Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.
Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.
§ 1
Species among logicians signifies the last and essential concept of a thing; thus those things are said to differ or agree in species which differ or agree in essential and final, ultimate concept. It is also customarily used for subjects, or for the inferiors of genera, in which sense it is taken in the present section, and subjectible species is divided into lowest and subaltern. 1 The lowest, or atomic, is called that which contains under itself only individuals wholly similar in the last essential concept, as man. The subaltern is that which contains under itself several distinct species, as animal. Wherefore all genera except the supreme are subaltern species.
§ 2
Species is defined by Porphyry: species is that which is subjected to a genus. 2. 1 To be subjected to a genus is nothing other than to be an inferior account contained under a genus, of which the genus is predicated. In the opinion denying objective abstractions, it is the same as to be an objective part of the genus, namely, several individuals of the same species, wholly similar, known confusedly, which are a part of the object of generic cognition, because these several things terminate at individuals of different species, from which the individuals of the same species are one species, and a part of the matter of the genus. I would add that they are a part in such a way that in the predication by which the genus is predicated, they directly have the account of subject, as in man is an animal, all the individuals of man are a partial subject of which the genus is predicated; otherwise it would only be an objective part, as when I know a whole wall, for example, a part of the wall cannot be said to be subjected to the wall, nor to its cognition; for in this way logical inferiors are subjected to their superiors, so that this whole is ordered to having the account of subject in a proposition. Just as logical universals are ordered to having the account of predicate, concerning which I have treated at length in the disputation, and section 4. 2 But in the opinion of the Thomists, to be subjected to a genus is to be some concept abstracted from individuals, from which, together with others similarly abstracted, the genus is abstracted and predicated of them, as animal of man and lion abstracted; because, since the generic account lies more widely open than each species, those species are said to be subjected to the genus, because, since it is predicated of all of them, they have the account of subject in the direct proposition of the genus concerning the species, as man is an animal.
§ 3
Subjectible species are given in things fundamentally only, and not formally. 3. 1 For the same is the foundation for constituting a predicable and a subjectible, because if there is no foundation in things for some thing to be predicated, then neither for another to be subjected, because a predicable is predicable of some subjectible. Hence just as a predicable fundamentally is nothing other than the essence of things connoting diverse operations, or common accidents, so subjectibles fundamentally are the essences themselves, insofar as they participate in that common account; and just as a predicable formally says directly, and as regards the material element, an object contained under that common account, and connotes obliquely for the formal element the act of the intellect by which it is predicated in a proposition, and just as a predicable is a denomination extrinsic to things taken from the act of the intellect, so also is a subjectible; for by the same numerical act by which a predicable thing is constituted, its inferior subjectibles are constituted. 2 For thus a predicable is constituted by the act. For if by that act it is not predicable of something: therefore it is not a predicable, because a predicable is predicable of something. Therefore by the same act a predicable and a subjectible are constituted. The consequence is clear, because just as the same act actually existing denominates subject and predicate, the very same existing in potency denominates predicable and subjectible. Just as actual vision denominates the seen, but vision in potency denominates the visible; for the phrase of something denotes the subjectible account, for the subject is that of which something is predicated. It is confirmed: in actual predication, by the same act the subject and the predicate are constituted, as I shall show in the books On the Soul, disputation 7, section 2.
§ 4
1 Having explained the account of subjectibility, against the definition of subjectible species the first difficulty is that in it, and in the definition of genus, a circle is committed. For of the genus it is said to be that which is predicated of the species, and of the latter it is said to be that which is subjected to the genus; but this is vicious in a definition, because the thing remains equally unknown as before, therefore the definition is vicious.
