Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?
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1 Terms of the first intention signify things according to what belongs to them on the part of the thing, with every extrinsic denomination excluded; terms of the second intention signify things not according to what belongs to them from their intrinsic nature, but only according as they underlie some extrinsic vital denomination, such as to be a genus, a subject, a middle term, etc., where both the thing denominated itself and the denomination from which it is called a genus, etc., are signified. First, terms of the first [intention] will be treated; second, terms of the second intention.
§ 22
1 I say first: these are true predications: Petrus est homo, homo est animal. Animal est rationale, rationale est animal, animal est homo. This is common, nor can it be doubted. For that is a true affirmative predication which affirms the thing as it is; therefore all those are true, for the proposition animal est homo is equivalent to this, aliquod animal est homo: because when a lower account is predicated of a higher, that proposition is equivalent to a particular and confused proposition.
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1 I say second: this is false: Petrus est humanitas, homo est animalitas et rationalitas. It is proved openly, because on the part of the thing man is not the same as humanity; for besides humanity man includes the supposit, which is really distinguished from humanity. Just as this is false, homo est animal, because besides that it includes body.
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1 I say third: this is true, humanitas est animalitas. First, because on the part of the thing humanity is the same as animality. Second, because a higher account is truly predicated of a lower. For who would deny that whiteness is a color? But similarly animality is a higher account than humanity: therefore it is truly predicated of it.
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1 I say fourth: this is true, humanitas est rationalitas, and this, rationalitas est animalitas. The proof, first, because on the part of the thing one is the other. Therefore the proposition which affirms it is true, because a proposition is called true or false from what the thing is or is not. Second, because this is true, iustitia Dei est misericordia Dei; but animality and rationality are not more distinguished than the justice and mercy of God; therefore they too will be able to be predicated of each other.
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1 But against all the conclusions it is argued, first, that a part is not predicated of a part, nor the whole of a part, nor a part of the whole: therefore all those propositions are false, because either they are of the whole of a part, as animal est homo, where I predicate the whole of a part; or of a part of the whole, as homo est animal, where I predicate a part of the whole; or of a part of a part, as animal est rationale. 2 I distinguish the antecedent: it is true when there is a distinction on the part of the thing between the parts, because then the thing is not as it is enunciated, as this is false, animal est corpus, manus est caput. But the antecedent is false when there is no distinction on the part of the thing between the whole and the parts, but only through our intellect; for then the thing on the part of the thing is as it is enunciated. The a priori reason is that a distinction of reason and composition is not a distinction on the part of the object, but is only a distinction on the part of the intellect knowing the object confusedly, 3 which distinction of reason does not remove the real identity of the object, and so neither the truth of the proposition. Because a proposition is called true or false from what the thing is or is not really, not from what is conceived or not conceived; but the word is signifies the real identity of the predicate with the subject, not a diversity in the manner of conceiving.
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1 But against it, second, because this is false, Deus voluntate intelligit, et intellectu amat, although there is only a distinction of reason between God's will and intellect. Therefore similarly this will be false, humanitas est rationalitas. 2 I deny the consequence. The reason is that in the former proposition will and intellect are taken reduplicatively (as they say) and in the formal sense, which sense includes not only the object but also our manner of conceiving; but with reduplication those things cannot be predicated which are distinguished by reason, because they are not things as they are enunciated. Wherefore the divine will, as divine will, is not the divine intellect, because as it is conceived by us under the account of will, it is not conceived under the account of intellect; in which sense this is true, attributum iustitiae non est attributum misericordiae, because the word attribute also reduplicates the manner of conceiving. So also this is false: Deus iustitia miseretur, misericordia punit, for the same reason; and although these propositions are false, yet those are true: Intellectus divinus est voluntas divina, misericordia est iustitia, because in these the object is signified according as it is on the part of the thing, with our manner of conceiving excluded, and the formal sense which this proposition, Deus voluntate amat, effects.
