually destroy each other, being incompatible with one another.

Examples of explicative concepts, which the ancients also called by the Latin name of conformable (consonant) concepts, we have in the concepts of absolute immutability and eternity or of spirituality and immortality. By merely penetrating well the concept of absolute immutability, the concept of eternity emerges. By merely penetrating well the concept of spirituality, that of immortality emerges. They are but partial aspects of a total concept².

Examples of diverse concepts we have in the concepts of science and virtue, or quantity and quality, or color and taste. However much one penetrates the concept of science, the concept of virtue will never emerge from it; nor from the concept

Neither from quantity will that of quality come; nor from the concept of color will that of taste come. However, although those concepts do not derive from one another, and therefore are not explanatory, neither do they oppose one another, and therefore they are not yet contrary, but simply diverse.

Examples of contrary concepts we have in the concepts of spiritual and material, or of necessary and contingent, or of black and white. These concepts not only do not arise one from another, just as differing concepts do not arise, but they exclude one another in the same subject or in the same doctrinal formula.

All this, which because of its importance or our lack of conciseness has taken us quite a few paragraphs to explain, had been condensed by Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure into very few words. The question we discuss today about whether new dogmas are possible, the Scholastics discussed under the heading of whether one can add (to add) something to the revealed deposit. Here is the objection and the response: “On the contrary: it is said in Revelation, last chapter, 18: if anyone adds to these things, God will add to him the plagues. I reply: to add is twofold: either something that is contrary or diverse, and this is erroneous; or that which is contained implicitly, by expounding, and this is praiseworthy³. There is an addition in which what is added is contrary; and there is one in which what is added is diverse; and there is one in which it is consonant. The first addition is of error; the second, of presumption; the third, of faithful instruction, because it explains what was implicit”⁴.

21. EXPLANATORY EVOLUTION AND SUBSTANTIAL EVOLUTION.—Whenever, then, the concepts of successive formulas are neither contrary nor even diverse, but mutually implicit (consonant), the evolution is in the same sense and, therefore, homogeneous. In the contrary case, the evolution is transformational.

When doctrinal evolution is homogeneous because the formulas are implicitly contained within one another, the ancient theologians called it explicative evolution (quoad explicationem); when it is heterogeneous or transformist because they are not implicitly contained, they called it substantial evolution (quoad substantiam).

Therefore, what distinguishes homogeneous or explanatory evolution from transformist or substantial evolution, when it comes to doctrines, is the implicit containment or lack thereof of the meaning of later formulas within that of the earlier formulas or starting point.

22. EVOLUTION AND DISTINCTION.—As we have already seen, evolution or progress, in general, is the same as increase of something that already existed. There can be no increase without the acquisition of something new. Now, since nothing is new except insofar as it is distinct from what already existed, it follows that, according to the degrees of distinction between the newly acquired and the old that was already possessed, so will be the degrees of evolution or progress.

23. THREE DEGREES OR KINDS OF DISTINCTION.—Every distinction either exists in the object itself prior to any operation of the subject, or is made by the subject without existing in the object. The first is called objective or real distinction; the second, subjective or rational distinction. In turn, the subject can make the distinction with a foundation in the object or without a foundation in it. The first is called a distinction of reasoned reason, and the second, a distinction of reasoning reason. Hence the three degrees or species of distinction that everyone knows: a) real or objective distinction; b) distinction of reasoned reason, which is also called virtual or conceptual distinction; c) distinction of reasoning reason, which also receives the name logical or nominal distinction. The first is a distinction of real objectivity; the second is only a distinction of aspects or partial concepts within the same and unique objectivity; the third is a pure distinction of names or formulas not only within the same and unique objectivity, but also within the same and unique concept or aspect of that objectivity. The first is purely objective, and completely independent of the subject. The second is subjective, although with a foundation in the object. The third is also subjective, but so purely subjective that it has no foundation at all in the object and is a pure product of the subject¹

The third distinction is a distinction improperly so called, since it is purely nominal, and teaches us nothing new about the object. The second and the first are proper distinctions, since both supply us with some new knowledge. The second supplies us with new aspects or partial concepts of the same object, and the first with a new objectivity or reality.

As an example of nominal distinction we will point out that which exists between the concepts of man and rational animal. As an example of virtual distinction, the concepts of immateriality and intellectuality. As an example of objective-real distinction, the concepts of soul and body, or of accident and actual inherence in the subject.

