Universa Philosophia

The adequate object of logic.— Therefore, taking the object properly and in rigor, that is the adequate object of logic which it attains through all its acts, namely proposition, division, definition, and argumentation, and their parts, properties, attributes, causes, and contraries. It is proved, because all logical acts terminate at all these things, and not at another. Therefore these are the adequate object of logic: the consequence is clear from §. 11. The antecedent is proved by induction, for the subject, the union, and the predicate, from which the proposition results, and the opposition of propositions and other attributes are dealt with in the Summulae and in the books of the Perihermenias: the five predicables, which are more commonly used as subject and predicate in a proposition, are dealt with in Porphyry's Isagoge: concerning division and definition it is certain that they belong to the logician: Aristotle's books on these two modes of knowing have perished: the syllogism is dealt with in the Prior Analytics; the topical syllogism in the Topics, the fallacious in the Elenchi, but in the Posterior Analytics demonstration; the remaining argumentations are reduced to these, because they have no force unless reduced to a syllogism. But besides these there is nothing that belongs to the logician, for the whole method of reasoning and the mode of proceeding in any faculty is contained in these things: therefore proposition, division, definition, and argumentation, and their parts, affections, and attributes are the adequate object of logic, or the adequate matter of logic.

It is confirmed, for (as will be clear in sect. 4.) the adequate object of logic is to direct the acts of the intellect, but for directing these as regards inference and right disposition, all these things are necessary and sufficient, therefore these are the adequate matter of logic. The first part of the minor premise is clear from itself, for who will deny that it is necessary to affirm one thing of another, to divide and define things, to demonstrate their properties, or to advocate them with probability, and likewise to discern the fallacies of argumentations? But that these suffice is proved from this, that nothing will be assigned in the investigation of the sciences which is not contained in the aforesaid things.

Objection.— But you will object first that the first operation of the intellect, which they call apprehension, belongs to the object of logic, because error often arises from it; but the operation is not a proposition, nor a mode of knowing; because apprehension affirms or denies nothing. therefore besides the proposition and the mode of knowing there is another object of logic. I deny the major premise, for the first apprehension does not belong to the logician in any way,¹ just as neither phantasy nor the exterior sense pertain to him, although error arises from them. To the proof it is answered that that defect cannot be met by dialectical precepts, but by philosophical ones, for once the nature of the thing dealt with is known, apprehension and the external and internal senses are to be corrected: and although the logician deals with the subject and predicate, which can be the object of apprehension, he nevertheless deals with them not as they are the object of apprehension, but as they are parts of judgment, for just as in apprehension there is no proposition, so there are no terms.

Definition, as it is a judgment, belongs to the logician.— Similarly, although through apprehension the definition of a thing is known, as rational animal, v. g. nevertheless the definition does not belong to the logician except insofar as it is affirmed of the defined thing, or something is affirmed or denied of it. For we use a definition in two ways: either when asked, as what is man? We answer rational animal, where this proposition is understood, man is a rational animal. or we use the definition by delivering it when not asked, as when the philosopher says, man is a rational animal. but in both cases the definition belongs to judgment, and not to apprehension. therefore the logician does not deal with the definition as it is the object of apprehension, but of judgment.

It is confirmed, the object of logic is what can be directed by logical precepts in the mode of knowing, but simple apprehension is not thus directionable: therefore it is not the object of logic. The major premise is clear from sect. 7. the minor is clear, because simple apprehension is not a part of judgment (as will be clear in disput. 7. on the soul sect. 2.) therefore neither is its object, as it is its object, directionable by logical precepts. But when St. Thomas in opusc. 9. says that the object of simple apprehension belongs to the logician,¹ understand it materially, because the subject and predicate of a proposition correspond to apprehension, but not formally, as it is the object of apprehension, because as such it is neither predicated nor made a subject, since that is done through judgment: but if you wish these things to belong to the logician, they are still contained in the mode of knowing, because the apprehension of a definition is, by your account, a mode of knowing, and it is the subject and predicate, otherwise I do not see in what way they belong to the logician.

Objection.— You will object secondly that the categories belong to the logician, and are not contained in the mode of knowing. therefore the mode of knowing and the proposition are not the adequate object of logic. I deny the major premise, nor did Aristotle deal with the categories in logic, but inserted them into logic so that they might be the matter in which the logician might exercise himself,¹ just as Aristotle often exercises himself in the elements of the alphabet, which is proved from him, who denies that things according to themselves fall under the consideration of logic, but as they underlie second intentions;² but the categories deal with things according to themselves, therefore according to Aristotle's mind the categories do not fall under the consideration of logic. I see that many have seized from Aristotle the occasion to teach in logic almost the whole of metaphysics, and a good part of the science of the soul: on which matter one must treat at length in disp. 9. of the metaphysics sect. 2.

Objection.— You will object thirdly that it follows from our opinion that the logician deals no less through itself with the fallacious syllogism than with the demonstrative: but this is false, therefore. I distinguish the major premise: the logician does not deal with the fallacious syllogism through itself, that is, for its own sake as with an object of attribution and an extrinsic end which he intends:¹ but he does deal with the demonstrative as with an object of attribution. therefore in this sense I deny the sequel, but the sequel is conceded if the word through itself is understood as concerning an object known through its own principles, and concerning its demonstrated passions: for in the same way logic demonstrates the properties of the fallacious syllogism as it demonstrates the properties of demonstration. But this is no absurdity, just as it is not absurd that in Theology one dispute about sins and about virtues, because of contraries there is the same discipline. It is confirmed, because the cognition of the fallacious syllogism is altogether necessary, nor does it belong to another faculty, therefore it belongs to logic; but demonstration indeed as the end; the Elenchus however as contrary and opposed to the end.