Universa Philosophia

The arguments for the opinion set out in § 45 are to be refuted chiefly from disput. 19 on metaphysics, where it is openly shown in sect. 3 that a being of reason is nothing but a figment and a chimera. But that extrinsic denominations are a real being is proved in the same place sect. 1. But that the formal character by which an object is denominated known is not distinguished from the cognition itself I show in the same place from § 39: from which all the arguments will easily be refuted. Their solutions I will briefly indicate here, referring the reader to that disput. 19.

The first argument of Soto: all things that are treated in logic are treated under the consideration of a being of reason: therefore a being of reason is the adequate object of logic. The antecedent is proved, because the logician treats only of genus and species as an object defined and divided: but all these are beings of reason: therefore. The minor is proved, because a being of reason is what belongs to an object precisely as it is under the operation of the intellect: but to be a genus and to be a species belong to an object as it is subject to the operation of the intellect: therefore to be a genus is a being of reason. Soto borrowed this argument from Durandus on the first book, dist. 33 q. 1 num. 10. I answer, however, by denying the antecedent. To the proof I deny the minor: for they are not proper beings of reason, but denominative ones. To the proof I distinguish the major: a being of reason is what belongs to an object through the operation of the intellect formally, I deny the major: what belongs through the operation of the intellect feigning some chimera, I concede the major. I distinguish likewise the minor: to be a genus belongs to an object through the operation of the intellect denominatively, I concede the minor: it belongs through an operation feigning, I deny the minor. I distinguish also the consequent: therefore to be a genus is a proper being of reason (which is fictitious), I deny the consequence: it is a denominative being of reason, I concede the consequence. Review § 44, where I explained these beings of reason.

I explain this doctrine: when some object is known, there belongs to it this predicate known, existing objectively in the intellect. Which belongs to the object only as it underlies the intellection: which is the form of this formal effect, or the formal character. But that belongs to the object not through any being of reason, but through the intellection itself which is a real being: but it is of reason only effectively, subjectively, and denominatively. But we are dealing at present with the being of reason which is outside the whole range of real being as such. I shall show, however, in disp. 19 of the Metaphysics, sect. 3, that a being of reason is that which has being only objectively in the intellect: where I shall also show that this happens through an act of fashioning: because if it had another being distinct from the objective one and were known, it would no longer have being only objectively in the intellect. For this reason the act producing a being of reason is chimerical: because on the part of the object there does not correspond what is affirmed through it. Consult disp. 19, § 65, 66 and 67. But Durandus spoke only of the denominative being of reason: which I said consists in the extrinsic denomination of cognition, in the passages cited from disp. 19, § 4.

Someone will object that animal's being a genus does not belong to animal itself formally from the act of the intellect, but from a certain being of reason derived from it. For an object's being known is not the immediate formal effect of cognition. I reply first that the denomination 'known' formally consists in the cognition itself: as I shall show in disp. 19 of the Metaphysics from § 56, because by the same character by which a man is knowing and sees color, by that same the color is represented and seen: as I shall show in disp. 19, § 62, where in the whole of sect. 2 I attack most extensively these beings of reason derived from extrinsic denominations. Durandus also clearly handed down this doctrine. Secondly I reply that, granted a being of reason thus derived, it is not the adequate object of logic: whose scope is the acts of the intellect of genus, species and others, but not their effects of reason, as I shall show in § 119.

The second argument of Soto: the subject of a science is that from which it takes its species: but logic takes its species from the being of reason; therefore the being of reason is the object of logic. The minor is proved, because logic is called the science of reason or rational: for it is not called a real science. Soto himself saw the emptiness of the argument: whose minor proposition I deny. To the proof I reply that logic is divided from the real sciences, not because its object is not real: but because it deals with things themselves not according to themselves, but as they underlie second intentions: likewise it disputes about the acts themselves not according to themselves, whether they are action, quality, etc., but as they bestow on objects the denomination of genus, species, etc. But it is called the science of reason not only because it is according to reason, but because its object is the acts of reason themselves, as I showed from St. Thomas in § 58 (where note how much his disciples disagree with him, affirming that logic is called the science of reason because it deals with the being of reason, while St. Thomas asserts that it is called the science of reason and rational because its object is the acts of reason themselves: which they banish from the object of logic. St. Augustine, tom. 7, lib. 1, against Cresconius the grammarian, chap. 13, teaches that dialectic is the skill of disputing, but chap. 14 teaches that dialectic should have been called in Latin disputatoria: but disputatoria in Latin is the same as dialogue or dialexis in Greek: but disputatoria in Latin is not named from the being of reason, but from disputation, which is discourse: but dialectic and logic are the same: for logos in Greek sounds in Latin sermon, or sermocination. Dialectic, therefore, and logic are named because it teaches to reason and dispute. But what Soto says, that in no science is a being of reason considered, is clearly false from disp. 1 of the Metaphysics, § 51 and from § 4, where I show sufficiently that the being of reason as such pertains to the metaphysician.