In the nominal distinction, concepts or propositions are, not only really, but also logically or formally identical. In the real distinction, concepts or propositions are, not only logically or formally, but also really distinct; in the virtual distinction, concepts or propositions are logically or formally distinct, but really or objectively identical.

The reader may excuse our having dwelt on such elementary matters, for upon their correct understanding depends in large part the question of the nature—homogeneous or transformist—of all evolution.

24. THREE KINDS OF CONCLUSIONS AND REASONINGS.—Since, then, there are three kinds of distinction, there will also be correspondingly three kinds of conclusions, namely: a) nominal conclusions; b) conceptual conclusions; c) objective-real conclusions, according to what is between the conclusion and²

the principle from which it is deduced that there is nominal distinction, conceptual distinction, or real distinction.

There will, therefore, also be three classes of reasonings, namely: a) nominal reasonings; b) conceptual reasonings; c) real reasonings, according as their conclusions are nominal, conceptual, or real.

25. THREE CLASSES OF VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE.— Since “virtual or mediate” is the same as “conclusion,” there will also be three classes of virtual or mediate, corresponding exactly to the three classes of conclusions, namely: a) nominal virtual or mediate; b) conceptual virtual or mediate; c) objective-real virtual or mediate.

26. THREE KINDS OF PROGRESS OR EVOLUTION.—According to those three kinds of distinction, of reasoning, of conclusion, or of virtuality, there are correlatively three kinds of progress or evolution, namely:

1st Nominal progress or evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another nominally distinct, e.g., the passage from "N. is a man" to "N. is a rational animal". It is progress of pure formulas, without progress of any new concept or aspect.

2. Progress or conceptual evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another conceptually distinct one, for example, the passage from "N. is spiritual" to "N. is immortal". It is progress, not only of formulas, but also of concepts or aspects virtually distinct from one another, but really and objectively identical to one another.

3rd Progress or objective-real evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another really distinct, e.g., "N. is an accident" to "N. has actual inherence in its subject". It is progress, not only of formulas, nor only of concepts or aspects, but also of objective reality, progress of substance or real objectivity.

The first progress is purely subjective progress, just as the nominal distinction on which it is founded is purely subjective. The second is also subjective, but founded in the object, as is the conceptual distinction. The third is purely objective, as is the real distinction (23).

27. PROPER AND IMPROPER DISCOURSE.—Of the three classes of reasoning of which we have spoken (24), the first reasoning, in which between the conclusion and the principle there is only a nominal distinction, is called and is improper reasoning. On the other hand, the second, in which there is a conceptual distinction, and the third, in which there is a real distinction, are called and are proper discourses.

The discourse of nominal distinction is called improper discourse because, although between the beginning and the conclusion there may be a diversity of names or formulas, there is only one concept or idea. There are, consequently, in it many oral acts, but a single intellectual act. Therefore, there is no true discourse, for discourse requires diverse intellectual acts.

By contrast, both the discourse of conceptual distinction and that of real distinction are proper discourses, because in them there is a multiplicity of realities or at least of concepts; and our intellect, unlike that of the angels, cannot grasp in a single act diverse realities or even diverse concepts. Therefore, when there is a distinction, whether conceptual or real, between the conclusion and the principle, the discourse is proper³.

28. OBSERVATION.—It is fitting, therefore, to distinguish well not only between proper and improper discourse, but also, and even much more, between the two kinds of proper discourse. Whoever confuses conceptual proper discourse with real proper discourse confuses the subject with the object and subjective evolution with objective; for, as we have seen, the conceptual distinction, although founded in the object, is formally subjective, whereas the real distinction is completely objective. On the other hand, both the conceptual distinction and the nominal or logical one are subjective, with no other difference than that of having or not having a foundation in the object.

For the question, then, of knowing whether this or that evolution of a doctrine is objective or subjective, it is much more serious to confuse the two kinds of proper discourse, one of which is objective and the other subjective, than to confuse proper conceptual discourse with improper discourse, which are both subjective. And yet, while all modern authors speak of the distinction between proper and improper discourse, there is scarcely one who speaks of the distinction between those two kinds of proper discourse.

