Universa Philosophia

Name: Universa Philosophia
Author: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza

First published 1624

Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.

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Summulae

Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument

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§ 11 Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.

Aristoteles primo Physicorum

Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?

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§ 4 Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.

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§ 20 Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.

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It is confirmed: man is not well divided into painted and true: because they do not agree in the account of man: therefore neither is term into vocal, written, and mental: but term ought to be divided through the various mental terms: but with crude Minerva, the term is thus divided for the sake of clarity, therefore, for beginners: then so that precepts may be handed down through vocal and written terms, because what is said about them fits mental terms by attribution, in whose place they are substituted, as a sign is accustomed to be put for the thing signified, and because voices and writings are signs of mental terms, for that reason the term is divided through them.

§ 26 Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.

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§ 35 Signum significativum ad placitum

Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.

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§ 43 Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.

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§ 66 Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.

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§ 68 Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.

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§ 73 Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.

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§ 87 Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.

§ 88 Dices categorematicos significare

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§ 92 Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.

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§ 103 Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.

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§ 108 Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.

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§ 111 Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.

Sectio I. On Supposition.

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§ 10 Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.

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§ 12 Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.

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§ 20 Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.

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§ 23 Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.

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§ 32 Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.

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§ 42 Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.

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§ 49 Sectio VIII. On Appellation.

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§ 52 Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.

Sectio I. On the Noun.

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§ 11 Sectio II. On the Verb.

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§ 18 Sectio III. On Speech.

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§ 21 Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.

Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.

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§ 3 Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.

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§ 6 Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.

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§ 12 Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.

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§ 14 Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.

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§ 19 Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.

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§ 23 Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.

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§ 33 Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.

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§ 37 Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.

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§ 41 Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?

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§ 46 Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.

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§ 50 Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.

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§ 60 Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.

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§ 64 Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.

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§ 74 Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.

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§ 76 Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.

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§ 2 Sectio I. On Definition.

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§ 6 Sectio II. On Division.

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§ 12 Sectio III. On Argumentation.

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§ 18 Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.

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§ 27 Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.

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§ 35 Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.

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§ 48 Sectio VII. On Consequence.

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§ 53 Some Terms Explained.

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§ 12 Logic

Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.

Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.

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§ 13 Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.

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§ 20 Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?

§ 21 Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.

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§ 26 Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.

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§ 40 Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?

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§ 44 Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.

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§ 52 Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.

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§ 59 Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.

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§ 70 Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.

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§ 80 Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.

§ 81 Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.

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§ 88 Subsectio II. The question is resolved.

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§ 98 Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.

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§ 110 Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.

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§ 118 Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.

§ 119 Subsectio I. The first opinion.

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§ 128 Subsectio II.

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§ 134 Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.

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§ 146 Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.

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§ 163 Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.

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§ 168 Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.

Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?

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§ 9 Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?

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§ 29 Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?

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§ 35 Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.

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§ 42 Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.

§ 1 Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.

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§ 8 Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?

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§ 20 Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?

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§ 33 Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.

Sectio I. I Define Genus.

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§ 6 Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?

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§ 16 Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?

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§ 20 Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.

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§ 26 Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?

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§ 48 Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.

Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.

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§ 11 Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.

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§ 16 Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.

Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.

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§ 22 Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.

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§ 29 Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.

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§ 40 Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?

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§ 48 Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.

§ 49 Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.

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§ 58 Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.

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§ 72 Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.

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§ 100 Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.

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§ 105 Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.

Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.

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§ 6 Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?

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§ 12 Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?

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§ 26 Sectio IV. Whether the Lowest Difference Differs Specifically from the Subaltern Difference?

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§ 28 Sectio V. On Property.

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§ 33 Sectio VI. On Accident.

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§ 40 Disputatio VII: Disputatio VII. On What Is Common to the Five Predicables.