Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.
Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.
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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.
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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.
Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.
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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.
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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.
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Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?
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Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.
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Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.
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Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.
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Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.
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Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.
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Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.
Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.
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Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?
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Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?
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Sectio IV. Whether the Lowest Difference Differs Specifically from the Subaltern Difference?
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Sectio V. On Property.
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Sectio VI. On Accident.
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Disputatio VII: Disputatio VII. On What Is Common to the Five Predicables.
Sectio I. Whether Predicable Is a Genus with Respect to the Five Predicables.
§ 1
Albert denies this together with some others in his work On Predicables, treatise 2, ch. 9.1 It is proved first, because the universal as such is not a univocal account common to all universals, therefore neither is it a genus. The antecedent is proved. First, because there are many universals of being of reason and of real being. Many likewise of substance and accident, to which nothing can be univocally common. Second, the same antecedent is proved, because the two last predicables depend on the first three, as accident on substance. Therefore the first three universals participate the account of universal prior to the two last, therefore the account of universal is analogical. Third, because the mode of predicating is similar to the mode of being, for as things are, so ought they to be enunciated. But the mode of being is analogical, therefore also the mode of predicating.
§ 2
This argument does not press. The antecedent is denied. To the first proof it is answered that to real being and being of reason, to substance and accident, there is not given an account univocally common in the first intention, but it is given in the second intention,1 because by an entirely similar account the genus of accident, or of being of reason, is predicated of its species as the genus of substance, as I said in disputation 4, section 2, and it will be said below in section 2.
§ 3
To the second proof, first the antecedent is denied, because although those predicables depend physically on substance, they do not [depend] in the account of predicable,1 because it is not necessary to conceive universal substance before accident. For once the concept of accident has been formed, one can refer it to inferior things, just as one can refer substance when one knows it. Second, the fourth predicable does not always depend physically on the others,2 for example when there is predicated a property that is not really distinguished from substance, then it does not depend physically on it. You will say that that concept depends on the quidditative [concept]. It is answered that it depends on it as a material object on a formal one in an a priori demonstration, which does not remove univocation; just as the concept of the risible in an a priori demonstration depends on the concept of the admirable, and both pertain univocally to the fourth predicable. Add that for the same reason the last predicables can be called prior to the first, because in an a posteriori demonstration these depend on those, therefore this dependence does not remove univocation.
§ 4
To the third proof I distinguish the major premise; 'the mode of predicating follows the mode of real being'—denied: 'follows the mode of being in the intellect and objectively'—granted.1 I explain: things are not predicated according to the mode in which they are, but according to the mode in which they are apprehended by our acts, and as they are objectively in the intellect. For things on the side of reality are determinate, and they are predicated confusedly because they are apprehended confusedly.2 Likewise genus and difference have the same mode of real being, and are predicated in a different mode. For the account of true predication, therefore, it is required that as regards the thing predicated, things be enunciated as they are, but not as regards the mode of predicating, which is very different because of the confused acts through which the thing is in the intellect. Moreover, granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied, because although substance is predicated as substance and accident as accident, nevertheless substance in relation to its inferiors is predicated in exactly the same mode as accident in relation to its own. For each is a common account univocally participated by its inferiors.
§ 5
Second, they object, because a genus cannot be a species. Therefore predicable is not a genus. It is answered that genus under a different consideration is a genus, and under a different consideration is a subaltern species;1 for in the respect in which it is a confused cognition representing several species, it is a genus; but in the respect in which it is the object of another cognition confusedly representing the accounts common to all predicables, it is a subaltern species, as in its own way happens to a predicable species, which is an individual together with other species in respect of that cognition by which species is known in common. Likewise cognition is essentially cognition, and accidentally is the object of reflexive cognition; see what I said in disputation 4, section 1.