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1 But you ask why in these last propositions a formal and reduplicative sense is not made? But is it made in the former ones? The reason is that one attribute is distinguished from another, and one concept from another, by order to different operations. But whenever we refer such a concept or attribute to its operations, we conceive it formally, as I shall say in disp. 5 of the Metaphysics, sect. 10. But when we do not refer such a concept or attribute to its operations, then it does not make a reduplicative and formal sense; wherefore these propositions are false: Homo rationalitate sentit, homo animalitate discurrit. The reason is that rationality is not denominated from sensation, nor animality from discourse, but rationality from discourse, and animality from sensation.
§ 29
1 Hence I say fifth: this is false, animal formaliter est rationale, because the word formally reduplicates the manner of conceiving, from which animal has it that it is distinct from rational; for it makes this sense: when man is conceived according as he is animal explicitly, he is necessarily conceived explicitly according as he is rational; but this is false, as I shall prove in disp. 5 of the Metaphysics; therefore the proposition by which I affirm it is false. But this is true, homo formaliter est animal, aut formaliter rationale, because the concept of man includes essentially the concepts of rational and of animal. And this is false, animal formaliter est homo, because the word formally reduplicates the precision of the intellect, by which animal abstracts from man. But this proposition, homo in quantum homo est animal in quantum animal, can be ambiguous: for if the word in quantum animal calls only the objective concept of animal with order to sensitive operations, it is true; yet false if the word in quantum also reduplicates the manner of conceiving, because it makes this sense, homo est quidquid animal est: nevertheless absolutely I judge it to be true, because its universality is restricted by the subject, and it effects this sense, aliquod animal est de conceptu hominis. Wherefore by using reduplication both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate, all higher accounts can be predicated of lower ones, and every difference of the species, as homo in quantum homo est animal in quantum animal, et rationale in quantum rationale est homo. But by using reduplication on the part of the subject, no property can be predicated of the essence, because this is false, homo ut homo est risibilis. It makes this sense, de essentia hominis est risibilitas. But with reduplication posited on the part of the predicate, as homo est risibilis in quantum risibilis, it is true, because all the formalities of risibility belong to man.
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1 2 3 I say sixth: terms of the second intention are predicated of terms of the first, as homo est species, because species supposits in the direct case for man, and connotes in an oblique case the act by which he is denominated, just as it is said, homo est cognitus, homo est albus. But terms of the second intention in the abstract are not predicated of terms of the first, as homo est specieitas is not said, just as homo est cognitio, homo est albedo is not said, because specieitas est cognitio, which is not predicated of man. But terms of the second intention in the abstract are predicated of other terms also of the second in the abstract, as specieitas est universalitas, and reflected concretes of concretes, as genus est universale; and concretes of abstracts, as genereitas est species, because that act which is genereity is conceived through another reflected act, as fitting many genereities differing only in number, from which reflected act genereity is denominated a species, just as man is called a species. For then genereity on the part of the subject signifies in the direct case the generic act, and in an oblique case connotes another reflected act, from which it is denominated a species. 4 But abstracts are not predicated of concretes, nor again direct concretes of direct abstracts. For this is false, genus est genereitas, because genus besides genereity says a thing which is denominated a genus, just as man besides the soul includes the body, and man seen includes vision.
§ 31
1 It must be noted that some dialecticians, admitting this proposition, homo est animal, homo est rationale, deny this one, humanitas est rationalitas, animalitas est rationalitas. Because they say that homo and animal supposit for the same supposit, by reason of which the proposition is verified, as album est dulce; it is otherwise with animality and rationality, as with whiteness and sweetness. 2 I judge that these do not speak consistently, and adduce examples that are not apt. For the supposit of animal could not rightly be predicated of the supposit of man, if according to their opinion a metaphysical part of composition by reason could not be predicated of the whole. It is proved, because the supposit of animal is a part of the human supposit, just as animality is a part of humanity, because animality, since it is a substantial and partial concept, cannot be understood to be supposited by a complete supposit, but by an incomplete one. Wherefore the human supposit is composed by our reason from the partial supposit of the rational and of the animal, just as humanity is composed from animality and rationality. Hence either they should admit both propositions, or reject both.