Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?
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Those who deny, with the Nominalists, the above objective precisions are necessarily bound to admit that the genus is predicated immediately of individuals;1 because they say that universals are only several singulars immediately confusedly known, as similar in some formal character. In whose opinion, just as the species is nothing other than several individuals altogether similar, so the genus will be nothing other than several individuals similar in common operations and dissimilar in others. Therefore the intended conclusion is proved, because the genus is predicated immediately of several species; but according to you the species are formally several similar individuals; therefore the genus is predicated immediately of several similar individuals. It is confirmed: if the genus were not predicated immediately of individuals, therefore it is predicated of some common formal character abstracted from them, which is the species, and which mediates between the genus and individuals; but that formal character so abstracted will not be an individual; therefore, unless the genus is predicated immediately of individuals, it will be predicated immediately of that abstracted formal character; but this is against your opinion, which denies a formal character abstracted from individuals; therefore in your opinion you are bound to admit that the genus is predicated immediately of several individuals.
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I explain, because according to your opinion several individuals known as similar only in common operations are denominated the genus, for example, several individuals of an animal related to sensitive operations constitute the genus animal; which concept of animal is altogether incomplete, because through it the quiddity of any individual is not known adequately; hence the genus is nothing other than several individuals similar [and] incompletely known.1 But individuals similar in operations both common and proper will be the species, as Peter and Paul related to sensitive and rational actions. Hence the species are several individuals completely known, because they are referred to all the operations by which they differ from all individuals of other species. Therefore the genus is predicated immediately of individuals completely or incompletely known, because it is predicated immediately of the species, which according to you are individuals.
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It is confirmed: according to you, man as such is nothing other than this or that man as similar, and lion as such nothing other than this and that lion; but animal is predicated immediately of man and lion as such; therefore animal is predicated immediately of this man and of that man, and of this and that lion.
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You will say that the genus is predicated immediately of individuals confusedly known, but not of those known in particular.1 On the contrary, first,2 therefore I already have what was intended, namely that in your opinion the genus cannot be predicated immediately except of individuals. On the contrary, second,3 because if the genus is predicated immediately of individuals known confusedly, why will it not be predicated of them if they are known explicitly? For if it belongs to individuals taken vaguely, why does it not belong to the same individuals taken determinately? Because this proposition man is an animal, which is a predication of the genus concerning the species, is equivalent to this, Peter and Paul and every singular man is an animal; and this, Peter is an animal, which is a predication of the genus concerning the individual, is equivalent to this, this determinate man is an animal. Therefore the one is as immediate as the other; for the species does not mediate, but only the difference holds itself on the side of the more clearly known subject, not on the side of the predicate, nor by the mode of predicating. Nor is there any need for the properties of man to be known before animal is predicated of Peter.4 For when Peter is seen with only the formal character of animal (as can best be done), animal can be predicated of him, which predication is of an individual known incompletely.
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It is confirmed: this is immediate predication, Man is an animal; therefore also this, Peter is an animal. The consequence is clear, because Peter and man are singulars: man indeed is singulars confusedly known, but Peter is a singular clearly known. Likewise on the side of the object nothing mediates between Peter and animal, because man in this opinion is not distinguished on the side of the object from Peter, but only by the mode of knowing; nor is there any need, in order to predicate animal of Peter, that animal first be predicated of man as such, because when Peter is seen animal can be predicated of him.
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The controversy is between the Thomists who admit objective abstractions and various abstract formalities distinct from individuals. Of these authors many teach that the genus animal, for example, is not predicated immediately of Peter and this lion, but of man and lion in common. They prove it first, because the genus is defined by order to the species, and not by order to individuals; therefore the genus is predicated immediately of the species, and not of individuals; but if it is predicated of individuals, that comes about because they suppose the species to be constituted from genus and difference.
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But this reason does not press. For the genus is defined by order to the species, not because it does not immediately regard individuals, but because it differs from the species by the phrase differentibus specie, and because it is supposed as certain that what is predicated of the species is predicated in the same way of individuals. But below I will show that the adequate correlative of the genus is not the species, but the subjectible in what [it is] incompletely.
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Secondly they argue, because between the supreme and the lowest grade a middle one must necessarily be interposed.1 middle. For there cannot be an immediate progression from extreme to extreme except through a middle; but the generic grade is supreme, the individual is the lowest, and the specific is the middle between the two; therefore the generic grade cannot be predicated immediately of the individual, unless it is first predicated of the specific.
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1 But I distinguish the major with its proof: when between the supreme and the lowest there is a middle that can be interposed, I concede the major; I deny it, however, when there is no interposable middle. In which case the supreme grade is called supreme because it is superior, and the lowest because it is inferior, but not because another is interposed between the two; and in this sense the species is the lowest grade with respect to the genus, and the genus the supreme, between which no grade mediates. Similarly I distinguish the minor: the specific grade is a middle between the genus and the complete individual, I concede the minor; but I deny that the species mediates between the genus and the incomplete individual. Similarly I distinguish the consequent: therefore the genus cannot be predicated of the complete individual unless the species mediates, I concede the consequence; but I deny it of the incomplete individual. The genus therefore has immediate incomplete individuals, but not complete ones.
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1 For explanation, note that an individual cannot be known perfectly and completely unless the specific formal character is explicitly known, because the complete cognition of the individual includes the concept of the difference of the species, from which concept and the generic one the species results, and through the concept of the difference the genus is completed and contracted. In this sense the argument evidently proves that the genus is not predicated immediately of the individual without the species being presupposed, because the individual is completely constituted through the concept of the species. But when the individual is not known completely according to its whole essential formal character, the concept of the difference does not mediate, and consequently neither does the species, which is constituted through the difference; but then the genus is predicated of the individual known incompletely. You will say that by the very fact that the individual Peter is designated, for example, the species man is also designated. I distinguish: by the very fact that the complete individual is designated, I concede; the incomplete, I deny. But that an incomplete one can be designated will appear from the proof of the conclusion.
§ 37
1 Therefore that the genus is predicated immediately of individuals incompletely known, St. Thomas teaches openly in opusculum 55, at the middle, in these words: When we have this animal, the intellect, considering before we come to the form of man, apprehends the universal form in this individual, namely, animal. Behold, St. Thomas admits an individual animal without its being formally man or lion, and says that animal is apprehended by the intellect in this animal before it apprehends man; and below he distinguishes this animal from a beast. 2 The conclusion is proved first. When I see a singular animal from afar, I evidently judge that it is an animal, because I see that some property of animal belongs to it, and I cannot judge that it is a man or a lion. Then I see that the formal character of animal belongs to such an individual, and not the determinate specific formal character; therefore animal belongs immediately to the individual. The antecedent often happens; I prove the consequence, because for the genus to be contracted immediately to the individual is nothing other than to know that the individual formal character is of animal, without knowing that it is of man or of lion; just as to know that the formal character of the species belongs to an individual confusedly known is nothing other than to know that the formal character of the species belongs to the individual, while ignoring whether such an individual is Peter or Paul.