29. PROPER AND IMPROPER VIRTUALITY.—Since there is one improper kind of reasoning and two proper kinds, there are correspondingly one improper virtuality, which is nominal virtuality, and two proper virtualities, which are conceptual virtuality and real virtuality.

The same caution we have given about properly distinguishing the two proper reasonings, the conceptual and the real, we give regarding properly distinguishing between the two proper virtualities. The reasons are exactly the same.

30. THE SCALE OF DOCTRINAL PROGRESS.—From what has been said, it is easy to form a true scale with which to measure and classify the different possible degrees of progress or evolution in the intellectual or doctrinal order. This scale consists of a starting point and three ascending and perfectly delineated degrees.

31. THE STARTING POINT is constituted by those truths which our intellect possesses before beginning to move (to discourse) or reason. It possesses them, then, without any reasoning, proper or improper; that is, by simple intuition in the natural order or by simple revelation in the supernatural order. That starting point in the natural order consists of the first principles self-evident or intuitive; in the supernatural order, they are the revealed statements just as they came from the mouth or pen of the Apostles and inspired writers.

The starting point of all progress receives the names immediate-explicit, or formal-explicit, or explicit plain and simple. It receives these names because there has not yet been any reasoning about it or any explanation of human reason, but only simple intelligence or simple revelation.

32. THE FIRST DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the new formulas that have come out of that starting point, but which are distinguished from the primitive ones only by a nominal distinction. It receives the names of: a) immediate-implicit or formal-implicit; b) virtual-improper or mediate-improper.

It is called and is virtual or improperly mediate and, therefore, properly immediate or formal, because there is not yet a virtual distinction, but only a nominal one; it is called implicit, and not explicit, because some explanation of the formulas of the starting point has already intervened⁴.

To this first degree belongs everything contained in the point of departure of one of these four ways: a) as definition in the defined; b) as essential part in the whole; c) as particular in the unconditioned universal; d) as one correlative in another. It is evident that to pass from one extreme to the other in any of these four cases, a simple explanation of terms or improper reasoning suffices, since each of the extremes enters into the definition of the other.

33. THE SECOND DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the new formulas that have come out of the primitive formulas of the starting point, but which are already distinguished from them, not only by nominal distinction, but conceptually. It receives the names: a) virtual implicit or mediate implicit; b) virtual identical-real. It is called virtual or mediate in the proper sense, because there already exists a conceptual or proper distinction, and not merely a nominal distinction, which is a distinction improperly so called. It is called implicit or inclusive because, although there is a passage from concept to concept, it remains within the same and only objectivity of the starting point. It is called identical-real because between this degree and the starting point there is not yet a real distinction, but a conceptual one or of aspects within the same objectivity of the starting point.

34. THE THIRD DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the formulas that have issued from the primitive ones but are distinguished from them not only by a nominal distinction or by a conceptual distinction, but also by a real distinction. It receives the names: a) non-implicit virtual or non-implicit mediate; b) purely virtual, or purely mediate, or purely connective (virtual "only", mediate "only", connective "only"). It is called virtual or mediate because there is already a distinction properly so-called. It is called non-implicit or non-inclusive because, being really or objectively distinguished from the point of departure, it is outside and not inside it, so that the conclusion is an addition of objectivity over the point of departure. It is called, finally, purely virtual, or purely mediate, or purely connective, because between it and the point of departure there is a pure connection, without inclusion or implicitness.

35. OBSERVATION.—As the reader sees, the three degrees of this scale are perfectly characterized by the three⁵

degrees of nominal, conceptual, and real distinction; and these degrees of distinction have the advantage of not lending themselves to confusion, since everyone knows and admits them, giving them the same meaning.

Every philosopher or theologian is free, then, to give those three degrees of progress whatever names he wishes, provided that he does not confuse the content or meaning of one degree with another. He who confuses the first degree with the second will necessarily confuse simple intelligence with reason in the natural order, and, consequently, faith with theology in the supernatural or revealed order. He who confuses the second degree with the third will confuse subjective progress with objective progress, since the conceptual distinction is subjective and the real one is objective, and, therefore, he will confuse homogeneous or explicative evolution with transformist evolution.

36. TWO GREAT KINDS OF SCIENCES.—With that scale of degrees, so clear and so perfectly delimited, it is now easy to determine to which degree the progress or evolution of each of the sciences belongs.

