Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.
Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.
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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.
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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.
Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.
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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.
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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.
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Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?
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Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.
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Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.
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Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.
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Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.
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Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.
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Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.
Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.
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Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?
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Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?
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1 2 The greater difficulty is, whether the concept of the subaltern difference is contained in the formal concept of the last difference? Some affirm it. First, because otherwise the last difference would be the supreme account, which would not be contained under a superior account. Secondly, because it would be altogether simple, and pure act. But these are futile, for the first is false, because for the account of a supreme thing it is required that it be contained neither directly nor indirectly under the accounts of a genus, and that it be predicable of several genera: both fail the last difference, which is enclosed at the side under the genus which it divides, and is not predicable except of the species which it constitutes, and of its inferiors. Moreover rational as such is contained under the concept of difference as such, which compared to its inferiors is a genus, contractible by the lowest and subaltern difference; just as color is a genus to whiteness and blackness, for the lowest incomplete concepts have their species and genera, by which they agree with one another and differ.
§ 14
But the second does not press. First, because it is a part of the composite, through which it is abstracted from the account of pure act. Second, because it has a thousand other compositions, from essence and existence, likewise from the genus of an incomplete thing, and from difference. For rationale has its own genus and difference, in which it agrees with another incomplete being.
§ 15
1 Therefore it is effectively proved. The roarable cannot be conceived formally without the sensible being formally conceived; but the roarable is the ultimate difference of the lion, and the sensible is a subaltern [difference]: therefore the ultimate difference cannot be conceived without the subaltern being conceived formally: therefore the formal concept of the ultimate difference includes the formal concept of the subaltern difference. This second consequence is evidently [derived] from the first, as is clear from the terms. But the minor of the first syllogism is certain. The major is proved: the roarable is formally nothing but the principle of the lion's operations, as those are proper to it, but the sensible is the principle of the animal's operations, as those are proper to it, that is, of sensations; but the principle of the lion's operations cannot be conceived without the principle of sensation, or of the animal's operation, being conceived formally (which is the same): therefore the roarable cannot be conceived formally without the sensible being conceived formally. The major cannot be denied in any view, because the Nominalists do not distinguish universal concepts from one another, and from singulars, except by an extrinsic denomination from similar and dissimilar operations. But the Thomists say that the animal is a different formality from the roarable, and the sensible from the living; but those formalities are distinguished by their order to operations, which are the foundation of such a distinction, as is clear in the divine attributes. And so the roarable is always formally the principle of leonine operation, and the sensible is formally the principle of sensation. Now the minor is proved, because leonine operation is formally the sensation proper to the lion, but leonine [operation] is formally sensation; therefore the same principle of leonine action is formally the principle of sensation, because leonine action is formally sensation: therefore the principle of leonine operation cannot be conceived without the principle of sensation.
§ 16
1 It is confirmed: leonine action is formally sensation, as no one will deny: therefore from the same principle from which it has its being a leonine action, it also has its being a sensation: just as man, from the same principle from which he has his being man, has also his being an animal; but the lion's action has its being a leonine action from the roarable formally, therefore from the same it has its being a sensation: therefore the roarable is formally the principle of sensation: therefore it is formally sensible. This is clear from what has been said, because the sensible as such is formally the principle of sensation; therefore it cannot be understood to be prescinded from the sensible, and consequently the lowest difference cannot be conceived without the subaltern.
§ 17
1 It is confirmed secondly: the roarable is formally the principle of vital action formally, because it is the principle of roaring (for I take roaring for the lion's specific sensation); but to roar, as also to reason, is to move oneself from within concerning objects (which is to live): therefore the roarable is formally a vital and animate principle, which are subaltern differences: therefore the ultimate difference includes the subaltern [differences] in its formal concept.
§ 18
1 You will say first that the lion's difference includes the account of the living and of the sensible, but incompletely and imperfectly. Which account is contained neither in the genus nor in the difference of the animal. On the contrary, first,2 because even the account of the living and of the sensible, etc., are incomplete in the genus which is the animal, and in its constitutive difference, which is the sensible; for they are common accounts, which are incomplete simply, until they are contracted to the ultimate difference and the species. On the contrary, secondly,3 because those more complete accounts are not contained more in the superior differences than in the roarable, because their complement is taken in order to the operations of which they are the principle: but the ultimate difference is formally the principle of vital and animal action, therefore it has the account of a complete vital and animate principle.
