La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

17. EVOLUTION IN GENERAL.—The name evolution, just like the synonymous names development, unfolding, and progress, taken in general, signifies nothing other than growth or increase of any being whatsoever. Hence the problem that today we discuss under the modern names of progress or development or evolution of dogma or of faith, the ancient Scholastics discussed under the title of growth or increase of faith: Whether the articles of faith have "grown" according to the succession of times; "Whether through the succession of times faith has 'advanced'"¹

18. HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMIST EVOLUTION IN MATERIAL BEINGS.—In every material being there are two things: its matter and its specific nature.

Therefore, the growth or evolution of material being can occur in two ways: 1st, growth in matter, without changing its specific nature; 2nd, growth in matter, while at the same time changing its specific nature.

The first growth is called homogeneous evolution; the second, transformational evolution. The reason it is called transformational is because the change of nature entails a change of substantial form and not merely of matter.

Clear examples of homogeneous material evolution are found in the small shrub, which grows and becomes a leafy tree, or in the child, who develops and becomes an adult. There is an increase or evolution of matter, while the same specific nature remains.

No less clear examples of transformist evolution we have in the ape that, according to Darwin's theory, became man; in the clay that God transformed into the body of our first father Adam; in the tree onto which the gardener grafts a branch of a different species; in the living being that dies. In all these examples, the change is not limited to matter, but also extends to the specific nature or substantial form.

Preserving, then, or not preserving the same specific nature is the distinguishing feature between homogeneous evolution and transformist evolution in material beings.

19. APPLICATION TO DOCTRINES.—Just as in material beings there are two elements, namely: matter and specific nature, so also in every doctrine there are two things: first, the words or formulas; second, their sense or signification. What matter is in material beings, words or formulas are in doctrines. What specific nature or substantial form is in material beings, sense is in doctrines. Hence the common saying that in doctrines the words are the material element and the sense is the formal element.

Therefore, growth or evolution in doctrines can also be of two kinds: 1st, growth or evolution of formulas, but with the same meaning remaining; 2nd, with the same meaning not remaining.

In the first case, evolution is homogeneous. In the second, evolution is transformist.

Therefore, preserving or not preserving the same meaning is the distinction between homogeneous evolution and transformist evolution in doctrines.

Hence comes the traditional formula of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma given by the Lérins author and consecrated by the Vatican Council: "Let it grow, therefore... but "in the same sense". Development, yes, but in the same sense.

20. WHEN THE SAME MEANING REMAINS.—The meaning of a doctrine through the various formulas remains the same when the meaning of the later formulas does not come from outside, but was already implicitly contained in the earlier formulas. The meaning does not remain the same in the contrary case, that is, when the meaning of the later formulas was not implicitly contained in the earlier formulas, but is a contrary or, at least, diverse meaning from that which the earlier formulas contained.

To clearly understand when the sense of one formula is or is not implicitly contained in the sense of another, it is appropriate to distinguish well, with St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, three kinds of senses or concepts: a) explicative concepts; b) diverse concepts; c) contrary concepts.

They are called explicative concepts those that emerge entirely from one another provided our intellect fully penetrates all their content.

They are called diverse concepts those that do not and cannot derive one from another, however much they interpenetrate, although they also do not oppose or destroy one another.

Concepts are called contrary when they not only do not arise from one another, but rather mutually destroy each other, being incompatible with one another.

Examples of explicative concepts, which the ancients also called by the Latin name of conformable (consonant) concepts, we have in the concepts of absolute immutability and eternity or of spirituality and immortality. By merely penetrating well the concept of absolute immutability, the concept of eternity emerges. By merely penetrating well the concept of spirituality, that of immortality emerges. They are but partial aspects of a total concept².

Examples of diverse concepts we have in the concepts of science and virtue, or quantity and quality, or color and taste. However much one penetrates the concept of science, the concept of virtue will never emerge from it; nor from the concept

Neither from quantity will that of quality come; nor from the concept of color will that of taste come. However, although those concepts do not derive from one another, and therefore are not explanatory, neither do they oppose one another, and therefore they are not yet contrary, but simply diverse.

Examples of contrary concepts we have in the concepts of spiritual and material, or of necessary and contingent, or of black and white. These concepts not only do not arise one from another, just as differing concepts do not arise, but they exclude one another in the same subject or in the same doctrinal formula.

All this, which because of its importance or our lack of conciseness has taken us quite a few paragraphs to explain, had been condensed by Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure into very few words. The question we discuss today about whether new dogmas are possible, the Scholastics discussed under the heading of whether one can add (to add) something to the revealed deposit. Here is the objection and the response: “On the contrary: it is said in Revelation, last chapter, 18: if anyone adds to these things, God will add to him the plagues. I reply: to add is twofold: either something that is contrary or diverse, and this is erroneous; or that which is contained implicitly, by expounding, and this is praiseworthy³. There is an addition in which what is added is contrary; and there is one in which what is added is diverse; and there is one in which it is consonant. The first addition is of error; the second, of presumption; the third, of faithful instruction, because it explains what was implicit”⁴.

21. EXPLANATORY EVOLUTION AND SUBSTANTIAL EVOLUTION.—Whenever, then, the concepts of successive formulas are neither contrary nor even diverse, but mutually implicit (consonant), the evolution is in the same sense and, therefore, homogeneous. In the contrary case, the evolution is transformational.

When doctrinal evolution is homogeneous because the formulas are implicitly contained within one another, the ancient theologians called it explicative evolution (quoad explicationem); when it is heterogeneous or transformist because they are not implicitly contained, they called it substantial evolution (quoad substantiam).

Therefore, what distinguishes homogeneous or explanatory evolution from transformist or substantial evolution, when it comes to doctrines, is the implicit containment or lack thereof of the meaning of later formulas within that of the earlier formulas or starting point.

22. EVOLUTION AND DISTINCTION.—As we have already seen, evolution or progress, in general, is the same as increase of something that already existed. There can be no increase without the acquisition of something new. Now, since nothing is new except insofar as it is distinct from what already existed, it follows that, according to the degrees of distinction between the newly acquired and the old that was already possessed, so will be the degrees of evolution or progress.

23. THREE DEGREES OR KINDS OF DISTINCTION.—Every distinction either exists in the object itself prior to any operation of the subject, or is made by the subject without existing in the object. The first is called objective or real distinction; the second, subjective or rational distinction. In turn, the subject can make the distinction with a foundation in the object or without a foundation in it. The first is called a distinction of reasoned reason, and the second, a distinction of reasoning reason. Hence the three degrees or species of distinction that everyone knows: a) real or objective distinction; b) distinction of reasoned reason, which is also called virtual or conceptual distinction; c) distinction of reasoning reason, which also receives the name logical or nominal distinction. The first is a distinction of real objectivity; the second is only a distinction of aspects or partial concepts within the same and unique objectivity; the third is a pure distinction of names or formulas not only within the same and unique objectivity, but also within the same and unique concept or aspect of that objectivity. The first is purely objective, and completely independent of the subject. The second is subjective, although with a foundation in the object. The third is also subjective, but so purely subjective that it has no foundation at all in the object and is a pure product of the subject¹

The third distinction is a distinction improperly so called, since it is purely nominal, and teaches us nothing new about the object. The second and the first are proper distinctions, since both supply us with some new knowledge. The second supplies us with new aspects or partial concepts of the same object, and the first with a new objectivity or reality.

As an example of nominal distinction we will point out that which exists between the concepts of man and rational animal. As an example of virtual distinction, the concepts of immateriality and intellectuality. As an example of objective-real distinction, the concepts of soul and body, or of accident and actual inherence in the subject.

In the nominal distinction, concepts or propositions are, not only really, but also logically or formally identical. In the real distinction, concepts or propositions are, not only logically or formally, but also really distinct; in the virtual distinction, concepts or propositions are logically or formally distinct, but really or objectively identical.

The reader may excuse our having dwelt on such elementary matters, for upon their correct understanding depends in large part the question of the nature—homogeneous or transformist—of all evolution.

24. THREE KINDS OF CONCLUSIONS AND REASONINGS.—Since, then, there are three kinds of distinction, there will also be correspondingly three kinds of conclusions, namely: a) nominal conclusions; b) conceptual conclusions; c) objective-real conclusions, according to what is between the conclusion and²

the principle from which it is deduced that there is nominal distinction, conceptual distinction, or real distinction.

There will, therefore, also be three classes of reasonings, namely: a) nominal reasonings; b) conceptual reasonings; c) real reasonings, according as their conclusions are nominal, conceptual, or real.

25. THREE CLASSES OF VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE.— Since “virtual or mediate” is the same as “conclusion,” there will also be three classes of virtual or mediate, corresponding exactly to the three classes of conclusions, namely: a) nominal virtual or mediate; b) conceptual virtual or mediate; c) objective-real virtual or mediate.

26. THREE KINDS OF PROGRESS OR EVOLUTION.—According to those three kinds of distinction, of reasoning, of conclusion, or of virtuality, there are correlatively three kinds of progress or evolution, namely:

1st Nominal progress or evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another nominally distinct, e.g., the passage from "N. is a man" to "N. is a rational animal". It is progress of pure formulas, without progress of any new concept or aspect.

2. Progress or conceptual evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another conceptually distinct one, for example, the passage from "N. is spiritual" to "N. is immortal". It is progress, not only of formulas, but also of concepts or aspects virtually distinct from one another, but really and objectively identical to one another.

3rd Progress or objective-real evolution, which is the passage from one proposition to another really distinct, e.g., "N. is an accident" to "N. has actual inherence in its subject". It is progress, not only of formulas, nor only of concepts or aspects, but also of objective reality, progress of substance or real objectivity.

The first progress is purely subjective progress, just as the nominal distinction on which it is founded is purely subjective. The second is also subjective, but founded in the object, as is the conceptual distinction. The third is purely objective, as is the real distinction (23).

27. PROPER AND IMPROPER DISCOURSE.—Of the three classes of reasoning of which we have spoken (24), the first reasoning, in which between the conclusion and the principle there is only a nominal distinction, is called and is improper reasoning. On the other hand, the second, in which there is a conceptual distinction, and the third, in which there is a real distinction, are called and are proper discourses.

The discourse of nominal distinction is called improper discourse because, although between the beginning and the conclusion there may be a diversity of names or formulas, there is only one concept or idea. There are, consequently, in it many oral acts, but a single intellectual act. Therefore, there is no true discourse, for discourse requires diverse intellectual acts.

By contrast, both the discourse of conceptual distinction and that of real distinction are proper discourses, because in them there is a multiplicity of realities or at least of concepts; and our intellect, unlike that of the angels, cannot grasp in a single act diverse realities or even diverse concepts. Therefore, when there is a distinction, whether conceptual or real, between the conclusion and the principle, the discourse is proper³.

28. OBSERVATION.—It is fitting, therefore, to distinguish well not only between proper and improper discourse, but also, and even much more, between the two kinds of proper discourse. Whoever confuses conceptual proper discourse with real proper discourse confuses the subject with the object and subjective evolution with objective; for, as we have seen, the conceptual distinction, although founded in the object, is formally subjective, whereas the real distinction is completely objective. On the other hand, both the conceptual distinction and the nominal or logical one are subjective, with no other difference than that of having or not having a foundation in the object.

For the question, then, of knowing whether this or that evolution of a doctrine is objective or subjective, it is much more serious to confuse the two kinds of proper discourse, one of which is objective and the other subjective, than to confuse proper conceptual discourse with improper discourse, which are both subjective. And yet, while all modern authors speak of the distinction between proper and improper discourse, there is scarcely one who speaks of the distinction between those two kinds of proper discourse.

29. PROPER AND IMPROPER VIRTUALITY.—Since there is one improper kind of reasoning and two proper kinds, there are correspondingly one improper virtuality, which is nominal virtuality, and two proper virtualities, which are conceptual virtuality and real virtuality.

The same caution we have given about properly distinguishing the two proper reasonings, the conceptual and the real, we give regarding properly distinguishing between the two proper virtualities. The reasons are exactly the same.

30. THE SCALE OF DOCTRINAL PROGRESS.—From what has been said, it is easy to form a true scale with which to measure and classify the different possible degrees of progress or evolution in the intellectual or doctrinal order. This scale consists of a starting point and three ascending and perfectly delineated degrees.

31. THE STARTING POINT is constituted by those truths which our intellect possesses before beginning to move (to discourse) or reason. It possesses them, then, without any reasoning, proper or improper; that is, by simple intuition in the natural order or by simple revelation in the supernatural order. That starting point in the natural order consists of the first principles self-evident or intuitive; in the supernatural order, they are the revealed statements just as they came from the mouth or pen of the Apostles and inspired writers.

The starting point of all progress receives the names immediate-explicit, or formal-explicit, or explicit plain and simple. It receives these names because there has not yet been any reasoning about it or any explanation of human reason, but only simple intelligence or simple revelation.

32. THE FIRST DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the new formulas that have come out of that starting point, but which are distinguished from the primitive ones only by a nominal distinction. It receives the names of: a) immediate-implicit or formal-implicit; b) virtual-improper or mediate-improper.

It is called and is virtual or improperly mediate and, therefore, properly immediate or formal, because there is not yet a virtual distinction, but only a nominal one; it is called implicit, and not explicit, because some explanation of the formulas of the starting point has already intervened⁴.

To this first degree belongs everything contained in the point of departure of one of these four ways: a) as definition in the defined; b) as essential part in the whole; c) as particular in the unconditioned universal; d) as one correlative in another. It is evident that to pass from one extreme to the other in any of these four cases, a simple explanation of terms or improper reasoning suffices, since each of the extremes enters into the definition of the other.

33. THE SECOND DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the new formulas that have come out of the primitive formulas of the starting point, but which are already distinguished from them, not only by nominal distinction, but conceptually. It receives the names: a) virtual implicit or mediate implicit; b) virtual identical-real. It is called virtual or mediate in the proper sense, because there already exists a conceptual or proper distinction, and not merely a nominal distinction, which is a distinction improperly so called. It is called implicit or inclusive because, although there is a passage from concept to concept, it remains within the same and only objectivity of the starting point. It is called identical-real because between this degree and the starting point there is not yet a real distinction, but a conceptual one or of aspects within the same objectivity of the starting point.

34. THE THIRD DEGREE of the scale is constituted by all the formulas that have issued from the primitive ones but are distinguished from them not only by a nominal distinction or by a conceptual distinction, but also by a real distinction. It receives the names: a) non-implicit virtual or non-implicit mediate; b) purely virtual, or purely mediate, or purely connective (virtual "only", mediate "only", connective "only"). It is called virtual or mediate because there is already a distinction properly so-called. It is called non-implicit or non-inclusive because, being really or objectively distinguished from the point of departure, it is outside and not inside it, so that the conclusion is an addition of objectivity over the point of departure. It is called, finally, purely virtual, or purely mediate, or purely connective, because between it and the point of departure there is a pure connection, without inclusion or implicitness.

35. OBSERVATION.—As the reader sees, the three degrees of this scale are perfectly characterized by the three⁵

degrees of nominal, conceptual, and real distinction; and these degrees of distinction have the advantage of not lending themselves to confusion, since everyone knows and admits them, giving them the same meaning.

Every philosopher or theologian is free, then, to give those three degrees of progress whatever names he wishes, provided that he does not confuse the content or meaning of one degree with another. He who confuses the first degree with the second will necessarily confuse simple intelligence with reason in the natural order, and, consequently, faith with theology in the supernatural or revealed order. He who confuses the second degree with the third will confuse subjective progress with objective progress, since the conceptual distinction is subjective and the real one is objective, and, therefore, he will confuse homogeneous or explicative evolution with transformist evolution.

36. TWO GREAT KINDS OF SCIENCES.—With that scale of degrees, so clear and so perfectly delimited, it is now easy to determine to which degree the progress or evolution of each of the sciences belongs.

Of the three kinds of reasoning that constitute the three degrees of the scale, the first gives rise to no science properly so called. Being improper or nominal reasoning, it still belongs to simple intelligence or intuition and not to reason or science.

On the other hand, the other two degrees, because they are proper reasoning and proper virtuality and proper and rigorous conclusion, give rise to two kinds of sciences, which are: a) the metaphysical and mathematical sciences; b) the physical and moral sciences.

These two genres of science are essentially diverse in three things: a) in certainty; b) in procedure; c) in homogeneity.

37. DIFFERENCE IN CERTAINTY.—The certainty of the metaphysical or mathematical sciences is an absolute, unconditional, objectively infallible certainty, which not even God Himself can make fail. If a true metaphysical conclusion were to fail in a single case, all the foundations of human reason would fail at their base, because the very essence of things would fail, the formal object of our reason and of every intelligence. Moreover, God Himself would fail, since the essences of things are not founded on the free divine will, but on the very essence of God.

Therefore, if a metaphysical or mathematical conclusion ever seems to fail, it is simply because it is not a true metaphysical or mathematical conclusion, or because the reasoning was not properly done. A truly metaphysical or mathematical conclusion, well deduced, and yet false, are contradictory things.

Very different, essentially different, is the certainty of the physical sciences or conclusions. In physical conclusions, certainty is not absolute, but conditional or relative: it is not founded on the essence of things, but on the regularity of the laws that govern the universe: it does not depend on the essence of God, but on His free will. Therefore, every physical conclusion carries implicitly or tacitly the condition provided that the laws of nature do not fail; and since these laws can fail and do fail as often as it pleases God, they carry implicitly the condition provided that God has not miraculously intervened.

Thus, while metaphysical conclusions are absolutely necessary in all orders, places, and times, in the supernatural order as well as in the natural order, physical conclusions are necessary only in the natural order, but they can fail, and frequently do fail, in the supernatural order.

The metaphysical conclusions that every contingent being is a created being, or that every spiritual being is immortal, or that everything absolutely immutable is eternal, are as necessary in the revealed order as in the natural order, with no imaginable case in which they can fail. In contrast, the physical conclusion that every man has human personality fails in Jesus Christ. The physical conclusion that the woman who is a mother is not a virgin fails in the Blessed Virgin Mary. The physical conclusion that every accident has actual inherence in its subject fails in the Eucharist. The physical conclusion that every fire actually burns failed in the Babylonian furnace. And this, which happens to every physical conclusion whenever it pleases God, can happen to every conclusion of the so-called moral sciences whenever it pleases human free will.

