Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
§ 120
The first opinion teaches that there are four adequate objects of the attribution of dialectic. The first is the proposition as such: the second, argumentation as such: the third, the mode of knowing as such: the fourth, the act of the human intellect as such, abstracted from apprehension and judgment. Its foundation is a new definition of the object of attribution: namely that it is that in whose nature, properties, causes, effects, integral and essential parts, and things to be known subjectively, the whole science is spent. And so the essence of the proposition must be considered, for example, this is the object of attribution, because it is considered first per se; but the objects attributed to it are subject, predicate, union, term in common, mode of knowing in common and in particular; because the term and the union are parts intrinsically composing it; but the term as such, or the act of the intellect as such, is a logical part of it; the mode of knowing however is its species, etc.
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But since the dialectician treats nothing that by some of these accounts does not belong to the proposition, this is adequately the object of dialectic. For terms and their union are parts intrinsically composing the proposition. But definition and the other modes of knowing are subjective parts of the proposition: in short, there is nothing that is not a proposition or something of it. Since likewise the mode of knowing in common includes the proposition and its terms, the proposition is something of it, and therefore the mode of knowing is also an object to which the proposition is attributed. Likewise to argumentation are reduced the proposition and the mode of knowing, because this includes the proposition and the mode of knowing: but because the mode of knowing is a species of intellection as such, and nothing is treated in logic that is not an act of the intellect, this is therefore also the adequate object of the attribution of logic. But they are called adequate objects not because each one is such that besides it there is no other, but because each one claims for itself the attribution of the others.
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This opinion relies on a definition of the object of attribution that is neither common nor good. Not common: because, as will be established in the first disputation of metaphysics from §. 28, the object of attribution is the extrinsic end of the whole faculty to which the other things are referred in knowable being, that is, in order that a more perfect knowledge of it may be had. And so the perfect cognition of the object of attribution is the end of the cognitions of the other objects. Hence I first attack this opinion: because those cognitions cannot be mutually an end, because there is no mutual causality, especially in the same genus: whereas in fact, for example, one cognition of the proposition is specifically in logic, and another of the term as such, they cannot be mutually useful: because the one first compared was independent of the second; and therefore the second could not be a means to the first. But because this opinion does not establish this mutual attribution in final causality, therefore, passing over this argument, I shall run through others.
§ 123
I attack this definition, because it does not establish the attribution of the object in final causality, which is contrary to Aristotle, St. Thomas, and others, whom I shall review in the first disputation of metaphysics §. 29 and 30, which indeed is altogether absurd. For since it has been disputed for many centuries about that genus of object, it is not now to be defined. Otherwise, unless the common definition is held fixed, we shall not be able to agree on the object of attribution.
§ 124
Secondly I argue, because the object of attribution does not claim for itself that all the objects of its faculty are its parts, properties, causes or effects: therefore neither is that a sufficient definition. I prove the antecedent, because real being as such, or substance, or God, is the adequate object of attribution of metaphysics, although being of reason, with which the metaphysician deals, is the effect, cause, part, or property of no real being: therefore some object can be attributed to others without being its part, cause, etc. To this argument it can only be answered that being of reason does not belong to the metaphysician, but to another distinct faculty, and a paradoxical one, into which this opinion necessarily falls because of its singular definition of the object. But the common adage holds that there is one and the same discipline of contraries; and indeed there will now be more parts of Philosophy, because this [discipline] about being of reason as such is not logic, as I have shown; nor is it physics, which contemplates corporeal substance; nor is it metaphysics, nor is it a species of mathematics: therefore it is a new faculty.
§ 125
From this too its absurdities are apparent, because the physicist deals with privation, which since it is nothing, is neither a part, nor a cause, nor an effect of corporeal substance. Let it be granted, however, that it is in some way something of matter and generation. Bachuvus is treated in Philosophy: which however is nothing of body: therefore either Bachuvus does not belong to the physicist, or it is an object attributed to body without being its part, cause or effect. The same is clear in the theologian dealing with true and false divinity, but the false is nothing of the true God: whereas this is the adequate object of attribution of Theology. In each faculty, therefore, there is treatment of being and its opposite, as in Theology of virtues and vices; of grace and sin: because the object of attribution is known more perfectly through comparison with its opposite.
§ 126
Thirdly, because in metaphysics there would be more adequate objects than philosophers have known. For its object of attribution would be being as such, God, complete substance, complete spiritual substance, accident as such, spiritual accident as such, Angelic spiritual accident. Finally every real being, with which the logician deals, would be the adequate object of metaphysics. This is proved openly, because just as the act of the intellect as such is the genus of the mode of knowing, and is treated per se by the logician, so also being as such is compared to the metaphysician. But being as such is compared to substance and accident as such, not otherwise than intellection is compared to the proposition and the mode of knowing; but God is treated by the metaphysician, and the other real objects of his faculty are something of God. But the Angel and common predicates, and all accidents, and God himself, are something of the Angel. For God is its cause. These and other things can be absurdly deduced against this opinion.
§ 127
Nay, even in logic itself there are several other objects besides the four designated by this opinion: for the subject of the proposition as such will also be an adequate object of logic: because it is a species of intellection, and the other objects of logic are something of it. For the predicate is something of the subject, and the union of predicate and subject is something of the subject. But the whole proposition is something of the subject: both because there is nothing besides the subject, the predicate and the union, which are the subject and something of the subject. I would say the same of the mode of knowing; which since it is a species of the proposition, is something of the subject as the proposition itself is. Likewise the same argument holds for the predicate, and the same for the union: for the predicate and the subject are something of the union, because they are its extremes. I would say the same of the major proposition; the same too of the minor; and the same of the conclusion. For the premises are something of the conclusion, because they are its cause: the major too is something of the minor, because it is a co-principle of it for the conclusion: and there is scarcely anything in logic that is not an object of attribution. Nay, even vital act as such, abstracted from intellect and sensation, will be an object of attribution of logic, because there is treatment of the natural sign as such, and of the apprehension of an object, whose species are apprehensions and intellectual signs.
§ 128
Finally, neither the mode of knowing nor argumentation will be the adequate object of logic: because the logician deals with the fallacious syllogism, which is neither a mode of knowing nor argumentation, since it is rather a mode of erring and of falling short of argumentation. For the mode of knowing is manifestative of the unknown: but a fallacious argumentation does not manifest the object about which it causes error: but argumentation is a leading of one thing from another: but that which does not keep the laws of argumentation gathers nothing from the proposed object, and therefore causes error, because it does not gather although it seems to gather. And just as nothing is gathered, nor is there absolutely a syllogism from four terms, or from two, nor from purely particular or from purely negative [premises]: so there is no argumentation absolutely unless it keeps the laws of argumentation. I omit other arguments, indeed many, against this opinion, which will readily occur to the student.