§ 19
19.1 You will say secondly that rationale is the difference of the animal, and yet does not include the superior differences, because the rational is not formally sensible: therefore the lowest difference does not include the subaltern. But I note2 that some differences, beyond the operations formally contained under the genus, add others which are altogether above the genus, nor are they contained under the common account of those operations, as rationale has indeed the sensitive operations, and the rational operations specific and proper to man, which formally contract the common operations of the animal, which are sensation, which is the genus of the animal's operation, which can be contracted to these and those sensations or animal operations; it has also discursive operations, which, because they are not sensation, are therefore not formally actions of the animal either: nor do they participate in the common account of those. The rationale therefore, as it has the specific actions of the animal, and the sensations proper to man, is formally the difference of the animal, because just as the animal is constituted by order to sensation, so its differences are in order to such sensations, as is clear in the roarable; but the rationale, as it connotes discourse and the other intellections, is not formally the difference of the animal, because it is the principle of a non-sensitive operation. 3 Hence the difference of a genus is always formally [constituted] by order to the operations contained under the operations of the genus which it divides, and the rationale under this account, that is, as it is the principle of such sensations, includes the sensible and the animate, just as human sensations are formally sensitive and animate.
§ 20
20.1 The opposite view is truer, and more common: although the proposed argument makes it not a little difficult. It is proved first, because if the lowest difference contained formally the subaltern, it would also contain the genus, because according to you, just as the laughable is the principle of sensible action, so it would also be the principle of vital action, because to sense is to live; in short, all the arguments by which you prove your view concerning the subaltern difference prove the same concerning the genus. From which2 two absurdities follow, in themselves rejected in dialectic. The first is that the genus does not constitute a predicable different from the difference, because the account of a transcendent does not constitute a predicable different from the thing which it transcends, as is clear in accident, which is not predicated of quantity and quality as a predicable universal, the account of which is none other than that it is transcendent. Indeed it does not even constitute a different predicament.
§ 21
The second absurdity1 is that the species does not differ from the difference, because each is composed by altogether the same formal account, because nothing is contained in the species besides the genus and the difference, which are formally contained in the difference itself according to you, and so the second predicable collapses, and the whole metaphysical composition from genus and difference, and from common and particular account, e.g. from species and singularity, because singularity formally contains the species. The reason is that composition is the simultaneous positing of two parts2: but there are not two parts where one permeates through the other, because they are not two when one is not outside the other, just as substance is not said to be composed from being and perseity. Because being transcends perseity. But these things are so manifestly absurd that they need no attack. It is confirmed3 thirdly from an absurdity, that the difference would be the whole and adequate essence of the thing, and would be predicated in quale quid. How absurd this is is clear, because the last quidditative concept, in quid, ought rather to be predicated than the generic. Indeed the difference, in quale quid, would be predicated only of individuals, because there would be no species of which it is predicated, but it is not predicated directly of the genus.
§ 22
22.1 The second reason for the conclusion, and the response to the argument, is drawn from the declaration of difference and genus. For the genus is a confused concept terminated to some account, as it is the principle of operations differing in species, which, because they are altogether similar, cannot lead to a distinct cognition of their principle unless they are known more explicitly, as two eggs cannot be distinctly known while their accidents are not distinctly known: but the difference is a more distinct concept of the same thing, through which such a thing is more known as the principle of this operation, from which operation the species is distinguished in cognition from the other species. This difference is not constituted in order to a new action distinct from the action of the genus, but in order to a new formality of it, through which formality both the concept of the genus and the operation proper to the genus are contracted and determined, as the laughable is known by order to roaring, which is not a new action distinct from sensation, but adds above it a new formality, or denomination, through which both the animal is contracted to the lion, and sensation to roaring.
§ 23
23.1 In this new formality the formality of the genus is not conceived, nor its explicit concept, for its proper account is to determine sensation in common to this species, that is, that it be such or such a mode of sensation: for in that determination, or contraction, of the action, to sense is not included, but presupposed, for to sense is nothing but to perceive through the senses, which is already presupposed through the animal in common; which lacks sensing in such or such a mode; which it has through the difference, whence arises the equivocation, that the genus and the subaltern difference are thought to be formally included in the concept of the ultimate difference, because this is not understood without the genus also being understood: it is indeed true that the genus and the subaltern difference are understood, but not as accounts formally composing the ultimate difference, but as presupposed to it, and connoted by it obliquely. For the difference cannot be understood to contract the genus without the genus being foreknown, in the way in which a form cannot be understood to determine matter without matter also being known. In this the predicables differ from the transcendents, for these are formally imbibed in their differences. Because since perseity, which is the difference of being, is something, it is necessarily being; but in the predicables, although the formal accounts of the lowest cannot be conceived without the highest being connoted as something determined by the lowest, yet they are not conceived as transcending the lowest differences.