38. DIFFERENCE AS TO PROCEDURE.—This difference as to certainty arises precisely from the difference as to procedure, that is, from the difference of the minors which such sciences employ in their reasonings.

In the metaphysical and mathematical sciences, the minor premises are always essential or conceptual minor premises, whose predicate is implicit in the essence or analysis of the subject. The metaphysical minor premises are always either of the essence of being insofar as being (general metaphysics), or of the essence of such...

being (particular metaphysics), but always of the essence. In the same way, the lesser mathematics are always of the essence of quantity in general (pure mathematics), or of the essence of such a species of quantity (applied mathematics), but always of the essence. Thus, consisting of act and potency or requiring a cause is of the essence of contingent being; being immortal is of the essence of spiritual being; having its radii equal is of the essence of the circumference.

In contrast, in the physical or moral sciences, minor premises are not essential but accidental: their predicate is never essentially implied in the subject, but is always something outside the essence of the subject. Having human personality is not of the essence of man; not being a virgin is not of the essence of motherhood; having actual inherence is not of the essence of accident; actually burning is not of the essence of fire; loving or not loving one's children is not of the essence of the mother.

39. DIFFERENCE AS TO HOMOGENEITY.—From the difference as to process arises the other difference as to the homogeneity of its conclusions or of its progress. In the metaphysical or mathematical sciences, progress is homogeneous or of analytical evolution. In the physical or moral sciences, progress is heterogeneous or of extrinsic addition.

In effect, since the minor premises—whether metaphysical or mathematical—are of the essence or of the intellect of the major premises, the conclusions do not go outside the objectivity of the starting point, but are purely different aspects that were already included or implicit in it. The whole of metaphysics, in all its conclusions, provided they are true and rigorous conclusions, is nothing but an analytical and homogeneous development of the starting point of metaphysics, which is the intuitive apprehension of the idea of being as being. With that sole apprehension, and always employing minor premises already implicit in that starting point, the metaphysician develops his entire science; and if from the beginning he had sufficient intellectual strength to penetrate well all that is implicit in the starting point, he would have no need whatsoever for those minor premises. At the very starting point he would see intuitively, as the angels see it, all those conclusions which, owing to the weakness of our reason, we now see only through many minor premises, successively, by reasoning. These minor premises, therefore, have no purpose of adding something that was not already implicit in the starting point, but merely of helping our weak reason to see, bit by bit or through successive aspects, the same thing that was already implicit there from the beginning. The narrow photographic apparatus of our reason needs to take multiple photographs of the object from different points of view, because it cannot encompass in a single photograph or in a single act of vision all the richness and fecundity of faces or aspects of the starting point.

The opposite occurs in the poor physical or moral sciences, sciences of a non-essential, but accidental constitution; not analytic, but synthetic. The lesser physical sciences are not truly implied in the objectivity or essence of the greater ones; they are outside, and not inside, the point of departure. In the essence of man, human personality is not truly implied; in the essence of the accident, its actual inherence in the subject is not implied; in the essence of fire, that it actually burns is not implied; in the essence of stone, that it falls or fails to fall is not implied. And since one cannot see in a thing what is not truly implied in it, God himself cannot see with absolute certainty in the essence alone of a thing any physical or moral conclusion, any actual property or contingent effect.

For this reason, and said parenthetically, Saint Thomas and his school require in God an act of will, a free decree added to His intellect in order to be able to see contingent futures, that is, everything that is not of the essence of things. By the science of simple intelligence, and without the need of any decree of His will, God sees with absolute certainty everything that is essential: all metaphysical or mathematical conclusions. If He had no other science than that of simple intelligence, He could never know with absolute certainty a single physical or moral conclusion.

40. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—Therefore, the progress or evolution achieved through lesser metaphysical or mathematical means belongs to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the virtual implicit.

It does not belong to the first degree, called formal implicit or immediate implicit, because into that first degree there enters only nominal or improper reasoning, whereas the metaphysical and mathematical sciences, when their conclusions are conceptually distinct from their principles, require rigorous conceptual reasoning for our intellect, and therefore they are not only true and proper sciences for us, but the most proper and rigorous of the sciences. Nor does it belong to the third degree, called virtual non-implicit or purely connective, because, although proper and rigorous reasoning is involved, it is analytic or inclusive reasoning, not synthetic or of mere connection.

On the other hand, the progress or evolution made through physical minors belongs to the third degree of the scale, called virtual non-implicit. Not to the first, because its reasoning is not merely nominal. Nor to the second, because its reasoning is not one of analysis or inclusion within the concepts or aspects of the same thing, but pure connection or transition from one thing to another really distinct.

All this had been condensed by Saint Thomas in very few words. Objecting to himself that in every true science there must be proper reasoning or a transition from one thing to another, he answers: “In all “sciences” the mode of “reason” is preserved in this regard, that one proceeds “from one thing to another according to reason,” but not that one proceeds “from one thing to another thing”: this is proper to natural science.”¹

**41. COROLLARY.—**The phrase, then, of minors of reason, so frequently used in the question of dogmatic progress, is ambiguous, because the word reason can signify two things: a) the faculty, which we call reason, and whose proper act is reasoning; b) the reasons or minors that this faculty employs when reasoning in the various sciences.

Although the power reason is unique, and therefore the same in every kind of science, its reasons or minor premises can be multiple and essentially diverse. They can be minor premises of metaphysical reason and they can be minor premises of physical reason. The former are minor premises already implicit in the major premises or starting points of reasoning, and they are nothing but instruments that our reason needs to explain or develop—not to add to or modify—the objectivity of the major premise. The latter are not implicit in the major premises, and therefore they add to, and do not merely explain, the objectivity of the starting point.

42. TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCLUSION.—The classical formula with which Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy defines the scientific conclusion properly speaking, and therefore the proper and rigorous theological conclusion, is the following: Deduction of property from essence, or effect from cause.

Upon the true or false understanding of that definition depends, then, the true or false idea about the nature of evolution made by way of scientific or theological conclusion.

In this section we will study the nature of the passage from essence to its properties, and in the next, the nature of the passage from cause to its effects.

43. THREE SENSES OF THE WORD “ESSENCE”.—The essence of any thing can be taken in three very different senses, namely: a) pure essence or in the abstract; b) integral essence or in a connatural state; c) completely perfect essence.

The pure or abstract essence implies only the essential predicates. The integral or connatural essence embraces, in addition, all connatural predicates or integral parts that the essence requires to have according to the laws of nature. Finally, the completely perfect essence also comprises all the accidental perfections of which such an essence is capable.

Thus, he who has the essential predicates of “animal” and “rational,” or of “rational soul” and “body,” already has the pure or true essence of man, even if he lacks this or that member or faculty; for example, even if he is lame or maimed, deaf or blind. He who has not only the essential predicates, but also all the integral parts, already has the whole or connatural essence, although he may lack accidental or acquirable perfections, for example, although he lacks knowledge or virtue. He who has all perfections without exception, that is, both the essential, the connatural, and the acquirable ones, has the completely perfect essence.

We beg the reader never to forget those three states of essence if he does not wish to become entangled in the question of the evolution of dogma. These three senses of essence are not only distinct, but are perfectly stepped or graded among themselves. The third includes the second, and the second the first. Therefore the first is implicit in the second, and the second in the third, but the third is not implicit in the second, nor the second in the first.

Thus, when God reveals to us that “N. is man,” he could have done so in three distinct senses, namely: a) essential or true man; b) integral or connatural man; c) completely perfect man. Since explicit divine revelation is the starting point of every conclusion or progress according to each of these three senses, the conclusions that may be deduced implicitly or in the same sense will be very different; and therefore their homogeneity or heterogeneity with the starting point or revealed datum will also be very different.

The same thing that we have said of the word “man,” there is

what can be said about any other predicate contained in divine revelation.

44. TWO SENSES OF THE WORD "PROPERTY".—There are two completely distinct kinds of properties: a) essential properties, which are also usually called metaphysical, "aptitudinal" or radical; b) accidental properties, which also receive the names physical, actual or formal.

The first are truly identical with the essence, and not even by divine power can the essence exist without them. The second are really distinct from the essence, and without them the essence of a thing can be preserved absolutely.

These two kinds of properties are easy to distinguish. One thing, for example, is the aptitudinal inherence of an accident in its subject, which exists even in the Eucharistic accidents, and another is actual inherence. One thing is the radical capacity to see, which exists even in the blind man and not in a stone, and another is the actual capacity, which both the blind man and the stone lack. One thing is radical risibility, which is preserved even in one whose facial muscles are all paralyzed, and another is actual risibility. One thing is radical peccability, which every pure creature possesses, and another is actual peccability, which the Blessed Virgin did not possess. One thing is the radical capacity to die, which existed even in the state of innocence, and exists in Elijah and Enoch, and another is actual death. One thing is the requirement to burn, which existed in the fire itself of the Babylonian furnace, and another is actually burning.

And thus infinite examples could be given. Precisely in the distinction between radical or metaphysical properties and actual or physical properties is founded the possibility of the miracle or of the supernatural order as regards efficient causality. God cannot suspend metaphysical properties, since they are essential; but He can suspend physical properties, because they are accidental¹.

45. SIX TYPES OF REASONING OR PASSAGE FROM ESSENCE TO PROPERTY.—Since, then, the word essence has three different senses and the word property two, there are six (3 X 2 = 6) combinations: three from combining the three senses of essence with the first sense of property, and another three from combining those same three senses of essence with the second sense of property.

Thus, if we take as the type of essence the essence of man (essential or true man—connatural or integral man—perfect man) and as the type of property risibility (radical risibility—actual risibility), the following six types of reasoning between essence and property result:

First type: reasoning from pure essence to radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a true man): therefore he is radically laughable.

Second type: reasoning from the connatural or integral essence to the radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a whole man): therefore he is radically risible.

Third type: reasoning from the completely perfect essence to the radical property; e.g.: N. is a man (a perfect man): therefore he is radically laughable.

Tipo cuarto: raciocinio de la esencia pura a la propiedad actual; v. gr.: N. es hombre (hombre verdadero): luego es actualmente risible.

Fifth type: reasoning from the complete essence to the actual property; e.g.: N. is a man (a complete man): therefore he has actual risibility.

Sixth type: reasoning from the perfect essence to the actual property; e.g.: N. is a man (a perfect man): therefore he has actual risibility.

It is evident that no more types of reasoning about the essence of property are possible than those six, and that any other type reduces to one of them.

46. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—Of these reasonings, the six are a true passage from essence to property, and therefore the six are proper reasonings. None, then, of them belongs to the first degree of the scale.

All of these, except the fourth, are reasonings of inclusion or implicitness. They belong, therefore, to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the virtual implicit. As for the first three²³, the matter is evident, for they are essential properties included in the essence itself. As for the fifth and sixth, it is no less evident, for although the actual properties or accidental perfections are not included in the concept of the pure essence, they are included in the concept of the integrity or perfection of the essence. For something to be "perfect," it is necessary that it have the form (essence) and the things that pre-exist, and the things that follow (the properties) from it ⁴.

On the other hand, the fourth type is evidently reasoning of real distinction or accidental connection. It corresponds, therefore, to the third degree of the scale. It is the reasoning proper to the physical sciences.

In reality, all these six types of reasoning reduce to two: a) reasoning of real distinction or of pure connection without implication, and that is the fourth; b) reasoning of real identity or true implication, and those are the other five.

47. THE ATTRIBUTES IN GOD.—What in other beings are called properties, and which the ancients also called passions, receive in God the name of attributes. Now, between the divine essence and its attributes or between the different divine attributes the distinction is not real, but conceptual. Therefore, in the treatise On God the fourth type of reasoning does not apply. All progress, then, from the divine essence to its attributes or from one attribute to another belongs to the second degree of the scale, or virtual implicit.

48. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL RELATIONS.—Everything that has been said about the passage or progress from essence to its properties applies equally to the passage or progress from essence to the relations that this essence or starting point may have with other things, for it is the same for properties as for relations. "Properties are also said to be whatever can be predicated of another, whether they are negations or "habitudes" (relations) to other things. And many such things can be proved about God both from naturally known principles and from principles of faith." ⁵

The passage, then, from the starting point to any of its essential or aptitudinal relations belongs to the second degree of the scale, or implicit virtual. The passage to its accidental or actual relations belongs to the third degree, or purely connective virtual.

CONFIRMATION.—Among the many texts that we could add in confirmation of what we have been saying, we will choose the following three:

"Therefore, when that by which the nature of a thing is constituted—by which the nature itself is understood—has an order and dependence on something else, then it is clear that that nature cannot be understood without it: whether it be joined by that union by which a part is joined to the whole... or also joined in the manner by which form is joined to matter... or also separated in reality; just as a father cannot be understood without the concept of a son, although those relations are found in different things"⁶.

"For that inclusion is indeed called identical and essential when certain things are so related that one essentially includes the other, and conversely, as is clear in divine matters, where the divine essence essentially includes every attribute and, conversely, every attribute includes the divine essence itself; or when two things essentially agree in some third thing, as passions and affections do in being itself."⁷

There exist, on the contrary, relations, not accidental but essential, which are implied in a determinate essence or in one of its faculties. And the concept that expresses this essence expresses at the same time the relations it contains. Thus, being designates that which is related to existence, and this relation is included in the very nature of what exists... What we say of being in general and of its properties we can also say of all the analogous absolute perfections that common sense attributes to God, such as Intelligence, Wisdom, Providence, free Will, Love, Mercy, Justice"⁸.

49. COROLLARY.—The definition, then, of deductio proprietatis ex essentia, which is commonly given of the theological conclusion, as well as its classical example of Christ is a man, therefore he is capable of laughter, are ambiguous and admit of two radically different senses.

If by man is understood the pure essence of man and by risible the actual risibility, then such a conclusion is of the fourth type, and it is not an implicit conclusion, but purely connective, and it belongs to the third degree of the scale.

But if by “risible” is meant radical risibility (types one, two, and three); or even if actual risibility is meant, if by “man” is meant integral or perfect man (types five and six), the conclusion is implicit in the principle and belongs to the second degree of the scale.

To understand, then, the true mind of a theologian,

It is not sufficient to focus on whether he uses that definition and that example or not, but rather one must focus primarily on which of those two senses he uses them.

50. TWO KINDS OF CAUSES.—There are two kinds of essentially distinct causes, namely: a) causes really identical with their effects and distinguished from them only conceptually; b) causes really distinct from their effects.

Examples of the former we have in absolute immutability with respect to eternity, or in immateriality with respect to cognoscibility, or in spirituality with respect to immortality. Absolute immutability is called and is the cause of eternity, because the latter follows from the former, and the former is the reason for being of the latter. And yet they are not really distinct, but two aspects of the same thing. The same happens in the other two examples given and in infinite ones that could be given.

Examples of the second kind we have in fire with respect to the effect of burning, or in the gravity of the stone with respect to its effect of falling, or in the debt or cause of original sin with respect to the act of contracting guilt. Between fire and the burn, or between the gravity of the stone and its fall, or between the debt and original guilt, there is not only virtual causality or reason for being, but also a real distinction.

The first kind of causes are called metaphysical, or virtual, or in knowing causes; the second, physical, or real, or in being causes.

In the former, the cause contains in itself really not only the power of producing the effect, but the effect itself. Thus, in absolute immutability, eternity is really contained, and not merely the power of producing it. If we distinguish between immutability and eternity, or between immateriality and cognoscibility, or between spirituality and immortality, this is a distinction not real or objective, but our or subjective, for it is only a distinction of concepts or aspects, although grounded in the object itself.

In secondary causes, the cause truly contains the power to produce the effect, but it does not contain the effect itself. Fire contains the power to burn, but not the very act of burning, which is a thing really distinct from it and even entirely separable from it. It is a distinction not subjective or ours, but objective, or of the object itself.

51. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE.—The progress or reasoning from the virtual or metaphysical cause to its effects evidently belongs to the second degree of the scale, or implicit virtual. It does not belong to the first, because its distinction is not merely nominal, but conceptual. Not to the third, because between the metaphysical cause and its effects there is no real or objective distinction, but subjective or of aspects.

On the other hand, the progress or passage from the physical or real cause to its effects clearly belongs to the third degree of the scale for the contrary reason. It is virtual, purely connective, without objective inclusion or implicitness.

52. FIRST COROLLARY.—Of the definition deductio effectus ex causa we must say exactly the same as we said (49) of the definition deductio proprietatis ex essentia. It is an ambiguous definition. If in that definition by cause is meant the metaphysical or virtual cause or in cognoscendo, such a conclusion was already objectively implicit in the starting point. If by cause is meant the physical or real cause or in essendo, the conclusion is not implicit but purely connective. The reason for this is that the physical cause contains the virtue of producing the effect, but does not contain the effect itself. On the other hand, the metaphysical cause contains the effect itself and not merely the virtue of causing it.

53. CONFIRMATORY TEXTS.—Although what has been said seems quite clear to us, we shall cite some texts in confirmation of it, above all so that the distinction between the physical cause and the metaphysical cause may be well understood.

Let us hear the Ferrariense:

"Ad huius evidentiam considerandum est quod dupliciter loqui possumus, de demonstratione a priori (seu per causam): Uno modo, de ea cuius medium est vere et realiter causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum de quo demonstratur. Alio modo, de ea cuius medium non est vere et realiter causa, sed est tantum medium secundum rationem... Dicitur ergo primo: quod de Deo (theological sciences) nullo modo potest esse demonstratio primo modo accepta, cum in Deo nihil sit vere causatum... Dicitur secundo, quod utique neque entis neque generum generalissimorum (metaphysical sciences) est demonstratio isto modo, propter eamdem rationem. Dicitur tertio, quod non sequitur metaphysicam et mathematicam non esse scientias, quia licet per primum genus demonstrationis non possit aliquid de ente et generalissimis generibus demonstrari, potest tamen de ipsis aliquid demonstrari per secundum modum" ¹

Let us hear John of St. Thomas and Cardinal Cajetan: “It is answered that for a demonstration it is not required that it always proceed from a cause that is a cause formally and physically; but it suffices that it be so virtually and metaphysically, so that one stands as the reason of the other, even if it is not causing it, just as immutability is the reason of eternity and the perfection of goodness” ². “Hence, speaking in formal language, it is not incongruously said that immutability is the cause of eternity, and immateriality of immortality, and so on” ³.

