Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
✦ This work is being completed — add a section.
Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
§ 60
§ 61
§ 62
§ 63
§ 64
§ 65
§ 66
Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
§ 67
§ 68
Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
§ 69
§ 70
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
§ 74
§ 75
§ 76
§ 77
§ 78
§ 79
§ 80
§ 81
§ 82
§ 83
§ 84
§ 85
§ 86
§ 87
Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
§ 88
Dices categorematicos significare
§ 90
§ 91
§ 92
Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
§ 93
§ 94
§ 95
§ 96
§ 97
§ 98
§ 99
§ 100
§ 101
§ 102
§ 103
Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
§ 104
§ 105
§ 106
§ 107
§ 108
Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
§ 109
§ 110
§ 111
Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Sectio II. On the Verb.
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
Sectio III. On Speech.
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
§ 13
§ 14
Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
§ 20
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
§ 60
Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
§ 61
§ 62
§ 63
§ 64
Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
§ 65
§ 66
§ 67
§ 68
§ 69
§ 70
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
§ 74
Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
§ 75
§ 76
Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
§ 1
§ 2
Sectio I. On Definition.
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
Sectio II. On Division.
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio III. On Argumentation.
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
Sectio VII. On Consequence.
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
Some Terms Explained.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
§ 21
Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
§ 60
§ 61
§ 62
§ 63
§ 64
§ 65
§ 66
§ 67
§ 68
§ 69
§ 70
Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
§ 74
§ 75
§ 76
§ 77
§ 78
§ 79
§ 80
Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
§ 81
Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
§ 82
§ 83
§ 84
§ 85
§ 86
§ 87
§ 88
Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
§ 89
§ 90
§ 91
§ 92
§ 93
§ 94
§ 95
§ 96
§ 97
§ 98
Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
§ 99
§ 100
§ 101
§ 102
§ 103
§ 104
§ 105
§ 106
§ 107
§ 108
§ 109
§ 110
Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
§ 111
§ 112
§ 113
§ 114
§ 115
§ 116
§ 117
§ 118
Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
§ 119
Subsectio I. The first opinion.
§ 120
§ 121
§ 122
§ 123
§ 124
§ 125
§ 126
§ 127
§ 128
Subsectio II.
§ 129
§ 130
§ 131
§ 132
§ 133
§ 134
Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
§ 135
§ 136
§ 137
§ 138
§ 139
§ 140
§ 141
§ 142
§ 143
§ 144
§ 145
§ 146
Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
§ 147
§ 148
§ 149
§ 150
§ 151
§ 152
§ 153
§ 154
§ 155
§ 156
§ 157
§ 158
§ 159
§ 160
§ 161
§ 162
§ 163
Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
§ 164
§ 165
§ 166
§ 167
§ 168
Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
§ 1
Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.
Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.
Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
§ 22
Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.
§ 49
Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.
§ 59
1 There is sharp contention among the Doctors for the other side. Cajetan denies it in the chapter on species, which side he says is common. Albert, Soto, Toletus, and the Louvain theologians in the same place subscribe to him. Fonseca, 5 Metaphysics, c. 6, q. 5, lect. 4, and c. 28, q. 1, sect. 3. But the greater and better part of the Philosophers affirms it. St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 30, art. 4, in the body, and to 1 and 2, whom Cajetan follows rather inconsistently. This opinion pleases me. 2 It is proved first, because individuation is either taken for the intrinsic and quidditative ratio of Peter and Paul, or for unity, as it denotes the negation of division, or for singular entity, connoting proper accidents. But in whatever way it is taken, one common ratio is given from them: therefore one common ratio of the individual is given.
3 The minor is proved, because from the intrinsic and quidditative singular concept of Peter and Paul the ratio of man is abstracted, for the specific ratio is immediately abstracted from singular quidditative concepts. For man is abstracted from this and that man. Likewise Peter and Paul agree in this, that each has his own numerical unity, through which each is distinguished from the other in number, although they do not have specific division. Likewise each agrees in this, that he has proper accidents, which are common to no other: therefore from that threefold ratio one common ratio can be abstracted.
§ 60
1 It is confirmed; the specific ratio of man as such has a certain unity abstracted from singular unities: but this is the ratio of the individual in common: therefore the ratio of the individual in common is given. This minor is proved: because that unity constitutes that man as one, which unity is communicated to all to whom the ratio of man is communicated: for all the passions of being are communicated with being itself, but that unity thus communicated constitutes man as individual and singular, just as the communicated ratio of man constitutes this man: and it belongs to that unity to be contracted and communicated to several differing in number, just as it belongs to the ratio of man as such: therefore just as this is a common ratio to several singulars, so also that is common to several individuals. And so one must philosophize in the same way about the specific ratio and about the unity consequent upon it; and just as the ratio of man as such is common to this and that man, so also unity is common to this and that unity, and to the individual.
§ 61
1 Secondly it is proved. Peter and Paul agree in the same way, and are alike in the ratio of individual as in the ratio of man, and differ in the ratio of such an individual as in the ratio of such a man: therefore just as a common ratio is abstracted from them, so also is the ratio of the individual. The consequence is clear from the equity of reason, because likeness is the foundation of abstractions.2 It is confirmed: all specific ratios are immediately abstracted from singulars, notwithstanding their singularity, through which they are primarily diverse: therefore notwithstanding the singularity of individuation, the ratio of the individual can be abstracted from them.
