Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.
Sectio I. I Define Genus.
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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?
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Here it is usually asked at length whether the material of genus, which is defined, is abstracted from all inferior material things: namely, whether this material is abstracted from animal, color, chimaera: of which each singly is a genus, the first in respect of man and lion; the second in respect of whiteness and blackness; the third in respect of the golden mountain and hippocentaur. This question can easily be resolved by asserting that this definition belongs to all genera1 according to both parts, because there is no genus that is not predicable of several species. Therefore this definition belongs to all genera. It is confirmed. Those three which we have enumerated are truly predicable in quid of several things differing in species, therefore the definition of genus belongs to all of them.
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=== LATIN Obiectio.— Sed obiicies, omnia genera non conveniunt univoce in ratione generis, ergo non possunt una definitione comprehendi. Consequentia patet, quia una definitio fertur in unum obiectum. Antecedens probatur, quia ens rationis etiam est genus, sicut ens reale, sed enti reali et rationis non potest dari una ratio univoce conveniens: ergo omnia genera non conveniunt univoce in ratione generis. === ENGLISH Objection.— But you will object that all genera do not agree univocally in the account of genus, therefore they cannot be comprehended by one definition. The consequence is clear, because one definition bears on one object. The antecedent is proved, because a being of reason is also a genus, just as a real being, but no one account can be given that agrees univocally to a real and a mental being: therefore all genera do not agree univocally in the account of genus.
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Solution.— But this argument both assumes something false and concludes badly, because all genera agree univocally in the account of genus, for all those are predicated in the same way of their inferiors. For just as animal is predicated in quid of man and lion, so color is predicated in quid of whiteness and blackness, and chimaera of the golden mountain and hippocentaur; therefore chimaera, color and animal are altogether similar in the account of genus. I explain this. For although animal and color have a dissimilarity in the account of being, and chimaera does not agree with them in the account of being, nevertheless color regards whiteness and blackness in exactly the same way as animal regards man and lion, and chimaera regards the golden mountain and hippocentaur in exactly the same way: therefore real and mental being agree univocally in respect of the inferior species regarded: but this is to agree univocally in the account of genus, and in the account of the matter of the genus1: for a genus is named that which is conceived as predicable in quid of several species. Therefore.
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It is confirmed, because the cognitions by which real and mental being are denominated a genus agree univocally in the account of genericity, which represents several species confusedly; therefore all genera also agree univocally in the account of genus. The antecedent is clear, because human intellectual cognition is a genus in respect of all human intellectual cognitions; the consequence is proved, because genera are denominated genera by those cognitions, which cognitions share similar denominations. It is confirmed. Man and whiteness agree univocally in the account of species, although in the account of being, according to the common opinion, they agree analogically. Therefore in the same way mental and real being agree univocally in the account of genus, although they are analogous in the account of being. The a priori reason is that two things which have one analogous account can have another univocal one1, because in the one they are altogether similar, but differently in the other, as besides what has been said is clear in quantity and substance, which are univocal in the account of existing in a place, although they are analogous in the account of being.
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=== LATIN Ens reale et rationis in nulla ratione primo intentionaliter conveniunt; secus secundo intentionaliter.— Per quae patet ad antecedens. Ad probationem respondetur, enti reali et rationis non posse esse aliquid commune univoce in ratione entis secundum se et primo intentionaliter, secus in ratione cogniti et secundo intentionaliter. Quia non comparamus illa entia, secundum quod habent entitates similes, sed secundum quod illae entitates dissimiles inter se, eodem modo participantur ab inferioribus cuiusque, ut patet in animali, et chymaera, et eodem modo terminant confusas cognitiones, quibus singulorum inferiora confuse noscuntur: at in respiciendis suis inferioribus, et terminandis confusis cognitionibus omnino sunt similia genera omnia. === ENGLISH Real and mental being agree in no account primarily intentionally; otherwise secondarily intentionally.— From these things it is clear as to the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that there cannot be something common univocally to real and mental being in the account of being according to itself and primarily intentionally, but otherwise in the account of the known and secondarily intentionally. Because we do not compare those beings according as they have similar entities, but according as those entities, dissimilar among themselves, are participated in the same way by the inferiors of each, as is clear in animal and chimaera, and in the same way terminate confused cognitions by which the inferiors of each are known confusedly: but in regarding their inferiors and terminating confused cognitions all genera are altogether similar.