Of the three kinds of reasoning that constitute the three degrees of the scale, the first gives rise to no science properly so called. Being improper or nominal reasoning, it still belongs to simple intelligence or intuition and not to reason or science.

On the other hand, the other two degrees, because they are proper reasoning and proper virtuality and proper and rigorous conclusion, give rise to two kinds of sciences, which are: a) the metaphysical and mathematical sciences; b) the physical and moral sciences.

These two genres of science are essentially diverse in three things: a) in certainty; b) in procedure; c) in homogeneity.

37. DIFFERENCE IN CERTAINTY.—The certainty of the metaphysical or mathematical sciences is an absolute, unconditional, objectively infallible certainty, which not even God Himself can make fail. If a true metaphysical conclusion were to fail in a single case, all the foundations of human reason would fail at their base, because the very essence of things would fail, the formal object of our reason and of every intelligence. Moreover, God Himself would fail, since the essences of things are not founded on the free divine will, but on the very essence of God.

Therefore, if a metaphysical or mathematical conclusion ever seems to fail, it is simply because it is not a true metaphysical or mathematical conclusion, or because the reasoning was not properly done. A truly metaphysical or mathematical conclusion, well deduced, and yet false, are contradictory things.

Very different, essentially different, is the certainty of the physical sciences or conclusions. In physical conclusions, certainty is not absolute, but conditional or relative: it is not founded on the essence of things, but on the regularity of the laws that govern the universe: it does not depend on the essence of God, but on His free will. Therefore, every physical conclusion carries implicitly or tacitly the condition provided that the laws of nature do not fail; and since these laws can fail and do fail as often as it pleases God, they carry implicitly the condition provided that God has not miraculously intervened.

Thus, while metaphysical conclusions are absolutely necessary in all orders, places, and times, in the supernatural order as well as in the natural order, physical conclusions are necessary only in the natural order, but they can fail, and frequently do fail, in the supernatural order.

The metaphysical conclusions that every contingent being is a created being, or that every spiritual being is immortal, or that everything absolutely immutable is eternal, are as necessary in the revealed order as in the natural order, with no imaginable case in which they can fail. In contrast, the physical conclusion that every man has human personality fails in Jesus Christ. The physical conclusion that the woman who is a mother is not a virgin fails in the Blessed Virgin Mary. The physical conclusion that every accident has actual inherence in its subject fails in the Eucharist. The physical conclusion that every fire actually burns failed in the Babylonian furnace. And this, which happens to every physical conclusion whenever it pleases God, can happen to every conclusion of the so-called moral sciences whenever it pleases human free will.

38. DIFFERENCE AS TO PROCEDURE.—This difference as to certainty arises precisely from the difference as to procedure, that is, from the difference of the minors which such sciences employ in their reasonings.

In the metaphysical and mathematical sciences, the minor premises are always essential or conceptual minor premises, whose predicate is implicit in the essence or analysis of the subject. The metaphysical minor premises are always either of the essence of being insofar as being (general metaphysics), or of the essence of such...

being (particular metaphysics), but always of the essence. In the same way, the lesser mathematics are always of the essence of quantity in general (pure mathematics), or of the essence of such a species of quantity (applied mathematics), but always of the essence. Thus, consisting of act and potency or requiring a cause is of the essence of contingent being; being immortal is of the essence of spiritual being; having its radii equal is of the essence of the circumference.

In contrast, in the physical or moral sciences, minor premises are not essential but accidental: their predicate is never essentially implied in the subject, but is always something outside the essence of the subject. Having human personality is not of the essence of man; not being a virgin is not of the essence of motherhood; having actual inherence is not of the essence of accident; actually burning is not of the essence of fire; loving or not loving one's children is not of the essence of the mother.

39. DIFFERENCE AS TO HOMOGENEITY.—From the difference as to process arises the other difference as to the homogeneity of its conclusions or of its progress. In the metaphysical or mathematical sciences, progress is homogeneous or of analytical evolution. In the physical or moral sciences, progress is heterogeneous or of extrinsic addition.

