Universa Philosophia

Predicate and subject are one thing as that which, and another as that by which. That which is the thing itself, or the object that is subjected or predicated. That by which is the word, writing, or concept by which we say one thing of another. For example, in Peter is a human being, what I say and affirm of Peter is the human being himself, who really exists in Peter; he is the predicate that which, or the matter that is predicated. But the word human being is the instrument by which I say Peter is a human being; it is the predicate that by which, that is, the formal character by which I predicate “human being.” In this sense the Nominalists say that one word is predicated of another, not as that which—for that would be false, since Peter is a human being would be false if it meant that the word Peter is the word human being—but as that by which. That is, it is predicated in the character of a sign taken for the thing signified. For it amounts to saying that the word human being is predicated that by which of the word Peter to say that the word human being is a sign of the same thing of which the word Peter is a sign. The reason is that a sign is taken for the thing signified, and thus stands in place not of itself but of the thing it signifies. For example, someone sees two images of Pompey and says, This is Pompey; the same Pompey, or the same man, is here and there—not because those images are the same or are Pompey, but because they are taken for their prototype, whose images they are. But if he sees a statue of Caesar and compares it with a statue of Pompey, he says, This is not Pompey, that is, it does not represent Pompey. I shall show elsewhere from Ockham that this is the Nominalists’ meaning. All dialecticians speak in this way when they teach rules about propositions, yet they wrongly accuse the Nominalists of it.