Universa Philosophia

THE SUBJECT (as far as pertains to the logician) is that of which the intellect enunciates something.¹ Taken broadly, it is taken for the object: for the object, in that it is the underlying matter of a science, is accustomed to be called the subject; thus the Doctors use them indiscriminately. But if it be taken properly, distinguish it from the object as a whole from a part; for the object is the whole which the intellect attains. Similarly, the object taken broadly, some extend to the terms of a physical power, as Father Molina 1. p. q. 25. art. 3. calls the term of God's omnipotence an object; properly, however, it does not pass beyond the limits of a vital power. For only that which is known or loved through any power whatsoever has properly received the name of object, as light and color are the object of sight.

The formal is one thing, the material another. The formal is that which is first and per se attained by the power, and on account of which the other objects are attained:¹ whence it is called the objective formal account. For example, the sick man who wishes to be cured first and per se wishes health, and on account of health wishes the cutting of the vein, potions, etc. Here health, the cutting of the vein, potions, etc. are loved by the sick man. But because that which is first and per se loved is health, while the rest are loved not for themselves but for health, therefore health is the formal object of those acts, which happens in every end and in means, for the end is the formal object of the will.² The same is clear in the intellect: in a syllogism, for example, the premises and the conclusion are known, but for a different reason: the premises per se first, and on account of them the conclusion. Wherefore the middle term of the syllogism is the formal object.³ You perceive the same in supernatural faith, whose partial objective formal account is divine revelation, which is known per se first, and on account of it the revealed mystery. Finally, in one word, the formal object is that which, when known or loved, leads to the knowledge or love of another. But the material object is that into whose love or knowledge the formal object leads us,⁴ as in the examples adduced the means are the material object of the will, the conclusions of science, and the revealed mysteries of faith.

Hence it is clear that the formal object is necessarily the cause on account of which the material object is loved or known.¹ This is explained by these terms, because and therefore, as because I love health, I love the cutting of the vein. Therefore I assent to the conclusion, because I have assented to the premises. Therefore I believe the revealed mystery, because I believe the revelation. But the material object exercises no objective causality upon the formal object, for all the propositions in which we assert such causality are false, as these two, therefore I love the end, because I love the means. Likewise, because I assent to the conclusion, I assent to the premises.

Hence it is further inferred that the same object can be material and formal in respect of different things,¹ because its love or cognition can depend on the love or cognition of another, and be the cause on account of which a third, different object is loved or known, e. g. the opening of a vein (as I said §. 2.) is the material object in respect of the act by which we will health, and is the formal object in respect of the will by which we will to summon the bloodletter, for I summon him for the reason that he may open the vein. Likewise the first passion is the material object in the syllogism in which it is inferred as the conclusion, and is the formal object in the syllogism in which it is posited as a premise. The reason a priori is that in the first case such an object has the character of the middle term or of the conclusion, but in the second of the premises or of the end.² But these objects are not called formal simply, but secondary formal, or formal in a certain respect, for everyone uses "formal simply" for the primary formal.

That, just as it is first in cognition and love, so it is last (as they say) in resolution,¹ because when we render the causes by which we are moved concerning objects, we always render the immediate ones, and thus beginning from the last we stop at the first, as if you count eight men in reverse order, you will begin from the eighth and end at the first, v. g. if you ask a sick man why he summons the bloodletter? He answers, because he wills that blood be let, and if you ask why he wills to let blood? He answers, because he wills health, therefore last the reason is rendered which first moves the sick man.

But the material and formal object are so called by analogy to physical form and matter:¹ because just as prime matter is indifferent to this or that complete species, and is determined by the form from which specific distinction comes, so the material object is indifferent to this or that science or virtue, but is determined by the formal object, as this conclusion, God exists, drawn from divine revelation, belongs to faith, but to philosophy if it is shown from the evident cognition of creatures.

This division comes down to that by which others divide the object into the formal object which and by which:¹ they call our material object the formal which, and our formal object they call the formal by which: but our division is more usual among authors, who call the formal object immediate, and the material object mediate. For the objective formal character, since it is loved or known first through itself, depends on nothing: but the material object, since it depends on another, is not attained through itself immediately but through the medium of an object previously known or loved, as is clear in the examples adduced. For the premises are known immediately through themselves, but the conclusion from them.

Objection.— You will say that the conclusion can be known either by the same act of the intellect as the premises, or by a different act; when the premises and the conclusion are known by the same act, then the conclusion is known mediately through the same act by which the middle term is known: but when it is known by a distinct act, then it cannot be a mediate object, because in that act nothing mediates. But the question is about the name, for the matter itself is clear, since by such an act the conclusion alone is represented, and it is also clear that the conclusion depends on the premises in its cognition. Nevertheless in that case I think that the conclusion should be called a mediate object,¹ because an object is not called mediate for the reason that it is known by the same act as the formal object, but because it is known from the cognition of the premises and with dependence on them: but the premises are always the medium,² and the conclusion is deduced from them from the medium, or is deduced through the medium; but if through the medium, therefore it is mediate. Moreover, against common sense we would be compelled to say that God is known by us immediately, because in a demonstration of his existence the act of the conclusion represents God alone. Likewise discourse would always be immediate, against common sense, because discourse has a distinct act in the conclusion and in the premises.

The material object into proximate and remote.— Again divide the material object into proximate and remote. The proximate is what is truly and properly attained by the power according to its own character, as the medium by the will, and the conclusion by the intellect. The remote object is called what is truly and properly not attained according to its own character, but is said to be known because some accident of it is known. A body is said to be seen because the color with which it is imbued is seen. That objects of this kind are not properly known is evidently proved, because when they are changed the cognition remains unchanged, from which cognition they are denominated as known, as is clear in the Eucharist, whose accidents are sensed in the same way before and after consecration, although the substance of the bread and wine vanishes through consecration.

The formal character under which: one objective; another on the part of the power.— Then the formal character under which is one thing objective, which we dealt with §. 2., and another is the most formal under which, as visibility in the object of sight, and lovableness in the object of the will. But whatever this character is, whether distinct from the objective one and from the act of the power, or the same as them, does not concern the logician, for whom it suffices to know that sight tends toward color under the character of the visible, and the intellect under the character of the intelligible.

What the partial and total object are.— Moreover one object is partial and another total. The partial is what is known together with another. The total and adequate is the whole thing which alone is dealt with in a science, or which is loved by the will, v. g. this whole proposition, Peter is a man, is the total object of that act, but the subject is a partial object, and likewise the predicate is a partial object, and similarly the copula. The adequate object of a power or habit is the object of all its acts, and not another,¹ as the object of sight is all things which are seen through all its acts, and of the will all things which are loved through all its acts. For since the object of a power, a habit, and an act is so the same that it is not distinguished even in thought, the object of a habit cannot be another, nor that of a power, than the object of all acts; and although the object of a power is more universal than the object of each act in particular, nevertheless it cannot extend more widely than the object of all acts taken together: but if so, assign me some objective formal or material character which is not included in the adequate object of all acts: for a power tends toward its object not through itself but through its acts, concerning which at length in the books on the soul disp. 4. and 5., where the unity of the object is dealt with, and in the prooemium of the metaphysics section 1.