Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
§ 1
§ 2
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§ 7
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§ 11
Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
§ 5
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
§ 88
Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
§ 109
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
§ 11
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
§ 13
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
§ 34
=== ENGLISH Wonderful was the genius of Peter of Spain, who surpassed Aristotle in handing down the doctrine of the modal proposition in bk. 1 of the Summulae ch. 13, which I shall try to explain clearly and briefly, omitting the trifles and tricks of the Summulists, by which they captiously delude the minds of beginners and deter them. This disputation is made difficult enough by so great a multiplicity of words, so that darkness is deliberately poured upon darkness. For neither do the towers of Cyzicus, or the porticoes of Olympia, resound with echo so many times from reflected voices, as often as a modal proposition is doubled. For if those words strike back twice seven times, the modes are refracted twice eight times, striking the ears of the audience and disturbing the mind: but I shall try to give the reason of the common doctrine, which I think is not altogether easy.
§ 35
=== ENGLISH Mode taken broadly is the limitation or restriction of some speech or word, which is made through adjective terms, as omnis homo iustus, or through substantive terms in an oblique case, as omnis liber Aristotelis, or through adverbs, disjunctions, etc., about which we do not treat at present. But we treat of the mode restricting a proposition in one determinate matter. We have said that matter is threefold: necessary, remote, contingent; to which three modes correspond, necessary, impossible, contingent, to which is added also a fourth, namely possible, which however differs little from contingent. For in the present disputation, for the sake of clarity, that we may comply with common usage, we shall discuss it reciprocally with possible. A modal proposition is made in two ways: either through a mode taken adverbially, or adjectivally, as Deus necessario est unus, or Deum esse unum, est necessarium; by which adjectival mode the whole proposition is changed, and the mode becomes the predicate. For Deum esse is the subject of which esse necessarium is predicated. But in this Deus necessario est unus, unity is predicated of God, but necessity is neither subjected nor predicated, but is a syncategorema of the subject.
§ 36
=== ENGLISH The mode is customarily interposed, as sedentem possibile est stare; or customarily placed before, as non est possibile sedentem stare; or customarily placed after, as stantem sedere est possibile; yet it always yields the same sense, which sense is twofold, composite and divided. It is composite when the predicate is joined to the subject for the same time at once, as stantem sedere est impossibile, that is, while he stands; it is divided when the predicate is attributed to the subject not for the same time but for a different one, as stantem sedere est possibile, that is, at the time when he does not stand, as I said on ampliation in disputation 2. Here however note that some modes are modes of composition (as Hispanus says) which compose the predicate with the subject, as Petrus contingenter disputat composes contingency with disputing; but other modes signify how a thing is done, as Petrus docte disputat shows in what manner he conducted himself in disputing. Soto, lecture 1, notable 3, calls a proposition made through an adverb of composition a divided modal, as Petrus contingenter disputat, but one made through a verb he calls a composite modal, as Petrum disputare est contingens.
§ 37
=== ENGLISH Modal propositions have their truth or falsity. An affirmative proposition in necessary matter is true, and the negative false, as hominem esse animal est necessarium, hominem esse animal non est necessarium; in a word you will discern truth and falsity: for if they affirm the thing as it is, they are true, but if otherwise, false. But they are always false, or always true, for they are true in natural matter, but false in remote matter; for although the dictum (that is, the subject) is in contingent matter, the mode however (that is, the predicate) is in natural or remote matter, as Petrum disputare est contingens, Petrum esse lapidem est possibile. Likewise this proposition, Petrum disputare est contingens, is a modal proposition: it is not modal, but absolute, because being modal belongs to it absolutely; nor is that reflexive predicate modal, for this requires that the predicate through the principal copula be a mode, as Petrum currere est contingens. They have also quantity: the universal ones are impossibile and necesse; the particular ones however contingens and possibile. Note that the quantity of modals is to be weighed absolutely from the quantity of the mode, and not from the quantity of the dictum. But we call dictum the other parts of the proposition distinct from the mode, of which below.