§ 62
1 Thirdly, a common ratio is given of the individual taken vaguely, as Petrus est aliquod individuum, Paulus est aliquod individuum: therefore also the ratio of the individual taken universally. The consequence is clear, because that sign, aliquod, always affects some universal term, as aliquis homo, aliquod animal, because it is a quasi-restrictive sign.
§ 63
1 Fourthly, this is a formal proposition. Petrus est individuum, Paulus est individuum, and it is not a singular proposition, because it differs from this. Petrus est hoc individuum: therefore they are universal propositions: therefore the ratio of the individual, which is predicated through them, is universal. 2 Fifthly, individuation is taken through order to proper accidents, and the negation of identity: but from all proper accidents the ratio of proper accident can be abstracted, because they agree in it; and from all negations the ratio of negation: therefore.
§ 64
1 The a priori reason is: because singular and individual things are not known distinctly, clearly, and explicitly, but confusedly. By reason of which confusion the universal and common concept is formed, not distinguishing those ratios, but rather uniting and confounding them: wherefore the cognition of singulars is said to be not in the singular, but in common. But when those ratios are known clearly and distinctly in the singular, a common ratio cannot be abstracted from them, otherwise one would proceed to infinity, which process is most easily avoided.
§ 65
1 2 For when they object: from ultimate differences a common account cannot be abstracted: but individuation is the ultimate difference: therefore from individuation one common account cannot be abstracted. The major premise must be distinguished, and conceded concerning ultimate differences known clearly and distinctly as ultimate: but denied concerning ultimate differences known under the common account of difference in a confused way; because indeed through concepts we arrive at a clear and distinct cognition of the ultimate difference, therefore the process to infinity is avoided, which in confused cognitions does not go on to infinity, since we now arrive at some clear cognition which is the last cognition of individuation. Nor is there greater difficulty in abstracting the account of a confusedly known individual from this and that individual, than the account of man from Peter and Paul, because the singular differences of man impede no less than the singular differences of unity.
§ 66
You will say that an individual differs from others by individuation, and does not agree with them. 1 I reply that it differs by individuation, and agrees: just as by humanity, because it agrees in this, that it is an individual, as it agrees in being a man, and it differs in the account of such an individual, as in the account of a singular man. A clearer example is in dissimilarity: for it can be that one concept of dissimilarity be given; for dissimilarity in whiteness and dissimilarity in quantity agree generically in the account of dissimilarity, and differ specifically, and in the account of such. Likewise two dissimilarities in quantity agree specifically, and differ numerically in the account of such, from which a common account is always abstracted, until the ultimate differences are explicitly discerned, by which the whole difficulty of the opposite opinion is exhausted. 2 Its authors perhaps wish that from individuals clearly and distinctly known a common account cannot be abstracted, which is evident, and they prove it by arguments concerning infinite process. But we do not take an individual thus, but we say that it can be conceived confusedly, as a man is conceived, and as the account of a man conceived confusedly is common to Peter and Paul; so individuation known confusedly is common to the same, and as from this and that man known in particular the account of man cannot be abstracted. So neither from this and that individual known in the singular.
§ 67
I have seen someone thinking this question to be of great difficulty in the opinion of the Thomists, which admits objective abstractions, otherwise in his own, which denies them: because in his opinion all common accounts are individual. But he does not weigh here the foundations of his own and the Thomists' opinion. For exactly the same foundation is required for conceiving by one confused act several individuals as similar, and for abstracting one common account from them. For the foundation is the very similarity of the objects: wherefore, since they admit this objective similarity in individuals, they fall back into the same difficulties: for the opposite opinion denies such similarity in individuals, because in ultimate differences there can be no similarity, since they constitute things primarily diverse, and there would be a process to infinity, etc. Wherefore, prudently, I have proved our opinion universally, not distinguishing between the opinions of the Thomists and the Nominalists concerning precisions, because in each opinion the arguments for each side have the same force. But let us answer the remaining arguments.
§ 68
1 The third is: because if individuation as such is common, then it is contracted by this individuation in number and by that: therefore these and those individuations together with individuation in common agree in the account of individuation, and are contractible by others, and so on to infinity. 2 To this argument, from the opinion of the Nominalists, it is answered that individuation in common is not other than the particular ones, but is all of them known confusedly. But when this individuation is clearly conceived in number, no objective contraction takes place. But that formal confused concept is made clear, in which there cannot be an infinite process, because one arrives at the clear cognition of one individuation, which is known in the singular and not in common: from which thus known a common account cannot be abstracted.
§ 69
1 In the opinion of the Thomists: I deny the antecedent, because a common account is not contracted by a particular account enjoying the same name and concept, but by particular differences, which together with the common concept constitute a species or an individual; as animal is not contracted by humanity or animality, but by rationality, with which it constitutes man; and man is not contracted by this humanity, but by the difference of singularity, with which it constitutes Peter or this man: so individuation is not contracted by another individuation, but by singular differences, with which it constitutes individuals. Hence it is clear that no infinite procession follows, since from humanity in common, and this and that humanity, another account of humanity cannot be abstracted. Otherwise in every abstraction you would go to infinity: therefore neither in the case of the argument can another account of individuation be abstracted. The a priori reason is that the account which is abstracted from this and that individuation is the account of individuation as such, in which they are similar. As this and that man in the account of man. But when this account has been abstracted, there does not remain in them the account of individuation which is abstracted, but only differential concepts remain, which are primarily diverse, as when animality has been abstracted from man and lion, animality does not remain in them; but rationality and rugibility, which are primarily diverse, and if they are known by another clearer concept, they ought to be conceived as primarily diverse.