Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
✦ This work is being completed — add a section.
Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
§ 60
§ 61
§ 62
§ 63
§ 64
§ 65
§ 66
Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
§ 67
§ 68
Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
§ 69
§ 70
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
§ 74
§ 75
§ 76
§ 77
§ 78
§ 79
§ 80
§ 81
§ 82
§ 83
§ 84
§ 85
§ 86
§ 87
Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
§ 88
Dices categorematicos significare
§ 90
§ 91
§ 92
Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
§ 93
§ 94
§ 95
§ 96
§ 97
§ 98
§ 99
§ 100
§ 101
§ 102
§ 103
Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
§ 104
§ 105
§ 106
§ 107
§ 108
Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
§ 109
§ 110
§ 111
Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Sectio II. On the Verb.
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
Sectio III. On Speech.
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
§ 13
§ 14
Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
§ 20
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
§ 60
Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
§ 61
§ 62
§ 63
§ 64
Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
§ 65
§ 66
§ 67
§ 68
§ 69
§ 70
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
§ 74
Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
§ 75
§ 76
Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
§ 1
§ 2
Sectio I. On Definition.
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
Sectio II. On Division.
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio III. On Argumentation.
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
Sectio VII. On Consequence.
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
Some Terms Explained.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
§ 21
Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
§ 36
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
§ 44
Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
§ 53
§ 54
§ 55
§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
§ 60
§ 61
§ 62
§ 63
§ 64
§ 65
§ 66
§ 67
§ 68
§ 69
§ 70
Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
§ 74
§ 75
§ 76
§ 77
§ 78
§ 79
§ 80
Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
§ 81
Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
§ 82
§ 83
§ 84
§ 85
§ 86
§ 87
§ 88
Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
§ 89
§ 90
§ 91
§ 92
§ 93
§ 94
§ 95
§ 96
§ 97
§ 98
Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
§ 99
It is customary for dialecticians to dispute what is the logical artifice considered in the formal mode of knowing by the logician, which artifice is customarily called the passive direction of acts. The first opinion teaches that this artifice is a being of reason: because from two acts of the intellect different conclusions can be inferred: as in the first figure and mode the universal affirmative conclusion is inferred directly, but the particular indirectly. However this foundation is altogether null: because if one treats of the inferential power, it is not distinguished from either premise: because things known to be the same as one third thing have the power to be known to be the same among themselves. But if one treats of actual inference, I answer that it is an extrinsic denomination of the premises, just as illumination and heating of the sun: but the Philosopher contemplating the concept of the agent in the second act does not contemplate a being of reason.
§ 100
Next, this opinion is defective: for the conclusion of a demonstration belongs no less to the logician than the premises: but the conclusion inferred from the premises is neither a being of reason, nor is it constituted in the character of conclusion by that: just as heat arises from the sun and love from cognition without any being of reason. therefore the logical artifice is not universally a being of reason. Add that the definition also enjoys its own artifice, and yet that character of being of reason is not found in it. Likewise because by one act the whole objective syllogism can be known: which then observes the laws of dialectic: and yet it is not indifferent so that from it different acts are inferred. therefore the syllogistic artifice as such is not constituted by that genus of being of reason. Finally, because no one has said (nor could have) that the formal object of moral Philosophy is a being of reason, but acts of the will to be exercised from right reason: therefore neither will the object of logic be a being of reason of this kind: because they are acts to be exercised from a certain art.
§ 101
The second opinion is that the acts of the intellect are the material object of dialectic: but the formal and proximate object is a real mode distinct from them. just as the proximate object of the architect is the arrangement of stones; but the stones themselves are the remote object. They are moved firstly, because the architectural arrangement is a mode distinct from stone and wood: therefore the logical arrangement will also be distinct from the disposed acts. I deny the consequence: for stones and wood must be constituted in different places, for which they need a different ubication. just as they need it independently of the building: for in order that a stone can be in that place where it now has the character of foundation in the building, there is no need for the rest of the building to be imposed on it: but in order that it be there, it needs always a ubication binding it to that place: therefore that mode is not distinct by reason of the artifice, but by reason of place. but the acts of the intellect are always in the same place, interpenetrated, wherefore as regards the character of their artifice they are independent of a different position of place.
§ 102
Secondly they are moved, because acts can be found without the artifice, therefore they are distinguished from it. I deny the antecedent: for although the major proposition can be without the minor; and this without that; and when they are separated, they do not have syllogistic power; nevertheless if both exist together, they cannot be separated from the logical artifice, because both through their own entity without anything distinct have necessarily the syllogistic power to infer the conclusion. and so the logical artifice of the premises is the two premises themselves. But for each thing this artifice is partly intrinsic, partly extrinsic: as I shall show concerning similitude and every predicamental character in disputation 15 of metaphysics, section 2 and 3.
§ 103
This second opinion is impugned firstly, because the definition is made from the precepts of logic, and yet it does not have an artifice distinct from itself: therefore. I prove the minor, because precisely that acts clearly represent the genus and difference of the object is a definition from the precepts of logic: but to represent the genus and difference of the object belongs to the act through its essence without a distinct mode: therefore to be a definition from the precepts of logic does not add a distinct mode.
To this habit thus defining, logical cognition adds nothing intrinsic, for this contemplates the essence of the definition. But that from this contemplation it becomes a definition is an extrinsic denomination, just as that the actions of the will are exercised from the precept of moral Philosophy adds nothing to the acts themselves.
