Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
§ 1
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.
Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.
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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.
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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.
Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.
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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.
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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.
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1 That there is no species to which a multiplicity of individuals is repugnant is so common an opinion of theologians that the opinion which St. Bonaventure 2, Alexander 3, Albert 4, Scotus 5, Gabriel 6, the Carthusian 7, and Marsilius 8 attack was condemned in three articles of the Parisians, whom the Conimbricense Fathers 9 report and follow in question 8 on the preface of Porphyry: among the Thomists Father Molina 10 in part 1, question 50, article 4, reports Ferrariensis 11, Capreolus 12, and others besides, and Durandus 13. But that the opposing opinion is to be banished from the schools even on logical principles, Molina himself teaches, with whom Father Suarez 14 agrees in the first [book] of the Metaphysics, disputation 5, section 2. St. Thomas 15 is sufficiently clear on our side.
§ 31
To this I premise that there are two questions: one, whether angelic natures can be many by number alone. In that controversy I do not now examine the Thomistic opinion. The other question is whether angelic natures, on the supposition that they cannot be many in number, pertain to the second predicable. I say therefore that St. Thomas never thought even in a dream about the opposing opinion. For we have seen how perversely it is dragged toward it by some Thomists; now consider the testimonies in favor of our opinion in Peter of Bergamo, at the word Species, no. 1, which I pass over for the sake of brevity; but he himself proposes these: Species is twofold—twofold, namely, a nature communicable immediately to several individuals, according to the name and the account equally participated, as man: in confirmation of which Bergamo cites a hundred passages. Consider moreover that St. Thomas requires for the account of a predicable species that it be equally and immediately participated by several; but where several are really impossible, the species cannot be equally participated by several. For individuals which are only logically or intellectually possible do not participate the concept of an Angel with the equality of Michael.
§ 32
The account of the conclusion.— The first foundation of this opinion is that, once the repugnance of real multiplicity is admitted, the specific and individual concept of Michael cannot be distinguished by reason: therefore the specific [concept] of this nature cannot be predicable of several. The consequence is clear, because an individual concept cannot be predicated of several. The antecedent is expressly stated by St. Thomas 1 in the question On Spiritual Creatures, art. 8, ad 4, in these words: Just as a form which is in a subject, or matter, is individuated by the fact that it is in a subject, so a separated form is individuated by the fact that it is not born to be in anything. For just as to be in this excludes the community of a universal which is predicated of many, so does the inability to be in anything. With these St. Thomas compares an individual having an order to matter with the individual of a complete spiritual substance: and just as a nature already received in singular matter, because it is individuated by it, cannot be common, so neither can a subsisting nature, because it is unreceivable in matter, be predicable, because it is singular.
§ 33
I prove that antecedent by argument: because St. Thomas, or whoever was the author of the repugnance of numerical multiplicity, established it for this reason, that every individuation distinct from the specific concept is taken through connotation to matter, as is in their old proverb: but in angelic nature no matter is connoted, therefore there can be no individuation distinct from the specific concept. But what is said, every numerical multiplication is taken from matter, is said because every individuation distinct from the species is taken from matter; but a species thus distinguished is taken from form according to itself. For St. Thomas says 1 in the question On Spiritual Creatures, art. 8, and in part 1, q. 50, art. 4, that forms separated from a subject can be multiplied in number through the diverse subjects in which they can exist: and that those things which agree in species differ in number, have this through matter. Therefore the whole account of individuation distinct from the species is through order to matter. Hence I argue: in an angel there is no connotation to matter: therefore there is no individuation distinct from the species. I prove the consequence, because where the principle of individuation is lacking, individuation is not.
§ 34
Likewise St. Thomas relies on another foundation: for he says that angelic species are individual by themselves, and not through something distinct: because by themselves they have the whole perfection of the species: therefore there is no foundation for distinguishing individuation from nature: because those whose nature has in itself its whole perfection also have their individuation from themselves. But these things are understood also of the containment of perfection through intellect and reason: the argument of some would be inept: because no species connoting matter receives perfection from an individuation really distinct from itself: for the specific and individual grades, according to St. Thomas, are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but only by reason: therefore, since it constitutes a difference between individuation and species in things connoting matter, and between individuation and species in things not connoting it, it does not constitute that in a real distinction, but in a distinction of reason between those grades. Therefore the disciples of St. Thomas, who deny the real multiplicity of individuals of angelic nature, and on the other hand distinguish in that nature the lowest species from individuation, did not understand the foundations of his opinion: because, when matter is lacking, individuation cannot be apprehended as distinct by reason from the lowest species.