55. REVEALED FORMULAS AND REVEALED MEANING.—In divine revelation, two elements must be carefully distinguished:

a) the revealed formulas, whether verbal formulas or imaginative formulas;

b) the revealed meaning of those formulas.

St. Thomas refers to these two by the names:

a) apprehension of the thing (acceptio rei);

b) judgment concerning the things apprehended (iudicium de acceptis).

Now then: the revealed sense, and not purely the formulas, is the formal element in divine revelation. If God had limited Himself to revealing new formulas to us without revealing their sense, that would not be true revelation, but mere vision, and such vision would be as useless for divine faith as Pharaoh’s divine dreams or Belshazzar’s divine vision of Mene, Tekel, Peres would have been, had God Himself not subsequently explained their divine sense through Joseph and Daniel.

For there to be true revelation and not mere vision, it is not necessary for the prophet or inspired author to understand the whole meaning that God intends to convey through such formulas, and which is truly enclosed in them. Nor is it necessary for the prophet or apostle, when promulgating the received revelation by word or in writing, to express in explicit terms the whole meaning that he is seeing with divine light in the divine formulas. Much less is it necessary for his hearers to grasp from the very first moment the whole meaning that the prophet's or apostle's formulas actually contain.

But it is indeed indispensable, for there to be true revelation and true divine faith, that God should have given some explicit sense to the revealed formulas; it is also indispensable that the prophet or apostle should have explicitly understood something, at least, of that divine sense; it is, finally, indispensable that the hearers of the prophet or apostle, which in our case is the primitive Church, should have understood from the very first moment some sense, but an explicit sense, of the apostolic formulas. Without any understanding of sense, neither would the one who receives the formulas from God be a true prophet, but rather a visionary or a dreamer, nor could the one who subsequently received them from the prophet or apostle perform any act of divine faith. The divine sense, and not the formulas, is therefore the formal element of revelation and of faith. The reception of divine formulas without a divine reception of any explicit sense, or progress in mere formulas without any progress of sense, does not properly deserve the name either of divine revelation or of dogmatic progress.

Let us listen to Saint Thomas:

Prophecy (or divine revelation) is a certain supernatural knowledge. Now for knowledge two things are required, namely reception (formulas) and judgment (meaning) of the things received. Therefore sometimes knowledge is supernatural in respect of reception only: sometimes in respect of judgment only: sometimes in respect of both. But if it is in respect of reception only (revelation of formulas without revelation of meaning) someone will not on this account be called a Prophet: as Pharaoh is not to be called a Prophet who supernaturally received a sign of future fertility and sterility under the figure of cattle and ears of grain. But if he has a supernatural judgment (sense), or simultaneously judgment and reception (sense and formulas), for this reason he is called a prophet¹.

“For unless the intellectual light is present for understanding the likenesses of sensible things formed in the imagination, he to whom such likenesses are shown is not called a prophet, but rather a dreamer. Sometimes he is called a prophet, but nevertheless improperly and very remotely”²

“It should be noted that there is a difference between vision and revelation: for revelation includes vision, but not vice versa. For sometimes things are seen whose understanding and meaning is hidden from the seer, and then it is vision only; as was the vision of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. But when with the vision there is had the meaning and understanding of the things that are seen, then it is revelation. Therefore as regards Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar the vision of the ears of grain and the statue was only vision: but as regards Joseph and Daniel, who had the meaning of the visions, it was revelation.”³.

“Faith cannot be actualized except by believing something determinately and expressly.”⁴

“For a man would not assent by believing to some things proposed, unless he understood them in some way.”⁵

That is why Cardinal Billot rightly said: “The reception of revealed truth does not consist in the material possession of the dead letter, but in the attainment of the sense and understanding of the sentences”⁶.

The point, then, of departure of dogmatic progress must be an explicitly revealed sense. Without some explicit sense, there can be nothing implicit or virtual, nor, therefore, any progress or evolution.

56. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAS IN THE DIVINE MIND.—As we have just seen, the divine meaning of the revealed formulas is what is essential in revelation and in faith. But that meaning can be considered in three distinct stages before reaching us, namely: a) in the divine mind, which conceived it and revealed it to the Apostles; b) in the mind of the Apostles, who received it from God and communicated it to the early Church; c) in the mind of the early Church, which received it from the Apostles and has transmitted it to us.

The meaning of the formulas was not in the divine mind partly explicit and partly implicit, partly immediate and partly mediate, partly formal and partly virtual, partly revealed and partly revealable. There, on the contrary, all meaning was and is most explicit, containing in a formal, immediate, actual state all the implicitness and virtuality of which such formulas are capable. If, then, when discussing whether there can be progress of meaning in dogma, we were to take as our starting point or point of comparison the meaning that this dogma has in the divine mind, in order to compare it with the meaning it has in us, it is clear that there has been no progress, but rather a diminution or regression. However much we unfold the dogmatic formulas, we will always know in them far less meaning than that which they contain and which God sees in them. When, therefore, theologians affirm that dogma progresses in meaning, it is evident that it is not progress if we take the divine mind as the term of comparison. Therefore, the starting point for assessing whether or not there has been an increase of meaning or dogmatic evolution is not the meaning as it exists in the divine mind. With respect to that starting point, no increase is possible.

57. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAS IN THE MIND OF THE APOSTLES.—Concerning the mind of the Apostles, something similar must be said to what we have said about the divine mind, not precisely because they received the revelation immediately from God, for the prophets and hagiographers also received it immediately from God, but because they received it as heads or leaders of the Church of the New Testament, in whom the fullness of divine revelation on earth was consummated and closed.

When it comes to mere prophets or inspired authors, it is not absolutely necessary that they explicitly know all the implicit meaning of the formulas that God reveals to them or inspires in them. According to St. Thomas, even true prophets do not know everything that the Holy Spirit intends to signify through the visions, sayings, or deeds that He reveals to them, and there is no inconsistency whatsoever in saying that we today know the meaning of the prophecies and revelations of the Old Testament much more explicitly and fully than the prophets themselves, because of the greater divine or dogmatic explanation of those prophecies and revelations that Jesus Christ, the Apostles, and His Church have given us ⁷

But the Apostles were much more than mere prophets or mere hagiographers.⁸ As supreme masters of the full and definitive revelation and as foundations of the Church until the end of the ages, traditional theology recognizes in the Apostles the special privilege of having received by infused light an explicit knowledge of divine revelation greater than that which all theologians or the entire Church have or will have until the consummation of the ages.

Therefore, all dogmas already defined by the Church and as many as may be defined in the future were in the mind of the Apostles, not in a mediate or virtual or implicit manner, but in an immediate, formal, explicit manner. Their way of knowing the revealed deposit was not, as in us, through partial and human concepts, which implicitly and virtually contain much more meaning than they express, and require effort and time to go on unfolding or successively explaining what they contain, but rather it was by divine or infused light, which is a simple supernatural intelligence that actualizes and illuminates at one stroke all implicitness or virtuality.

If, then, the sense of the revealed deposit, as it was in the mind of the Apostles, is taken as the term of comparison, in order to compare it with the sense that we know, then one must say something similar to what we said when speaking of the divine mind, namely, that there has been no progress, but rather a diminution or regression. We know and will know about the revealed deposit less meaning and less explicitly than the Apostles knew. When we speak, then, of dogmatic progress, it is not understood as progress over the Apostles. Therefore, the starting point or primitive datum for assessing whether or not there is dogmatic progress cannot be the apostolic mind⁹.)

58. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAS IN THE EARLY CHURCH..—Very different is what must be said of the revealed formulas, as they existed in the early Church. The Apostles communicated to the Church, in written or oral formulas, all that God had revealed to them for transmission. But concerning those revealed formulas, the Apostles did not give the Church the whole explanation or explicit sense that they themselves understood, and which was really and truly implied in those formulas. Instead, the permanent dogmatic magisterium gave it, which is nothing other than a perpetual prolongation of the apostolic divine magisterium, so as to go on explaining or unfolding more and more the implicitness of the deposit, as heresies, disputes, or the needs of each age might require.

The primitive Church thus received from the Apostles the entire deposit of Sacred Scripture and divine Tradition, without any need to expect, and without any possibility of, new revelation. But it did not receive from the Apostles that infused light which they had from God, enabling them to grasp at a single glance all the divine meaning truly included, though not formally expressed, in the revealed formulas. Therefore, such apostolic formulas, although of revealed and divine origin, are expressed in purely human language, and human formulas never succeed in expressing all the potentiality and meaning they implicitly contain, much more so when the sublime and fruitful divine realities are to be expressed by means of them. Such formulas resemble seeds pregnant with life or, better, trees overflowing with sap, which await only a favorable environment to develop into branches, flowers, and fruits the very potentiality and life that was already truly contained in them.

The true starting point, then, of dogmatic progress is the apostolic formulas just as they came from the pen or lips of the Apostles. Therefore, when the question is whether there has been dogmatic progress or evolution, or whether that progress has been only from the formal-implicit to the formal-explicit, or also from the virtual-implicit to the formal, it is a disorientation to focus on how those dogmas existed in the divine mind or in the apostolic mind. With respect to the divine mind or the apostolic mind, the question of formal and virtual, of mediate and immediate, of implicit and explicit has no meaning whatsoever. There everything was not only formal and immediate, but also explicit, and therefore the question of progress or evolution is meaningless.

What must be noted is how they were present not in the mind of God nor in the mind of the Apostles, but in the mind of the early Church: that is, whether in all our present dogmas they were already contained formally or only virtually in the written or oral formulas of the Apostles, giving to those formulas not precisely the meaning that the supernaturally enlightened intellect of the Apostles explicitly saw in them, but the meaning that such formulas of themselves express, understood as the early Church understood them.

59. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA.—As we have just seen, the starting point of all dogmatic progress is the revealed formulas that the Apostles delivered to the early Church. In these formulas, as in every formula of human texture, there is a part of meaning formally contained and another part of meaning virtually implied.

All Catholic theologians agree that not only are the formulas revealed, but also their immediate or formal content is revealed and, therefore, definable by divine faith. But is their mediate or virtual content also revealed and, therefore, definable by divine faith? If it is not, no true dogmatic evolution is possible, for there is no evolution without virtuality, nor dogmatic evolution without a virtuality that is truly revealed. If it is, dogmatic evolution is possible: evolution, because it is of virtuality; dogmatic evolution, because it is of revealed virtuality.

As can be seen, the whole problem of dogmatic evolution depends on the existence or non-existence of a true revealed virtuality. To resolve it, it is necessary, above all, that theologians be unanimous as to what is meant by revealed virtuality. But are theologians unanimous on that? That is what we are going to examine.

60. UNITY OF FORMULAS AND DIVERSITY OF MEANING.—As we said elsewhere (3), Catholic doctrine comprises four degrees: a) revealed datum; b) dogmas of faith; c) infallible truths; d) theological conclusions.

When it comes to determining the nature of each of these four degrees, all theologians agree on these four formulas or criteria: a) in Catholic doctrine there are truths revealed formally or immediately and truths revealed virtually or mediately; b) truths formally or immediately revealed constitute the proper or intrinsic object of divine faith; c) truths virtually or mediately revealed constitute the proper or intrinsic object of theology; d) the infallibility of the Church has as its primary object the truths formally or immediately revealed, and as its secondary object, the truths virtually or mediately revealed.

To avoid useless repetitions of synonymous names, we state once and for all that, in this matter, formal is the same as immediate, and virtual, the same as mediate¹.

On those four formulas or criteria that express the nature of the objects of divine faith, of sacred theology, and of the infallibility of the Church, there is complete unanimity among theologians, both ancient and modern. But unanimity in the formulas matters little if there is divergence in meaning.

Indeed, as the reader will have noticed, divine faith, theology, and infallibility are all defined in these formulas in terms of two objects: the formally revealed and the virtually revealed. Accordingly, depending on how the immediate and formal revealed and the mediate or virtual revealed are distinguished from or identified with each other, faith, theology, and infallibility will be distinguished from or identified with each other. The slightest variation in the nature or extension of these objects will necessarily carry with it the same variation in their respective habits. Under identical formulas, each author may say or understand different things simply by having a different idea of the meaning of those two names, immediate or formal and mediate or virtual.

Thus, when it is a question of knowing what a given author thinks about the nature or extent of divine faith, theology, or infallibility, it is useless to look at whether that author employs those formulas; rather, one must look at in what sense he takes the names formally or immediately revealed and virtually or mediately revealed, which form the basis of the four formulas. Everything depends on that.

Well, then: in this section we propose to show that, from Suárez to the present, the generality of theologians give to the names “immediately or formally revealed” and “mediately or virtually revealed” a meaning completely different from that which traditional theology, and especially St. Thomas, gave to them and understands; that, having a different idea of those two objects, they consequently also have a different conception concerning the nature and extent of divine faith and of sacred theology; that, by having modified the sense of those two objects, they have modified the true sense of the formulas, as a result of which there occurs the curious phenomenon of which I speak².

There are authors who, using identical formulas, understand radically different things, while others, using different formulas, understand exactly the same thing; and, in short, from that variation introduced by Suárez in the meaning of the terms “formal” or “immediate” and “virtual” or “mediate” proceeds that persuasion of many that no true dogmatic evolution is possible by way of virtuality or theological conclusion, and that exasperating difficulty which certain theologians and apologists find in reconciling the teachings of common theology with the evident facts of the history of dogmas.

To make this clear with all possible clarity, we will briefly set out four points: a) St. Thomas's doctrine on what is meant by properly virtual or mediate revelation; b) Suárez's innovation; c) the consequences of that innovation; d) the root of the modern confusion on this question.

I.—THE VIRTUAL REVEALED ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS

61. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.—To understand well what St. Thomas means by immediate or formal and by mediate or virtual, one must understand well the difference between simple intelligence and reason, or between intuition and discourse.

Indeed, our faculty of intellectual knowledge, although it is a single power, encompasses, unlike that of God and of the angels, two distinct functions or ways of knowing. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, gives them two distinct names: a), simple intelligence, which in Latin is called understanding; b), reasoning or discourse, in Latin reason.

By the first of those two functions of our one and only intellectual power we know through a single and simple act of intuition, immediately, without discourse properly so called. By the second, we know through successive acts, mediately, by discursive reasoning.

The fact of needing or not needing discourse proper marks the dividing line between simple intelligence and reason, between intuition and science, between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual.

When it is knowable by us without true discourse, it is simple intelligence, it is intuition, it is immediate or formal. When we cannot know it except through discourse properly so called, it is for us not simple intelligence but science; not immediate or formal, but mediate or virtual.

Therefore, when our intellect perceives the truth or falsity of a proposition merely by hearing it or by the simple exposition of the terms, without employing any new idea, the knowledge is immediate or formal, of simple intelligence. In that case there is no step or transition (discursive reasoning) from one concept to another, but rather an instantaneous perception of the relation between the predicate and the subject or, at most, a passage from the name to the idea, not from one idea to another. Thus, for example, to assent to the proposition that the whole is greater than the part, it is enough to hear the proposition or, at most, to define or explain the simple meaning of the terms whole and part, without the intervention of any other concept whatsoever.

From this follows the following corollary, of the utmost importance in Thomistic doctrine, namely: “For a proposition to be for us immediate or formal, and not mediate or virtual, two things are required and suffice: a) that to know its truth or falsity we need no reasoning whatsoever; b) that, if we do need reasoning, it be reasoning improperly so called, that is, reasoning ordered solely to ascertaining the formal meaning of the terms.”

Essentially different is the other function of our intellectual knowledge, called reasoning or science. Many times, in order to perceive the truth or falsity of a proposition, it is not enough for us to know or ascertain the formal meaning of the two terms, that is, of the predicate and the subject, but rather we need the intervention of a new term or concept, the intervention of a third term, virtually distinct from the two original ones. By means of that new concept, with which we compare the concepts of the subject and predicate, and only by means of it, can we know the truth or falsity of said proposition, by virtue of the principle of all reasoning which says: those things that are the same as “a third” are the same as “each other”.

This second manner of knowing is what is called, in the language of St. Thomas, mediate or virtual, because the truth or falsity of the proposition is not seen in itself, but through or by virtue of another concept. The function of our reason, which knows in this way, is called reasoning or science; the truths thus known are called virtual or mediate, and the discourse thus employed is called proper discourse, whether the new term is only conceptually distinct, without being really distinct, as happens, for example, in the mathematical sciences; or whether it is really distinct, as happens in the physical sciences.

62. COROLLARIES.—From which these two corollaries are also deduced, no less fundamental in the doctrine of St. Thomas, namely: a) for a conclusion or truth to be for us virtual or mediate and not immediate or formal, it suffices that we cannot know it without reasoning properly so-called; b) for there to be reasoning properly

That said, it is not required that the new formula or deduced conclusion be really distinct, but rather it suffices that it be virtually or conceptually distinct.

The reader will pardon us for having dwelt on explaining so obvious a thing and one which we had already indicated elsewhere (24-27), since it is a most fundamental point for anyone who wishes to understand the doctrine of St. Thomas on the nature and distinction of divine faith and theology and to penetrate well how dogmatic evolution is possible without an increase in real objectivity³

63. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR SUPERNATURAL KNOWLEDGE.—Just as the ideas of simple intelligence and reason relate to each other in the natural order, exactly in the same way do the ideas of divine faith and theology relate in the supernatural or revealed order. The reason for this is that revelation is, in the supernatural order, what intrinsic evidence is in the natural order.

The starting point in the natural order is the first principles.

Principles of reason known by pure intuitive evidence, immediately, without discourse strictly speaking. Likewise, in the supernatural order, the point of departure is the first principles of faith or the propositions that compose the primitive or revealed datum, known by simple revelation, immediately, without any discourse (31).