In effect, since the minor premises—whether metaphysical or mathematical—are of the essence or of the intellect of the major premises, the conclusions do not go outside the objectivity of the starting point, but are purely different aspects that were already included or implicit in it. The whole of metaphysics, in all its conclusions, provided they are true and rigorous conclusions, is nothing but an analytical and homogeneous development of the starting point of metaphysics, which is the intuitive apprehension of the idea of being as being. With that sole apprehension, and always employing minor premises already implicit in that starting point, the metaphysician develops his entire science; and if from the beginning he had sufficient intellectual strength to penetrate well all that is implicit in the starting point, he would have no need whatsoever for those minor premises. At the very starting point he would see intuitively, as the angels see it, all those conclusions which, owing to the weakness of our reason, we now see only through many minor premises, successively, by reasoning. These minor premises, therefore, have no purpose of adding something that was not already implicit in the starting point, but merely of helping our weak reason to see, bit by bit or through successive aspects, the same thing that was already implicit there from the beginning. The narrow photographic apparatus of our reason needs to take multiple photographs of the object from different points of view, because it cannot encompass in a single photograph or in a single act of vision all the richness and fecundity of faces or aspects of the starting point.

The opposite occurs in the poor physical or moral sciences, sciences of a non-essential, but accidental constitution; not analytic, but synthetic. The lesser physical sciences are not truly implied in the objectivity or essence of the greater ones; they are outside, and not inside, the point of departure. In the essence of man, human personality is not truly implied; in the essence of the accident, its actual inherence in the subject is not implied; in the essence of fire, that it actually burns is not implied; in the essence of stone, that it falls or fails to fall is not implied. And since one cannot see in a thing what is not truly implied in it, God himself cannot see with absolute certainty in the essence alone of a thing any physical or moral conclusion, any actual property or contingent effect.

For this reason, and said parenthetically, Saint Thomas and his school require in God an act of will, a free decree added to His intellect in order to be able to see contingent futures, that is, everything that is not of the essence of things. By the science of simple intelligence, and without the need of any decree of His will, God sees with absolute certainty everything that is essential: all metaphysical or mathematical conclusions. If He had no other science than that of simple intelligence, He could never know with absolute certainty a single physical or moral conclusion.

40. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—Therefore, the progress or evolution achieved through lesser metaphysical or mathematical means belongs to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the virtual implicit.

It does not belong to the first degree, called formal implicit or immediate implicit, because into that first degree there enters only nominal or improper reasoning, whereas the metaphysical and mathematical sciences, when their conclusions are conceptually distinct from their principles, require rigorous conceptual reasoning for our intellect, and therefore they are not only true and proper sciences for us, but the most proper and rigorous of the sciences. Nor does it belong to the third degree, called virtual non-implicit or purely connective, because, although proper and rigorous reasoning is involved, it is analytic or inclusive reasoning, not synthetic or of mere connection.

On the other hand, the progress or evolution made through physical minors belongs to the third degree of the scale, called virtual non-implicit. Not to the first, because its reasoning is not merely nominal. Nor to the second, because its reasoning is not one of analysis or inclusion within the concepts or aspects of the same thing, but pure connection or transition from one thing to another really distinct.

All this had been condensed by Saint Thomas in very few words. Objecting to himself that in every true science there must be proper reasoning or a transition from one thing to another, he answers: “In all “sciences” the mode of “reason” is preserved in this regard, that one proceeds “from one thing to another according to reason,” but not that one proceeds “from one thing to another thing”: this is proper to natural science.”¹

**41. COROLLARY.—**The phrase, then, of minors of reason, so frequently used in the question of dogmatic progress, is ambiguous, because the word reason can signify two things: a) the faculty, which we call reason, and whose proper act is reasoning; b) the reasons or minors that this faculty employs when reasoning in the various sciences.

Although the power reason is unique, and therefore the same in every kind of science, its reasons or minor premises can be multiple and essentially diverse. They can be minor premises of metaphysical reason and they can be minor premises of physical reason. The former are minor premises already implicit in the major premises or starting points of reasoning, and they are nothing but instruments that our reason needs to explain or develop—not to add to or modify—the objectivity of the major premise. The latter are not implicit in the major premises, and therefore they add to, and do not merely explain, the objectivity of the starting point.

42. TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCLUSION.—The classical formula with which Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy defines the scientific conclusion properly speaking, and therefore the proper and rigorous theological conclusion, is the following: Deduction of property from essence, or effect from cause.

