Universa Philosophia

Materially, and formally, we frequently use these words, and abuse them. Materially signifies when some predicate really belongs to some matter, or subject, as the white thing is sweet, namely materially, that is, the same matter or thing which is white is also sweet, and in divine matters paternity is nature, and justice is mercy, identically or materially.

Formally signifies when some predicate belongs to the subject by reason of some form, as the white thing formally scatters sight, that is, it belongs to the white thing to scatter sight by reason of whiteness, which word always reduplicates the form, and signifies that the form is the cause on account of which the predicate belongs to the subject, as for the white thing to scatter sight on account of whiteness; wherefore many propositions identically, or materially, true are false in the formal sense, as the white thing formally is sweet: because it makes this sense, whiteness is the reason on account of which the subject is sweet.

These terms are applied both to concepts really distinct, as is clear from the examples given above, and to concepts distinct only by reason, as in divine matters, in which the intellect formally is not the will formally. Likewise in human matters the animal formally is not the rational formally: because it makes this sense, the operation from which a man is denominated an animal is not the operation from which he is denominated rational, and with proportion preserved, the distinction of reason imitates the real distinction, because just as sweetness does not constitute the white thing, so neither does discourse denominate the animal, but the rational, concerning which I have said enough in disputation 6 of the Metaphysics, and in the third disputation of logic, section one.

Reduplicatively, and specifically, or identically. These words fall back into materially, and formally. For specifically, and identically call upon only the subject, or matter, or entity, or species, and answer to materially, but reduplicatively is equivalent to formally, by which word it is denoted that the predicate belongs to the subject by reason of some form, as the white thing reduplicatively scatters sight, yet it is not sweet reduplicatively, but specifically.

In common, and as such signify common concepts, as they are apprehended by a confused and common concept, as man as such is risible, that is, risibility belongs to the common account of man. But this proposition is false, man as such is white, for whiteness does not belong to the common account of man. As such can also reduplicate in the formal sense, and in the identical sense, but it is more usually in the identical sense, for common accounts have diverse common predicates, some of which belong to them formally by reason of essence, as man as such is an animal, others identically, as man as such is risible. Let as such therefore be taken for the common concept alone, as precisely separated from inferior things.

Formally, and efficiently, formally signifies a predicate belonging to the subject by reason of some form or concept, for example, prime matter formally is passive potency, that is, through its own concept, or essence. Likewise this heat renders [something] formally hot, that is, through its own entity: but efficiently signifies when some thing provides something by effecting another, for example, the heat of fire renders the hand hot efficiently, that is, by effecting in the hand a heat distinct from itself; but the heat existing in the hand renders it hot formally, that is, through its own entity united to it. Likewise fire formally is heat-producing, and heating formally is heating, that is, through their own entities and essences. Note that the account of acting also formally denominates the term acted upon, for it acts upon it through its formal concept: likewise the agent, the immediate agent is formally agent as that which, that is, it acts as that which through its own entity; but these denominations are reduced to the denominations of efficient causes.

Virtually, formally, and eminently are terms for the expression of causes and effects. An effect is contained formally in a cause when the proper entity of the effect is in it, as fire is formally hot, and in short, whenever the thing signified is in another according to its own being, it is said to be in that other formally, as whiteness in the wall, from which [the wall] is denominated formally white. An effect is contained virtually in its cause when it is not in it according to its own being, but can be produced by it, as the sun is virtually hot, not formally: because heat according to its own being is not found in the sun, yet it can be produced by the sun, because the sun is a power for heat: on which account it is said to contain it virtually. Eminently signifies that an effect is contained in the power of a cause more perfect than it, and equivocal, which contains the perfection of the effect, with its specific imperfections removed, as heat is contained eminently in light, which is a quality like it, but lacking the contrary, and creatures are contained eminently in God. Sometimes an angel is said to contain man eminently: because it is more perfect than he, but undeservedly, and in a common way of speaking, because it cannot produce him.

Act, and potency. A thing is said to be in act when it simply is, for what is not in act is not simply. A thing is said to be in potency when it is not, but can be, whence just as a man who is not yet Pope simply is not Pope, although he can be: so things which are in potency only simply are not, but can be: thus every effect, before it is produced, is said to be in the potency of the causes, that is, the causes have the power to produce it, concerning which he disputes in 8. Metaphys.

Absolutely or simply, respectively, or comparatively: a thing is said simply to be such when, considered in itself according to its own being, it has such a predicate, as a man is said to be simply great, or learned, when in himself he has sufficient greatness or learning. But it is said respectively when in itself it does not have such a predicate; but if it be compared to another thing, it seems to have it, as a tiny man is called great compared to a dwarf; and a tall man is called small compared to a giant, and a man moderately skilled is called learned respectively, that is, from comparison with a barbarian. Add in a certain respect, which almost falls back into respectively, as when someone rightly knows only one thing, and is ignorant of the rest, this man is absolutely an idiot, but in a certain respect is learned. Likewise a painted man in a certain respect is a man, that is, in representing.

Per se, and per accidens. Per se signifies when the predicate belongs to the subject from the principles of its nature, and not by some accidental event, as man is per se biped, and wine is per se necessary for drunkenness, and arms for a soldier. But a thing is said to be per accidens when the predicate belongs to it by chance and accidentally, as a man is per accidens one-eyed from an accidental concurrence of causes, and a house is made by a musician. Among causes, however, that is per accidens which is such that the effect could be without it.

As by which, and as that which. As that which is said to be some thing which receives denomination from some form or concept, as the intellect is understanding, as that which, because it receives that denomination from intellection. And matter and form are united as that which. But as by which is said to be that thing which gives such a denomination, as intellection understands as by which, that is, it is the reason by which the intellect understands, and union is united as by which.

Positively, and negatively. Positively a thing is said to be such when some form is posited in it from which it is so denominated, as studious is good positively, and he who precedes all others is positively first. But a thing is said negatively when it lacks the form conferring the contrary denomination, as a man who is not vicious is called negatively good, because he is not bad, and he to whom no one is prior is called negatively first, that is, he has no prior. Thus the blessed Virgin is said to have given birth to her firstborn, not because she afterwards bore others, but because she bore none before Christ: and she is said to have given birth before she came together with Joseph, not because she afterwards came together, but because she had not done so before.