Universa Philosophia

The doctrine that I shall set out concerning these two suppositions is best handed down by Soto, 2nd part of the introduction, cap. 1, lect. 3, notable 1 and 5. And first, against Toletus and Fonseca, there is this argument in this proposition: Petrus est individuum subiicibile. The word Petrus supposits simply, and not personally, and in this Petrus currit it supposits personally, and not simply, but in each it has the same immediate significate, and neither has a remote significate: therefore simple and personal supposition are not well distinguished by proximate and remote significate; because without that distinction of objects those suppositions are distinguished. I prove the minor: because Petrus est individuum subiicibile does not belong to Peter according to his own person considered in itself, but by the denomination of a second intellectual intention, because that man is a species belongs to him not by reason of human persons in themselves, but through an act of the intellect; therefore just as in homo est species it supposits simply, and not personally, so also in Petrus est individuum. It is confirmed: every supposition for predicables formally is simple, therefore also for subicibles: because they are versed in the same logical genus. That this supposition is simple Soto openly teaches above, and Toletus, lib. 1, c. 1. That Peter is also supposited personally is doubted by no one. That Peter in each proposition has the same significate is clear; because Petrus signifies only the account of man contracted by Petreity, and signifies nothing else either proximately or remotely—but if not, assign it.