Universa Philosophia

Note that someone can form an ultimate concept of the sign according to itself, and not an ultimate one of the thing signified, as when a Greek hears a Latin, he knows that it is a sound significative at will, and penetrates the quiddity, roughness, or smoothness of the voice; but he does not know what it signifies. Likewise he can know the thing signified ultimately, as if a Latin [word] signifies the city in which the Greek was born; this man indeed knows the thing and the sign, but that is to know those things materially, that is, he knows those matters well, not however formally in the character of sign and signified. Hence someone can rightly be ignorant of the physical nature of the sign and of the thing signified, and form an ultimate concept of them in the character of sign and signified, as the word equus is not known by a muleteer — whether it is a quality? or an action? nor whether a horse is a species of beast of burden — and yet he knows that a horse is signified by that word. That is to know the sign ultimately in the character of sign, because it is known that that thing, whatever it may be, is signified by that word, whether it be action or quality; and he who does not know this does not form the ultimate concept of the thing, however perfectly he may know both the sign and the thing.