Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.
Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.
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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.
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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.
Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.
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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.
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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.
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Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?
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Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.
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Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.
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Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.
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Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.
§ 73
1 A vague individual is opposed to a determinate individual, for this is a certain singular thing, which can be pointed out by a demonstrative term, as Peter, this man, that animal. But the vague is a singular thing, yet uncertain, and which cannot be signified by a proper name or by a demonstrative term, but by a confused term and without distinction, as some man, a certain animal. Peter, or Paul here, or that boy. It is called vague from the intellect, by whose act it is formally called vague: not that the object in itself is vague, but because the vital act is borne to it vaguely and confusedly, and as far as in it lies, not more to this than to that, whereby it differs from a determinate act tending to this and not to another object. For if I clearly know Peter, I say, this is Peter and not another; and it is called vague because the intellect and will do not rest in one certain singular, but wander through several disjunctively. 2
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Hence it is plainly evident that a vague individual formally does not exist on the side of the thing, because whatever is really is a certain and determinate thing. But a vague individual formally exists in the intellect or will tending indeterminately and confusedly to a singular thing, whence vague formally does not connote the thing, but the mode by which it is confusedly attained by the power; as when Peter exists here, and I do not clearly know him, I immediately say, Here some man exists. Behold, I vaguely conceive a determinate thing. Likewise when I want one of two books, yet not more the one than the other. Behold, the will is borne vaguely to singular things.
§ 75
1 Note the difference: the intellect, when it conceives vaguely, does so because of its imperfection, on account of which it does not penetrate singular things, nor distinguish them, but confuses them in a concept. Wherefore it is repugnant to the divine mind to conceive a thing vaguely. But the will, without any imperfection, because of its liberty, can tend vaguely to things, as when I see two books clearly and distinctly, and I discern no more good in the one than in the other, I can will the one that you may wish to give me, not determining this or that. So God wills from us things vaguely, as when he commands that either turtle-doves or a lamb be offered in sacrifice. Behold, the divine will is borne vaguely to objects which the intellect knows determinately; whose account I have given at length, 3 p. disp. 10. sect. 4, where I showed that God is not borne so vaguely to these objects as determinately to each, but preferring none to another.
§ 76
For the will tends properly vaguely to an object when it has known it confusedly: and just as the mind does not distinguish one object from another, so neither can the will will one rather than another; because it cannot be borne to the unknown. But when the intellect has clearly known all objects, then the will cannot be borne confusedly and properly vaguely to the common account of the object; because it is not represented. It can, however, at its own discretion equally will each object, preferring none to the others, as I explained in that section 4, which is improperly said to be borne vaguely to the object; because that is to tend to an account known confusedly. But whether God can vaguely will means to be executed by himself alone? 1 the question is to be discussed in 1 p. q. 13, whose negative part I follow with Suarez 3 p. q. 1, because this kind of confusion in the election of means denotes in us some ignorance of them, on account of which, when we have decided to choose one of two means, we are not certain which of them is better; thus someone decides to make a journey on horseback or on foot, yet because he does not well weigh which means is more suitable, he does not determine himself to either in the singular, until a better reason occurs. But God has the most thoroughly examined suitableness of any means, whence we cannot apprehend him willing means in common and afterwards in particular; but whatever he wills, he wills determinately; it is otherwise when he leaves what he wills to another's decision. For then he efficaciously wills nothing except what the other wills, but this is treated in the matter of predestination and incarnation.
§ 97
1 Next, when a vague individual is required for something: that for which it is required cannot, on the side of the thing, be exercised except in a determinate individual, as sight is required for seeing; when a vision takes place, a determinate vision takes place, and not a vague one. Likewise it takes place through a determinate individual, namely by this determinate power, and not vaguely by some power, for which one single individual is as sufficient as the whole collection, as when it is said, a horse is required for riding, the riding is exercised in one determinate horse, and as much in one as in all together, always preserving the proportion of that for which it is required, as if a horse is precisely required for riding: one horse is as sufficient as the whole equine species; but if for riding well and swiftly, a swift and strong horse is required: one strong and swift horse is as sufficient as all the others together. Which doctrine, 2 as it is certain, so is it also especially necessary in the matter of predestination for refuting the opinion of those asserting that so great a multitude of aids is prepared by God for the predestined that from the force of the whole collection the effect is infallible, although not from this or that aid determinately. For it is impugned because the whole collection of aids does not exist at once. And therefore it must be said that the whole of it has no greater force than any single aid, because in that opinion no determinate aid is required, but a confused one for that infallibility. But a vague individual is of such a nature that any individual of the same species is of as much strength as the whole species. These things indeed are not to be disputed at present, but to be indicated, so that the theological difficulties may be known, which are to be explained from the principles of dialectic.
§ 98
1 Furthermore, when it is said that a vague individual is required for some thing, that thing is commonly signified vaguely, universally, and indeterminately; not however in the singular, for example it is said that an eye is required for seeing, and a horse for riding, where to see and to ride are taken vaguely, and not for this vision and this riding. But for particular effects, particular causes are commonly required. For, for this vision numerically one and this riding numerically one, a determinate horse and a determinate eye are required, because from the nature of the thing and the law established by God, neither this vision nor this riding can be from other causes. In modal effects the matter is most clear, because the mode of one thing cannot be the mode of another. In absolute things it is also evident, because this effect, numerically one, arises either from this cause, numerically one, with all the adjuncts accompanying it here and now, or it arises from this will of God, numerically one, willing here and now to concur with this cause to this effect, which cannot from the nature of the thing, supposing God's will, arise from another. It is true 2 that real absolute effects (which are not modes) prerequire the will of God to concur with some cause; not however with fire or the sun determinately to this heat, but either with the sun or with fire, for it can with both. But this exigency of a vague cause is nothing vague, but is this essential order which this heat has to those causes, and because it is contained in the potentiality of both, therefore it can be produced by both.
§ 99
But that we say this is not required determinately, we signify that not only fire enjoys the power of producing heat, but also the sun enjoys it. Whence it does not arise necessarily from fire, that is, it can also arise from another; and fire or the sun is required necessarily, that is, it can arise from no other cause except fire or the sun; yet it can arise from the sun in such a way that it can also arise from fire, and conversely, in which you will find nothing vague, for nothing is vague, but all things are determinate in this, that this heat can of itself be produced both by the sun and by fire, and not by another agent, which is that for this heat fire or the sun is required indeterminately, and in this sense the Summists do not speak of the determination of effects by the will of God, but pronounce the laws by which God administers the world; which having been posited, they say that for seeing some eye is required, but not this one determinately. And because some do not notice that the word to see is also taken vaguely, they also wander vaguely and diffusely.
§ 100
1 Likewise observe that a vague individual is determined to one by the exclusion of the others, for example you are not bound to give a lamb determinately in sacrifice, nor turtle-doves determinately, but one of them, whichever you please; but if you once exclude the lamb from the sacrifice, you are now bound to offer turtle-doves determinately. Similarly someone truly says, Peter does this, or Paul, and another also truly says Peter does not do it; that truth is determined in Paul, because since one did it and not this one, there does not remain anyone who did it, and in whom this proposition is true. But that this does not happen in a proposition signifying power, I showed in the Summulae, disputation 2, because an exclusion of all cannot be made and rest in one alone. These things concerning the nature of the vague individual. Let us rise to predicability.