Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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It is the common opinion of the Thomists that Dialectic is simply speculative and not practical.1 It is proved first by the foundation of Soto related by Molina, 1 p., q. 1, art. 4, disp. 1, §. dubitari tamen potest. and Suar., 2 met., disp. 44, lect. 13, num. 20.2 Because a practical habit is one which regards practice, but logic does not regard practice. Therefore logic is not practical. The minor is proved, because logic is adequately concerned with the acts of the intellect as with its object, but the acts of the intellect are not practice; therefore logic is not concerned with practice. The minor is proved, because every act of the intellect is speculation, but practice cannot be speculation; therefore an act of the intellect cannot be practice.3 It is confirmed, because the intellect becomes practical by extension (as the common proverb has it), but the intellect is not extended except regarding the acts of the other powers; therefore the intellect does not become practical regarding its own acts, but regarding the acts of the other powers.
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But that this foundation is altogether null is plain.1 For to the first minor it is answered that logic regards practice. To the second minor it is answered that an act of the intellect can be practice, because it is not repugnant for the same act to be speculative and practice.2 For this, suppose that speculation is the contemplation and cognition of some object, while practice is an object known by a practical act. Hence, just as it is not repugnant for a direct act to be known by a reflexive act, so also it is not repugnant for a speculative act to be known by another practical act. Wherefore the speculative act itself knows its object in one way, and is itself known by the practical act in another way. For it so rests in the cognition of its object that it gives no rules for making it, as one who considers an Angel does not give rules for how an Angel is made. But the act itself, as it is known by a practical act, is so known that it is taught by the practical act how it is to be made. For a speculative act can rightly be known by a practical act, just as a practical act can be known by a speculative act. I shall set an example for each. When a man makes this demonstration, omnis homo est animal rationale. Petrus est homo, ergo Petrus est animal rationale. this demonstration is speculation, because it gives no rules for making the object. And when this demonstration is known by the logician, it is so known that logic gives the rules for making it. Because logic teaches that in order to conclude rightly the premises must be arranged in the first figure. Therefore a speculative act can be known by another act which teaches how the speculative act ought to be made.
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Now however I prove that a practical act can be known speculatively, for example.1 The Architect knows the house practically, because the act of architecture gives the rules for constructing the house; but an Angel who beholds that act of the Architect considers it speculatively, because he gives no rules for making that act. Therefore a practical act can be known speculatively.
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Hence you will gather that practice and speculation are not opposed, because the same act can be both practice and speculation. But speculation, or speculative knowledge, and a practical act are opposed, because the same act cannot contemplate the same object at once practically and speculatively, because it cannot at once give rules and not give them for making it. From these things the answer to the argument is clear.
§ 14
To the confirmation it is answered that this proverb is of no approved author, by whose authority we are compelled to answer.1 Second, it is answered that the intellect becomes practical by extension, because it does not rest in contemplation alone, as speculation does, but extends itself further to producing the work.
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The a priori reason of our doctrine is that an act of the intellect can be an object dirigible by another act so that it be done rightly; therefore it can be practice.1 No one doubts the antecedent, because just as the intellect can err, so it can be directed. The consequence is clear, because practice is an object dirigible by an act of the intellect so that it be done rightly.2 It is confirmed, because an act which directs another act so that it be done rightly does not rest in its mere contemplation, as a speculative act does, but proceeds further to making it rightly; therefore the act which regards such an act is not speculative but practical. The antecedent is certain, because such an act teaches the feasibility of the object, just as Architecture teaches the feasibility of the house. But the consequence is clear, because a speculative act rests in the contemplation of the object alone.
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Some say that practice is necessarily an external work dirigible by reason.1 But on the contrary, first, because this is a frivolous begging of the question, as Suarez rightly says above: for that is what we are attacking. For why will an intellectual work not be practice, since it is an object dirigible by reason? On the contrary, second, because prudence is a practical habit, as is confessed by all the Theologians. Therefore an act of the intellect can be practice. The consequence is clear, because an act of the intellect is an object dirigible by prudence; for prudence dictates that here and now one must study. Then thus: but just as prudence directs the acts of studying so that they become morally good, similarly logic regards the same acts so that they be artistically good; therefore just as the acts of the intellect are practice with respect to prudence, similarly they will be practice with respect to logic.
§ 17
The second foundation of Soto's opinion is1 that logic considers the nature and essence of the mode of knowing by handing down no rules for producing it, but once its nature is known the intellect is rendered easy for producing it; therefore logic is not a practical science.2 The antecedent is proved, because all of logic is concerned with the nature of the mode of knowing, and it teaches what it is, what parts it has, etc. Nor indeed does it teach how a syllogism is to be made, in which respect it differs both from prudence, which judges that here and now this virtue or that one is to be exercised, and from Architecture, which teaches the rules by which the house is to be built. But logic rests in the cognition of the syllogistic form alone, and since the syllogism is in the same intellect, it is very easily made by the one understanding.
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Hence the same antecedent is proved secondly, because a practical habit is always posited to remove the difficulty which arises regarding the exercise of an object already known, but in the intellect there is no difficulty regarding the exercise of a syllogism already known. Therefore logic is not a practical science. But the first consequence is proved, because for a habit to be practical it does not suffice that a work follow from it in some way whatever, but it is necessary that it follow from the habit as from one dictating and prescribing the rules for producing it. As this act, Deus est summum bonum, is speculative, although from it follows love toward the highest good. But this act is practical: Summum bonum est amandum. Because it dictates love toward God.
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1 Nor does this foundation press, for the antecedent is denied. To the first proof I answer that the same cognition of the mode of knowing is the rule by which it ought to be done. For a rule is nothing other than a cognition which directs the power to the work, for in no way is a power directed by the intellect except through cognition of the object. For these propositions are entirely identical: Syllogismus in barbara constat tribus propositionibus universalibus affirmativis, et, syllogismus est faciendus in barbara ex tribus propositionibus universalibus affirmativis. Just as these are identical: Deus continet summam amabilitatem, et, Deus est amabilis summe. Therefore the cognition itself of the mode of knowing is the rule of constructing it. But the distinction of prudence is not to the point. For prudence is established only for the exercise of the other virtues, for which it does not need to speculate their natures, but it suffices to presuppose in the intellect knowledge of them. But logic is established not only for exercise but also for the construction of the essence of the mode of knowing, lest one err regarding its essence, and it become topical when it ought to be demonstrative. But architecture and logic are entirely similar.
§ 20
1 To the second it is answered that a practical habit does not remove a new difficulty which remains, the cognition of the object being presupposed, concerning the effecting of the same, but removes that which can be concerning the cognition of the object, to which it itself inclines and facilitates the power. Logic overcomes this difficulty, because the intellect furnished with the logical habit is more ready for the cognition of the mode of knowing than if it were destitute of it: but the difficulties of the external power concerning the effecting of the subject are not overcome by the habits of the intellect, but partly by exercise itself repelling the impediments of the members, partly from the greater perfection of practical species, for these external powers are necessary, which act necessarily as much as they can and as is commanded them. But if they do not accomplish something, it is because they cannot. For this a habit is of no help, which does not give the power that it can, but that it can easily. To those two propositions Deus est summum bonum, and summum bonum est amandum. It is answered that from them our opinion is proved. For the first is speculative, because the act of love which follows from it is not known by it, and so is neither its object nor practice. But the second proposition is practical, because it regards such love as object, which love arises from that cognition as object: thus the syllogism arises from dialectical cognition as object from the act illuminating the power to effect it.