Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
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§ 12
§ 13
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
§ 21
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
§ 27
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
§ 37
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§ 40
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
§ 67
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
§ 88
Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
§ 104
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
§ 109
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§ 111
Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
§ 2
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
§ 11
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
§ 13
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
§ 50
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
§ 12
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Sectio III. On Speech.
§ 19
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
§ 4
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
§ 7
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
§ 13
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
§ 1
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Sectio I. On Definition.
§ 3
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Sectio II. On Division.
§ 7
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
§ 49
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Some Terms Explained.
§ 1
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
§ 1
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
§ 21
Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
§ 119
Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
§ 147
I judge that demonstration alone, as it embraces all species of demonstrations, is the adequate object of logic's attribution. Aristotle clearly taught this opinion in six hundred places, asserting that demonstration was the goal proposed to himself. The opponents could not deny this. Yet some, with Father Fonseca, asserted that the books on definition and division had perished; but certainly the books On Interpretation, On Prior and Analytic Resolution did not perish, which nevertheless Aristotle directed to demonstration. Therefore others asserted that the object of Aristotelian logic's attribution is demonstration, but not of logic according to itself. The Greeks imitate Aristotle—Themistius, Simplicius, Philoponus, and not a few of the moderns—to whom the distinguished theologian P. Vasquez brought light in part 1, disputation 4, ch. 1.
§ 148
It is proved first because definition is referred by its nature to demonstration; therefore demonstration is the object of attribution. I prove the consequence: because definition is by nature a part of demonstration. To this argument it is usually answered that definition is referred not per se but accidentally to demonstration. I reply first that definition is referred by logic per se to demonstration, although definition according to itself is accidentally referred to demonstration as to an accidental whole; as is clear from § 40.
This especially should be kept before the eyes: because arts by their nature are referred to a perfect work; but this art is rational, perfecting by reason, and it is not adequately perfected except through demonstration.
§ 149
I answer secondly that the conclusion says, not accidentally but per se, a transcendental order to demonstration, because by its nature it is inferential of the conclusion. For just as an angel deduces the cognition of an attribute from the cognition of the essence, so the definition, because it represents the essence quidditatively, seeks to infer the cognition of an attribute. But if you object that the definition says an order to the cognition of a property, but not to demonstration, because the latter consists of another premise to which the definition does not say an order: I answer that in our way no property is known a priori without two premises. Hence if the definition seeks to be a principle of cognition a priori concerning an attribute, it seeks by its nature to be joined with the other co-principles, without which that cognition cannot be inferred, of which the other premise is composed: from which in actual existence the definition is independent, but not in possible existence: because otherwise the definition would not say a transcendental order to the cognition of an attribute: because this would be impossible if the other premise were impossible. This I explain by the example of a partial cause, which by its nature seeks to be completed for the effect by another co-partial cause; without which neither can the effect be, nor would one partial cause be possible. For example, the eye seeks to be completed by the impressed species for seeing. Hence I conclude that the definition is referred not accidentally in its entity, but per se and transcendently both to the demonstrative conclusion as to an effect, and to the other premise as to a co-part.
§ 150
Secondly it is proved a priori: because demonstration alone is the ultimate end of logic that is ultimately desirable per se, therefore demonstration alone is the extrinsic end of logic. The antecedent is proved first on the part of the human intellect itself, which is perfected adequately and completely by one demonstration: which demonstration includes and presupposes the threefold operation of the intellect; it presupposes indeed simple apprehension, which precedes every judgment, but it includes judgment and assent to the principles (that is, the premises) and the discourse of conclusions: beyond these operations the human intellect has none. Therefore demonstration is the ultimate end of the human intellect. I prove the consequence. For the ultimate end of any power is that in which its adequate perfection is contained. Secondly it is proved on the part of the object itself, for that is the ultimate end of a cognitive power through which it exhausts and perceives the whole object. But the human intellect exhausts and perceives the whole object through demonstration alone, therefore demonstration alone is what the human intellect ultimately seeks. The major seems certain, because a cognitive power naturally desires its operation: and the more perfect the operation, the more vehemently the power desires it: therefore when the power attains the whole perfection of its operation, it rests in it, and desires nothing further. Therefore a cognitive power desires as ultimate end that operation in which its adequate perfection is contained, and through which it exhausts the whole object. But the minor is proved, namely that through demonstration the whole object is exhausted, and that in it the whole perfection of the intellect is contained, because through demonstration we know the nature and essence of the object, likewise its properties and attributes, likewise also all its causes; but the human intellect is adequately perfected through the cognition of the nature and essence of the object, and through the cognition of its properties and causes. Likewise it exhausts the object through cognition of this kind, because nothing of it remains to be known; therefore the human intellect is adequately perfected through demonstration, and through it exhausts the whole object.
§ 151
It is confirmed, because it is the quidditative and proper difference and perfection of man to be cognitive through discourse, for this is what rationality means: but he reduces that power of discoursing into act through demonstration, therefore demonstration is the proper cognition of man, and the exercise of that essential difference, in order to which exercise the essential difference of man is taken. Then thus; but every power loves as a perfection ultimately desirable to itself that operation in order to which it is essentially constituted, as no one denies: therefore demonstration is what the human intellect ultimately desires.
