Universa Philosophia

The second mode of knowing is division. Physical division is the disjoining and separation of two parts: as when wood is cut into two parts. By a trope, logical division is indeed a dividing act of the intellect, and as it were cuts the object into its parts. Logical division is therefore: Oratio explicans naturam rei per partes: it agrees with definition in those words, oratio explicans naturam rei: but it differs in this, per partes: and so every object consisting of parts, when it is clearly known through them, is divided by the intellect. But some parts are logical, as genus and difference: others physical: thus one division is logical, another physical: namely physical which knows physical parts, but logical which knows logical parts. For example, man is composed logically of genus and difference, likewise he is composed physically of body and rational soul: the act of the intellect knowing the parts of man to be animal and rational is the logical division of man; but if it knows his parts to be body and soul, it is physical division, not because it divides the object physically, but because it represents its physical parts. In which case homo, e.g., is the divisum: but animal and rationale, or corpus, et anima, are the partes dividentes. Likewise a common account is divided into its inferiors: as homo in Petrum, et Paulum; and animal, in hominem, et equum.

That division is a mode of knowing is clear: because man is more explained through the concept of animal rational than through the concept of man, as I said. §. 1. and 3. Likewise animal is more perfectly known in man and horse than without them. That every division is distinguished from definition is commonly asserted: but I do not grasp that: because the definition of man attains in itself the parts of man as clearly and explicitly as division does: for it knows altogether the same parts as definition, and in the same way. I grant that the division of a common account into its inferiors is distinguished from the definition of the same common account. For example, man is divided into Peter and Paul, yet is not defined through Peter and Paul, but through animal rationale, on which matter I treated more abundantly, disp. 10 of Logic, sect. 6.

Laws of division. The first, that the divided contain in itself all the dividing extremes, otherwise the division is bad and false, as if you say animal aliud homo, aliud Angelus: every dividing part therefore ought to be a participant of the divided. The second rule, the divided is not convertible with the individual dividers: because the divisum contains other parts beyond one divider, as man contains under himself Peter and others: but all the dividers together are equal to the divided, for man, lion, and the other animals are equal to animal, and this to them. The third law, that the individual dividers be distinguished among themselves: for example, animal, aliud homo, aliud leo: but if you said, animal aliud homo, aliud rationale, it would be faulty: because homo and rationale are not distinct animals, but the same.

From the divided to one divider is a bad consequence, as this is bad, est animal, ergo est homo: for it could be a lion; but the consequence from one divider to the divided would be valid, as est homo, ergo est animal: because man cannot be without being an animal. Likewise the consequence from one divider to another is bad, as est homo, ergo est leo: for man is not chained to the lion. But the consequence from the divided to one divider would be valid, the others being excluded, as est elementum, et non aër, nec terra, nec aqua, ergo est ignis, because no other remains which is an element. From the negation of one divider the negation of the divided does not follow, as non est ignis, ergo non elementum; for it could be earth, which is an element; but from the negation of all the dividers the divided is rightly denied, for example, non est terra, nec aqua, nec aër, nec ignis, ergo non est elementum.

You will say, Bonum is divided into honestum, utile, et delectabile, and yet from one divider the consequence to another is valid, as est honestum, ergo est delectabile, et utile. I answer that the consequence is not valid: because the honest good pertains to virtue, which is not useful with a pecuniary utility, or another which is estimated by money, nor delightful with corporeal delight, although it is useful and delightful as regards the spirit; which utility and delight is not posited in the division of good, but only pecuniary good and corporeal delight are posited. Or I say that this is not properly a division of good, but a certain account of explaining it, concerning which disp. 13 On the Soul.

A division established by these laws is called good, but one deprived of them bad, as I said of definition in § 6. One division is called quid nominis, another quid rei. Quid nominis explains the diverse significations of words, lest by their ambiguity the disputation be confusedly taxed; but quid rei explains the things themselves about which one disputes, which is done through every genus of parts, namely logical, physical, essential, or integral.