§ 104
Secondly, because the two premises in the first mode and figure have through their entities the power to infer the conclusion necessarily: but the syllogistic artifice is nothing other than the two premises necessarily inferring the conclusion. therefore. The minor is clear, because the whole logical artifice is for defining, dividing, and arguing rightly: just as the architectural artifice is for a right building. The major is proved: because the whole syllogistic power rests on this principle, dici de omni, dici de nullo: for he who affirms that two created extremes are the same as some third cannot deny that they are the same among themselves: but through those two premises it is said that the extremes are the same as the middle: therefore through them without any distinct mode the intellect has the necessity of assenting to the conclusion, and consequently the whole syllogistic artifice. You will find the same in division and any other mode of knowing: for when man and lion are known as subjective parts of animal, we divide animal itself: but these things are done through the essence of the acts themselves. therefore the character of division does not consist in an artifice distinct from the dividing act.
§ 105
Add that the mode of knowing not rarely consists in one single act: which cannot have that character of artifice: because by itself alone it has the whole character of the mode of knowing. And although to this second opinion there were granted that artifice distinct from the mode of knowing; still the acts of the intellect would not be the remote object of dialectic. Firstly, because architecture does not treat remotely of stones: for this proposition, lapis iaciendus est in fundamentum, attains the stone immediately. Secondly, because infinite precepts of dialectic fall immediately upon the acts themselves, for example, definitio est oratio explicans naturam rei: genus praedicatur de pluribus. For although the acts need some mode distinct from themselves, it cannot be denied that by their entity they are both the explanation and the character of predicating the object. Review the other arguments in disputation 7 on the soul, section 6. Therefore that acts are made from logical direction is an extrinsic denomination to them from the art of logic itself.
§ 106
The third opinion confesses that the logical artifice is not distinguished from the formal mode of knowing, nor adds to it anything but an extrinsic denomination: it asserts nevertheless that the office of dialectic is to direct the acts of the intellect. It explains this direction by the example of architecture, which teaches to compose stone with lime and wood, and the other parts of a building: so this opinion distinguishes the act of the subject from the act of the predicate, and both from the act of union, and teaches that the dialectician composes the act of the subject with the other two: and so the logical artifice is an aggregation of several acts, by which some mode of knowing is composed: just as the architectural artifice is an aggregation of several things, by which a building is constructed. The argument of this opinion is, because logic does not consider the acts of the intellect according to their essence, nor according to some mode distinct from them: therefore according to this character of being per accidens.
§ 107
This opinion would rightly explain the object of dialectic, unless it rested on a false foundation. For I shall show in disputation 7 on the soul, section 2, that judgment is one simple quality; and although some philosophers compose it from three acts, no one nevertheless denies that it can be one simple quality. Suppose therefore a definition lacking composition, that is truly a mode of knowing, because it is manifestative of the unknown, and a discourse explaining the nature of a thing: under which concept it does not belong to the science of the soul, which cares nothing whether the act is terminated at the genus or at the difference: it belongs therefore to the logician. but not under this collocation of several acts. therefore this is not the common character of dialectic. Add that this opinion is true in the syllogism when the whole object is first apprehended: for then the three propositions of it are really distinguished: but if we admit that the whole objective syllogism can be known by one act, this opinion has no place. But in order to defend the object of dialectic, we are not to be bound to one opinion less common and less probable.
§ 108
Wherefore I think that the very substance of the acts of the intellect is the object of logic; not however considering it what it is, what properties it has, what dependence on causes, etc. but considering it as it precisely denominates object, genus, difference, subject, predicate, major, minor, etc. Many of these predications add something extrinsic to the acts of the intellect themselves, for example, in the syllogism, that the major proposition is a part of the syllogism says an intrinsic denomination consisting in the very entity of the major, and connotes an extrinsic denomination from the existence of the minor. But often it adds nothing extrinsic, but is the sole essence of the act as it represents and denominates the object secondarily and intentionally. For example, the dialectician teaches to define: for which acts concerning the genus and difference are necessary: for whether these acts are several or one, the object is always to be known through genus and difference, otherwise the object is not defined: and I would say the same of any other mode of knowing. Wherefore I asserted in §. 96. that the dialectician does not treat of the formal mode of knowing, except as it denominates the object, and by comparison with it. And so the logical undertaking is to teach, define, divide, and argue, not only passively, as I objected from Father Rubio in §. 73, but also actively, as I have often shown in section 4 and 5. But whether definition and division consist of several acts or of one alone matters little to the logical undertaking: for he who by one act knows the genus and difference of the object defines it as well as he who does so by two: for he conjoins the genus and difference of the object, and observes the laws of right definition, which the student of the science of the soul does not consider, nor cares by what reason several objects are to be conjoined to explain another.
§ 109
You will object: therefore the logician deals with the acts of the intellect according to themselves. I prove the consequence, because to be a representation of an object is essential to cognition as such. I deny the consequence, because the whole of dialectic doctrine has demonstration as the adequate object of its attribution: it therefore deals with definition, in order to compose a demonstration with it; and with division, in order that through certain syllogisms the object may be defined and its attributes known; but a syllogism is an aggregation of three acts: that these add nothing except a mutual extrinsic denomination of one by another I have already shown, and so I spoke in §. 78. From these things the answer to the argument from §. 106 is clear. Therefore the science of the soul deals with these acts with the independence of one from the other, and without order to showing one object from another; the dialectician, however, conversely. This is rightly explained by the example of Philosophy and architecture. Note however that the dialectician cannot altogether abstain from some quidditative cognition of the acts of the intellect, for he who considers the mode of knowing to be the manifestation of an object touches the essence of those acts to which that manifestation is essential, and this in every view: because this is the logical predication, the act concerning the predicate affirms something of the subject: whereas that affirmation is of the essence of that act. The reason a priori, because the logician considers the manifestation of one object from another, which manifestation is essential to the acts themselves, whereby the logician differs from the architect: for a stone is without a transcendental order to wood. But what it is for a proposition in a syllogism to be major or minor, I shall show in disputation 10, section 11.