Universa Philosophia

=== LATIN Idemque patet in oppositione contradictoria duarum propositionum, quarum altera sit universalis, altera confusa. Nam si universalis esset vera, et particularis falsa, sequeretur de eodem individuo simul proferri duas propositiones singulares mutuo contradicentes, nam si, omnis homo currit, est vera, et aliquis non currit, est vera: ergo de eodem Petro vere affirmari poterit, Petrus currit, Petrus non currit, quia ab universali vera descenditur ad singularem veram, Petrus currit: demus autem ad veritatem particularis negativae illud individuum non currens esse Petrum, in quo vera est illa propositio (idem namque est in quovis alio, quia universalis propositio omnia complectitur) iam Petrus curret, et non curret simul, similiter si utraque sit falsa. demus enim universalem falsam, quia Petrus non currit, si particularis est falsa, sequitur Petrum currere, quia omnis homo necessario currit, ad huius falsitatem aliquis homo non currit, ut dixi, §.27. et 28. ergo Petrus simul curreret, et non curreret. omnis ergo oppositio propositionum re ipsa est contradictoria: explicatur autem triplici illa distinctione, ut ostendantur diversae rationes, quibus haec oppositio cernitur in propositionibus diversarum quantitatum. === ENGLISH The same is clear in the contradictory opposition of two propositions, of which one is universal and the other confused. For if the universal were true and the particular false, it would follow that two singular propositions mutually contradicting are asserted at once of the same individual; for if omnis homo currit is true and aliquis non currit is true: therefore of the same Peter it could be truly affirmed Petrus currit, Petrus non currit, because from a true universal one descends to a true singular, Petrus currit; but let us grant for the truth of the particular negative that the individual not running is Peter, in whom that proposition is true (for it is the same in any other, because the universal proposition embraces all), now Petrus curret, et non curret simul, similarly if both are false. For let us grant the universal false because Petrus non currit; if the particular is false, it follows that Peter runs, because every man necessarily runs, for the falsity of this aliquis homo non currit, as I said, §27 and 28. Therefore Petrus simul curreret, et non curreret. Therefore every opposition of propositions is in reality contradictory; but it is explained by that threefold distinction, so that the diverse reasons may be shown by which this opposition is discerned in propositions of diverse quantities.