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=== LATIN Definitio univoca convenit his quae univoce conveniunt, analoga his quae analogice.— Quod vero male concludat argumentum probatur: transeat enim antecedens, et nego consequentiam. Ad probationem respondetur, una definitione univoce convenienti pluribus non posse definiri, nisi ea, quae univoce participant talem definitionem; at una definitione analogice conveniente pluribus posse analoga definiri, ut haec definitio, ens creatum est quidquid ab alio habet esse, convenit substantiae et accidenti creatis. In hoc autem sensu definitio generis erit una analogice, sicut definitio entis creati. === ENGLISH A univocal definition belongs to things that agree univocally, an analogous one to things that agree analogically.— That the argument concludes badly is proved: for let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequence. To the proof it is answered that by one definition agreeing univocally to several things only those can be defined which participate univocally in such a definition; but by one definition agreeing analogically to several things analogates can be defined, as this definition, created being is whatever has being from another, belongs to created substance and accident. In this sense, however, the definition of genus will be one analogically, just like the definition of created being.
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=== LATIN Dices, definitionem generis constare genere et differentia, genus autem debet esse univocum, ergo generis definitio debet esse univoca. Haec omnia vera sunt iuxta primum modum, quo argumento respondi. At iuxta secundum respondeo, tunc non constare definitionem genere proprie sumpto: et in rigore, sed late, ut quando definitur accidens esse entis ens, licet ens non sit proprie genus. Quando enim suprema genera definiuntur, eorum definitio non potest proprie constare genere, sed aliqua ratione analogice communi. Sic in praesenti praedicabile ut sic abstrahens a praedicabili reali et rationis non est genus; est autem genus praedicabile reale ad praedicabilia realia, et praedicabile rationis ad praedicabilia rationis. Definiuntur ergo omnia genera secundum rationem communem generis. Quod vero haec ratio abstracta sit communis univoce, vel analogice ab omnibus generibus, sive sint omnia singularia genera immediate, et confuse cognita, parum refert. Nam in quacumque earum opinionum, est vera nostra conclusio. === ENGLISH You will say that the definition of genus consists of genus and difference, but the genus ought to be univocal, therefore the definition of genus ought to be univocal. All these things are true according to the first way in which I answered the argument. But according to the second I answer that then the definition does not consist of genus properly taken: and in rigor, but broadly, as when an accident is defined as a being of a being, although being is not properly a genus. For when the supreme genera are defined, their definition cannot properly consist of a genus, but of some account commonly shared analogically. Thus in the present case the predicable as such, abstracting from real and mental predicable, is not a genus; but real predicable is a genus in relation to real predicables, and mental predicable in relation to mental predicables. Therefore all genera are defined according to the common account of genus. But whether this abstract account is common univocally or analogically to all genera, or whether all singular genera are immediately and confusedly known, matters little. For in whichever of these opinions, our conclusion is true.