Everything that our intellect perceives in the first principles of reason without any discourse, or with discourse improperly so called, such as all discourse ordered to knowing the meaning of terms, is immediate or formal, not mediate or virtual. In the same way, everything that our intellect finds in the revealed datum without any discourse or with discourse improperly so called is revealed immediate or formal, not mediate or virtual.

Everything that in the natural order our intellect cannot see without its own reasoning or without the intervention of a new concept is for us science or reason, not simple intelligence or intuition. In the same way, everything that in the revealed datum or revealed premise we cannot see without our own reasoning or without the intervention of another new concept is for us theology or theological science, not simple intelligence or divine faith.

As can be seen, the whole doctrine of St. Thomas on the distinction between faith and theology, or between what is immediately or formally revealed and what is mediately or virtually revealed, in the supernatural order, is perfectly based on the distinction between simple intelligence and reason, or between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual in the natural order⁴.

The parallelism could not be more complete. Intrinsic evidence is the formal motive of both understanding and reason in the natural order; revelation is the formal motive,

Both of faith and of theology, in the supernatural. Natural evidence is divided into evidence in itself and evidence in another; the former is immediate or formal evidence; the latter, mediate or virtual evidence; the former is the formal motive of simple intelligence or intuition; the latter, the formal motive of science or reason. In the same way, supernatural revelation is divided into revelation in itself and revelation in another; the former is immediate or formal revelation; the latter, mediate or virtual revelation; the former is the formal motive of faith; the latter, the formal motive of theological science.

St. Thomas does not have two philosophies or two nomenclatures, one for the natural order and another for the supernatural, but rather the same philosophy and the same nomenclature that he uses in the natural order for simple intelligence and reason and for immediate or formal and mediate or virtual evidence, which are the two cognitive habits and their two specific objects in the natural order, that same nomenclature, and in the same sense, he applies to divine faith and to sacred theology, and to immediate or formal and mediate or virtual revelation, which are also the two cognitive habits and their two specific objects in the supernatural order.

64. COROLLARIES.—Whence there likewise follow two other parallel corollaries, no less fundamental in the doctrine of St. Thomas, and which he who does not wish to become entangled in these questions must not forget, and they are: a) it is, for us, virtual or mediate revelation, and not formal or immediate, every truth that we cannot deduce from the revealed datum or revealed premise except by means of our own reasoning; b) it is, for us, our own reasoning, and, therefore, virtual or mediate revelation, every reasoning in which the new formula or deduced conclusion expresses a distinct concept, although it does not express a distinct reality from the revealed datum or revealed premise from which it is deduced (27).

Everything said thus far is the ABC of St. Thomas's doctrine, as every Thomist knows; if anyone, however, still desires a broader study of the difference between immediate and mediate revelation, he will find it later in the fourth section of the third chapter of this work, nos. 157-169, where we will examine the relations between the authority of the Church and mediate or virtual revelation.

II.—SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION ON THE VIRTUAL REVEALED

65. The eleventh section of the third disputation of Suárez's treatise On Faith is epoch-making in the history of theology. The title of that section is: "Whether virtual or mediate revelation suffices for the formal object of faith." To this title, so important for the question of the development of dogma, Suárez added this other subtitle: "Wherein is treated the formal distinction between the objects of faith and theology"⁵.

66. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION.—The subtitle of the question very clearly indicates that Suárez fully recognized the importance of what he intended to treat, and that the distinction or formal identification between divine faith and theology depended entirely on the nature of what is revealed virtually or mediately.

Suárez begins by observing, and rightly so, that the question proposed in the title amounts almost to this: “Whether a proposition elicited by discourse from two principles of faith, or from one premise of faith and another natural one, is to be believed as a matter of faith.”⁶ Under this rubric, seemingly without consequence, and which many manuals dispatch in four words, as if it were some antiquated question, lies hidden the entire modern problem of the homogeneity or transformism of Catholic dogma.

That question, translated into modern terms, is exactly the following: When over the course of the centuries divine revelation (premise of faith) comes into contact or combination with what we call human civilizations or philosophies (premise of reason), is the result (conclusion) of that contact the corrupting or transforming of the primitive gospel, or only the developing of it homogeneously? Does that result, which the ancients designate by the name of conclusion, have the same value as the gospel, for that means being of faith, or does it have only human value, for that means not being of faith, but a pure theological conclusion?

We make these observations, which will be commonplace to theologians of the true stamp, because there is no lack of superficial theologians who seem to understand only the outer shell of scholastic nomenclature and who, when treating the development of dogma, say quite calmly that the ancients dealt little or not at all with this question. There is scarcely any modern question related to dogma that the ancient masters of Scholasticism did not treat, and treat very thoroughly; and to them the theologian must turn if he wishes to find truly fundamental principles for resolving it. But let us return to Suárez.

67. SUBDIVISION INTO TWO QUESTIONS.—Suárez, following in this the Thomistic tradition, subdivided the proposed question into two others: first, whether that conclusion, deduced from a

premise of faith and another of reason, it is of faith before the definition of the Church; second, whether it is of faith after the definition. The first question he treats from number 2 to number 11, and the second in numbers 11 and 12.

68. UNANIMITY REGARDING THE SECOND QUESTION.—Regarding whether the theological conclusion is of divine faith after the Church’s definition, Suárez notes that the affirmative answer is unanimous among theologians, to such an extent that, among all the great theologians who preceded him, there is only one who has said the contrary, and that one is Molina.

69. TRADITIONAL SPIRIT OF SUÁREZ.—Unlike his predecessor Molina, his contemporary Vázquez, or his successor Ripalda, Suárez is an eminently traditional spirit, and when an opinion is common among theologians, he very rarely takes the contrary side. Thus, despite the affection and almost respect with which he always treats Molina, Suárez cannot, in the present question, contain his astonishment (it is to be wondered at, he says in no. 3) that Molina has dared to deny, against all tradition, that the theological conclusion, even after its definition by the Church, is of faith; and against Molina he establishes, not as probable doctrine but as certain, the following thesis: “Thirdly, it must be said that a theological conclusion, after it is defined by the Church, is formally and most properly of faith, not only mediately but immediately. This opinion seems to me certain and to be held from the common consensus of theologians. Nor in this do I find a theologian contradicting”⁷

Thus far Suárez moves on firm ground, as does everyone who follows an opinion common to all the great masters of theology. That this opinion was not only common but completely unanimous before Molina seemed so clear to Suárez that he did not even wish to linger over citing the texts of those theologians. We will cite them later, classified by centuries, in the final chapter of this work (352-398).

70. ECLECTIC SPIRIT OF SUÁREZ.—Highly traditional when it comes to common doctrines, Suárez is one of the most eclectic spirits when it comes to questions in which his predecessors are divided. Between two opposing schools, Suárez rarely declares himself unconditionally for either of them. His most frequent approach is to make some distinction or observation of his own devising, with the laudable intention, no doubt, of shortening the distances between adversaries. An end, no doubt, very laudable in intention, but not always philosophical and frequently dangerous; for when one seeks to harmonize heterogeneous or contradictory systems, one runs the danger of, instead of settling anything, entangling everything. That is the danger of all eclectic or concordist spirits, and Suárez fell into it, as we shall see, when treating the first question of whether the theological conclusion was a matter of faith before its definition by the Church.

71. TWO OPPOSITE OPINIONS REGARDING THE FIRST QUESTION.—Regarding that question, Suárez found that theological opinions were divided.

A first opinion affirms that the virtually revealed or theological conclusion is of divine faith by itself or before the definition of the Church, and that anyone who deduces it by evident reasoning can give it the assent of divine faith. Such, says Suárez, is the opinion of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega, although we hope to show elsewhere (449), and Suárez himself later acknowledges ⁸, that Cano is not of that opinion. Finally, Suárez notes, and very rightly, that all those who do not specifically distinguish the habits of divine faith and theology have to follow that opinion of Vázquez and Vega.

A second opinion, which Suárez qualifies as radically contrary (extremely contrary), holds the negative view, namely, that before the Church's definition the virtually revealed or theological conclusion is not of divine faith, but a mere theological conclusion, and no other assent can be given to it than theological assent. This is the opinion, says Suárez, followed by Capreolus, Cajetan, all the Thomists, and clearly St. Thomas: Which is commonly held... by Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Thomists, and "clearly St. Thomas" ⁹

72. SUÁREZ'S ATTITUDE.—If Suárez had been a faithful Thomist, in the manner of Capreolus or Cajetan, Báñez or Medina, John of St. Thomas or Gonet, Gotti or Billuart, one could already calculate in advance what opinion he was going to follow. Having just confessed that the two opinions in question were irreconcilable with each other (extremely contrary), and that St. Thomas clearly followed the second opinion (and plainly St. Thomas), a dyed-in-the-wool Thomist would have declared himself without hesitation for that second opinion.

But Suárez, rather than a Thomist, is, as we have said, one of those eclectic minds who have never sworn on the word of the master, even if that master is called Saint Thomas.

Thus, instead of declaring himself wholly and frankly for neither of these two opposed opinions, Suárez prefers to declare himself partly for one and partly for the other, that is, to agree in part with Vázquez and Vega and in part with St. Thomas. To that end he introduces into this question an element of his own invention, to which he gives the name of the "formal-confused" revealed. In our judgment, this formal-confused has been the true cause of all the confusion that reigns in post-Suarezian theology regarding the definability of the true and proper theological conclusion as a matter of divine faith—or, what amounts to the same thing, regarding the development of dogma by way of a proper and strict implicit virtuality. The notions of the formal revealed and of the virtual revealed are correlative, and the slightest modification introduced into the understanding of one of them flows back upon the understanding of the other, modifying in parallel the notions of divine faith, theology, and dogmatic progress, which are notions correlative to those of the formal and virtual revealed.

73. THE CONFUSED FORMAL AND THE PROPER VIRTUAL, ACCORDING TO SUÁREZ.—In philosophy, two genera of properties are distinguished, and, consequently, two classes of virtuality and of conclusions. The properties of the first genus are those that express only a concept distinct from the essence or principle from which they are deduced; those of the second genus express not only a distinct concept, but also a distinct reality or objectivity. The former are really identical with the starting point, and, therefore, inseparable from it even by divine power; the latter are really distinct and absolutely separable. The former are called metaphysical, or essential, or radical properties, and constitute the implicit virtuality of the metaphysical and mathematical sciences; the latter are called physical, accidental, or formal properties, and constitute the virtuality that is not implicit, but purely connective, of the physical sciences (44).

Now then; Suárez considers that first kind of properties or virtuality not as virtual properly speaking, but as truly formal, albeit confused formal; and he regards as proper virtual only the second kind of properties, or virtuality, or conclusions.

Therefore, under the new name of formal-confused revealed, Suárez includes two classes of conclusions: a) conclusions deduced through improper reasoning or a simple explanation of terms, such as the conclusions in which the defined is deduced from the definition, the parts from the whole, the particular from the universal, or one correlative from another, and which modern theologians usually call formal implicit; b) conclusions conceptually distinct from the revealed premise, and which therefore are really identical with it and absolutely inseparable from it, which is what today is usually called virtual implicit, or virtual identical, or virtual connective-essential (32-33).

By contrast, under the name of proper virtual, or of theological conclusions properly so-called, he understands only those conclusions that express something really distinct and in no way separable from the revealed premise from which they are deduced. This is what modern authors call purely virtual, purely mediate, purely connexive (“only” virtual, “only” mediate, “only” connexive), and what we always designate as non-implicit virtual or physical-connexive virtual ¹⁰. This is for Suárez the true and proper revealed virtuality, the true and proper theological conclusion, the proper and rigorous theology ¹¹.

Perhaps to one who, without being versed in these matters, reads Suárez for the first time, it will not seem clear that Suárez understands under the name of confused formal all that we have just attributed to him. But we are sure that all the true disciples of Suárez, and even anyone who reads with attention all that eleventh section of the third disputation of the treatise On Faith that we have been examining, will agree with us that this is the true mind of Suárez. Suffice it to cite in confirmation a by no means suspect testimony, that of Ripalda: “The third opinion is middle (that is, middle between the opinion of Vázquez and Vega and the opinion of St. Thomas and the Thomists), namely, that the object of such a conclusion is believable by faith when it is really identified with the revealed object, but not if it is really distinct and separable from it: and therefore the metaphysical property of the nature is credible by faith as the revelation of the nature itself, but not the physical property. And hence the radical risibility, and remote, of Christ pertains to the faith by which we believe Christ to be a man; but not the formal risibility, and proximate, which we suppose to be separable and distinct from the nature, although the conclusion of both is deduced from the revelation of the humanity and at the same time from evident knowledge, by which humanity is radically and proximately risible. Thus Suárez and Lugo” ¹².

One may likewise see Lugo¹³, Haunoldo¹⁴, Cardinal Mazella¹⁵ or any other Suarezian author.

74: SUÁREZ'S SOLUTION.—Once that distinction between the confused formal and the proper virtual has been made, Suárez is already perfectly logical and traditional, and he does nothing more than apply Thomistic principles to the solution of the question. According to Thomistic doctrine, everything formally revealed is of faith, and everything virtually revealed is in itself a matter of theology.

Thus, then, to the question of whether the revealed virtuality or theological conclusion is of divine faith in itself or without definition by the Church, he very logically answers with the following two conclusions:

1st. If it is a question of that virtuality or conclusions called formally confused, they are in themselves of faith or before the Church’s definition, and the theologian can give them the assent of divine faith provided only that he knows them through evident reasoning. “On this—says Suárez—I agree with the first opinion, that is, with Vázquez and Vega.”

2. If we are dealing with conclusions qualified as properly virtual or purely virtual, they are not in themselves of divine faith, nor can they be given the assent of divine faith, but only theological assent. “In this—says Suárez—I follow Capreolus, Cajetan, and St. Thomas.” It is worthwhile to cite, in Latin and literally, the text of Suárez:

“I say therefore first: Formal revelation, even if confused, suffices for the formal object of faith and consequently for assenting by faith to the particular contents contained under such revelation, if it is sufficiently applied to them and a person uses reasoning in a suitable manner for assenting. In this assertion I agree with the first opinion... I say second: Merely virtual or mediate revelation does not suffice for the formal object of faith, and consequently an assent founded on it, with the help of some naturally evident principle, does not suffice for a proper assent of faith, but only for theology. Besides the cited authors... Cajetan holds this opinion not obscurely... and St. Thomas likewise thinks the same... where also Capreolus”¹⁶

75. TRADITION AND INNOVATION.—In this position taken by Suárez, one should carefully distinguish the part that Suárez has preserved from the Thomistic tradition and the part in which he has innovated.

Suárez has remained traditional in four things: a) in preserving the division of the revealed into immediate or formal and

mediato or virtual; b) in affirming that the former is of itself the object of divine faith, and the latter of itself the object of theology; c) in denying, against Vázquez and Vega, that what is virtually revealed is a matter of faith of itself, or without a definition by the Church; d) in maintaining, against Molina, that it is a matter of faith after the definition.

In contrast, Suárez has been innovative in two respects: a) in not considering as virtual properly speaking anything but the non-implicit or physical-connective virtual, really distinct from the formal and absolutely separable from it; b) in considering as formal, although with the qualifier of confused, the implicit or essential virtual, that is, all conclusions really identical with the revealed premise, although conceptually distinct from it.

Thus, in Suárez's theory the division between formally revealed and virtually revealed is nominally preserved, which are the two specific objects of faith and theology. But under the new label of confused Suárez has furtively transferred to the department of the formally revealed or of divine faith all implicit virtuality, that is, all theology strictly speaking; for, as is evident and as we shall see in the following sections, no rigorous theological conclusion is possible, just as no rigorous metaphysical or mathematical conclusion is possible, except through that implicit or essential virtuality.

76. GRAVITY OF SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION.—To understand the immense significance of this innovation of Suárez, it suffices to reflect on three things.

1.ª That implicit virtuality, in order to be deduced or explained by our weak human reason, always requires reasoning of its own, and frequently complicated and profound, as is seen in the mathematical or metaphysical sciences. Now then: to qualify such virtuality as formal or immediate, making it in itself of divine faith, is to overturn completely the whole doctrine of St. Thomas, who excludes from the domain of divine faith, which is simple understanding, everything that our reason cannot know without reasoning of its own.

2nd. That the implicit virtuality encompasses all conclusions really identical and objectively homogeneous with the revealed premise or deposit of faith. Therefore, to exclude that virtuality from the properly theological domain, in order to transfer it to that of faith, is to leave theology without any homogeneity or objective continuity with the revealed deposit, opening a hiatus or objective abyss between the dogmatic material and the properly theological material.

3rd. That the implicit virtuality, because it is based on a

real identity and the inability to fail without the very principle of contradiction failing is the only thing that can give reasoning or conclusion an absolutely certain certainty, which not even God himself can cause to fail. Therefore, to remove that virtual from theology is to leave theology properly so-called without absolute certainty, with a certainty inferior to metaphysical or mathematical certainty, with only the certainty of the absolutely fallible and contingent physical sciences (37).

III.—THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION

77. This innovation of Suárez gave rise to an interesting historical-theological episode of incalculable consequences for the question of dogmatic progress, and one which, as far as we know, has not been noticed until now. Three first-rate theologians took part in it: Suárez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses.

Before Suárez, no renowned theologian, with the sole exception of Molina, had denied the definability of faith of what traditional theology called virtual revelation. Consequently, none had denied the definability of faith of the third and fourth degrees of Catholic doctrine. Understanding, as they did, by virtual the inclusive virtuality, its definability offered no difficulty, since such virtual is in itself or objectively identical with what is formally revealed. In defining it, therefore, as of divine faith, the Church thereby taught us nothing other than what was from the beginning objectively implicit in the revealed deposit.