The third argument of Father Rubius from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas is diluted from § 54. But the fourth of the same author, num. 20, is: because the logician deals with genus and species, subject and predicate: but these are not real beings: therefore they are beings of reason. The minor is proved, because on the part of the thing they are not formally genera and species. I reply that some genera and species according to their material aspect, or as the logicians say their substratum, are a being of reason: for example, chimaera as such is a genus to chimaeras of diverse species. Of this kind of being of reason there is no question in this argument: but the question is of the formal character of genus and species. In which sense I deny the minor: for the character of genus and species are real beings, extrinsic however to the objects: for they are acts of the intellect knowing objects in many ways. To the proof I reply that the universal is not on the part of the thing: that is, the universal nature does not have in itself intrinsic universality: but extrinsic universality in things is on the part of the thing, namely in the intellect effecting and receiving it.

Come now: let the formal character of genus, species, etc. be a being of reason distinct from the extrinsic denomination of cognition: even so the being of reason will not be the primary object of logic. For in that view genus (the same holds of the other second intentions) can be considered proximately and formally, and can be considered in its proximate foundation. Genus formally is the being of reason itself distinct from generic cognition, which is the proximate and formal character of genus. But the remote fundamental genus is animal itself which is called a genus: because although in the character of object it terminates cognition immediately; and in the character of quasi-subject receives genericity, which according to you is a being of reason: yet for this to result, there is need of a cognition abstracting animal from its differences: from which there is proximately and immediately derived the being known, as Father Rubius contends; or there is derived another being of reason, as others hold.

These things being established, I reply to the argument from § 65, with the minor proposition distinguished: genus and species formally and proximately are beings of reason, let the minor pass: genus and species remotely and fundamentally are beings of reason, I deny the minor. To the proof I reply that genera and species formally and proximately are neither on the part of the thing in things, nor in the intellect: but genus and species fundamentally (in this kind of foundation) although they are not in things, are nevertheless in the intellect. But the dialectician does not deal with genus and species proximately and formally, but fundamentally, as will be established from § 74 and 78.

We can argue fifthly from the same Father Rubius, question 6, conclusion 2: because the directibility of the acts of the intellect ought to be in the objects themselves as in a subject, or matter: but in the object there cannot be anything real: therefore the directibility must be of reason. The minor is proved, because that directibility is the order of subject to predicate, of premises to conclusion: but in objects there cannot be a real order, therefore it is of reason. The minor is proved because a real order cannot exist except between extremes really distinct. I reply that the thing is directed by the intellect, and that there is nothing in the objects themselves besides an extrinsic denomination from the directing acts. Hence I deny the major, taken of a subject and matter of inhesion: but I concede it of a subject and matter of denomination: for every object is called the subject and matter about which the act is exercised: as color is the subject and matter which is and is denominated seen: yet on that account vision is not in the color but only in the sight. So the matter of logic is the object of the directibility of the acts of the intellect. Hence I distinguish also the minor: there cannot be in known things subjectively a real order of subject and predicate, I concede the minor: there cannot be denominatively and extrinsically a real order, I deny the minor: just as vision denominates color as seen. To the proof I reply: an intrinsic real order is between extremes really distinct: but an extrinsic real order does not require extremes really distinct: for an act of the intellect can extrinsically denominate a really one entity in diverse ways: thus the same thing is subject and predicate; the defined and the objective definition: because all these are an extrinsic denomination of the object: but the same thing can have several extrinsic denominations. Secondly one can reply from the doctrine of § 66, by distinguishing proximate and remote order. The proximate is the being of reason, which the logician does not treat: as I indicated in § 67. But the remote is the real being extrinsic to objects, because it is formally an act of the intellect, and therefore it pertains to the logician.

The sixth argument: because logic ranges through all the categories: because it deals with the same categories as the metaphysician: therefore it deals with them under some character discoverable in them: then further: but no one real character belongs to all of them; therefore it is a character of reason. I prove the minor, because the direction of the acts of the intellect pertains only to the category of action, or of quality, because the acts of the intellect are placed in it, which cannot range through all the categories: therefore some being of reason attributable to them is the character under which logic deals with all the categories. This demonstration is confirmed: because syllogistic intentions pertain to some science, not to another besides logic. Therefore.

SUBSECTION IV. The object of logic is real being.