Upon the true or false understanding of that definition depends, then, the true or false idea about the nature of evolution made by way of scientific or theological conclusion.

In this section we will study the nature of the passage from essence to its properties, and in the next, the nature of the passage from cause to its effects.

43. THREE SENSES OF THE WORD “ESSENCE”.—The essence of any thing can be taken in three very different senses, namely: a) pure essence or in the abstract; b) integral essence or in a connatural state; c) completely perfect essence.

The pure or abstract essence implies only the essential predicates. The integral or connatural essence embraces, in addition, all connatural predicates or integral parts that the essence requires to have according to the laws of nature. Finally, the completely perfect essence also comprises all the accidental perfections of which such an essence is capable.

Thus, he who has the essential predicates of “animal” and “rational,” or of “rational soul” and “body,” already has the pure or true essence of man, even if he lacks this or that member or faculty; for example, even if he is lame or maimed, deaf or blind. He who has not only the essential predicates, but also all the integral parts, already has the whole or connatural essence, although he may lack accidental or acquirable perfections, for example, although he lacks knowledge or virtue. He who has all perfections without exception, that is, both the essential, the connatural, and the acquirable ones, has the completely perfect essence.

We beg the reader never to forget those three states of essence if he does not wish to become entangled in the question of the evolution of dogma. These three senses of essence are not only distinct, but are perfectly stepped or graded among themselves. The third includes the second, and the second the first. Therefore the first is implicit in the second, and the second in the third, but the third is not implicit in the second, nor the second in the first.

Thus, when God reveals to us that “N. is man,” he could have done so in three distinct senses, namely: a) essential or true man; b) integral or connatural man; c) completely perfect man. Since explicit divine revelation is the starting point of every conclusion or progress according to each of these three senses, the conclusions that may be deduced implicitly or in the same sense will be very different; and therefore their homogeneity or heterogeneity with the starting point or revealed datum will also be very different.

The same thing that we have said of the word “man,” there is

what can be said about any other predicate contained in divine revelation.

44. TWO SENSES OF THE WORD "PROPERTY".—There are two completely distinct kinds of properties: a) essential properties, which are also usually called metaphysical, "aptitudinal" or radical; b) accidental properties, which also receive the names physical, actual or formal.

The first are truly identical with the essence, and not even by divine power can the essence exist without them. The second are really distinct from the essence, and without them the essence of a thing can be preserved absolutely.

These two kinds of properties are easy to distinguish. One thing, for example, is the aptitudinal inherence of an accident in its subject, which exists even in the Eucharistic accidents, and another is actual inherence. One thing is the radical capacity to see, which exists even in the blind man and not in a stone, and another is the actual capacity, which both the blind man and the stone lack. One thing is radical risibility, which is preserved even in one whose facial muscles are all paralyzed, and another is actual risibility. One thing is radical peccability, which every pure creature possesses, and another is actual peccability, which the Blessed Virgin did not possess. One thing is the radical capacity to die, which existed even in the state of innocence, and exists in Elijah and Enoch, and another is actual death. One thing is the requirement to burn, which existed in the fire itself of the Babylonian furnace, and another is actually burning.

And thus infinite examples could be given. Precisely in the distinction between radical or metaphysical properties and actual or physical properties is founded the possibility of the miracle or of the supernatural order as regards efficient causality. God cannot suspend metaphysical properties, since they are essential; but He can suspend physical properties, because they are accidental¹.

45. SIX TYPES OF REASONING OR PASSAGE FROM ESSENCE TO PROPERTY.—Since, then, the word essence has three different senses and the word property two, there are six (3 X 2 = 6) combinations: three from combining the three senses of essence with the first sense of property, and another three from combining those same three senses of essence with the second sense of property.

Thus, if we take as the type of essence the essence of man (essential or true man—connatural or integral man—perfect man) and as the type of property risibility (radical risibility—actual risibility), the following six types of reasoning between essence and property result:

First type: reasoning from pure essence to radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a true man): therefore he is radically laughable.

Second type: reasoning from the connatural or integral essence to the radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a whole man): therefore he is radically risible.

Third type: reasoning from the completely perfect essence to the radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a perfect man): therefore he is radically laughable.

Tipo cuarto: raciocinio de la esencia pura a la propiedad actual; v. gr.: N. es hombre (hombre verdadero): luego es actualmente risible.