On the contrary, since with Suárez's innovation the virtual came to be understood as something really distinct from the revealed premise, and therefore not objectively implicit in what is revealed, which is the same as saying not revealed, the problem of the definability of faith and the objective homogeneity of the last two degrees of Catholic doctrine found itself faced with an insoluble difficulty. In his determination to resolve it, Suárez resorts to an unheard-of and dangerous theory: the theory of new revelations. Lugo tries to correct Suárez's slip; but without correcting the starting point, he ends up in another theory, not so dangerous but no less untenable: the theory of indefinite or transforming assistance. Finally, the Salmanticenses realize that the knot, as Suárez and Lugo had left it, was insoluble; and being unable to untie it, because they had not noticed where the tangle lay, they cut it with the bold stroke of their famous nego maiorem, denying, like Molina and against all theological tradition, that the Church has ever defined or can define as of divine faith the revealed virtuality:

Since this episode has had serious consequences for all subsequent theology and we know of no one who has noticed it until now, we are going to describe it, briefly setting out: a) Suárez’s new revelations; b) Lugo’s transforming assistance; c) the famous I deny the major of the Salmanticenses.

A) First consequence: Suárez's new revelations

78. The laws of logic are all the more inflexible the greater the talent of the one who employs them, and once a wrong step is taken, especially in the definition or understanding of primordial notions, the final outcome is always absurd. “A small error in the beginning is great in the end,” St. Thomas had already warned. This is what happened to the great talent of Suárez because he misunderstood the concept of the virtually revealed, which is a most fundamental concept, upon which depend the other concepts of faith, theology, and dogmatic progress.

Indeed, with the new definition that he gave of the virtual revealed properly so-called, Suárez immediately found himself between a rock and a hard place, for he encountered these two propositions: a) the virtual revealed properly so-called comprises only truths really distinct from the revealed truths and, therefore, not revealed; b) the Church has defined as of divine faith truths virtually revealed or properly so-called theological conclusions.

The antinomy between these two propositions is too evident to have escaped a talent such as Suárez. If the virtual properly so-called is objectively distinct from the formal revealed, it cannot be implicitly revealed, and nothing that is not truly revealed, at least implicitly, can ever be defined as of divine faith, unless we suppose that the definition of the Church is a new revelation that makes revealed what before the definition was not revealed. To admit new revelations is something unheard of in Catholic theology, and so far was Suárez from ignoring this that he frequently repeats it in various parts of his works.

However, Suárez rightly saw that there was no other means than that, if one wanted to harmonize the two aforementioned propositions; and of those two propositions, the first was Suárez’s personal doctrine on the virtual revealed, and the second was an undeniable fact of the history of dogmas. What to do? Must we deny the evident facts of history because they oppose certain theories, or should the theories be modified, insofar as necessary, to adjust them to the reality of History?

Suárez does not hesitate, and softening the phrases as much as he can, for he feels the extremely delicate and grave nature of his position, he resolutely affirms that the definition of the Church is a new divine testimony, a new revelation. God, he says, speaks to us anew in every definition of the Church; the testimony that He gives us of a truth through the Church has the same value as that which He gave us through the Apostles or prophets, and therefore amounts to a true revelation. Thus, what was not revealed before the definition becomes revealed through the definition, and is consequently of divine faith. Let us hear the words of Suárez himself:

"The reason, indeed, is that what the Church defines, God testifies through the Church. But the Church defines such a truth (that is, the virtual objectively distinct) in itself and formally: therefore by that very fact it is sufficiently constituted under the formal object of faith. For divine testimony is the same and equally certain, whether it is given through itself, or through the Church or another minister... Therefore it is a sign that the Church has proximate and immediate infallibility, from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is equivalent to revelation, or, so to speak, perfects it"¹⁷

Although Suárez's thought is quite clear from the whole context, it will not be superfluous to cite the testimony of two illustrious theologians, both of Suárezian affiliation: "Therefore, so that it may be believed afterwards as a matter of faith, it is necessary that it be revealed anew by God, and this will happen through the Church's definition, as Suárez held"¹⁸. "Suárez teaches that the theological conclusion is a matter of faith, because he thinks that in that case the Church's definition is a new revelation"¹⁹.

After the Vatican Council, this opinion of Suárez can no longer be maintained. Rightly, Cardinal Mazella, without naming its author, calls it intolerable: It can no longer be tolerated²⁰. Behold to what a false conception of the properly so-called revealed virtuality led a theologian of Suárez's stature"²¹

B) Second consequence: Lugo's indefinite assistance

79. Cardinal Lugo's treatise On Faith is neither less extensive nor less profound than that of Suárez. Lugo treats the question of revealed virtuality, the basis of dogmatic evolution, in the first disputation, thirteenth section, which bears the title: “The difference between the habit of faith and the habit of theology is inferred from what has been said.” Lugo divides the section into three paragraphs, the first of which is entitled “On the conclusion deduced from one premise of faith and another naturally evident”²².

Following Suárez and the entire Thomistic tradition, Lugo begins by subdividing the question into two further questions: a) the theological conclusion before the Church's definition²³; b) the theological conclusion after its definition²⁴. With regard to the first question, Lugo recounts the two completely opposed opinions that we already know: the opinion of Vázquez and Vega, which affirms that it is of faith in itself or without definition, and the opinion of St. Thomas and his school, which affirms that in itself or without definition it is not of faith, but purely theological²⁵.

Before deciding in favor of one of these two opinions, Lugo

According to St. Thomas, no private revelation can ever become a matter of Catholic faith. “Our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not upon any revelation made to other teachers” (Summary of Theology, pt. 1, q. 1, art. 8, reply to objection 2). If the Church ever approves such revelations, that approval requires of us only a pious or human faith. “It must be known that this approval is nothing else than a permission for them to be published for the instruction and benefit of the faithful after mature examination; inasmuch as to such revelations thus approved, although the assent of Catholic faith is neither due nor can be given, yet the assent of human faith is due, according to the rules of prudence, according to which, namely, such revelations are probable and piously credible” (BENEDICT XIV, On the Beatification of the Servants of God, bk. 2, ch. 32, no. 11).

Various ancient theologians, even Thomists, sometimes call the definitions of the Church revelation. But since they expressly say that such definitions extend only to explaining more fully what was already truly implicit in the revealed deposit, they understand by revelation what today we call—and should call, in order to avoid confusion—mere divine assistance. In this sense of the ancient theologians, Valencia says: “However, whether that new assertion or clearer proposition of the Church, because it is infallible through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who likewise assisted the canonical writers, is to be called new revelation, or because it does not contain a new truth unknown to the Apostles, is not to be so called, is a question of name (GREGORY OF VALENCIA. On Faith, d. 1, q. 1, point 6, vol. 3, p. 128).”

Suárez is not censurable, then, precisely for having used the name new revelation, but for having used it with regard to things that he himself confesses were not implicitly contained in the revealed deposit. In this sense Cardinal Mazella is right in saying that it can no longer be tolerated.

He explains the notions of formal and virtual revealed truth in exactly the same way as Suárez. For Lugo, every conclusion really identical, though conceptually distinct, with the revealed deposit is formal, albeit confused, revealed truth. The properly virtual revealed truth embraces only conclusions that are really distinct and absolutely separable by divine power²⁶. Having made this distinction, Lugo maintains with Suárez and the whole Thomistic school that the virtual is not of faith in itself or before definition²⁷, and he answers several objections against that doctrine²⁸.

It remains for Lugo to resolve the second question, which is the most important, namely, whether what is virtually revealed is a matter of faith after the definition. Lugo recounts the negative opinion of Molina and the theory of new revelations that Suárez has employed to support the affirmative opinion. The learned cardinal rejects both as contrary to the whole theological tradition. Against Molina he establishes that what is virtually revealed is truly of divine faith after the definition, and this—he says—is the common opinion of theologians and the constant practice of the Church. “Which, beyond the arguments adduced by Suárez, is confirmed by the practice and usage of all.” Against Suárez he also establishes that, in order to define the revealed virtuality, the Church neither has nor needs new revelations, and that this too is the common sentiment of theologians. “For here seems to be the common sense of theologians”²⁹.

Up to this point the path has been easy for Lugo, but upon arriving here he found, as he was bound to find, the same Gordian knot that Suárez had found. Lugo has just admitted, with Suárez and with the whole tradition against Molina, the definability as a matter of faith of what is virtual. Lugo has understood the virtual as revealed in the same sense as Suárez, that is, as the virtual objectively distinct from what is formally revealed, and therefore not revealed. Finally, he has rejected, with all the theologians, Suárez’s theory of new revelations, which was the only thing by which the difficulty seemed capable of being resolved. How is Lugo going to resolve it? How can something virtual that is not revealed be defined as a matter of faith, and therefore as revealed, if the theory of new revelations is rejected?

If it were a question of an implicit virtual, and therefore revealed, such as that which Suárez and Lugo have qualified as formally confused, its definability would offer no difficulty whatsoever³⁰.

Nor would there be one—adds Lugo—if it were a conclusion deduced from two premises of faith³¹. But it is not a question of that, but of a virtual, the so-called virtual in the proper sense, which evidently is not revealed. That such a virtual is not revealed had already been established by Lugo³² with these beautiful and convincing words, on which the Salmanticenses later relied: «However much revelation and the revealed object may be explained, the object of the conclusion will never be found to have been said by God». Now then: if such a virtual is not truly said by God, which is the same as not being revealed, how can it be defined by the Church as of divine faith, that is, as revealed, without a new revelation?

This is where Lugo gave a very clear demonstration of the skillful flexibility of his wit. Here is his curious solution. It is true—says Lugo—that such a virtual truth is not truly revealed. But it is no less true that the assistance of the Holy Spirit in all definitions of the Church is revealed, and therefore in each one of them. Hence, after the definition of such a virtual truth by the Church, we already have two revealed propositions, namely: a) the Holy Spirit assists the Church in all definitions; b) the Holy Spirit assists the Church in this definition of such a virtual truth. Thus, such a virtual truth, once defined, is deduced not from one premise of faith and another of reason alone, as it was deduced before the definition, but is now deduced from two premises of faith, and therefore is of faith. Let us copy from the literal text of Lugo:

«God could have testified not to the things themselves but only to His assistance, so as not to permit the Church to be deceived by proposing something false; and from this revealed assistance of God we infer that this object proposed by the Church is true: not because God has explicitly revealed this object, but because its truth follows from the revealed assistance of God. It follows, however, not from one revealed proposition together with another unrevealed one, but from two revealed propositions, namely from these: “what the Church proposes and defines cannot be false, with the Holy Spirit assisting her so that she may not err,” and again, “the Holy Spirit assists the Church when she defines that Christ is capable of laughter.” Of these propositions, the first is a matter of faith... the second is also a matter of faith because... (the first proposition) is universal and contains all particular cases, and therefore this one as well... Furthermore, that a proposition which follows from two revealed propositions is also a matter of faith is to be seen in the following points»³³.

Suárez had said: “Such a virtual, unrevealed [thing] is a matter of faith.”

after the definition, because the definition of the Church is a new 'revelation.' Lugo says: "Such an unrevealed virtual truth is of faith after the definition, because the assistance of the Holy Spirit to define it is revealed."

As can be seen, Lugo takes for granted the very thing he had to prove, namely, that the Church can define such a virtual. As we shall see in due time, such a virtual cannot be defined by the Church either as a matter of faith or as infallible. With this theory of Lugo one could equally prove that the Church can infallibly define the number of stars in the sky or the number of drops of water in the sea. Rightly too, Cardinal Mazella, referring to this theory of Lugo, though without naming him, said the following: "Therefore the Church will be able to define whatever it pleases, prescinding from other objects contained in the revelation handed down by the Apostles, and attending only to the promise of assistance that it may not err."³⁴

In these two theories of Suárez and de Lugo the problem of the homogeneity of the evolution of dogma would offer no difficulty whatsoever. However great the apparent changes in doctrine, however deep the hiatus or discontinuity between the primitive datum and subsequent developments, one easily escaped the difficulty by appealing to new revelations with Suárez or to the unlimited and transforming assistance with Lugo. That is where a bad definition or conception of the revealed virtuality properly so-called can lead, even to theologians as eminent as Suárez and Lugo.

C) Third consequence: a famous "I deny the major" from the Salmanticenses

80. Following Lugo and Suárez came the renowned Salmanticenses theologians, and with them the question of the definability, as of divine faith, of the virtual proper, understood in the manner of Suárez and Lugo, ended in lamentable tragedy.

The Salmanticenses treat the question of virtual revelation in Question IV of the first disputation of their notable treatise On Faith, from numbers 124 to 133³⁵.

By virtual revelation properly so-called, the Salmanticenses understand, with all theologians, what is deduced from the revealed deposit as an effect of its cause. But, in the style of Suárez and de Lugo, they understand by cause the natural or physical cause, which is always really distinct from its effect. Consequently, they only regard as virtual revelation

that which is really distinct from the revealed deposit and, therefore, not revealed; with which it is extremely easy for them to establish and prove with numerous reasons the following conclusion: “Thirdly, it must be said that the virtual revelation of some truth in its adequate or inadequate cause—as, for example, that Christ is visible was revealed in the proposition ‘He was made man’—does not suffice for the formal reason under which the habit of faith assents, and therefore the aforesaid truth is not of faith, but a theological conclusion”³⁶. The proofs continue up to number 134; but before finishing them, they warn us that in that cited conclusion they have spoken of the natural cause or in being. “It is answered by denying the major premise concerning the natural cause, whether in being and appearing, of which we have spoken in our third conclusion”³⁷.

Once the causality or revealed virtuality is understood in the sense of Suárez and Lugo, the Salmanticenses had to meet with the same difficulty with which they themselves had met, namely, with the fact that the Church has defined as of divine faith truths that are virtually revealed. That difficulty is all the more serious in that the fact clearly results from the history of dogmas and is admitted without any exception by all theologians before Molina.

The Salmanticenses are aware of it, as Suárez and Lugo had been, and they set it before themselves in the form of an objection, whose major premise is the following: “The Church often defines as matters of faith to be believed several truths that are not formally revealed in Sacred Scripture, but are legitimately deduced from what is made known therein, together with other natural principles”³⁸

To respond to that major premise, which is the basis of the objection, the Salmanticenses cite and reject the Suarezian theory of new revelations as contrary to the truth and to all theological tradition³⁹. They then cite and also reject Lugo’s theory of indefinite and transforming assistance as contradictory and worthless⁴⁰.

Once those two solutions of Suárez and Lugo are rejected, the Salmanticenses realize that it is futile to attempt any new solution. The virtually revealed, as the Salmanticenses together with Suárez and Lugo understand it, is a virtual that is not revealed either explicitly or implicitly, and what is not revealed can never be defined as a matter of faith. Now then: since what the Church cannot do must be supposed from the outset that it has never done, the Salmanticenses cut the Gordian knot with one bold stroke and, with a solemn I deny the major, make a clean sweep of history, denying that the Church has ever defined anything virtually revealed, any theological conclusion properly so-called. Here are their words:

— «Hence, having omitted this and other solutions, we respond to the argument, by denying the major. For the Church never defines as a dogma of faith that which is not presupposed to its definition as formally revealed in Sacred Scripture, at least confusedly (therein is indicated the mind of the Salmanticenses: the confused formal of Suárez) and implicitly... But that which only is included in a revealed proposition as an effect in its cause (the pure virtual or physical-connective of Suárez and Lugo), since it is not said and attested by the Holy Spirit, cannot be defined by the Church as a dogma of faith»⁴¹

Never had any theologian before Molina, whether of the Thomist school or of any other school, dared to hurl that I deny the major of the Salmanticenses, which is a complete denial of everything that the history of dogmas teaches and that the opinion of theologians unanimously admits up to the end of the sixteenth century. And yet, it must be confessed that the Salmanticenses are in this more logical than Suárez and Lugo. Once the non-implicit virtuality is understood as revealed virtuality, as Suárez and Lugo understand it, it is impossible to admit that the virtual is definable as an article of faith; and the Salmanticenses do well to deny it. But if the Salmanticenses showed more logic in this than Suárez and Lugo, Suárez and Lugo showed much more historical sense than the Salmanticenses⁴²

However, in principle, there is no human principle—however universal—that has no exception in particular cases; Homer himself is not so vigilant as never to sleep. Incomparably greater than the authority of the Salamancans is that of the Prince of Commentators, the Cardinal.

IV.—SUMMARY: TWO HISTORICAL DATES AND WHERE THE CONFUSION LIES

81. In the history of theology, as in the history of other sciences, there are facts that form an epoch by being the starting point of a new orientation, good or bad, but on which subsequent developments depend. Now then: in the capital problem of the definability as a matter of faith of the revealed virtuality, which is none other than the problem of the development of dogma, there are two historical epochs marked by two names equally illustrious: Suárez and the Salmanticenses.

Up to Suárez, all the great theologians, with the exception of Molina, had defended or taken for granted as indisputable truth the de fide definability of the virtual. For traditional theology the following equation was evident:

Virtually revealed = definable as a matter of faith.

The only question on which the theologians differed was whether the revealed virtual was a matter of faith before or after the definition. The former was affirmed by Vázquez and Vega and by all those theologians of more or less nominalist affiliation who did not distinguish between the habits of faith and of theology. The latter was affirmed by the Thomists and by all who know how to distinguish between theology and faith. But all were unanimous in defending the definability of the revealed virtual, for by revealed virtual they understood a virtual implicitly, but really and objectively, revealed.

Then comes Suárez, and with the new notion that he gives of the virtual revealed, and which Lugo later accepts, he completely modifies the first member of the equation, for he understands by virtual revealed a virtual that is not implicit, and therefore not revealed, although it continues under the name of revealed.

In every equation, once one of the mem-

Cardinal Cajetan. And a Thomist as conservative and moderate as the learned Father Norberto del Prado does not hesitate to write about him, with regard to the interpretation of a particular point in St. Thomas: "Cajetan, however, like good Homer who sometimes nods, certainly nodded in the interpretation of the corollary that St. Thomas placed at the end of the article" (St. Thomas and the dogmatic bull "Ineffable God" [Fribourg, Switzerland, 1919], p. 196).

Finally, notwithstanding the authority of John of St. Thomas, which is not inferior to that of the Salamanca theologians, a Thomist through and through such as Fr. Santiago Ramírez, O.P., wrote, last year, these words so expressive and ingenious that every Thomist ought to treasure in his heart: "It remains to be seen whether, in John of St. Thomas, everything is from St. Thomas, or whether there is also something of John!" (Thomistic Science, March 1922, p. 183).