§ 5
1 Note that a circle can be committed in two ways: first, by not explaining the nature of the defined, in this way: a father is he who has a son, and a son is he who has a father; which circle is vicious, as the argument proves, and thus the definition of genus and of species would be vicious, as if you said genus is what has species, species is what is had by a genus; for thus their essence is not explained. In another way a circle is committed when in the definition of relatives the terms mutually connote one another, but with an explanation of the defined, as what is a father? he who has a son. But if you ask what it is to have a son, one must not answer, a son is he who has a father; but one must say that a man has begotten and coexists with him is to have a son. Nor can it fail that in the definition of a relative another relative is connoted, because each thing is defined as it is, but relatives in their being mutually connote one another, therefore in the definition it must be connoted. Thus, when a genus is defined as predicable of things differing in species, one must explain what it is to differ in species, namely to have dissimilar ultimate essential concepts; and when a species is said to be subjected to a genus, one must explain what it is to be subjected to a genus, which can easily be done, since it is clear what it is to be predicated and what it is to differ in species.
§ 6
To the argument I distinguish the minor: it is vicious when in the circle the nature of the defined is not explained, I concede the minor; otherwise when it is explained. Hence the consequence is denied, because in the definition of genus it must be explained what it is to be predicated, and to differ in species.
§ 7
1 The second difficulty is: because this definition belongs to the incomplete individual, which is subjected immediately to the genus, as I said in disputation 4, section 5, therefore it is a bad definition. I answer, 2 that in the definition this word only is understood, so that the sense is: species is that which is subjected to the genus alone, just as in the definition of predicable species we shall say that it is predicated of things differing only in number. Nor indeed is it necessary that these particles always be explained by the doctors, because they are gathered from the rest. For it is clear that individuals are subjected to all things to which the species is subjected, just as it is clear that whatever is predicated of the species is said of individuals. And perhaps Porphyry wished to abstract from that question, whether the genus is predicated immediately of individuals? and left the definition to be understood according to various opinions.
§ 8
1 You will say that by the word only the species differs from the individual only accidentally, because to be subjected to a species or to a genus, unless there is diversity in the mode of subjecting, does not constitute a different subjectible essentially: but in the mode by which the species and the individual are subjected to the genus, this diversity is not found: therefore they differ only accidentally. I concede the intent of the argument, for just as the genus does not differ in the mode by which it is predicated of the species and the individual, so neither do the species and the individual differ in the mode by which they are subjected to the genus. Indeed the lowest and the subaltern species do not differ in the account of subjectible to the genus, because the genus is predicated of each in quid incompletely; whereas nevertheless they differ in the account of predicable, because one is predicated as genus, the other as species.
§ 9
From what has been said gather that the immediate and adequate correlate of a genus is not a species, but something subjectible in quid incompletely1. For the correlate of a predicable is subjectible; but a genus immediately and adequately is not predicated of a species alone, but of an individual, and therefore they agree in the character of being subjectible in quid incompletely. But the relative of a genus alone is a species alone, because it alone is subject to the genus. For the individual is also subject to the species, and although the species alone is said to be immediately the correlate of the genus, it is nevertheless not the adequate correlate, because individuals also are subject to the genus; these agree with the species in the character of being subjectible, just as the genus is also predicated of both.
§ 10
Secondly gather that the subjectible as such, reduplicatively, is not formally a universal1. First, because the individual is subjectible, and is not a universal, nor predicable. Secondly, a priori, because the universal is formally constituted in order to its inferiors, of which it is apt to be predicated; but the subjectible is in order to its superior, which is predicated of it: therefore formally the character of the subjectible is not formally predicable. It is confirmed. The subject is not formally a predicate: therefore neither is the subjectible formally predicable, because the exercise of predicability is actual predication. In some subjectibles both characters are found, the subjectible and the predicable, but in respect of different things, as is clear in the lowest and the subaltern species, which in respect of their inferiors are predicable and in respect of the genus are subjectible; in others only subjectibility is found, as in individuals; in others again only predicability, as in the supreme genus.
§ 11
You will say: in order that the species be subject to the genus, it is necessary that it be abstracted from individuals: therefore as such it is universal. Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequence. Because it is not called universal in order to a superior, but in respect of inferiors; then however it will be universal materially, and (as they say) presuppositively, or antecedently.