Fifth type: reasoning from the complete essence to the actual property; e.g.: N. is a man (a complete man): therefore he has actual risibility.

Sixth type: reasoning from the perfect essence to the actual property; e.g.: N. is a man (a perfect man): therefore he has actual risibility.

It is evident that no more types of reasoning about the essence of property are possible than those six, and that any other type reduces to one of them.

46. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—Of these reasonings, the six are a true passage from essence to property, and therefore the six are proper reasonings. None, then, of them belongs to the first degree of the scale.

All of these, except the fourth, are reasonings of inclusion or implicitness. They belong, therefore, to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the virtual implicit. As for the first three²³, the matter is evident, for they are essential properties included in the essence itself. As for the fifth and sixth, it is no less evident, for although the actual properties or accidental perfections are not included in the concept of the pure essence, they are included in the concept of the integrity or perfection of the essence. For something to be "perfect," it is necessary that it have the form (essence) and the things that pre-exist, and the things that follow (the properties) from it ⁴.

On the other hand, the fourth type is evidently reasoning of real distinction or accidental connection. It corresponds, therefore, to the third degree of the scale. It is the reasoning proper to the physical sciences.

In reality, all these six types of reasoning reduce to two: a) reasoning of real distinction or of pure connection without implication, and that is the fourth; b) reasoning of real identity or true implication, and those are the other five.

47. THE ATTRIBUTES IN GOD.—What in other beings are called properties, and which the ancients also called passions, receive in God the name of attributes. Now, between the divine essence and its attributes or between the different divine attributes the distinction is not real, but conceptual. Therefore, in the treatise On God the fourth type of reasoning does not apply. All progress, then, from the divine essence to its attributes or from one attribute to another belongs to the second degree of the scale, or virtual implicit.

48. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL RELATIONS.—Everything that has been said about the passage or progress from essence to its properties applies equally to the passage or progress from essence to the relations that this essence or starting point may have with other things, for it is the same for properties as for relations. "Properties are also said to be whatever can be predicated of another, whether they are negations or "habitudes" (relations) to other things. And many such things can be proved about God both from naturally known principles and from principles of faith." ⁵

The passage, then, from the starting point to any of its essential or aptitudinal relations belongs to the second degree of the scale, or implicit virtual. The passage to its accidental or actual relations belongs to the third degree, or purely connective virtual.

CONFIRMATION.—Among the many texts that we could add in confirmation of what we have been saying, we will choose the following three:

"Therefore, when that by which the nature of a thing is constituted—by which the nature itself is understood—has an order and dependence on something else, then it is clear that that nature cannot be understood without it: whether it be joined by that union by which a part is joined to the whole... or also joined in the manner by which form is joined to matter... or also separated in reality; just as a father cannot be understood without the concept of a son, although those relations are found in different things"⁶.

"For that inclusion is indeed called identical and essential when certain things are so related that one essentially includes the other, and conversely, as is clear in divine matters, where the divine essence essentially includes every attribute and, conversely, every attribute includes the divine essence itself; or when two things essentially agree in some third thing, as passions and affections do in being itself."⁷

There exist, on the contrary, relations, not accidental but essential, which are implied in a determinate essence or in one of its faculties. And the concept that expresses this essence expresses at the same time the relations it contains. Thus, being designates that which is related to existence, and this relation is included in the very nature of what exists... What we say of being in general and of its properties we can also say of all the analogous absolute perfections that common sense attributes to God, such as Intelligence, Wisdom, Providence, free Will, Love, Mercy, Justice"⁸.

49. COROLLARY.—The definition, then, of deductio proprietatis ex essentia, which is commonly given of the theological conclusion, as well as its classical example of Christ is a man, therefore he is capable of laughter, are ambiguous and admit of two radically different senses.

If by man is understood the pure essence of man and by risible the actual risibility, then such a conclusion is of the fourth type, and it is not an implicit conclusion, but purely connective, and it belongs to the third degree of the scale.

But if by “risible” is meant radical risibility (types one, two, and three); or even if actual risibility is meant, if by “man” is meant integral or perfect man (types five and six), the conclusion is implicit in the principle and belongs to the second degree of the scale.

To understand, then, the true mind of a theologian,

It is not sufficient to focus on whether he uses that definition and that example or not, but rather one must focus primarily on which of those two senses he uses them.