The act of criticizing a theologian—however great he may be—on a particular point does not in the least diminish his authority. So that the other schools may be persuaded of the impartiality of the criticisms we direct at one of their theologians—even those as illustrious as Scotus, Suárez, and Lugo—the best means is not to avoid the criticisms, or to disguise them under euphemisms because they are our own theologians, be they called John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, or Billuart.

brothers, the other cannot remain identical. But since the second member is supported by the whole theological tradition and by evident facts in the history of dogmas, Suárez and Lugo, with an excellent traditional spirit, strive to keep it intact, even having to resort for that purpose to theories as singular as that of new revelations and transforming assistance. With Suárez and Lugo, the traditional equation thus becomes converted into the following:

Virtual (not) revealed = definable as a matter of faith.

The word no, placed in parentheses, indicates that Suárez and Lugo still continue to give it the name of revealed, even though, according to the notion they give of it, it is not revealed.

The Salmanticenses come, and with them the traditional equation enters a new phase. These most learned Thomist theologians, who never forgive Suárez and Lugo any lapse, at once perceive the incoherence of that equation of Suárez and Lugo. But the manifest falsity of the theories of new revelations and transforming assistance which Suárez and Lugo have placed in the second member of the equation as props to support it draws all the attention of the Salmanticenses toward that second member; and this makes them fail to notice that the origin of the evil comes to that equation not from the second member, but from the first. Thus, with a solemn I deny the major premise, they correct the defects of the second member, hardly taking notice of the first, and the equation is thereby formulated in this way:

Virtual (not) revealed = not definable as a matter of faith.

As can be seen, the transformation of the traditional equation is complete. The two members, which were positive, have become negative. The first no was surreptitiously introduced by Suárez with his new notion of the virtual. The second no was the fruit of the inexorable logic of the Salmanticenses.

Modern theological writers, in their treatises on faith or theology, almost all depend on one of these three great theologians, as will be noticed at once by looking at their citations. The only difference among them is that, if they are not rigorous Thomists, they usually cite Suárez and Lugo preferably, and if they are, the Salmanticenses. Since these three theologians agree in understanding by "virtually revealed" a virtual that is not implicit and, therefore, not revealed; that is the notion of the virtual that the majority of modern authors give. And since to defend the definability of such a virtual one would have to resort to the inadmissible theories of

Suárez and Lugo, and almost all of them, agree with the Salmanticenses in denying the definability of what they call virtual revealed.

As for all the other theological conclusions—that is, the conceptual or really-identical conclusions—almost everyone, following Suárez and Lugo, conceals them under the name of confused formal, implicit formal, or virtual really-identical, and makes them not only definable as matters of faith, but as faith in itself or without definition.

This is what has confused certain apologists who have wanted to defend the homogeneous evolution of dogma or the homogeneity of the third and fourth degree of Catholic doctrine. They have seen that that third and fourth degree were evidently of revealed virtuality. They have also seen that almost all modern theologians seem to deny the definability of the virtual. From this they have concluded that it was not possible to defend dogmatic evolution without going against the almost common opinion of theologians. All because they fail to notice that in the formulas of formal and virtual, used since Suárez, there is frequently hidden a confusion that makes it appear that what is ultimately admitted is denied ⁴³

The difficulty on this question lies in two things: a) in that many reserve the traditional name of virtual revealed to signify only a non-implicit virtual, which is neither virtual revealed nor virtual theological, but virtual physical, incapable of being the object of true theological certainty or of the infallibility of the Church, as we shall see in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter; b) in that under the name of confused formal they have concealed and still conceal all that is truly and rigorously virtual revealed and theological.

From this there have resulted among modern theological writers two curious phenomena: a) that when they deny the definability of the virtual or theological conclusion, they deny only the definability of the Suarezian virtual or non-inclusive conclusion; b) that when they affirm the definability as a matter of faith of the confused formal or real-identical virtual, they affirm the definability as a matter of faith of the true revealed virtual and the homogeneous evolution of dogma by way of true implicit or conceptual virtuality.

82. CONFIRMATION.—To confirm this, we will cite two modern theologians, chosen from among the many we could cite. First, the learned Cardinal Mazella: “If the question concerns a truth that is implicitly contained in another explicitly revealed truth, with which it is nevertheless identical only really, not formally, Ripalda, the Würzburg theologians, and others hold that it is not revealed; De Lugo, Suárez, etc., however, teach the contrary. And this opinion seems to be the one to subscribe to... But if the question concerns an object that is said to be contained in another explicitly revealed object, insofar as it is only connected with it or follows from it (this they call a properly virtual comprehension), even Suárez, De Lugo, etc., deny that it is in itself spoken by God and believable by divine faith ... I would nevertheless employ here a distinction that seems also to be in accordance with the mind of those Doctors: for if the implicit object follows upon the explicitly revealed truth in such a way that in no hypothesis can it be separated from it, and this becomes known without a new revelation, I would say that it is revealed: for otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object could in no way stand; or it can be separated from it, at least by the absolute power of God, and then the opinion of Suárez, De Lugo, etc., returns, concerning which we will say immediately what we think. Thus our doctrine is established. Proposition XVII: That which is formally and implicitly contained in some explicitly revealed truth is in itself a material object of faith; but that which is contained in it only virtually, inasmuch as, although necessarily connected with it, it is nevertheless distinguished from it both really and formally, indeed can be separated by divine power, does not seem to belong as such to the object of faith.”⁴⁴.

Secondly, another wise theologian, Fr. Sola: “Thesis 76: A truth formally implicitly contained in what is explicitly revealed belongs, in itself, to the material object of faith. The same is more probably to be said of those things which are contained in the explicitly revealed [truth] materially and identically, or essentially connectedly, but not formally. Censure: the first part, that is, that a truth formally contained in what is explicitly revealed is, in itself, the material object of faith, or truly and really revealed, is certain and common against Arriaga... The second part is in reality most common and much more probable, at least if the real identity of both can be certainly known by us without a new revelation. Among the older [authors] Suárez and Lugo hold it... and the more recent [authors] commonly, against Ripalda, the Würzburgers, and others... Thesis 77: Things which are contained only virtually in what is explicitly revealed are not, in themselves, the material object of faith” ⁴⁵

Although expressed in different terms, this doctrine of Cardinal Mazella and Father Sola is found in most theologians after Suárez and Lugo. Anyone who reads them attentively will immediately observe that when they deny the definability of the virtual revealed or theological conclusion, they understand by virtual the false virtual of the fourth type; and when they admit the definability of the formal revealed or affirm that only the formal, or identical, or essential revealed can be defined, they understand by formal, or identical, or essential, the true virtual of the other five types (45-46).

Whatever opinion one follows on this point of the definability of the virtual revelation, it will be impossible to interpret the true thought of theologians after the sixteenth century, unless one clearly distinguishes between the false virtual of the fourth type—introduced into theology after Suárez—and the five remaining types of true virtual revelation.

83. The THEOLOGIANS BEFORE MOLINA.—Before undertaking to examine whether or not there exists true revealed virtuality, and in what that virtuality consists, it is fitting to give first a brief summary of the different opinions of Catholic theologians on this matter.

All theologians before Molina, without a single exception that we know of, maintain that the true revealed virtuality or true theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith, which is the same as maintaining that true evolution in dogma is possible.

There is no more difference between these theologians except that the Thomist theologians, who have always specifically distinguished faith from theology, are careful to note that, although the theological conclusion may be definable as of divine faith, it is not, however, formally of divine faith, but purely theological, before the definition of the Church. Whereas the Scotists and the nominalists, who have not distinguished or have not been clear in distinguishing specifically faith from theology, are content to say that every theological conclusion is of divine faith, without distinguishing between before and after the definition.

But all, Thomists and Scotists, agree that it is definable as a truth of divine faith, and, therefore, it is a true dogma of faith if the Church defines it. Hence Suárez, who knew well the tradition of the School, said without hesitation: "This opinion seems to me certain, and to be held from the common consensus of theologians, nor in this do I find any theologian contradicting"¹. And with no less reason and historical judgment, Lugo added: "That, besides the arguments adduced by Suárez, the practice and use of all confirm it"². On this point no historical doubt is possible.

84. MOLINA'S INNOVATION.—Molina was the first among the theologians to affirm that no true theological conclusion, however inclusive or implicit it may be, such as the conclusion that there are two wills in Christ, is or can be of true divine faith, either before or after the definition of the Church. If, then, the Church defines such conclusions, even though she defines them with the dogmatic formula of anathema, as she defined the two wills in Christ at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, they do not merit the assent of true divine faith, but a theological assent founded on reasoning, since it is by reasoning that the Church knows and defines them. There can, therefore, be no growth in dogma or truly dogmatic evolution³.

This truly innovative opinion of Molina was defended with no less ardor than talent by Granados and later followed in part by Ripalda, and in its entirety by Kilber or the so-called Wirceburgenses with some others. This is also the opinion that, at least in appearance, the Salmanticenses and Billuart followed, because they failed to notice the Suarezian confusion concerning the virtual revealed.

On the other hand, that innovation of Molina was vigorously opposed not only by all the Thomists before the Salmanticenses, including John of St. Thomas, but also by Suárez and Lugo and by the vast majority of theologians, without distinction of schools, prior to the introduction of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

That innovation of Molina, destructive of all dogmatic evolution, merited the following judgment from the illustrious Navarrete: “This opinion contains many false things, which for now we do not wish to mark with censure, because it is not sufficiently clear what that author thought... Therefore the aforesaid author (Molina) errs greatly in that he asserts that the theologian, by the habit of theology, assents to that truth, as the Church deduces it: for although the Fathers who were present at the said councils deduced that conclusion by the habit of theology, nevertheless, with the definition presupposed, they gave their assent to it by the habit of faith” ⁴. The Thomist Nazario labeled it, without mincing words, Molina's error ⁵.

That is that innovation of Molina which caused such astonishment in Suárez that he could not help exclaiming: It is to be wondered at ⁶. Finally, concerning this innovation, the Jesuit Schiffini has said in modern times: “Suárez marvels at the novelty of that (Molina’s) opinion, and censures it as contrary to the common consensus of theologians” ⁷.

85. THE POSITION OF VÁZQUEZ AND VEGA.—For Vázquez and Vega, every true theological conclusion is not only definable as of divine faith, in which they agree with the traditional opinion against Molina, but it is in itself of divine faith, even before being defined, and every theologian who deduces it by evident reasoning must or can give that assent of divine faith, in which Vázquez and Vega follow the Scotist or nominalist line against the Thomist.

Indeed, for Vázquez every evident theological conclusion can be considered, even before the definition of the Church, under two aspects: a) formally, or insofar as it is a conclusion; b) materially, insofar as it is contained in the revealed premise or premises. Under the first aspect, it merits theological assent; under the second, assent of divine faith, even before the definition of the Church. These are the two celebrated assents which Suárez later applied (and which almost all modern theologians apply) to the formal-confused or metaphysical-inclusive conclusions, and which the Salmanticenses, against all Thomistic tradition, later applied to conclusions deduced from two revealed premises⁸.

The reason on which Vázquez bases his claim that conclusions known by evident reasoning are for the theologian an object of divine faith even without a definition by the Church is that reasoning stands in relation to the theologian’s private reason as the definition of a Council stands in relation to the whole Church. “Theological demonstration is related to the theologian who demonstrates it in the same way as a Council, when it declares that something is a matter of faith, is related to the whole Church. The only difference is that the Council proposes to all what it defines as something to be believed, so that all may be bound to believe: but theological reason only for those for whom the consequence from the articles of faith is evident⁹.

From this theory of Vázquez have arisen both the distinction currently made between dogmas of divine faith and dogmas of Catholic faith, and the theory that the authority of the Church is absolutely necessary for the faith of simple believers, but not for the faith of learned theologians; a distinction and theory that are false and with which we will deal later (135-156).

In short, it is concerning this theory of Vázquez that the ordinarily so moderate John of St. Thomas says the following: "But that the opposite opinion seems to equate the certainty of a theological conclusion with the definition of the Church, cannot be tolerated at all... Otherwise, a conclusion derived theologically would not need the definition of faith as confirming it and as the rule of its certainty, if it has in itself as much certainty, with respect to the theologian who infers it, as the definition of the Church; and thus the theologian would be a sufficient rule for himself in the certainty of matters of faith, without recourse to the Church, which would be a most pernicious error"¹⁰.

86. THE THEORY OF SUÁREZ AND LUGO.—The reader already knows the theory of these two distinguished theologians. It consists in distinguishing two virtual revealed truths: the metaphysical-inclusive and the physical-connexive. With respect to the first, they affirm the same as Vázquez and Vega, namely, that it is not only definable as a matter of faith, but that it is of divine faith, even before being defined, for every theologian who knows it with evident reasoning. Consequently, they applied to this virtual truth or conclusion the two assents of Vázquez.

Regarding the second, they believed that that was the proper virtual itself and the proper theological conclusion itself, and they applied to it the same doctrine that the Thomist tradition applies to every true revealed virtual, namely, that it is not of divine faith, but purely theological, before the definition; but that it is of true divine faith after the definition. Only that, having considered as a proper virtual a non-implicit virtual and, therefore, the non-revealed virtual, they had to resort, as we have already seen, to the theories of new revelations or of indefinite and transformed assistance (72-79).

87. THREE THEORIES, NOT TWO.—With regard, then, to whether theological conclusions or the virtually revealed are or are not of faith, there are not, as the manuals commonly say, two opinions: one of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega, and another of the remaining theologians; rather, there are three essentially distinct theories: two diametrically opposed to each other, namely those of Molina and Vázquez, and one that occupies the middle ground between them, which is the Thomistic.

The first, which is Molina's, denies that they are of divine faith either before or after the definition. This theory, followed by few theologians and censured or abandoned by most, is what later gave rise, as we shall see in due course (233), to the so-called ecclesiastical faith, applying to dogmatic facts almost the same thing that Molina had applied to theological conclusions.

The second, which is that of Vázquez and Vega, takes the opposite pole, affirming that they are of divine faith not only after, but also before, the definition. Melchor Cano never followed this opinion, although the contrary is commonly said, as we hope to demonstrate fully later on (449-464). But Suárez and Lugo did follow it, with respect to the metaphysical-inclusive conclusions, and the generality of modern manuals follow it, scarcely realizing it, under the name of confused formal or of virtual identical-real.

The third, midway between the two preceding ones, is the traditional Thomist theory, which distinguishes between before and after the definition. Before the definition, no true theological conclusion, not even one deduced from two revealed premises, is of divine faith, nor can it merit an act of divine faith; rather, it is purely theological and can merit only theological assent, the same for the learned theologian as for the simple faithful. But after the dogmatic definition of the Church, every true theological conclusion (and only the metaphysically inclusive one is a true theological conclusion, as we shall soon see) is as much of divine faith as the articles of faith themselves.

These three theories concern the true theological conclusion, that is, the metaphysically inclusive conclusion; for before the Suarezian conclusion, no theologian had thought to call the physically connective one a true theological conclusion. Therefore, if we were to include that physically connective virtual under the name of theological conclusion or of the revealed virtual, one would have to say that there is a fourth opinion, namely, the opinion of Suárez and Lugo, who say about that false virtual or theological conclusion exactly the same thing that the third opinion says concerning the true conclusion or true virtual. This fourth opinion is the one that the Salmanticenses actually combat, and with irrefutable logic, by denying that the pure virtual (only virtual) is definable as a matter of faith; although in appearance they seem to combat the definability of every virtual, because they did not distinguish between the true virtual and the physically connective virtual.

The third of those theories, which is the traditional Thomistic one, John of St. Thomas expounds it thus: "The third opinion is that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, if they are defined by the Church, immediately pertain to faith... The Thomists commonly follow this opinion, as can be seen in Master Navarrete and Master González"¹¹. And in the treatise On Faith, alluding to this same passage, he expresses himself thus:

"From the aforesaid it is inferred that virtual or mediate revelation, or that deduced by reasoning, such as is found in theology, is distinguished specifically from immediate revelation, which is obtained from the testimony of the speaker, and attains that which is to be believed as a matter of faith, as we have handed down more fully in the first part, first question, second disputation, fourth article, where we rejected two extreme opinions: one, that of Vázquez, who thinks that a conclusion drawn from the premises of faith is so certain with respect to one who knows the arguments just as a proposition defined by the Church: the other, that of Molina, who thinks that even if a definition of the Church should supervene upon some proposition that previously was not a matter of faith, it would not make it a matter of faith: but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not, however, so as to make matters of faith those things that previously were not matters of faith. These opinions in the cited place can be seen impugned"¹².

As the reader will have noticed, of those three theories about the metaphysical-inclusive conclusion, the third, which is the Thomist one, defends its definability as a matter of faith, and, therefore, defends the evolution of dogma by way of a true theological conclusion. The second, which is that of Vázquez and Vega, of Suárez and de Lugo, not only defends it, but defends it excessively by making such conclusions not only definable as a matter of faith, but also formally of faith in itself or without definition. Only the first, which is that of Molina, of Kilber, and of a few others, is the one that denies its definability as a matter of faith and, therefore, the true evolution of dogma.

It may, therefore, be said that the definability of faith of inclusive or conceptual conclusions and, hence, the evolution of dogma by way of implicit virtuality, is common doctrine among theologians, even among those of today, although many manuals seem to say the contrary because they do not distinguish between an inclusive conclusion and a physical-connective conclusion.

88. INTRINSIC STUDY OF THE PROBLEM.—Leaving aside, then, this question of the opinions of theologians—all the more so because at the end of this work we shall cite the literal texts of almost all of them (353-448)—let us now examine in itself the question of the evolution of dogma, which is not, at bottom, anything other than the question of the existence and nature of the virtuality of the revealed deposit, together with the question of the nature and extent of the authority of the Church with respect to that virtuality.

As we have already seen (46), the six types of virtuality or of reasoning are reduced to two: physical-connective virtuality, which is that of the fourth type of reasoning, and metaphysical-inclusive virtuality, which encompasses the other five types. In the following sections we are going to examine whether these two virtualities, or either of them, are truly revealed and capable of dogmatic evolution, and whether for that dogmatic evolution the definition of the Church is required or not. These are extremely important questions, for they are the center and the key of the existence of dogmatic evolution and of the specific distinction between dogmatic evolution and theological evolution.

