Universa Philosophia

First, this iste mode of resolving propositions does not seem very apt; for although that doctrine would have a place in propositions concerning a definite subject, it does not have a place in a universal subject. For this proposition tantum omnis homo currit is in the first mode, because it is entirely affirmative, just like this tantum homo currit, and yet it cannot be resolved in iste through the first particular affirmative; for it must necessarily be resolved through the first universal affirmative and through the second universal negative, for example, omnis homo currit, et nihil praeter illum currit. For propositions of the first mode are resolved with the same subject retained. Nor again in necessary matter can an indefinite proposition be resolved through a particular: e.g. tantum homo est rationalis, which is resolved through the universal equivalent to it, omnis homo est rationalis, et nihil praeter illum est rationale. But this is a bad exposition, aliquis homo est rationalis, et nihil praeter illum est rationale; because besides some man something is rational, namely two, and all men are rational; for whatever term may be signified, it is rational. Therefore a proposition in iste is not always resolved through the first particular affirmative.

Then the proposition of the second mode, tantum omnis homo currit, which is said to contradict the former, cannot be resolved in Regit disjunctively through the first universal negative and the second particular affirmative. For they could be false at the same time, against the laws of contradictories. For let us grant that only Peter runs, and nothing else; then this proposition of the first mode, tantum omnis homo currit, would be false, because it has this sense, omnis homo currit, et nihil praeter illum, which is false, because Antony does not run. Likewise this, non tantum omnis homo currit, would be false, if it were resolved in Regit in this way: nullus homo currit, vel aliquod non homo currit. For Peter runs, and no non-man runs. Which suffices for the falsity of this proposition, because no part of its object is posited, as is enunciated by it; because neither is the absence of running posited in every man, nor is running posited in things distinct from man; as this is false, Petrus currit, vel Ioannes non currit, if neither Peter runs nor John is without running; for for the truth of a disjunctive it is required that one part of the object be, as is said by it. I refrain from answers to this argument, because they can easily be impugned; I consider it better to show the falsity of that rule, by which the other rules collapse. But this can be confirmed from a proposition concerning a singular subject, which cannot be resolved by that method.

Second, this resolution of propositions seems to have been introduced not so much clearly as in a ram-like manner. For this proposition, non tantum homo currit, is resolved by the Summulists thus: nullus homo currit, vel aliquod non homo currit; whereas we have sucked from the breasts that its resolution is this: homo currit, et aliquid praeter hominem currit. The reason a priori: because in this proposition of the first mode, tantum homo currit, the word tantum denies the association of the running of other things with man, concerning whom running is not denied but affirmed in that proposition. But this proposition of the second mode, non tantum homo currit, affirms that association, because that negation prefixed to the negative sign affirms what is denied by the sign; for two negations affirm. For the sign is a negation, and what is denied by it alone is affirmed by it and by the negation prefixed to it. And so both propositions affirm running of man; but the first denies that running of other things, while the second concedes the same to the same things.

It is confirmed: because this sign solus is exclusive, just like tantum: for the proposition solus sum ego is equivalent to this, tantum ego sum. Likewise this, non sum ego solus, is equivalent to this, non tantum ego sum. But this non solus sum ego does not deny that I exist, nor is it expounded disjunctively by a first negative and a second affirmative, but copulatively by both affirmatives, and it affirms that I exist and another with me: therefore this proposition, non tantum sum ego, does not deny that I exist, but rather says that I exist and another with me. The minor is proved first, from John ch. 8, no. 16: solus non sum, sed ego, et qui misit me pater, where Christ resolves this proposition non sum ego solus thus, copulatively, ego sum, et est Pater meus.

Secondly it is proved: because if anyone were to say, ego solus natus sum in peccato originali, he would be bound to retract this proposition, at least by this one, non solus ego natus sum in peccato originali, that is, ego et alii nati sumus in peccato, where the word non solus does not deny that that man was born in sin, for thus it would not purge the error. Therefore a negation placed before an exclusive sign does not deny the copula of the subject, but affirms precisely what had been denied by the sign: but each proposition is affirmative in the first prejacent.

