Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Others think that the adequate object of logic's attribution is the mode of knowing which embraces definition, division, and argumentation. This P. Suarez taught, disput. 1 of the Metaphysics, sect. 4, from no. 16; P. Fonseca, 2 of the Metaphysics, ch. 3, q. 1, sect. 7; the Conimbricenses Fathers, q. 5, art. 1; Masius, sect. 1, q. 12 of the proem, conclusion 7; Toletus, q. 5, seems to favor them; and it is the more common opinion among our dialecticians. The Conimbricenses first prove it because in the mode of knowing they find three conditions of an adequate object. First, because the mode of knowing has some unity by which it can be defined. Then, because the dialectician treats of nothing that is not definition, division, or argumentation, or a part of it, such as proposition and term, or is referred to it as a predicament. They borrowed this argument word for word from Father Fonseca. I reply that the mode of knowing is not as perfectly one as demonstration is: for this reason those who require unity in the object of attribution should incline to demonstration. Then the other things treated in logic are indeed referred to the demonstrative mode of knowing: for definition and division are also referred to it; since dialectic was invented to correct the defects of reason, this is done in no way better than by demonstration, through which dialectic differs from the other faculties.
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Secondly they argue on the side of the practical art, whose matter is a work; but the matter of dialectic by common consent is the instrument by which we can discourse distinctly; therefore. I distinguish the minor: if we speak of the proper object, not only the mode of knowing but many things also are taught by the logician; but if we speak of the object of attribution, the dialectical work is demonstration, including the other modes of knowing.
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Their third argument: every form of disputing that discloses the unknown from things better known shares the character of the subject of dialectic; but definition, division, and argumentation share the character of disclosing the unknown from things better known; therefore they share the character of the subject of dialectic. The minor is proved: because definition and division manifest the defined and divided thing through its parts, and this independently of each other and of argumentation. For we can divide and define an object without forming any syllogism. I reply that every mode of knowing shares the character of logic's proper object, but not of the adequate object of attribution; thus these three modes of knowing are a proper partial object, not an object of attribution. And although division and definition can be exercised without existing in any syllogism, they are nevertheless useful for it; by reason of this utility they are treated by the dialectician, in which there is an evident ad hominem example. For a proposition distinct from definition and division is a partial object of logic and can be exercised independently of every mode of knowing; and a proposition is manifold, categorical, hypothetical, modal, etc., yet by these authors it is referred to the mode of knowing as to the object of attribution; therefore although definition and division can be exercised independently of demonstration, they can be referred to it.
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But they object that definition and division are modes of knowing desirable for themselves independently of demonstration; therefore they are treated for themselves independently of it. I distinguish, however, the antecedent: they are desirable for themselves as the ultimate end in which the mind rests—I deny the antecedent; they are desirable for themselves as parts useful in themselves for composing demonstration—I grant the antecedent. Just as body and soul are desirable for themselves, not indeed to be possessed for themselves independently of the composite, but to be in it. I likewise distinguish the consequent: they are treated for themselves by the logician, that is, by their own proper principles—I grant the consequence; for themselves, that is, by stopping at them as at the ultimate end—I deny the consequence. Besides body and soul, let the proposition be an example for us: it is desirable and knowable for itself, yet by these authors it is referred to the mode of knowing; therefore by the same reason an imperfect mode of knowing can be recalled to perfection.
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Yet they press us: because a part can be referred to the composite in two ways: first, per se and by its nature, as body and soul to man; second, accidentally, as stone and wood to a building. A part of the first kind is referred, in the order of the knowable, by its nature to the composite, as body and soul to man, and genus and difference to the species. A part of the second kind is not referred by its nature to the composite, but only accidentally when that composite is treated; for when a building is treated, wood and stone are treated in comparison to it. So when the logician treats of demonstration, he will also treat of definition; but then the latter is referred to the former. Yet when definition is treated according to itself, it will not for that reason be referred, in the order of the knowable, to demonstration. By this argument the moderns think they are sufficiently fortified.
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Yet they do not notice the enemy within the rampart. For a proposition is not referred per se or by its nature to the mode of knowing otherwise than definition to demonstration; let them see for themselves how I admit that a proposition is referred accidentally to the mode of knowing. For it is a certain artificial whole, entire and complete, from which definition and any mode of knowing can be composed accidentally. Yet by these authors the proposition is banished from the class of objects of attribution, is attributed to the mode of knowing, and is never treated for itself without being referred to another. Therefore a part that in its own entity accidentally regards the whole cannot be treated by any science unless it is referred, in the order of the knowable, for itself to such a composite. But if they say the proposition is referred per se to the mode of knowing, I would say the same of definition and division compared with demonstration.