89. THE VIRTUAL OF THE FOURTH TYPE.—We have seen how, from Suárez onward, what has been properly called the revealed or theological virtual is the physical-connective virtual, that is, the fourth virtual among the six types of reasoning or virtuality that we already know (45 and 73).

In this section we are going to try to show that this physical-connective reasoning is not rigorous theological reasoning; that it is not a rigorous theological conclusion; that it does not conclude in theology; that it is not virtual theological or revealed; that it is not necessarily connected with the revealed major premise or revealed deposit from which it is to be deduced. And if it is not virtual revealed or theological, if it is not necessarily connected with the revealed deposit, much less will it be an object of infallibility, and still less definable as divine faith. These assertions of ours will seem to many to clash with what, since Suárez, has been said in most theological manuals; but we believe that it is not difficult to give a conclusive demonstration of this and to show that in this whole question there is nothing but a confusion between pure essence or essence in the abstract and connatural or perfect essence¹.

90. THREE PRELIMINARY NOTES.—Let us recall, first of all, that in this physical-connexive reasoning the aim is to deduce, as a conclusion, not the metaphysical, or essential, or aptitudinal, or radical properties, but the physical-actual properties, and that we suppose these physical-actual properties are really distinct from the essence and absolutely, or by divine power, separable from it (44).

Let us recall, secondly, that to deduce such properties that are really distinct and in no way separable, we begin from the essence in its pure state or in the abstract, that is, we suppose that God has revealed nothing more to us than that N. has such an essence; but without saying a word to us, either expressly or implicitly, about whether that essence is in a connatural or preternatural state, in an integral or deficient state, in a perfect or imperfect state.

Let us recall, thirdly, that we are trying to deduce not a conditioned conclusion, but a simple or absolute conclusion. That is, assuming that we know by revelation that N. is a man (pure essence, or in the abstract), we are not trying to deduce “therefore N. is actually risible if he is in a connatural state,” but rather we are seeking to deduce in this way: “therefore N. is actually risible.” If we were trying to deduce the conditioned conclusion, we would also be outside the case, for deducing that “N. is actually risible if he is in a connatural state” becomes this other [proposition]: “N. is in a connatural state, therefore he is actually risible,” which is no longer the reasoning of the fourth, or physico-connective, type with which we are now dealing, but the reasoning of the fifth type, of which we grant not only that it is theological, but that it is definable as being of divine faith.

These preliminary remarks having been made, which, even at the risk of being accused of repeating too much, we have believed indispensable given the delicacy of the question, we are going to adduce the proofs on which we rely to believe that the reasoning of the fourth or physical-connective type does not conclude in theology nor can it, therefore, be or be called a true virtually revealed nor a true theological conclusion, except in the broad sense in which not only what is demonstrative or conclusive is called a conclusion, but also what is theologically uncertain and probable.

91. FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL REASON.—It is an axiom in logic that from what is true nothing false can ever follow or be concluded, or that if a conclusion is false, it must be either because one of the premises is false, or because the reasoning is badly done. Let us, then, examine one or several reasonings of the true virtual physical-connective sort or of the fourth type, that is, reasonings in which, knowing by revelation the pure essence of a thing, one seeks to deduce in the conclusion a physical-actual property by means of a minor premise of physical necessity.

By revelation we know that the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist is true body; that the Eucharistic accidents are true accidents; that the fire of the Babylonian furnace was true fire, etc., etc. By physical science we know, with full certainty or physical necessity, that every body has local extension or occupation of place; that every accident has actual inherence in the subject; that every fire duly applied does in fact burn, etc. Let the following reasonings, then, be of the fourth type:

1.º The body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist is a true body: now, every body in fact occupies a place, therefore the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist in fact occupies a place.

2nd. The Eucharistic accidents are true accidents: now, every accident has actual inherence in the subject; therefore, the Eucharistic accidents have actual inherence in the subject.

3rd. The fire of the Babylonian furnace was true fire and applied under the proper conditions: thus all true and well-applied fire burns in fact, therefore the fire of the Babylonian furnace burned in fact.

4th. The fire of hell or of purgatory is a true body: since nothing corporeal can torment or imprison a spirit, therefore the fire of hell or of purgatory does not torment or imprison spirits.

5.º Elijah was a true man: since every man dies in fact, therefore Elijah has died in fact.

6.º Jesus Christ is true man: now every man is a human person and is conceived by the work of a man; therefore Jesus Christ is a human person and conceived by the work of a man.

7th. The Most Holy Virgin is a descendant of Adam and conceived by the work of a man: thus under those conditions original guilt is in fact contracted, therefore the Most Holy Virgin in fact contracted original guilt.

8th. Jesus Christ and His Most Holy Mother really and truly died: since no dead person resurrects or returns to life, therefore neither Jesus Christ nor the Virgin resurrected, etc., etc.

Let anyone consider carefully all these reasonings. They are true reasonings of the physical-connective virtual. In the major we know by revelation the essence; in the minor we lay down a physically necessary or certain principle. The conclusion, however, far from being a true theological conclusion, far from having theological certainty, far from having theological necessity or connection, is a theological error. Therefore the physical-connective virtual is not a true theological conclusion, has no theological certainty, has no theological necessity, has no necessary connection with the theological; that is, with the divine; that is, with the revealed major or the revealed deposit.

We are sure that anyone who, without worries or preconceived ideas, carefully reflects on those reasonings and does not let himself be deluded by considerations that are foreign to their intrinsic value will soon understand the radical difference that exists between physics and theology and that physical-connexive reasoning has no demonstrative value whatsoever in theology.

Indeed, all those reasonings we have just cited are true reasonings, or virtual physical-connective ones, and yet, far from concluding in theology, they lead to false conclusions. It is an evident principle that the falsity of a conclusion always proceeds from one of these two sources: either from one of the premises being false, or from the syllogism being badly formed. In the cited syllogisms none of the premises is false, for the major premises are revealed and the minor premises are physically certain. It follows, then, that those syllogisms are badly formed. That is to say, it follows that in theology a syllogism is not well formed in which the major expresses only the pure essence and the minor is not an essential minor, but one of pure physical connection. And since this is precisely what the virtual physical-connective reasoning, or the fourth type, consists in, it evidently follows that that power does not conclude in theology; it is not a theological conclusion.

92. A DODGE.—Let no one think of replying that those reasonings are not conclusive or that those conclusions are false, because we know, by revelation, the contrary of those conclusions.

In the first place, that would be an answer proper to simple believers, not to true philosophers or theologians, as Báñez, with Cardinal Cajetan, observes very well on another similar point².

Secondly and chiefly, those conclusions are not false because God has revealed the contrary; rather, the reverse is the case. God has revealed the contrary because they were false. Their intrinsic falsity is not caused by the revelation, but by their lack of necessary connection with the principles or premises from which they are intended to be deduced. God could surely have revealed to us only the major premises of those reasonings, and said not a word as yet about the conclusions, and yet such conclusions would still be just as false as they are. God could have revealed to us the real presence of the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist and kept silent about whether it has local extension or not. He could have revealed to us the real existence of the Eucharistic accidents without telling us anything about their inherence. He could have revealed the death of the Virgin and told us nothing about her resurrection. He could have revealed the fact that the three children were cast into the Babylonian furnace without telling us anything about whether the fire burned them or not.

He could have kept silent about those supernatural facts, in which the connatural state of the essence is suspended by divine will, just as He must have kept silent about so many other supernatural facts of His supernatural providence; and yet, the facts would remain as true whether we know them or not, and the physical-connexive reasonings and conclusions in which those facts are denied would continue to be as false without His revelation, as we know they are by revelation. Revelation does not change the value of reasoning; it does no more than make us know what was already true or false, and which perhaps without revelation we would not know, or would not know so well.

Reasoning, therefore, of the physical-connective or fourth type neither leads nor can lead to theologically certain conclusions, nor does it conclude in theology.

93. WHY DO SUCH REASONINGS NOT CONCLUDE IN THEOLOGY? These reasonings do not conclude in theology or in metaphysics simply because they are badly made, because under the appearance of an impeccable form they are composed, at bottom, of four feet. In the major premise of these reasonings only the pure or abstract essence is affirmed, an essence that abstracts from the natural or preternatural order, from the state of integrity or the defective state, from the perfect or imperfect state.

In contrast, in the minor premises there is set down an affirmation which is not true of the essence in every state, but only and exclusively of the essence in the connatural state, not in the supernatural state. These arguments, then, have four terms. The middle term is not taken in the same sense in the major and in the minor; in the major it is taken in an essential or abstract sense, and in the minor it is taken not in an essential sense, but in a connatural sense. The reasoning thus consists of four terms instead of three. It is no wonder that it does not conclude.

Why do they conclude in physics?—Because in physics, as the physicist understands them, they are well made. In physics there are no essential or abstract premises of the natural and the supernatural. In physics, by its very formal object, every premise and every assertion is taken or assumed by the physicist in a connatural sense. The physicist, insofar as he is a physicist, does not know the supernatural. When physics and the physicist say: “N. is a man,” they take the word “man” not in an essential or abstract sense, but in a connatural sense; they take the essence insofar as it is subject to and governed by physical or natural laws. The physicist’s starting point is not the essence, but the nature. With the essence thus taken and understood in the major premise of the reasoning, the minor premise is irreproachable. In that minor premise it is said that every essence (that is, assuming it connatural, as the physicist assumes it) has always and unfailingly the actual properties. The conclusion, in that supposition of connaturality from which the physicist always starts and which he always tacitly assumes, is most correct. The conclusion has no more meaning than “N. will actually be risible in the supposition (starting point of the physicist) that the natural laws are fulfilled or that the connatural state is verified.”

But, as can be seen, the reasoning, in that hypothesis, is no longer physical-connective, but physical-connatural; it is no longer the fourth type of reasoning, but the fifth (90). The physical-connective reasoning, therefore, does not conclude in theology; and if it concludes in physics, it is because it ceases to be physical-connective, since poor physics is limited to the natural or connatural state and cannot rise to the supernatural or essential state in which theology and metaphysics, respectively, move.

94. WHERE IS THE THEOLOGICAL DEFECT OF PHYSICAL-ABSTRACT REASONING?—To see clearly where the defect of such theological arguments lies, one need only look at the middle term man, which is the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor. In this major premise it is only said, or we suppose that it is only said, that “N. is essentially man” or that he has the true essence of man. The word “man,” taken essentially, does not determine any of the states in which the human essence may be found, but rather abstracts from all states. For man is as essentially man in the natural state as in the preternatural or supernatural state, in the integral state as in the maimed or defective state, in the most perfect state as in the imperfect state, with all actual properties or without them. Since, therefore, man can have all these states without losing the essence of man, in the major premise of the reasoning we suppose that only the essence is affirmed and that the state is completely abstracted.

But then in the minor premise it is said that “every man has the actual properties.” That phrase “every man”—for whom does it stand? Does it stand perhaps for every man both in the natural state and in the supernatural state, both under the ordinary laws of nature and under the miraculous action of God? No. In that sense, that minor premise, far from being true, would be a very great falsehood; it would be the rationalist error; it would be the very negation of the supernatural order.

When in that minor premise, then, we say that every man has these or those actual properties, that every accident has actual inherence, that every fire burns, that every dead person remains dead, that every body occupies a place and is impenetrable, that every human nature has human personality, etc., etc., we say it of every being provided that be in a connatural state, provided that God has not intervened by a miraculous act. Then, either we must deduce the conclusion in conditional form, that is, “N. is actually risible, provided that God has not intervened” miraculously, and then we have already departed from physical-connective reasoning; or, if we deduce it in absolute and unconditional form, we draw in the conclusion something that is not in the premises.

One can also clearly see the theological defect of those physico-connective reasonings by noting how the physicist grants them and how every theologian distinguishes them. If we propose the following argument to a physicist: “The eucharistic accidents are true accidents: now every true accident has inherence in a subject, therefore the eucharistic accidents have inherence in a subject,” the physicist will reply: I concede the whole, and as a physicist, he will have replied well. On the other hand, if we propose this same reasoning or argument to a theologian, the theologian must distinguish and will immediately distinguish the minor premise and the conclusion in the following manner: “They have inherence in a subject,” I distinguish; inherence aptitudinal, I concede; inherence actual, I distinguish further; if they are in a connatural state, I concede; if they are not in a connatural state, but a supernatural or miraculous one, I DENY.

This elementary distinction, which every theologian makes and must make, clearly shows three things:

1st. That the reasoning in which from the essence of a thing its aptitudinal, or radical, or essential properties (first, second, and third types) are deduced must be granted in theology, that is, it is a theological conclusion.

2nd. That the reasoning in which its actual properties are deduced from the essence, under the condition that that essence be in a connatural or perfect state (fifth and sixth types), must also be granted in theology, that is, it is a theological conclusion.

3rd. That the argument in which, from the essence alone of a thing, one tries to deduce the actual properties in an unconditional way (fourth type) must be denied in theology, that is, it is not a true theological conclusion.

These three assertions sum up our opinion, and we believe that the true Thomistic doctrine on the nature of true and false revealed or theological virtuality.

95. THE SO-CALLED “PHYSICAL NECESSITY”.— But someone will say: physical necessity, is it not perhaps true necessity? Yes. Physical necessity is true necessity, but physical necessity, not metaphysical or theological, just as moral necessity is true necessity, but moral necessity, not physical or metaphysical.

The word necessity, as Cardinal Cajetan already noted³, is not a univocal term but an analogous one, which does not apply and cannot be applied equally to all orders of beings or sciences. A thing "morally necessary" or necessary in morals is not physically necessary, but is contingent or uncertain in physics. A thing "physically necessary" or necessary in physics is not necessary in metaphysics, and much less in theology; rather, in theology or metaphysics it is contingent or uncertain. Hence, a line of reasoning can conclude in morals and not in physics; it can conclude in physics and not in metaphysics or theology. A conclusion can be true or certain in morals and be an uncertain or probable conclusion (which is the same as not being a true conclusion) in physics; just as it can be a true and certain conclusion in physics and be an uncertain or probable conclusion in metaphysics and theology, which is the same as not being a rigorous metaphysical or theological conclusion.

Thus, for example, the principle that “every mother loves her children” is a necessary and certain principle in morals, but uncertain and contingent in physics, in metaphysics, and in theology. The reasoning “A. was the mother of B.; therefore A. loved B.” is a necessary, true, proper, and certain conclusion in morals; but it is not a true conclusion either in physics, or in metaphysics, or in theology. The principle that “every fire, applied under the appropriate physical conditions, actually burns” is a certain and necessary principle in physics, but contingent or uncertain in metaphysics or in theology. The conclusion of “N. is”

fire and is duly applied to a combustible, then "it actually burned" is a necessary, certain, proper, and rigorous conclusion in physics, but it is contingent and uncertain (and, therefore, not a true conclusion) in metaphysics and theology.

If God, then, has revealed to us that "A. is the mother of B." without telling us more, that is, without telling us that she was a good mother or that she behaved according to the impulses or moral laws of maternal love, the moralist will be certain, with moral certainty, that A. loved B. But the physicist will not be certain, but uncertain, because no physical principle falls to the ground whether A. loved or did not love B. And the metaphysician will be even more uncertain, because none of his principles is destroyed if A. did not love B. Since the theologian starts, as from a principle, from the revealed major premise, and the revealed major premise only says that she was mother (essentially, not good mother), the theologian is as uncertain as the metaphysician, for the revealed principle that A. was the mother (essentially) of B. remains completely intact and standing, whether A. loved or did not love her son.

96. THE MINOR PREMISES OF REASON.—The confusion in this matter stems, in our judgment, from not having understood or having forgotten the true function of the human sciences or of the minor premises of reason in the reasoning of the science of the revealed, or Sacred Theology. Theology, it is true, makes use of all kinds of sciences or minor premises of reason, whether metaphysical, physical, or moral. But it has frequently been overlooked that the starting point, the true principles, and the formal subject of theology are not those human sciences or minor premises of reason, but the major premises of faith, the revealed ones. The purpose of theological reasoning is not, then, to make use of the revealed major premises in order to extract or deduce the virtuality that may exist in the minor premises of reason, but, on the contrary, to make use of the minor premises of reason in order to extract, or deduce, or intellectually explain the virtuality contained in the principles or major premises of faith. The revealed major premises, then, are not instruments of the minor ones, nor do they even enter on an equal footing with the minor premises of reason in theological reasoning; rather, the minor premises of reason are mere intellectual instruments for developing or making explicit the objective virtuality with which the revealed major premises are pregnant, although they do not express it. Those minor premises of reason are in themselves or objectively unnecessary; if theology needs them, or rather, our theology, or rather, the theologian, it is only because of the weakness of our intellect, which cannot see intuitively or all at once everything that is really included in the revealed major premises, and needs those instruments or minor premises of reason in order to go on developing or discovering piecemeal what was already enclosed in the major premises revealed in the revealed deposit. This is the only true Thomistic conception of Sacred Theology ⁴

In theological reasoning, therefore, the revealed major premises must never be accommodated or subordinated to the rational minor premises; rather, the rational minor premises must be subordinated and accommodated to the revealed major premises. If the revealed principle gives us only the essence of a thing, the minor premise can be no more than essential. If the revealed principle gives us not only the essence but its connatural state, the minor premise can be physical or natural. If the revealed principle gives us the essence in a perfect or moral state, the minor premise can be moral.

Thus, and only thus, is preserved the subordination of the lesser truths of reason to the greater revealed truths, the subordination of reason to faith, in that most special and sovereign science in which faith and reason must function together, but not as equals. That is precisely what Saint Thomas Aquinas and all Thomists understood when speaking of the elevation of the lesser truths of reason by the greater truths of faith, which is precisely what makes theology have a certainty superior to moral, physical, and metaphysical certainty, even when employing lesser metaphysical, physical, or moral means.

