Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
§ 9
1 A property cannot be of the essence of a thing. Because essence is the first concept that is known in an object, as in man body and soul; but property is the second concept, which flows from the first. 2 Property can be taken in two ways: first, as it is a thing truly and really distinct from the essence, as heat is a property of fire. In the second way, as it is not really distinct, but is understood to be distinguished only by our reason, and to flow from the essence, as the divine attributes are not really distinguished from the nature of God, but only by our reason.
§ 10
1 The title of the question is in this second sense. For those who say that predicable character is not of the essence of the universal, but a passion, do not assert that it is a passion really, but only distinct in reason. 2 This opinion is of weighty authors: Albertus, Toletus, Sotus, Veracruz, and others. It is proved first, because by priority of reason a thing's being is prior to its being predicable. Because for a thing to be is the object of an act, and the object is prior to the act. Therefore predicable character is not of the first concept of the universal, but its passion.
§ 11
1 Secondly, this is a true causal [proposition]: because a thing is universal, therefore it is predicated of many; therefore universality is the principle of predicable character; therefore predicable character is not of the essence of the universal, but rather something that follows from it as from a principle. 2 Thirdly. The whole essence of the universal can be understood without predicable character; therefore this is not of its essence, because that is not of the essence of any thing without which such a thing can be conceived. The antecedent is proved, because if the act of predicating were repugnant, the thing would still be universal.
§ 12
1 The opposite view is that of Scotus in his logic q. 1. 5, whom others follow. His view is more approved by me. First, because the universal is made by comparative knowledge, as many hold, and thus predicability is of its essence, because comparative cognition is reflexive cognition, by which the universal is compared to its lower things, and is apprehended to agree with them. But when the agreement of the superior with the inferior has been apprehended, it is already proximately predicable. Or it is made by abstractive knowledge, as others hold, and thus predicability is of its essence; therefore predicability is always of the essence of the universal. The second part of the antecedent is proved: because, in order that some thing be predicable, it is only required that it be conceived as agreeing with the thing of which it is predicated; for as we conceive one thing to agree with another, or not to agree, immediately we can affirm one of another, or deny [it]; for such a conception is an immediate disposition to affirming. But by the abstractive knowledge of the universal, the universal is conceived as agreeing with its lower things, because it is conceived as one in many; therefore that knowledge formally constitutes the thing as predicable; therefore predicability is of the essence of the universal.
§ 13
1 It is confirmed. It is of the essence of the premises to constitute the intellect capable of discourse, because the premises by themselves immediately determine the intellect to it. But by a similar reason that abstractive knowledge of the universal determines the intellect to predicate it; therefore it is of the essence of that abstraction to constitute the universal proximately predicable, because it is the same as to determine the intellect to predicability.
§ 14
1 That the whole matter may be explained, note that the act of the intellect can be considered in two ways. First, as they regard and denominate the objects, which are said by them to be known, and as they regard the power itself, which they denominate as knowing. Secondly, as the acts themselves regard one another, as principle and principiated, or as cause and effect; thus discourse regards judgment, and this regards apprehension as a condition previously required for itself. Each respect is essential to acts. Concerning the first there is no doubt; concerning the second it is also clear, because those acts are essentially subordinated, and one is referred to another; just as the essences of things are essentially referred to their effects, because they regard them by themselves immediately. From these two respects two essential denominations arise for the acts themselves. From the first results the denomination of universal, because the act regards an object representing a common character to several. From the second results the denomination of predicable, because that same act disposes the power as proximately apt, so that one may be predicated of another, in which predicability consists, and the proximate reason, and disposition, so that it can be predicated, to which nothing is lacking besides the predication itself. Wherefore St. Thomas said that the character of universal is one thing, that of predicable another; another (I say) in denomination. For the universal represents objects confusedly, but the predicable connotes the judgment to which it disposes. But if the universal act is adequately penetrated, each character is of its first concept, as animal and rational of man, and neither is an attribute of the other.
§ 15
1 Secondly others prove this view, because the logical universal is essentially constituted in the character of such by predicability, as man by rationality; therefore it is of its essence. The antecedent is proved, because the metaphysical universal abstracts from the predicable or not predicable. 2 But to this argument one can easily answer that predicability is not formally the immediate difference of the logical universal, but radical predicability. For in this the metaphysical differs from the logical, because from the metaphysical predicability in no way follows, otherwise from the logical. As if someone were to say that man differs essentially from the brute, because man is the root of wonder, otherwise the brute. Then without foundation a distinction is devised between the metaphysical and logical universal, because every universal in being is made by an act of the intellect, like the logical universal, and the Scotists could only use that distinction.
§ 16
1 To the first from §. 10. it is answered: the thing is prior than it is predicable, because it is also prior than it is conceived as agreeing with several, and thus the object is prior than the act; but it is not prior [as] universal than [as] predicable, because the same act by which it is made universal immediately determines the intellect so that it can predicate it. Just as a thing is prior than it is conceived through the premises, but it is not prior as conceived through the premises than as capable of discourse, because the premises dispose the intellect to discourse.
§ 17
1 To the second, from § 11, the reply is that this causal [proposition] is true if it is understood of fundamental universality, but false if of formal universality: for because a thing is universal fundamentally, therefore it is predicable; because by reason of the foundation it is knowable as fitting many, and through this cognition it becomes universal and predicable. But this causal [proposition] is true: therefore it is predicated because it is universal formally, which is the same as to say: therefore it is predicated because it is predicable. For these two accounts belong essentially to the universal act, and neither follows from the other; but that causal [proposition] understood of formal universality, which is predicability, is not true.
§ 18
1 To the third the reply is: by denying the antecedent, because the whole essence of the universal is not conceived without predicability, just as neither is the essence of man without rationality. To the proof the reply is that it would not be possible for the universal to exist unless the predicable were possible, because they are the same. For formally it is the same to be one in many through the intellect and to be predicable of them. Predicability is therefore an essential difference of the universal, because the act by which it is conceived as fitting many differs essentially from other acts, since of itself it proximately constitutes the intellect able to predicate the universal of many.
§ 19
1 You will say that Porphyry says the definition of genus is descriptive, because it is given through predicability. The reply is that Porphyry is understood to speak not of predicability but of actual predication, or that description is taken broadly for an essential definition, just as property is taken broadly for an essential concept when logicians say that predicability is a property of the universal.