This doctrine is confirmed. Whoever were to blurt out this error: tantum ego natus sum in peccato originali, would afterwards purge it by this proposition: Non tantum ego natus sum in peccato originali. Which the Summulists cannot deny, thinking that these two propositions are contradictory: but an error is corrected by its contradictory. In my opinion, however, it will now appear that it is sufficiently purged. Therefore this proposition non tantum ego natus sum in peccato originali, is a catholic proposition defined by the Church: because it is the purging and correction of a heretical proposition, therefore its exponent ought also to be catholic, and defined by the Church: as is clear from the terms.

But this exponent assigned by the Summulists, ego non sum natus in peccato, vel alii sunt nati in peccato, although it is true, is nevertheless not catholic, nor defined by the Church, therefore that exclusive of the second mode is not well expounded by it. The minor is clear: because that proposition is nowhere found, nor another in which it is contained. But by this hypothetical copulative and wholly affirmative proposition, ego et alii nati sumus in peccato originali, the first error is satisfied: therefore this expounds this, non tantum ego natus sum in peccato. The consequence is clear: because the error was in the exclusion of others from original sin, which exclusion this last proposition removes. And since that proposition of the second mode is expounded by one of those two ways, and it has been shown that it is not catholic through the disjunctive exponent, it follows that the copulative wholly affirmative exponent is catholic, and equivalent to it, and expounds it.

But that this copulative is defined is clear from session 5 of the Council of Trent, asserting that all the posterity of Adam are born in sin. Under which universal affirmative are contained copulatively all singular affirmatives. For example: Ego, et alii nati sumus in peccato. But this is not contained, ego non sum natus in peccato, vel alii nati sunt in peccato; because a universal affirmative contains no singular negative nor a disjunctive descent, but a copulative one: therefore this disjunctive cannot be the exponent of this catholic proposition, non tantum ego natus sum in peccato: but that copulative and affirmative will be its exponent. Which is clear, because if anyone were to say, Christus non est homo, in order to correct the error, he ought determinately to say, Christus est homo: nor would he satisfy if he said Christus non est homo, vel lapis est substantia, because although this is true, nevertheless it is not determinately conceded what he determinately denied before: therefore similarly, one who said, non tantum ego natus sum in peccato, would not satisfy if he had this sense: ego non sum natus in peccato, vel alii sunt nati, because he would not determinately affirm what he determinately denied, and his proposition could be true without his being born in sin. But in my opinion it satisfies, because it affirms me, et alios natos in peccato originali. Therefore this mode of resolving is suitable: nor would it be difficult to show the falsity of the rules which the Summulists hand down concerning the other modes.

For they thought that a negation prefixed to the mode denies the whole proposition, when it denies only the negation of the mode itself. Whom I do not argue in this last argument for falsity in their proposition, but for ineptness in expounding exclusive propositions.

But exclusives are expounded thus: this first of the first mode, tantum Petrus currit, thus Petrus currit, et praeter illum nihil currit. This second of the second mode, non tantum Petrus currit, is expounded thus, Petrus currit, et praeter illum aliquid currit. But the third, tantum homo non currit, thus homo non currit, et praeter illum omnia currunt. But the fourth non tantum homo non currit, thus homo non currit, et praeter illum aliquid etiam non currit.

To these propositions contradictories are to be assigned in the exponents, not indeed in the expounded propositions themselves. For example. In the first mode tantum Petrus currit, it is not well contradicted by this non tantum Petrus currit, for both can be false, if Peter does not run. The reason is, because a negation prefixed does not deny the whole proposition, but only the sign, as I said; but it is contradicted by the exponents. For example, Petrus currit, et nihil praeter illum currit, is contradicted thus non Petrus currit, et nihil praeter illum currit. Nor can it be contradicted by this copulate, Petrus non currit, et aliquid praeter ipsum currit: because two contradicting propositions would be false at the same time, from the supposition that neither Peter nor anything runs. For this is false, Petrus currit, et praeter illum nihil currit. Likewise also this copulative, Petrus non currit, et praeter illum aliquid currit. The same must be said of the propositions in the other modes.