Thus, one thing is to reveal that “A. was truly or essentially mother of B.”; quite another to reveal that she was not only essentially mother, but mother with all the physical or connatural laws of motherhood, and quite another that she was a good mother or with all the moral laws and instincts of motherhood. Fixing the sense of revelation belongs, as we said, to the Church; deducing the consequences is the function of theology.

If, according to the sense or doctrine of the Church, only that “A. is the true mother of B.” has been revealed to us, it follows theologically that A. has all the essential attributes or properties of motherhood; for example: consubstantiality of nature; but it does not follow with theological necessity that she has all the physical-natural requirements and attributes; for example: the company of a man, the loss of virginity, etc., etc. If the mere knowledge that she is truly or essentially a mother sufficed for it to be theologically certain or necessary that she is not a virgin, we would be theologically certain that the Mother of Jesus Christ was not a virgin, for we know by revelation that she was a mother.

If, on the other hand, it has been revealed to us that A. was not only the true mother of B., but was so in the connatural or ordinary manner that other mothers are, then we will be theologically certain of any conclusion that has a physical connection with motherhood; for example: that she conceived by the work of a man, etc., etc.; but we will still be uncertain of the moral attributes or conclusions, such as whether she loved her son or not.

In short, if it has been revealed to us not only that she was a true mother and in a connatural way, but that she was a good mother, then we will be theologically certain that she loved her son.

There can be, then, in theology minor premises (and, therefore, reasonings and conclusions), whether metaphysical, physical, or moral, but applied proportionally to the nature or sense of the revealed major. To set up as a revealed major a thing of purely essential sense and to attach to it an accidental minor is to ignore the homogeneity of all science, and far more to ignore the subordination of the minors of reason to the majors of faith; it is to make a reasoning that is neither theological, nor metaphysical, nor physical, but a hybrid amalgam of theology or metaphysics with physics. If in physics that class of arguments seem to conclude, it is, as we have already said, because the physicist supposes a priori, or by his very formal object, the connaturality of the essence, and excludes a priori the

Preternatural and supernatural state. But neither metaphysics nor theology can do that without destroying themselves.

97. THE ANALOGY OF BEING.—The same must be said of the word "being" that we have said of the word "necessity"; they are analogous words and concepts, not univocal; and therefore, when transferring them from one science to another, one must preserve their analogy of proportionality, that is, they must be applied in proportion to the being or science in question. If in the revealed major premise only essential being is affirmed (essentially man, essentially accident, essentially fire, etc.), in the minor premise it is not enough that being be affirmed in any way, but rather it is necessary that essential being be affirmed; for otherwise, under a common term "being" in the major and the minor, there will be two distinct concepts, and the reasoning will consist of four terms.

If in reasoning I say: "N. is (essentially) a man; therefore N. is (essentially) risible," which is the same as "therefore N. has radical or essential risibility," the reasoning is well made. The verb is not only has the same name in the major and in the minor, but it also has the same sense, an essential or radical or aptitudinal sense.

But if I say: "N. is (essentially) a man; now every man is (actually) risible; therefore N. is (actually) risible"; in that reasoning the verb is, with the same name in the major as in the minor, has a different sense, an essential sense in the major and an actual or accidental sense in the minor. With the same word is two different senses have slipped into the reasoning. With the appearance of three terms, the reasoning has four. But that does not conclude in theology⁵. If it concludes in physics, it is because the physicist takes the word is, like any other word or concept, in a connatural or accidental sense, and then there are no more than three terms. The essential concepts, like the preternatural or supernatural ones, are unknown to the physicist; they are ultraphysical, that is, metaphysical or theological. The necessity, therefore, of deduction or consequence in physical-connective reasoning is not theological necessity.

98. ANOTHER CONCLUSIVE PROOF.—Another proof, in our judgment completely conclusive, that physical-connective reasoning is not a true theological conclusion or a true virtually revealed truth, will be given to us by the Angelic Doctor. According to St. Thomas, it is of the very essence of true reasoning that, when the conclusion is destroyed or denied, the principle from which it is deduced is destroyed or denied. If, when a conclusion is denied, the principle does not remain denied, it is an infallible sign that such a purported conclusion is not a true conclusion of such a principle⁶

Now then: examine any physical-connective reasoning, that is, a reasoning in which the major premise affirms only the essence of an individual thing and in the conclusion its physical-actual properties are affirmed, and one will palpably see that the conclusion can be denied and be false without the major premise or principle being denied or false. Let us focus on the very classic example: “N. is a true man or essentially a man; therefore he is actually risible.” Does one cease to be essentially a man because one ceases to be actually risible? Does an accident cease to be a true and essential accident because it ceases to have actual inherence? Does a body cease to be essentially and truly a body because in fact it does not occupy a place or is interpenetrated by another body? Does fire cease to be true and essentially fire because in fact it does not burn? Does, in general, any thing cease to have the essence it had because it ceases to have the actual properties which, by supposition, are really distinct from it? Evidently not. Therefore, the actual properties are not a true theological conclusion from the essence. Therefore, the physical-connective reasoning, in which the revealed major premise only affirms the essence of an individual, and in the conclusion one seeks to deduce its actual properties, is not a true virtually revealed or theological truth, nor a true theological conclusion, but a hybrid mixture of theology with physics, which is neither physics nor theology.

On the other hand, if instead of deducing in the conclusion the actual properties, we tried to deduce the aptitudinal or radical properties, or also, if we wished to deduce in the conclusion the actual properties, but placing in the revealed major premise not the pure or abstract essence, but the connatural or perfect essence, we would immediately see that in neither of those two cases could the conclusion be denied or destroyed without denying or destroying the principle. The radical risibility cannot be denied without denying or destroying the very essence of man, with which we suppose it really identifies itself. Nor can the actual risibility or any other physical-natural property be denied without denying or destroying the connatural or perfect state of the essence. Therefore the conclusions in which the radical or essential properties are deduced from a revealed major premise in which the essence is affirmed, or the conclusions in which the actual properties are deduced from a revealed major premise in which the connatural or perfect state of the essence is affirmed, are true theological conclusions or true revealed virtuality; but the conclusions in which the actual properties are deduced from a revealed major premise in which only the essence is affirmed, are not.

The same exactly as we have said about the aphorism "deduction of properties from essence" applies to the aphorism "deduction of effect from cause".

There is a metaphysical cause, which is also called virtual, and a physical or real cause. The first is really identical, although conceptually distinct, to its effect, as, for example, absolute immutability is the metaphysical or virtual cause of eternity, and spirituality the cause of immortality. The second is really distinct from its effect, as the essence of fire is really distinct from its effect or action of burning (50). This physically-distinct cause can (as we said of the essence) be considered in a pure or abstract state or in a connatural or perfect state. Hence the following three consequences:

1st The conclusion in which the metaphysical effect is deduced from its metaphysical or virtual cause is a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion, such as: "N. is absolutely immutable, therefore he is eternal"; or "he is spiritual, therefore he is immortal."

2nd. The conclusion in which the physical-actual effect is deduced from its physical cause in a connatural or integral or perfect state is also a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion, as for example: “N. is fire in a connatural state and is well applied, therefore it burns in fact”, or “Christ had the powers in a most perfect state, therefore He had the acts of knowing and willing”.

3rd. The conclusions in which one seeks to deduce the physical-actual effect of the pure or abstract cause are not strictly theological or do not have theological certainty, such as: "N. was fire and well applied, therefore it actually burned"; "N. was a heavy body, therefore it sank in the water"; "N. was composed of contrary or corruptible elements, therefore it actually decayed." All these effects can fail in the supernatural or theological order; they are not, therefore,

rigorous theological conclusions nor revealed virtuality. With this, we believe that the traditional definition of the theological conclusion or revealed virtuality is perfectly explained, namely: "what is contained in the revealed deposit as a property in the essence, or an effect in the cause." Now then: to explain or understand well the definition of a thing is to explain and understand its true nature or essence. For definition signifies the form and essence of a thing."⁷

99. THE PHYSICAL-CONNECTIVE VIRTUALITY AND THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH.—Then, cannot the Church infallibly define that "N. is risible," or that it has any other property, on the supposition that it is revealed that "N. is true man," that is, that "N. has the essence of man"? .

The answer to this question, in our judgment, already follows from everything that has been said. If the question is to define radical risibility, or any other radical, aptitudinal, or essential properties, the Church can define them infallibly merely by knowing through revelation that he is essentially man. The revealed major premise that N. is a man cannot be saved or preserved if it is denied that N. is essentially or radically risible. This conclusion is therefore necessary for the preservation of the revealed deposit. It is, consequently, an object of infallibility.

If the matter concerns actual risibility or any other of the physical-actual properties, the Church can also define them infallibly provided that the sense of the revealed major premise is not only that N. is essentially a man, but that he is a man in a connatural state, or an integral state, or without defect, or like the common run of men, or in a perfect state. The revealed truth that N. is a man in a connatural, integral, or perfect state can be neither saved nor preserved if he is deprived of any connatural property, attribute, or perfection. This conclusion, therefore, is also an object of infallibility⁸.

But if the question is to define the actual risibility or any other of the actual properties of an individual, starting solely from a revealed major premise in which nothing more is said than “N. is essentially or truly a man,” without saying whether he is in the connatural or preternatural state, in the integral or defective state, in the perfect or imperfect state, our opinion is that neither can the theologian conclude with theological certainty, nor can the Church define infallibly that N. in fact has these or those actual physical properties. It may define that he requires connaturally to have them (radical property); it may define that he has them in fact, yes, provided that he is in the connatural state (reasoning of the fifth type, not of the fourth type); but to define infallibly that he has them in fact and unconditionally, that is impossible for it to be an object of theological science nor of infallibility unless one starts from other data than a revealed major premise in which only the essence is affirmed and a minor premise in which a physical law is affirmed.

It is perfectly preserved that something is essentially man, essentially accident, essentially body, essentially fire, without being actually risible, without having actual inherence in the subject, without having occupation of place, without actually burning. Therefore, to save or preserve the greater revealed truths or the revealed deposit that N. is essentially man, accident, body, fire, the truth or conclusion that N. is actually risible, actually inherent, that he actually occupies place, that he actually burns is not indispensable. If they are not indispensable for the preservation of the revealed deposit, if the truth of the revealed deposit is saved and preserved without such conclusions, they are not an object of infallibility as erroneous, although they may be so as rash, imprudent, etc. If revelation only states the essence of a thing, one who affirmed that such essence was not in a connatural and integral state, but in a preternatural or defective state, that is, one who affirmed that such essence, by miracle or divine intervention, was deprived of this or that actual property, could be imprudent, rash, foolish in affirming a miracle without that; such reasonings are not only perfectly theological, but are, as we shall see, definable as matters of faith, because they are inclusive.

If instead of saying: “N. is a being, contingent, therefore it is a created being”, we were to say: “N. is a being, therefore it is a created being”, that reasoning would not be conclusive in either metaphysics or theology, although there is room for only one exception, which is God, regarding a thing being “being” and not being “created”. In the same way, if instead of saying: “N. is a whole or perfect man, therefore he is actually risible”, or “therefore he has any other actual property”, we were to say: “N. is essentially man, therefore he is actually risible”, that reasoning is not theologically conclusive, for not only is there room for one exception in the matter of being “man” without being actually “risible”, but there is room for as many exceptions as God pleases.

reason. But one thing is to be without reason or rash, and quite another is to be against reason or, rather, against revelation, which is the only thing that constitutes what is erroneous in theology⁹.

100. THE ACTUAL PROPERTIES IN JESUS CHRIST.—For how has the Church defined as infallible, and even as of divine faith, certain actual properties of Jesus Christ, for example, the human powers of intellect and will? Here, in our judgment, lies the origin of the error or oversight of so many modern treatise writers. The Church has defined these actual properties of the most sacred humanity of our Savior because we have revealed not only that Jesus Christ is man essentially or in the abstract, but that He is man in an integral and connatural state and without defect, and not only that, but man perfect or most perfect in all senses not opposed to the hypostatic union or to the end of redemption. Starting from that revealed major premise of “integral and perfect man,” the Church can define as infallible, and even as of divine faith, not only the intellect and will of Christ, but each and every one of the properties or attributes that integrate or perfect human nature, such as actual risibility, the interior or exterior senses, quantity, gravity, and the other properties of the soul or of the body.

But if God had only revealed that Christ is essentially man, without telling us either explicitly or implicitly

whether that human essence was or was not in an integral or defective state, connatural or preternatural, perfect or imperfect, no theological certainty or infallibility could be had regarding any of its actual properties, just as none can be had regarding many other individuals of whom we know from Sacred Scripture that they were men, and yet the Church, like theology, does not know whether they were integral or without defect.

Of our adorable Savior it was necessary or fitting for us to know not only the essence in the abstract, but also His properties and perfections, and therefore God revealed to us not only the essence, but His state, connatural and perfect. Of very many other individuals or things revelation has told us only the essence, because it was not necessary for us to know divinely or theologically more. And from the revealed, and only from the revealed, proceed both theology and infallibility; and only that is theological or an object of infallibility, in the order of reasonings or conclusions, without which the revealed truth cannot be saved or preserved. And the essence can be perfectly preserved even if God has taken away from it some or all of its actual properties.

101. THE TREATISE "ON THE INCARNATION".—In the treatise "On the Incarnation" of the Theological Summa anyone can see how the Angelic Doctor carefully distinguishes the three revealed principles (Christ is true, or essentially, man—Christ is whole, or perfect, man—Christ is most perfect man) and how he uses each of them differently, depending on whether he is deducing essential parts or properties, connatural properties, or accidental perfections. When it is a question of whether Christ had something essential to humanity, for example, a true body, he has recourse to the first revealed principle of the essence of man: "Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body. I answer that it should be said that... a threefold reason can be assigned for this. Of these the first is from the notion (essence) of human nature, to which it belongs to have a true body. Therefore, supposing from the premises that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, it follows that He assumed a true body"¹⁰

On the other hand, when the Holy Doctor tries to deduce some of the connatural properties of Christ, for example, whether He had the powers of the intellect, or of the will, or of the concupiscible and irascible appetite, he no longer has recourse to the revealed principle that "Christ is true or essentially man", but rather to the other principle that "Christ is man whole or perfect". "Whether in Christ there are two wills. I answer that it must be said that... For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed perfect human nature, as was shown above. But the will pertains to the perfection (not to the essence) of human nature, which is its natural power, as also is the intellect, as is evident from those things that have been said in the first part. Therefore it is necessary to say that the Son of God assumed a human will in human nature¹¹.

"Then it is urged by the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article. Because the faculty of willing is a perfection of human nature, without which it would not be integral and perfect: But the Word assumed human nature perfect and integral with all its properties: Therefore the Word assumed human nature with its own proper and connatural faculty of willing.”¹².

Finally, when the Holy Doctor attempts to deduce the accidental or acquirable perfections of human nature, such as knowledge or virtue, he likewise does not resort to the principle that “Christ is true man,” but rather to that of “Christ is perfect or most perfect man.” “Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the divine. I answer that... it was necessary that (Christ) have created knowledge for three reasons. First, indeed, for the perfection of the soul. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to know intelligible things. But that which is in potentiality is imperfect, unless it is reduced to act. Moreover, it was not fitting that the Son of God should assume human nature imperfect, but perfect. And therefore it was necessary that the soul of Christ be perfect through some knowledge”¹³.

“Then the conclusion is proved by the discourse of St. Thomas in this article, which we can reduce to this form: For Christ the Lord had a human nature whole and perfect: But without a created act of understanding, the aforesaid nature would not have had whole and perfect being: Therefore...”¹⁴

The same, and more clearly still, can be seen where the Holy Doctor asks: “Whether there were virtues in Christ. I answer that... the more perfect a principle is, the more it imprints its effects: hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, it follows that from it there came virtues to perfect the individual powers of the soul, as regards all the acts of the soul, and thus Christ had all virtues”¹⁵.

In the treatise, then, on the Incarnation, in which the properties or perfections of our Savior’s humanity are determined by reasoning, one starts not solely from the principle “Christ is essentially man,” but rather from these three principles: first, Christ is man in essence; second, Christ is man in His integrity, or without physical defect, in everything that does not oppose the hypostatic union or the end of redemption; third, Christ is a most perfect man, with all the perfections not opposed to that same end. From the first principle are deduced all the essential properties; from the second, all the actual or connatural ones; from the third, all the accidental or acquirable ones. Whoever denied any of the essential properties would oppose the first principle, that Christ is true man. Whoever denied any of the actual properties, by supposing that God had suspended them in the humanity of our adorable Savior, just as He suspended human personality, would not oppose the principle that Christ is essentially man, since being essentially man is preserved without having this or that actual property; but he would oppose the revealed principle that Christ is man in a connatural or integral state, or without defect, or like other men. Finally, whoever denied any of the accidental perfections, such as the knowledge or virtue of Christ, would oppose neither the principle that Christ is man nor the principle that He is man in a connatural state; but he would oppose the principle that He is a most perfect man. Because these three concepts—pure essence, connatural essence, and most perfect essence—have not been well distinguished, many have not rightly understood the aphorism “deduction of property from essence,” which is the classical definition of the virtually revealed or theological truth and the specific constitutive and distinguishing element between divine faith and theology.

**102. COROLLARIES.—**From all that has been said, we believe that these two corollaries are evidently deduced:

1st. They are true and proper revealed virtuality and true and proper and rigorous theological conclusions: a) all the conclusions in which, from the revelation of the essence (even pure or in the abstract), any of its essential or metaphysical or aptitudinal or radical properties are deduced by reasoning, that is, all the conclusions of the first, second and third types (45); b) all the conclusions in which, from the revelation of the integral or connatural or perfect essence, any of its physical or actual properties are deduced by reasoning, that is, all the conclusions of the fifth and sixth types (45). This is the true Thomistic understanding of the revealed virtual or of the "deduction of property from essence", the classical definition of the true and proper and rigorous and specific theological conclusion.

2nd. Neither true and proper virtual revelation nor true and proper theological conclusions are the conclusions in which, from the revelation of the pure essence or abstract essence of an individual, the physical-actual properties are deduced, that is, all the conclusions of the fourth type, which are those that constitute the physical-connective virtuality and the only ones that correspond to the third degree of the scale of progress (46).