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The a priori reason is that what is accidental to the object can be per se to the faculty concerned with it: because a faculty asserts an essential order to a character accidental to the object. This is clear in arithmetic, which essentially considers the conjunction of several units, from which different numbers are formed; yet this varied coupling of units is accidental to the units themselves. The same is seen in architecture and other faculties. Thus although relation to demonstration would be accidental to definition considered in its own entity, nevertheless as considered by the dialectician it is with that relation; because practical arts have as their end a perfect work, to which they refer the more imperfect things, which they in no way treat except in order to it. I first confirm this by the example of the proposition: although in its entity it is accidentally referred to division, it is never treated by the dialectician except in order to division. Likewise, in these authors' opinion, the logician treats name, verb, subject, predicate, speech as such, imperfect speech, and other words, which do not compose a proposition and a mode of knowing except accidentally; nor yet does the logician consider them per se without relation to the mode of knowing. For he does not treat the term per se, but through the proposition that he accidentally composes. As the grammarian and rhetorician treat them, not to stop at them, but to construct congruent or elegant speech. This is especially seen in the military faculty: for equestrian doctrine has an object knowable per se, namely the use of horses, which however it refers per se to the right composition of the whole army and battle; for the horseman strives, by jousts, tournaments, and the bending and turning of horses, to drive them around the circuits, so as to imbue them vigorously with the precepts of battle.
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These are especially confirmed because in these faculties, in which we deal with accidental being, two treatments of the parts of the adequate object are not instituted. Philosophy treats wood and stone according to themselves; likewise the science of the soul treats the acts of intellect and will; but architecture treats wood, stone, lime, and other things not according to themselves, but as they can compose a building. So the logician treats acts as they compose the mode of knowing, and the moral [discipline] as they are made from right reason. But architecture does not treat twice of wood and stone, nor of wall, floor, or roof. For it does not now treat of the floor independently of the house, and then of the floor in relation to it; but there is one common treatment of floor and wall, although in themselves they are accidentally referred to the roof and the rest of the house. This is an evident argument that either floor or wall is never referred to the whole house by the nature of the art, or is always referred. But it cannot be denied that sometimes by the nature of the art roof and wall are referred to the whole house; therefore they are always referred. By the same reason the logician does not treat twice of definition but once; just as he does not treat twice but once of proposition, name, and other things. Yet when he treats of them once, name is attributed to proposition, and proposition to the mode of knowing; therefore by the same reason definition is attributed to demonstration. The a priori reason is that definition and the other parts of accidental beings do not have different predicates when treated according to themselves and when in the whole composite.
Therefore, since those parts are sometimes to be referred to the whole composite, they are then referred when they are treated according to themselves. The a priori reason is that art, in order to refer them to the whole composite, needs on their part only an aptitude for it; and this aptitude it contemplates and desires for itself, whether it be essential or accidental to them; for art by its nature delights not in a begun work but in a perfect one.
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They also object that definition and division are considered by logic even though there is no demonstration; therefore demonstration is not the end to which definition is attributed. I reply that the same argument holds for proposition, name, and verb; likewise for the sentence composing judgment from three acts. For although the mode of knowing were impossible, proposition, subject, predicate, name, and verb would still be possible. Therefore these are objects of attribution, and no longer the mode of knowing alone. But if, without this argument pressing, these are still referred to the mode of knowing, why not definition to demonstration? I reply: if demonstration were impossible, neither would our intellect be possible, since it asserts an essential order to those things, essentially dependent on its possibility. Secondly I reply: even if demonstration were impossible and our intellect possible, this logic would not be possible, because neither would this definition be possible, since by its nature it seeks to be a principle of knowledge concerning the property of the essence it defines; and also because this logic is by its nature for demonstration as for an ultimate end—not that individual acts assert an accidental order to demonstration by adequately representing it, but because they represent something of the act itself, or of the power, and because by its nature it has it as an end, just as it also has the vital power itself as an end.
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To the example of the proposition, with which we often press our opponents, the Conimbricenses Fathers reply, q. 5, art. 3: a proposition abstracted from the mode of knowing is not manifestative of the unknown, and therefore must be banished from the object of dialectic's attribution. I reply first that the proposition was adduced as an example to show that the opponents' arguments are of no weight: because it is something knowable, and is an accidental part of the mode of knowing, independent of it, and things that could be considered for themselves even if the mode of knowing were impossible; therefore all the arguments are broken by this example. Secondly I reply that it is not sufficiently proved by these authors that any mode of knowing is the object of attribution; for division is very imperfectly a participant in the mode of knowing; and by a similar argument in the case of proposition.
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I say therefore that the mode of knowing as extended to definition, division, and argumentation is not the adequate object of dialectic's attribution. This conclusion seems sufficiently established from the reply to the third argument. It is proved because a proposition is not the object of dialectic's attribution; therefore neither is division nor definition. I prove the consequence: because a proposition is as knowable as division, since very many precepts concern proposition and are more useful than those about division, as is clear from the Summulae on categorical, hypothetical, and modal proposition, on its quantity, quality, and opposition. Likewise through a proposition we are certain of the properties of objects, which are per se as knowable as the division of the object: for man as such is divided into Peter, Paul, and Anthony; man likewise is risible: certainly any prudent person will value knowing through a proposition man's risibility as much as knowing Anthony through division. I confess I would more willingly establish as the object of dialectic every proposition in species than the mode of knowing alone.