§ 6
You will say, therefore, that predicable is predicated accidentally of genus, because it accidentally belongs to it to be a subaltern species.1 I deny the consequence. Because, although it accidentally belongs to it to be represented by another cognition and to be denominated a subaltern species, nevertheless the represented account (which is to be predicable) belongs to it essentially,2 for example animal is a genus, and includes the act of the intellect as genericity, and the very nature of animal as material. To this genus, namely animal, it belongs accidentally to be represented by an act and to be a genus; yet the represented account is essential to all things contained under animal: to this whole genus it is accidental to be known through another reflexive act, as it is fitting with species and the other predicables: to be predicable is of the essence of genus as it is a genus, and this is the account represented by predicable as such; but to be known through a reflexive act is accidental to it, and consequently it happens to it accidentally to be a subaltern species in comparison with predicable as such. Hence it is clear that it is not unfitting that any predicable is accidentally a subaltern species and essentially predicable.
§ 7
Third is the most difficult argument of all: because if predicable as such is a genus, therefore it pertains to the first predicable: therefore it cannot be the account common to all predicables.1 The consequence is clear, because a common account ought to contain under itself all particular accounts: but the first predicable does not contain itself under itself, nor is it a common account to the other predicables, because they are not a genus. The antecedent is proved, because the first predicable is a genus, in which all genera are contained formally and directly: nor is there reason why any should be excepted, since all things required for a genus belong to it.
§ 8
Nor does it help to say that the universal as such is a reflexive act, which is above all predicables.1 For reflexive genera also pertain to this predicable, both because they are truly genera, and because reflexive cognition as such is a genus in relation to human and angelic reflexive cognition, which nevertheless pertain to this predicable. But if you say that the other reflexive cognitions do not reflect on the common account of predicable as predicable as such does, and that for this reason the other reflexive [cognitions] can pertain to the first predicable, whereas predicable as such [cannot]: if you say this,2 you are indeed begging the principle, for this is what we are attacking; for why does one reflexive act pertain to the first predicable and not another, since according to you both are altogether a genus?
§ 9
For the explanation of the argument1 it must be noted that predicable as such has for its quidditative account that it is one predicable of many (as animal is a sensible living thing) in which are contained the things that are denominated universals, such as animal, man, and the act of the intellect from which they are denominated, such as the cognition of animal, the cognition of man, because universals are composed of an object and the act representing it. And so predicable as such is essentially either all universals immediately and confusedly known, such as all genera, all species, all differences, all properties, and all accidents, including both matter and form; or (there is one account abstracted from all of them, as the Thomists hold) which account is essential to each predicable as it is predicable. This account of predicable as such connotes as its denominating form the reflexive act of our intellect confusedly representing all predicables, which is called reflexive because it has for its object the acts of the same intellect through which the particular predicables are constituted.
§ 10
1 This reflexive act belongs accidentally to predicable as such, just as cognition, from which genus is denominated, belongs accidentally to animal as such. This reflexive act represents the common and confused account of the material and formal [element] of the universal. Just as the cognition of animal represents the common account of animal: in which representation the acts themselves are also represented, and all reflexive acts upon it, insofar as they agree in the account of the material and formal [element] of the universal. For although the act of the human intellect cannot have itself as object clearly and distinctly, it can nevertheless [have itself as object] according to some common account in which it agrees with its object; as when being, or vital action in common, is defined or known, certainly by that definition the defining act itself is also defined, because it is being and vital action, and the definition of being and of vital action belongs to it.
§ 11
1 The reason is a priori, because for knowing a common account nothing is required but to know something in which several things are similar: for once one similar thing is known, the other things similar to it are known confusedly, as I said in disputation 3, section 1. It is confirmed: when being is defined, that definition belongs to the defining act, because it is truly being, like the others. Likewise we say that God knows all our acts, and by knowing that act of God confusedly we know all our [acts] confusedly as terms of the divine act. Thus that reflexive act by which I know predicable as such also knows itself as the constituting form of the universal. Likewise the reflexive act knows another reflexive act as the form from which it is itself denominated universal, and so on to infinity.