Universa Philosophia

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza

Universa Philosophia

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)

First published 1624

Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.

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Summulae

Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument

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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.

Aristoteles primo Physicorum

Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?

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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.

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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.

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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.

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Signum significativum ad placitum

Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.

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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.

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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.

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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.

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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.

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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.

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Dices categorematicos significare

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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.

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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.

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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.

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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.

Sectio I. On Supposition.

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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.

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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.

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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.

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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.

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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.

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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.

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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.

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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.

Sectio I. On the Noun.

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Sectio II. On the Verb.

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Sectio III. On Speech.

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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.

Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.

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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.

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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.

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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.

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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.

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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.

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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.

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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.

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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.

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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?

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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.

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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.

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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.

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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.

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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.

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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.

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Sectio I. On Definition.

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Sectio II. On Division.

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Sectio III. On Argumentation.

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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.

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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.

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The four modes of the first figure are the prototype and model of the most perfect reasoning, to which the other modes are recalled, as gold to the Lydian stone. I warn, however, that those modes have their beginning from four consonants, B. C, D. F.; the other modes begin from the same consonants, in order to signify that they are recalled to those perfect modes to which they are similar in that consonant: for example, all those to which B. gives a beginning, to Barbara: to celarem, all beginning with C. and so on.

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In some modes m. is found, to signify that modes of this kind are to be converted, with the premises changed: for example, so that in the conversion there is placed as the major proposition what was the minor in the converted syllogism: and the major becomes the minor. S. and P. are also found. S. signifies that the proposition which precedes S. ought to be converted simply: but P. signifies that the preceding proposition ought to be converted per accidens. But what conversion simply and per accidens is, I have already shown in disputation 3.

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To Barbara are reduced Baraliptom, Barocho, and Bocardo: only Baraliptom is deduced ostensively, but Bocardo and Barocho through the impossible. Baraliptom differs from Barbara only because the conclusion was indirect: but it is deduced to Barbara, not through conversion per accidens: for this cannot be in a particular proposition: but it is converted in this way, there ought to be in Barbara, every rational thing runs, it is said in Baraliptom, some running thing is rational, which was conversion per accidens: but in order that Baraliptom be reduced to Barbara, that conversion is dissolved, and the converted proposition is taken as if it had not been converted, and it is said, therefore every rational thing runs: for thus one returns to the direct conclusion in Barbara. And so P. in Baraliptom does not signify that the conclusion is to be converted per accidens, but rather that it is already converted per accidens from Barbara in Baraliptom.

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To celarem are converted celantes, Cesare, camestres. An example in celantes, by converting simply only the conclusion, for in the others celarem and celantes do not differ: for example, no man runs: every rational thing is a man: therefore no running thing is rational, but if you say, therefore no rational thing runs, it will be in Cesare: but this is done through the simple conversion of the celantic conclusion.

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Cesare is converted through only the simple conversion of the major: for example, no man runs: every lion runs: therefore no lion is a man: but if in the major you say no running thing is a man, the syllogism is in celarem.

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Camestres is more difficult to convert: because the premises are to be transposed, likewise the minor and the conclusion are to be converted simply: for example, every lion runs, no man runs, therefore no man is a lion: but if you say, no running thing is a man: every lion runs, therefore no lion is a man, you will make celarem: but the camestric minor has been converted simply, and made the major, and similarly the conclusion has also been converted simply.

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To Dary are reduced dabitis, darapti, dissamis, and datisi. Dabitis by the simple conversion of the conclusion alone, an example of which is easy. Darapti by the conversion per accidens of the minor alone, for example, every man runs, every man is rational: therefore some rational thing runs. It is in darapti; but if in the minor you say some rational thing is a man, you will make a syllogism in darii with the same major and conclusion. Dissamis is converted with the premises changed, and the major converted simply, and similarly also the conclusion, for example: some man runs, every man is rational: therefore some rational thing runs, is in dissamis; but say, every man is rational, some running thing is a man; therefore some running thing is rational. Datisi is deduced with the minor simply converted, the major and conclusion retained.

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To ferio are reduced sapesmo with the major converted per accidens, and the minor converted simply, and with the premises changed. For example, every man runs: no lion is a man, therefore some running thing is not a lion, is in sapesmo: but it ought to be converted. No man is a lion, some running thing is a man: therefore some running thing is not a lion, is in ferio. Frise somorum is converted with the premises changed, and with them simply converted. Festino with the major converted simply. Felaptom with the minor converted per accidens. Ferison, with the minor converted per accidens.

Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.

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Sectio VII. On Consequence.

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Some Terms Explained.

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Logic

Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.

Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.

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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.

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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?

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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.

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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.

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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?

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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.

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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.

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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.

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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.

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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.

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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.

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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.

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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.

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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.

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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.

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Subsectio I. The first opinion.

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Subsectio II.

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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.

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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.

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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.

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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.

Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?

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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?

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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?

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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.

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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.

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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.

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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?

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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?

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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.

Sectio I. I Define Genus.

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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?

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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?

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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.

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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?

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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.

Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.

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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.

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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.

Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.

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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.

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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.

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Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?

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Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.

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Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.

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Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.

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Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.

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Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.

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Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.

Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.

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Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?

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Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?

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Sectio IV. Whether the Lowest Difference Differs Specifically from the Subaltern Difference?

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Sectio V. On Property.

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Sectio VI. On Accident.

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Disputatio VII: Disputatio VII. On What Is Common to the Five Predicables.

Sectio I. Whether Predicable Is a Genus with Respect to the Five Predicables.

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Sectio II. On the Number of Predicables.

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