Universa Philosophia

You object, that this definition applies to things other than the defined: for a cause, once known, leads into cognition of its effect, and yet a cause is not a sign of its effect¹, therefore. I deny that this defect is committed in the definition. For it is said leads into cognition of the thing signified through it, but a cause, although once known it leads into cognition of its effect, nevertheless the effect is not signified through the cause. For to be a sign, or image of a thing, says that such a thing is by its nature, or by the will of men, imposed for representing another: but a cause is not by its nature for representing an effect. For Caesar does not represent his image, although from cognition of Caesar we come into cognition of his image: but the image of Caesar represents Caesar, because it was made to represent him. Thus I am the image of my parent, and he is not the image of me, because I was made to the likeness of him. so creatures are called images of God: but God is by no means an image of creatures. Nay, the Son of God is called the image of the Father, because he was produced to express the Father, but the eternal Father is not called the image of the Son, thus demonstrations through effects are called demonstrations from a sign.