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=== LATIN Definitio supremorum generum non potest constare genere proprio.— Hoc autem admonuerim, haud quaquam loci consequentes, qui negant distinctas formalitates in obiectis (secundum opinionem Nominalium, quae relata est in disputatione, etc. 1.) asserentes materiam universalem esse plura individua confuse cognita, et aliunde negant dari posse confuse communem materialis generis entium realium, et rationis, quia enti reali et rationis nulla potest dari ratio communis, dicunt tamen in praesenti definiri immediate omnia materialia generum realium et rationis. Hos igitur non loqui consequentes probatur, quia per te diffiniuntur omnia materialia generum immediate cognita, vel ergo cognoscuntur ut similia, vel ut dissimilia: non ut dissimilia, quia conceptus confusus in hoc distinguitur a claro, quia clarus cognoscit rem distincte, et ut dissimilem ab aliis: at vero confusus rem cognoscit indistincte, et ut similem, et convenientem cum aliis. Sed definitio generis est conceptus confusus. Ergo non repraesentat genera ut dissimilia. Probo etiam neque ut similia, quia per te ens reale et rationis nihil habent commune, in quo sint similia. Nam, si aliquid haberent commune, in quo assimilarentur, illud posset abstrahi; quia talis similitudo esset universale fundamentaliter, non minus quam quaevis alia similitudo. Qua igitur ratione ea genera cognoscuntur? === ENGLISH The definition of the supreme genera cannot consist of a proper genus.— But I would warn this: those who deny distinct formalities in objects (according to the opinion of the Nominalists, which was reported in the disputation, etc. 1), asserting that universal matter is several individuals known confusedly, and on the other hand deny that a common account of the material of genus of real and mental beings can be given confusedly, because no common account can be given of real and mental being, yet say that in the present case all material parts of real and mental genera are immediately defined—these, then, are proved not to speak consistently, because according to you all material parts of genera immediately known are defined, and therefore they are known either as similar or as dissimilar: not as dissimilar, because a confused concept is distinguished in this from a clear one, because the clear one knows a thing distinctly and as dissimilar from others; but the confused one knows a thing indistinctly and as similar and agreeing with others. But the definition of genus is a confused concept. Therefore it does not represent genera as dissimilar. I prove also that it does not represent them as similar, because according to you real and mental being have nothing common in which they are similar. For if they had something common in which they were assimilated, that could be abstracted; because such a similarity would be a universal fundamentally, no less than any other similarity. By what account, then, are those genera known?
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=== LATIN Confirmatur. Non cognoscuntur, aut definiuntur, genera sola realia, nec sola genera rationis, quia definitio omnibus illis convenit, neque cognoscuntur omnia illa clare et distincte, secundum quod sunt dissimilia, quia conceptus ille est confusus; neque item cognoscuntur, secundum quod sunt similia, quia per te nullam habent similitudinem; neque item cognoscuntur secundum rationem abstractam illis communem, quam rationem tu negas, qua igitur ratione cognoscuntur? === ENGLISH It is confirmed. Neither real genera alone nor mental genera alone are known or defined, because the definition belongs to all of them, nor are all those known clearly and distinctly according as they are dissimilar, because that concept is confused; nor again are they known according as they are similar, because according to you they have no similarity; nor again are they known according to an abstract account common to them, which account you deny; by what account, then, are they known?
§ 16
=== LATIN Effugium. Praecluditur.— Dices, ea omnia immediate cognosci confuse, ut sunt similia in eo, quod est de suis inferioribus eodem modo praedicari: contra primo; ergo nisi aliunde abstractio repugnet, non repugnabit ex eo, quod sint entia realia et rationis. Quia per te in ratione generis sunt similia, quod sufficit ad abstractionem. 1 Contra secundo, quia non minus requiritur in sententia Nominalium ad illum actum confusum immediate repraesentantem plura individua ut similia, quam in sententia Thomistarum ad abstrahendas duas formalitates obiectivas, quia in utraque sententia tantum requiritur similitudo in aliqua ratione. Dicendum igitur est, iuxta Thomistarum opinionem immediate definiri omnia genera secundum rationem communem ab illis abstractam, et iuxta Nominalium opinionem immediate definiri omnia genera, ut sunt similia in ratione generis: consequenter in utraque sententia, quae dixi disput. 3. sect. 1. === ENGLISH An evasion. It is precluded.— You will say that all those are immediately known confusedly as they are similar in this, that they are predicated in the same way of their inferiors: against this, first; therefore unless abstraction is repugnant for another reason, it will not be repugnant because they are real and mental beings. Because according to you they are similar in the account of genus, which suffices for abstraction. 2 Against this, second, because in the opinion of the Nominalists no less is required for that confused act immediately representing several individuals as similar than in the opinion of the Thomists for abstracting two objective formalities, because in either opinion only a similarity in some account is required. It must therefore be said that, according to the opinion of the Thomists, all genera are immediately defined according to a common account abstracted from them, and according to the opinion of the Nominalists all genera are immediately defined as they are similar in the account of genus: consequently in either opinion, what I said in disputation 3, section 1.