§ 152
But now I prove that nothing besides demonstration is the end which logic teaches per se first or ultimately; for any other natural cognition being posited in our intellect, the intellect still does not rest, but strives further to have demonstration: therefore no natural cognition besides demonstration is ultimately desirable by the intellect. The consequence is clear, because that in which the intellect does not rest is not its ultimate perfection, and it cannot rest except in the ultimate perfection, because when another is had, it still strives for that which it lacks: as a stone does not rest except in the center: nor the will except in its ultimate end. The antecedent is proved. First on the part of the intellect itself, because in a definition, for example (for concerning the other cognitions it is more clearly evident), not every operation of the intellect is adequately contained, but discourse is lacking to it; but when some perfection is lacking, the power does not rest until it acquires it. Therefore when a definition is posited the intellect does not rest.
Secondly on the part of the object itself, which is not exhausted nor adequately perceived through a definition, which represents the essence alone and not the properties; therefore when a definition is posited the intellect still does not rest. It is confirmed, because through a definition alone man does not exercise his ultimate difference, which is rationality.
§ 153
It is confirmed secondly, because the end of the other faculties is to know all their objects adequately, as in the science of man the end of attribution is man with his properties: for one does not rest in the bare essence of man, but perfect and adequate cognition of him is intended. Therefore logic has demonstration as its end. The consequence is proved, because logic is the instrumental science of the other faculties, providing them with the mode of knowing: but an instrumental faculty has as its ultimate end to give that instrument by which the principal faculty attains its ultimate end. But this instrument is demonstration. Therefore demonstration is the ultimate end of logic. The minor is proved, because an instrumental science serves the principal science, and is subjected to it as a servant; but it would not be perfectly subjected to it unless it preserved this order. Therefore the instrumental and the principal science have the same end. This I explain in the art of bridle-making and of horsemanship; for horsemanship has as its ultimate end to tame the horse perfectly; but bridle-making has as its end to give the instruments necessary for this end. Hence it cannot rest in the mere making of nails, but in the making of all things which horsemanship needs for its ultimate end. Therefore similarly logic cannot rest in definition alone, but in demonstration. For the remote end of logic is the immediate end of the faculty to which it provides instruments, as the remote end of the bridle-maker is the end of horsemanship: namely the perfect use of horses: therefore the immediate end of logic is the instrument by which the faculty it serves attains its end; but the principal science attains its end by demonstration alone. Therefore it ought also per se to provide the instruments by which the science of man penetrates the whole man.
§ 154
Hence I argue further: although a definition is referred accidentally, and not by its nature, to demonstration, it is still treated by logic per se as ordered to it, because a science concerning an accidental object per se deals with its parts in order to the whole, which is clear first in logic itself dealing with the subject and predicate. Likewise concerning universals and predicables, not resting in them, but in order to the proposition, or the mode of knowing, although the subject and predicate compose the objective proposition; likewise the vocal and written, not per se but accidentally. Secondly in architecture dealing with wood and stone in order to the house. Likewise in horsemanship dealing with reins, bridle, stirrups, etc. in order to the perfect instrument taming the horse. Since therefore logic is an instrumental faculty in comparison with the others, and these are acquired by demonstration alone, it will per se deal with definition in order to it. Nor indeed does the architect deal with wood and stone for any other reason than because his end is the house. Likewise the end of logic is to equip perfectly the other sciences, which is done by demonstration alone. Hence it deals with definition as with a part of it. Nor does it ever show different attributes concerning definition, but always the same. Therefore it is a sign that it is always dealt with for the sake of procuring demonstration.
§ 155
They object first that there is no reason why the definition is rather reduced to demonstration than this to it: indeed that there is greater reason for the latter, because the definition is nobler than demonstration. It is confirmed, because just as the cognition of the essence helps toward the cognition of the property, so the cognition of the property helps toward the cognition of the essence: why therefore is the one reduced to the other?
§ 156
It is answered that the definition is not referred to the conclusion as to an end, but to the whole demonstration, which is composed of all the acts, just as the cognition of the form is referred to the cognition of the composite, although prime matter is less perfect than the form. Hence the whole demonstration is more perfect than the definition alone, because besides this it contains the conclusion. Just as a physical composite is more perfect than the substantial form alone. To the confirmation it is answered that from both cognitions is constituted the perfect and consummated perfection of the intellect and knowledge of the object, to which both are referred, as matter and form to the composite.
§ 157
You will say that the whole demonstration is nothing besides the premises and the conclusion; wherefore if the definition is referred to the demonstration, it is also referred to the conclusion, which is against us. I answer by denying the consequence, because the end of the premises is that they be together with the conclusion; because what the parts intend is the whole, as happens in the Physics; for form and union are not referred to matter as to an end, although in the composite besides form and union there is nothing besides matter: and just as the end of form and matter is that they be united together, so the end of the premises and the conclusion is that they be together, because thus they perfect the intellect adequately and exhaust the object.