Universa Philosophia

Name: Universa Philosophia
Author: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza

First published 1624

Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.

This work is being completed — add a section.

Summulae

Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11 Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.

Aristoteles primo Physicorum

Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4 Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

The second defect is that this definition does not apply to every term, since it does not apply to a term that does not signify by convention, from which propositions can be formed, as I showed in § 7. Therefore. I prove the premise: a non-signifying spoken expression is not a sign, because signification belongs to the essence of a sign. You may say that it signifies naturally. But this natural signification is common to all effects that signify their causes; nor is it placed in a proposition by virtue of that significate. This response can readily free the definition from this second defect.

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20 Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26 Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35 Signum significativum ad placitum

Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40

§ 41

§ 42

§ 43 Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.

§ 44

§ 45

§ 46

§ 47

§ 48

§ 49

§ 50

§ 51

§ 52

§ 53

§ 54

§ 55

§ 56

§ 57

§ 58

§ 59

§ 60

§ 61

§ 62

§ 63

§ 64

§ 65

§ 66 Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.

§ 67

§ 68 Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.

§ 69

§ 70

§ 71

§ 72

§ 73 Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.

§ 74

§ 75

§ 76

§ 77

§ 78

§ 79

§ 80

§ 81

§ 82

§ 83

§ 84

§ 85

§ 86

§ 87 Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.

§ 88 Dices categorematicos significare

§ 90

§ 91

§ 92 Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.

§ 93

§ 94

§ 95

§ 96

§ 97

§ 98

§ 99

§ 100

§ 101

§ 102

§ 103 Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.

§ 104

§ 105

§ 106

§ 107

§ 108 Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.

§ 109

§ 110

§ 111 Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.

Sectio I. On Supposition.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10 Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.

§ 11

§ 12 Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20 Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23 Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32 Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40

§ 41

§ 42 Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.

§ 43

§ 44

§ 45

§ 46

§ 47

§ 48

§ 49 Sectio VIII. On Appellation.

§ 50

§ 51

§ 52 Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.

Sectio I. On the Noun.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11 Sectio II. On the Verb.

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18 Sectio III. On Speech.

§ 19

§ 20

§ 21 Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.

Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3 Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6 Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12 Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.

§ 13

§ 14 Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19 Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.

§ 20

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23 Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33 Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.

§ 34

§ 35

§ 36

§ 37 Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40

§ 41 Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?

§ 42

§ 43

§ 44

§ 45

§ 46 Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.

§ 47

§ 48

§ 49

§ 50 Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.

§ 51

§ 52

§ 53

§ 54

§ 55

§ 56

§ 57

§ 58

§ 59

§ 60 Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.

§ 61

§ 62

§ 63

§ 64 Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.

§ 65

§ 66

§ 67

§ 68

§ 69

§ 70

§ 71

§ 72

§ 73

§ 74 Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.

§ 75

§ 76 Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.

§ 1

§ 2 Sectio I. On Definition.

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6 Sectio II. On Division.

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12 Sectio III. On Argumentation.

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18 Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.

§ 19

§ 20

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26

§ 27 Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35 Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40

§ 41

§ 42

§ 43

§ 44

§ 45

§ 46

§ 47

§ 48 Sectio VII. On Consequence.

§ 49

§ 50

§ 51

§ 52

§ 53 Some Terms Explained.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12 Logic

Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.

Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12

§ 13 Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20 Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?

§ 21 Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26 Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40 Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?

§ 41

§ 42

§ 43

§ 44 Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.

§ 45

§ 46

§ 47

§ 48

§ 49

§ 50

§ 51

§ 52 Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.

§ 53

§ 54

§ 55

§ 56

§ 57

§ 58

§ 59 Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.

§ 60

§ 61

§ 62

§ 63

§ 64

§ 65

§ 66

§ 67

§ 68

§ 69

§ 70 Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.

§ 71

§ 72

§ 73

§ 74

§ 75

§ 76

§ 77

§ 78

§ 79

§ 80 Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.

§ 81 Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.

§ 82

§ 83

§ 84

§ 85

§ 86

§ 87

§ 88 Subsectio II. The question is resolved.

§ 89

§ 90

§ 91

§ 92

§ 93

§ 94

§ 95

§ 96

§ 97

§ 98 Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.

§ 99

§ 100

§ 101

§ 102

§ 103

§ 104

§ 105

§ 106

§ 107

§ 108

§ 109

§ 110 Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.

§ 111

§ 112

§ 113

§ 114

§ 115

§ 116

§ 117

§ 118 Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.

§ 119 Subsectio I. The first opinion.

§ 120

§ 121

§ 122

§ 123

§ 124

§ 125

§ 126

§ 127

§ 128 Subsectio II.

§ 129

§ 130

§ 131

§ 132

§ 133

§ 134 Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.

§ 135

§ 136

§ 137

§ 138

§ 139

§ 140

§ 141

§ 142

§ 143

§ 144

§ 145

§ 146 Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.

§ 147

§ 148

§ 149

§ 150

§ 151

§ 152

§ 153

§ 154

§ 155

§ 156

§ 157

§ 158

§ 159

§ 160

§ 161

§ 162

§ 163 Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.

§ 164

§ 165

§ 166

§ 167

§ 168 Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.

Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9 Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29 Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35 Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40

§ 41

§ 42 Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.

§ 1 Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8 Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20 Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33 Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.

Sectio I. I Define Genus.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6 Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16 Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20 Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26 Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40

§ 41

§ 42

§ 43

§ 44

§ 45

§ 46

§ 47

§ 48 Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.

Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11 Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16 Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.

Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20

§ 21

§ 22 Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26

§ 27

§ 28

§ 29 Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33

§ 34

§ 35

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40 Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?

§ 41

§ 42

§ 43

§ 44

§ 45

§ 46

§ 47

§ 48 Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.

§ 49 Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.

§ 50

§ 51

§ 52

§ 53

§ 54

§ 55

§ 56

§ 57

§ 58 Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.

§ 59

§ 60

§ 61

§ 62

§ 63

§ 64

§ 65

§ 66

§ 67

§ 68

§ 69

§ 70

§ 71

§ 72 Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.

§ 73

§ 74

§ 75

§ 76

§ 97

§ 98

§ 99

§ 100 Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.

§ 101

§ 102

§ 103

§ 104

§ 105 Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.

Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.

§ 1

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

§ 6 Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11

§ 12 Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

§ 16

§ 17

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20

§ 21

§ 22

§ 23

§ 24

§ 25

§ 26 Sectio IV. Whether the Lowest Difference Differs Specifically from the Subaltern Difference?

§ 27

§ 28 Sectio V. On Property.

§ 29

§ 30

§ 31

§ 32

§ 33 Sectio VI. On Accident.

§ 34

§ 35

§ 36

§ 37

§ 38

§ 39

§ 40 Disputatio VII: Disputatio VII. On What Is Common to the Five Predicables.