50. TWO KINDS OF CAUSES.—There are two kinds of essentially distinct causes, namely: a) causes really identical with their effects and distinguished from them only conceptually; b) causes really distinct from their effects.

Examples of the former we have in absolute immutability with respect to eternity, or in immateriality with respect to cognoscibility, or in spirituality with respect to immortality. Absolute immutability is called and is the cause of eternity, because the latter follows from the former, and the former is the reason for being of the latter. And yet they are not really distinct, but two aspects of the same thing. The same happens in the other two examples given and in infinite ones that could be given.

Examples of the second kind we have in fire with respect to the effect of burning, or in the gravity of the stone with respect to its effect of falling, or in the debt or cause of original sin with respect to the act of contracting guilt. Between fire and the burn, or between the gravity of the stone and its fall, or between the debt and original guilt, there is not only virtual causality or reason for being, but also a real distinction.

The first kind of causes are called metaphysical, or virtual, or in knowing causes; the second, physical, or real, or in being causes.

In the former, the cause contains in itself really not only the power of producing the effect, but the effect itself. Thus, in absolute immutability, eternity is really contained, and not merely the power of producing it. If we distinguish between immutability and eternity, or between immateriality and cognoscibility, or between spirituality and immortality, this is a distinction not real or objective, but our or subjective, for it is only a distinction of concepts or aspects, although grounded in the object itself.

In secondary causes, the cause truly contains the power to produce the effect, but it does not contain the effect itself. Fire contains the power to burn, but not the very act of burning, which is a thing really distinct from it and even entirely separable from it. It is a distinction not subjective or ours, but objective, or of the object itself.

51. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—The progress or reasoning from the virtual or metaphysical cause to its effects evidently belongs to the second degree of the scale, or implicit virtual. It does not belong to the first, because its distinction is not merely nominal, but conceptual. Not to the third, because between the metaphysical cause and its effects there is no real or objective distinction, but subjective or of aspects.

On the other hand, the progress or passage from the physical or real cause to its effects clearly belongs to the third degree of the scale for the contrary reason. It is virtual, purely connective, without objective inclusion or implicitness.

52. FIRST COROLLARY.—Of the definition deductio effectus ex causa we must say exactly the same as we said (49) of the definition deductio proprietatis ex essentia. It is an ambiguous definition. If in that definition by cause is meant the metaphysical or virtual cause or in cognoscendo, such a conclusion was already objectively implicit in the starting point. If by cause is meant the physical or real cause or in essendo, the conclusion is not implicit but purely connective. The reason for this is that the physical cause contains the virtue of producing the effect, but does not contain the effect itself. On the other hand, the metaphysical cause contains the effect itself and not merely the virtue of causing it.

53. CONFIRMATORY TEXTS.—Although what has been said seems quite clear to us, we shall cite some texts in confirmation of it, above all so that the distinction between the physical cause and the metaphysical cause may be well understood.

Let us hear the Ferrariense:

"Ad huius evidentiam considerandum est quod dupliciter loqui possumus, de demonstratione a priori (seu per causam): Uno modo, de ea cuius medium est vere et realiter causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum de quo demonstratur. Alio modo, de ea cuius medium non est vere et realiter causa, sed est tantum medium secundum rationem... Dicitur ergo primo: quod de Deo (theological sciences) nullo modo potest esse demonstratio primo modo accepta, cum in Deo nihil sit vere causatum... Dicitur secundo, quod utique neque entis neque generum generalissimorum (metaphysical sciences) est demonstratio isto modo, propter eamdem rationem. Dicitur tertio, quod non sequitur metaphysicam et mathematicam non esse scientias, quia licet per primum genus demonstrationis non possit aliquid de ente et generalissimis generibus demonstrari, potest tamen de ipsis aliquid demonstrari per secundum modum" ¹

Let us hear John of St. Thomas and Cardinal Cajetan: “It is answered that for a demonstration it is not required that it always proceed from a cause that is a cause formally and physically; but it suffices that it be so virtually and metaphysically, so that one stands as the reason of the other, even if it is not causing it, just as immutability is the reason of eternity and the perfection of goodness” ². “Hence, speaking in formal language, it is not incongruously said that immutability is the cause of eternity, and immateriality of immortality, and so on” ³.