Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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I say first. The formal mode of knowing is the object of logic. This conclusion is that of St. Thomas, cited at §.57 and §.58, where he establishes the acts of the intellect as the object of logic, as the act of the will is the object of moral philosophy: of Durandus cited at §.46, of Toletus at the same §., of Didacus Masius cited at §.50, and of others whose enumeration would be long. It can be confirmed from St. Augustine, cited at §.67, asserting that the office of dialectic is to teach the reason of disputing: but disputation is formally an act of the intellect: therefore from St. Augustine the formal mode of knowing is the object of logic.
§ 90
It is proved first, because logic teaches what definition, division, and argumentation are: but that doctrine fits the formal definition: therefore the dialectical precepts are about the formal mode of knowing. The minor is proved: because definition is called a discourse explaining the nature of the thing: but by the name "discourse" we understand both the vocal proposition and the act of the intellect for which it is substituted: but to be a discourse does not belong to the objective definition: for animal rationale is not a discourse explaining the nature of man, but rather is the object of the discourse explaining it. Therefore this precept fits only the formal definition, and not the objective one. Likewise, when a syllogism is said to consist of three affirmative propositions, this is received of the formal syllogism alone: whose object affirms or denies nothing, nor is it formally a proposition. Add that the inference signified in argumentation by this word ergo is nothing on the part of the object; but is an act of the intellect connoting the necessity of inference from the premises. And although these things also in their own way belong to the objective mode of knowing, they nevertheless belong to the formal one as to the form on account of which they belong to the objective: for that animal is a genus and homo a species; that risibile is the conclusion and rationale the premise; that animal is the predicate and homo the subject—these they have formally from the acts of the intellect, to which it belongs as that by which they are genus, species etc. just as all things that belong to a white thing as dispersing sight belong also to whiteness as the account of dispersing. Therefore in dialectical doctrine we cannot separate the objective mode of knowing from the formal, because the latter is the account constituting the former in the character of objective.
§ 91
Father Rubio tries [to make] the object of dialectic to be the things themselves as they are passively denominated, disposed by the intellect; but not the disposing acts themselves. I have attacked this view more than once. I confirm it thus: because passive disposition is not distinguished from the disposing acts themselves, or depends on them in such a way that it cannot be known except through them: for who will apprehend that an object is defined without also apprehending the defining cognition? as a thing cannot be known to be loved without also apprehending the love: which seems so clear that it dazzles the eyes with light. I add that the precepts of definition as such fit the active or formal definition: for the defining act is both a mode of knowing and a discourse explaining the nature of the thing, no less than the passive denomination defines: therefore it pertains to the logician: because every mode of knowing pertains to the logician: and the precepts are so similar that they cannot pertain to two faculties. But what Father Rubio objects, that the acts of the intellect as they formally or actively denominate objects pertain to the books On the Soul, has been refuted at §.83, where I established by what reason these acts pertain to the science of the soul and to dialectic. Just as the act of the will pertains to the same science of the soul and to moral philosophy: likewise a stone to the physicist and to the architect.
§ 92
It can be objected secondly that the act of the intellect belongs to logic not indeed in the direct case and directly, but in the oblique case and indirectly: just as the science of the soul treats of colors indirectly and remotely, because it treats of sight, whose object is color. On the contrary, the logician treats of the formal mode of knowing as immediately as of the objective: for when the definition is said to be a discourse explaining the nature of a thing, this precept belongs per se to the act of defining: indeed the logician treats of the formal mode of knowing in the abstract and in the concrete. In the abstract indeed, when it is said, definitio est oratio explicans naturam rei: which definition belongs to the act of defining alone: just as it belongs to that same act alone to be quidditative cognition of the object through genus and difference, and it belongs to vision to be external sensation of color. In the concrete, however, it is treated when we say that the definition is predicated quidditatively of the defined: where the defined is placed in the direct case; but the quidditative predication in the oblique: not indeed indirectly, but as the formal character by which we predicate something quidditatively: this twofold character of treating something is a clear argument in some faculty that that is the object of that faculty per se and directly: just as the Philosopher treats of agent and action, of the intellective power and of intellections. But the student of the science of the soul does not treat of color in the abstract, nor in the concrete explaining its formal effects, but precisely as it is the term of vision. What color is, however, the student of the science of the soul presupposes from another part of Philosophy treating of the secondary qualities. But if someone thinks that color belongs per se to the books On the Soul, he does not impede but assists the argument.
