Universa Philosophia

Villalpandus, book 1, 3rd part, ch. 1, says that a term to supposit is for the term to exist in the proposition, and to be the thing which it signifies at the time signified by the copula. For example. In this proposition Adam was, Adam supposits, because he exists at the time enunciated by the proposition: likewise in this Adam is, Adam does not supposit: because Adam does not exist at the time signified. Villalpandus has not yet wholly cast off the trifles of the sophists, who poured out many things about supposition; thinking that supposition is a term verifiable in a proposition. Hence took its origin among them the common adage in false propositions, they are about a non-suppositing subject, that is, about a term not verifiable, and about a non-existent object, as it is enunciated in the proposition. But this definition is rightly rejected, and hissed off by Sotus, Toletus, and Fonseca. For to supposit is to be placed for another, therefore every term in any proposition whatsoever is supposited, or supposits. I prove the consequence, because a term in any proposition whatsoever is placed in place of the thing signified, or in place of mental concepts. For in this proposition, Peter is a stone, this word Peter is not placed in place of itself, but in place of Peter himself as existing in the mental proposition, as in this Peter is a man, it is not placed for itself, but for Peter, who is a man, therefore in both propositions it is placed in place of another, and is supposited. But whether the object exists or does not exist is irrelevant. The adage took its origin from trifling sophists, because there is no subject of a proposition that is not supposited, or suppositing: but the object signified by the terms is not supposited nor supposits, but rather the term is supposited in its place. But a proposition will be able to be called about a non-suppositing subject, when someone argues from some proposition as if conceded, when it is not: as if someone says, let us suppose Peter to be honest, then thus, but every honest man is worthy of praise, therefore Peter is worthy of praise. If this man proceeds in the argument without the suppositum being admitted by the respondent, he can be said to speak about a non-suppositing subject.