§ 35
The second reason for the conclusion.— The same opinion is proved secondly, once a distinction of reason is admitted between the specific concept and the individual concept of Gabriel. In order that some nature be predicable, it is necessary that it be univocally common to several individuals by which it is immediately participated, as I said from St. Thomas: but the nature of Michael can neither be univocally common to several individuals, nor be equally participated by them: therefore the nature of Michael cannot be a predicable species. The major proposition is born from the terms alone: because all inferiors of any predicable agree univocally in the predicable account; but those which agree in the lowest species differ only in number. But the minor is proved, because Michael, who exists in reality, cannot differ only in number from a Michael whose existence in reality is repugnant, and who exists only in the intellect: but in this opinion there cannot be other individuals: therefore the nature of Michael cannot be univocally common to several individuals. The minor is clear, because the existing Michael is a real being; but another Michael is not a real being, but a fictive or apprehended one: but a real and a non-real being differ more than in number, nor do they intrinsically agree in anything. Therefore. Indeed this argument is a logical demonstration.
§ 36
The first evasion.— It can be answered first that a multiplicity of individuals through the intellect suffices for a nature to be predicable: which suffices for them to agree univocally in the account of a logical individual: because predicability is a logical attribute, agreeing univocally to a real being and to a being of reason. 1 Against these things the opinion entirely contradicts its own principles: for in this opinion every numerical multiplication is taken from matter: but in the nature of Michael matter existing on the part of the object cannot be apprehended: therefore numerical multiplication cannot be apprehended. The minor is clear, because the nature of Michael is a subsisting act, repugnant to matter. Therefore. Likewise, on the part of the mode of conceiving the nature, we would not give a foundation for multiplying it in number. 2 This is clear a priori, because when we conceive things of a higher order through a lower order, we do not apprehend in the higher object the imperfection existing in the lower. For when we conceive God, we do not apprehend the account of body existing in Him: nor discourse in His intellect, nor a defect from reason in His will: nor can God be said in any way to be univocally, or even analogically, corporeal with us, discoursing, or deficient from right reason: because that mode of conceiving is only through species received from lower things, by whose likeness we explain higher things once the imperfections which we see in lower things have been removed.
§ 37
Univocals require agreement, not only on the part of the mode of conceiving, but also on the part of the object.— But I attack this answer also a priori: because things which agree univocally ought to have two things, one on the part of the object, the other on the part of the mode of conceiving: on the part of the signified object they have the same substance, that is, entirely similar: but on the part of the mode they have a common concept: which things are signified by this common definition: univocals are those whose name is common, and according to the name the account of substance is the same: but these individuals do not have the same account of substance signified by the name or concept: therefore they are not univocals. I prove the minor, because the existing Michael is not of the same substance with the Michael repugnant to existence. And so even for logical attributes there is required agreement through the real likeness of individuals. Which is the foundation of abstraction and universality.
§ 38
But if these things were not true, it would be openly concluded that a real being and a being of reason agree univocally,1 because they do not differ on the part of the mode of conceiving, although the conceived objects differ: likewise God and corporeal substance would agree absolutely univocally, because God is apprehended through corporeal things just as an Angel is. But these things are rightly denied: because on the part of the apprehended object there is lacking likeness and real agreement in those predicates, without which agreement there cannot be logical universality. But I forewarn that it is one thing for logical denominations, considered reflexively, to agree univocally to a real being and a being of reason:2 and another thing that a real predicate, conceived through a second intention, can be predicated univocally of a real being and a being of reason. The first is true: because on the part of the thing there is found likeness and agreement. For example, a chymaera and an animal agree univocally in the account of genus, because just as animal is a part of the quiddity of man and of the lion, so is a chymaera compared to this and that species of chymaera: but this agreement arises because both the chymaera and the animal have their inferiors offering a foundation for abstraction. But a real object cannot be directly predicated of a real being and a being of reason, although one is known through analogy to the other. Since therefore the nature of Michael is a real being, it cannot be univocally predicable of the true Michael and the apprehended one.
§ 39
I confirm this thus: every predicable can be brought to second act through actual univocal predications of its inferiors: for predicability says an aptitude for actual predications, which if they are not possible, there is no predicability: but there cannot be actual predications univocally of the angelic nature of the true and the apprehended Michael: therefore there is no univocal predicability. I prove the minor, because this predication is true: The true Michael really has the nature of Michael; but this is false: The apprehended Michael really has the real nature of Michael. And so that mode of apprehending the real nature of Michael does not make it apt to be truly predicated of two individuals.
§ 40
1 It can be answered secondly to the argument proposed at §. 39 that the nature of Michael is referred to several individuals not absolutely possible, but by hypothesis; that is, if several individuals were possible, this nature would be common to them. Against this. First, this answer shows that angelic natures are not absolutely predicable: but that they would be predicable if they had several individuals, which no one denies. It is proved, because the real likeness of individuals is the foundation of predicability: but there is no real likeness among these individuals: therefore there is no foundation of predicability. But an impossible hypothesis about the possibility of individuals does not provide likeness;2 for now there is no univocation: because things which are absolutely impossible do not agree univocally with impossible things, however many hypotheses you feign; just as man is not a genus, although from the impossible hypothesis that there were several men specifically distinct, man would be a genus. The reason a priori: because a species absolutely obtains predicability through order to inferiors, which absolutely differ only in number, and to which it is absolutely univocally common: but it is not absolutely univocally common to a being possible absolutely, and a being impossible absolutely, and possible only under an impossible condition.