§ 93
I say secondly. The objective mode of knowing, as it is distinguished from the formal, is also the object of dialectic. This conclusion is the work of St. Thomas in Opusculum 56, to the middle, in these words: Avicenna dicit quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Which dialecticians commonly follow, asserting that the objects of the other sciences belong to logic as they are subject to second intentions. It is proved openly, because many precepts of dialectic cannot fit only the formal mode of knowing, therefore they fit the objective. I prove the antecedent by these precepts: *definitio distinguitur a definito sola ratione: definitio praedicatur quidditative de definito: utraque praemissa distinguitur a conclusione solo modo conci-*piendi: genus praedicatur quidditative de specie. But all these belong to objects alone, but not to acts, nor to some passive denomination, or being of reason distinct from the very entity of genus, species, etc. Because the act of the intellect concerning the definition is distinguished more than in reason from another act concerning the defined, of which it cannot be predicated quidditatively, because it is really distinct from it: but the formal premises are also distinguished really from the formal conclusion: therefore the objective mode of knowing belongs per se and immediately to the logician no less than the formal. I form the same argument concerning passive denomination and being of reason: for the denomination of the definition, or the being of reason, is not predicated quidditatively of the denomination, or of the being of reason of the defined.
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You will object however that the logician treats of the objective mode of knowing remotely, as of the subject of the formal mode of knowing: just as when one treats of the white, one treats per se of whiteness alone, but of its subject remotely and per accidens. On the contrary, the precepts reviewed in §.93. belong to the objective mode of knowing immediately and by its own character, not indeed mediately and remotely, indeed not even by reason of the formal mode of knowing: because that the objective definition is not really distinct from the defined, nor the conclusion from the premises, they have indeed of themselves, although they add some extrinsic denomination from the formal mode of knowing. What is objected concerning the white and the other physical subjects is not to the point, because if one treats of the effects of whiteness, it itself is their cause, but the subject is a remote cause: in which it differs from the objective mode of knowing, which is immediately subjected or predicated; and by reason of itself it has identity or distinction. But if one treats of the whole accidental physical composite, one treats also immediately of the subject itself and the form: by which reason one treats in logic of the objective and formal mode of knowing: for when we say, the genus is predicated: this precept belongs to the objective genus as that which: but to the thing generated as by which.
§ 95
I say thirdly. The logician does not contemplate the objective mode of knowing except as affected by an extrinsic denomination from the formal mode of knowing. This doctrine is St. Thomas's in Opusculum 56, to the middle: Logica (he says) principaliter est de secundis intentionibus etc. ideo Avicenna dicit, quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. From which no one can dissent: because the logician treats of the objective mode of knowing as it is subject, predicate, definition, defined, syllogism, etc. but all these belong to the objective mode of knowing as it is affected by the formal. therefore. I prove the minor, because on the part of the thing there is not formally a subject, genus, nor species. therefore. And although the definition has of itself a real identity with the defined, nevertheless to be a definition and defined, a premise and conclusion, is formally from the formal mode of knowing: for the objective definition is the object clearly known through genus and difference: but the defined is the same object confusedly known.
§ 96
I say fourthly. Nor does the dialectician treat of the formal mode of knowing except by comparison, and in order to the objective. For the logician considers the formal mode of knowing as it is affirmation or negation of the subject concerning the predicate: definition or defined; division and syllogism: but all these are by comparison of the object, affirmation or negation, etc. Indeed although many predicates belong to the formal mode of knowing alone, it is always so that we explain what it has by comparison with the objective: as when the definition is said to be a discourse explaining the nature of a thing. But when dialecticians dispute at length about the word of the mind, about truth or falsity, and other such things, they do not accomplish this in the dialectical manner, but in the manner of the science of the soul: from which faculty the dialectician borrows many things; no otherwise than the architect from Philosophy.
§ 97
I say fifthly. The adequate and immediate object of logic is the formal and objective mode of knowing. This doctrine, being new, does not need proof: because the adequate immediate object of some faculty is the adequate immediate object of all its acts: but the adequate and immediate object of all the acts of dialectic is the formal and objective mode of knowing. therefore. The minor is proved, because some acts contemplate immediately the formal mode of knowing; some the objective, besides which the dialectician contemplates nothing. therefore all dialectical acts are concerning the formal and objective mode of knowing.
§ 98
You ask whether beings of reason belong to the object of logic? To answer, I hold that a being of reason can be considered as the form constituting some second intention of genus, species, etc. In this consideration I have rejected the being of reason from the object of logic. Likewise a being of reason can be considered as the object of a second intention, which can be denominated genus, species, subject, predicate, etc. Thus it belongs to the logician like any other object. But by what reason a being of reason agrees with a real being in the character of the knowable, I shall show in disputation 4.