Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
§ 1
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?
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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.
§ 21
The whole of powers is also called a genus compared to species, and it contains them by power. To explain this, I presuppose that the discourse is not about physical containment or power, because the genus, since it is physically the same as the species, neither contains them nor has a physical power over them.1 The discourse is therefore about logical power and containment, or through the intellect. Likewise I presuppose that the genus is not called the whole of powers because it could be composed of species. For a superior formal character can never be composed of inferior ones, both because the whole essence of the superior is conceived without the inferior being conceived, and because the differences of inferiors are outside the generic concept, of which they are not directly and formally predicable; but a part that logically composes something is directly and formally predicable of it, because it is the formal character constituting it, as rational and risible are predicated of man. Therefore the genus is not a whole of powers through any possible composition by which the species would be understood to be parts clearly and distinctly belonging to the construction of the genus. Hence I conclude that it is not a whole simply, but only in a certain respect,2 because a whole and a part simply bespeak an order to composition through the clear conjunction of two concepts resulting therefrom in a third. But where there is no composition of this kind, there is no part, nor any whole. The genus will therefore be, analogically and metaphorically, a whole insofar as several things are posited aggregately in a confused act without any distinction, which is against the formal character of a whole and a part simply.
§ 22
And first St. Thomas,1 whom I refer to in disp. 2 of the Metaphysics, sect. 3, says that the differences of being are contained by power in the concept of being, but are contained in act in the concept of substance or accident, that is, in an act terminated to the concept of being as such; by power, that is, confusedly and indistinctly, the differences are known; but by the clear and distinct concept of substance, in act, that is, the differences are known clearly and distinctly. And so, in the opinion of St. Thomas, to be contained in the power of the genus is to be known confusedly with the genus, and to be contained in act is to be known distinctly, which is true. Wherefore Aristotle said that equivocations lie hidden in the genus, that is, that unequal species are contained confusedly in it. I nonetheless think that this is not the potential totality which they ascribe to the genus,2 for thus the difference would be no less a potential whole compared to the genus than the genus compared to the species, because in the concept of the difference alone the genus is known as confusedly as the difference is in the concept of the genus alone, on account of the real identity between the two. But the difference is not called a whole with respect to the genus; therefore this potential totality does not consist precisely in the confused cognition of inferiors, unless something is added, as will appear in §. 24.
§ 23
I think the matter is as follows. The genus under the formal character of the predicable is a potential whole, that is, a whole predicable of the species.1 For the genus under that formal character is a whole with respect to the species, under which it regards the species as a part, because a whole as whole bespeaks a relation to parts. But it regards the species as a part under the formal character of the predicable; therefore the genus under the formal character of the predicable is a whole with respect to the species. I prove the minor, because the species regards the genus as a whole under the formal character of the predicable of it; therefore the genus also regards it under the same formal character of the predicable. I prove the antecedent, because the species, as it is subjectible to the genus, is a part; but the part of that [whole] as subjectible bespeaks a respect to the whole as predicable, because the correlative of the part is the whole, and the predicable is the correlative of the subjectible; therefore the genus in comparison with the species is a whole, and regards it under the formal character of the predicable. I prove the major, because the species is a subjective part of the genus; for thus it is called a part of the genus and not otherwise. But a subjective part is a subjectible part, that is, a part of the subject, for in the predication of the genus no species is the total subject,2 because it is also predicated of others, which are also the subject of the genus. And so the species is a part of the subject of the genus, that is, it alone is not subject to the genus, but together with other species it composes the entire subject; the genus, however, because it is predicable not only of one but also of others, is called a potential whole, that is, predicable or able to be predicated.
§ 24
You will say that it follows from this that the aggregate of all subjectible species is a whole, but not the genus,1 because a whole results from parts, whether all the parts are together; thus the whole with respect to the individual genera is a heap resulting from all of them. Just as the whole with respect to individual grains is a heap resulting from all of them. I answer2 that the whole by composition or aggregation is all the species subjectible to the genus, because all those integrate the adequate subject of the genus; but the genus is shown in §. 21 not to be called a whole by composition, but only metaphorically, for which the properties of a whole simply are not to be required. Then I answer that all the species taken together are the genus:3 for I will show in disp. 5 of the Metaphysics, sect. 10, that the matter of the genus is all the species confusedly known; hence, if all those individually and clearly known are the total subject, all those also confusedly known are the total predicable, because the genus, as predicable of all, is all [species] confusedly known, and the subject is all [species] clearly known. But the difference between clear and confused cognition does not remove the fact that the objective concept, which is usually denominated the genus, is always denominated the genus (as I showed in §. 19). Likewise the species is called an objective part of the genus,4 that is, a partial object of generic cognition, because that cognition is immediately terminated at all the species; in which sense I prove in disp. 5 of the Metaphysics, sect. 10, that every universal immediately says all its inferiors, because it is a whole with respect to them, not by a distinct aggregation of all, but by a unification through a confused act. Thus inferiors are called dividing parts, or dividing members of the universal whole. In which sense St. Thomas rightly said that by the confused cognition of the superior the inferiors are contained by power, because all of them are known confusedly, which does not belong to the concept of the difference, in which not even the irrational is closed materially. I do not see how the formal character of the totality of the genus in relation to species could otherwise be explained.
§ 25
It is inferred from what has been said that the genus is not a whole with respect to the species in any other way than it is a part of it in power.1 It is shown openly, because the genus is a whole as it is predicable, because the species is a part of it as it is subjectible to it; but it is formally predicable as it is a part in power; therefore it is a potential whole as it is a part in power. The minor is clear, because the genus is predicable in what [it is] incompletely, and similarly the species is incompletely subject to it; for the genus does not contain the whole essence of the species, but a part. Therefore the genus is formally predicable as it is a part of the species; therefore in the same formal character it is a part of the species and a potential whole, which rightly cohere, for to be predicated as superior and common to many is to be predicated as a potential whole. Because whatever inferior is a partial subject, and for the same reason cannot be predicated adequately and completely of individuals, but incompletely and partially, because my whole essence cannot be common to other species.
§ 26
You ask how the same thing can be a whole and a part in comparison with the same term? A great difficulty! It is a whole through the confused and universal act, by which all inferiors are confusedly conceived, by which it is as it were composed, because the common formal character embraces all of them; but it is a part through composition and clear cognition, by which the common formal character together with the difference composes the inferiors.1 Indeed the genus is a part of the species, and the exercise, and as it were the second act, of the potentiality of the potential whole, because actual predication, by which it is actually a part, is the exercise of predicability, by which it is a whole. See disputation 5 of the Metaphysics, from §. 86.