Universa Philosophia

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza

Universa Philosophia

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)

First published 1624

Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.

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Summulae

Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument

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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.

Aristoteles primo Physicorum

Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?

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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.

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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.

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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.

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Signum significativum ad placitum

Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.

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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.

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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.

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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.

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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.

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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.

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Dices categorematicos significare

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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.

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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.

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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.

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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.

Sectio I. On Supposition.

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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.

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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.

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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.

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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.

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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.

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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.

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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.

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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.

Sectio I. On the Noun.

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Sectio II. On the Verb.

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Sectio III. On Speech.

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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.

Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.

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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.

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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.

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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.

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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.

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Conversion is a necessary consequence of one proposition to another from the transposition of terms, that is, by changing the subject into the predicate and the predicate into the subject; and it occurs in three ways. First, simply, by the mere transposition of terms, with the same quality and quantity preserved: thus the universal negative and the particular affirmative are converted, as nullus homo est lapis, therefore nullus lapis est homo. Likewise aliquis homo est albus, therefore aliquod album est homo. The reason a priori, because the terms thus converted are altogether really the same in both propositions, and from one term to another really the same the consequence holds, as if some man is white, then some white thing is a man, because a white man is some white thing.

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Secondly, conversion occurs per accidens in a universal negative and a universal affirmative, when the extremes are changed while the quality remains, but the quantity is changed, as omnis homo est animal, therefore aliquod animal est homo. Likewise nullus homo est albus: therefore aliquod album non est homo, because if no man is white, then no white thing is a man, otherwise some man would be white; but if no white thing is a man, then some white thing is not a man. The reason is that, the identity of man with white being denied, the identity of white with man is denied, because it is the same; but if it is denied of every white thing, the same is denied of some white thing, indeed contained under every one.

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Thirdly, it occurs by contraposition in a universal affirmative and a particular negative, by the addition of certain negations, as omnis homo est animal, therefore omne non animal est non homo, because if it is not an animal, it is not a man, who is an animal, and it cannot be an animal and a non-animal. Likewise it is converted by this: therefore aliquod animal non est non homo, which is equivalent to this, aliquod animal est homo. Likewise aliquis homo non est lapis, therefore aliquod non lapis non est homo. Here the word non is taken infinitantly, signifying something which is not a man. Likewise note that in this third conversion constancy must be added, that is, the existence of the thing must be posited; for example, omnis homo est ens, if it is converted by this, therefore omne non ens est non homo, is false: because a non-being, although it is not a man, is nevertheless not a non-man, because to be a non-man says to be something which is not a man; but a non-being is not something, taking is and something properly. But in the negative there ought to be constancy in the subject of the converted proposition, as if you say Antichristus non est bonus, if it is converted by this, therefore aliquod non bonum est non Antichristus, this is false, because at present there are some non-good things which nevertheless are not Antichrist; but if the word Antichristus had the constancy of existing, the proposition would be true: for then some non-good thing, namely Antichrist himself, would not be non-Antichrist, that is, would be Antichrist himself. Finally, the identity of the terms of the converted proposition and of the converting one must be attended to; for which it will be worthwhile to know equipollence, whence a proposition cannot be converted by another which has terms really distinct from its own, because the consequence is not from one thing to a distinct thing, but to the same, as from man to rational is a consequence, but not to non-man. But there are many trifles of boys here; but the force of negations must be attended to.

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The whole of conversion is closed by these verses.

Asserit A, negat E, sunt universaliter ambae.
Asserit I, negat O, sunt particulariter ambae.

That is, the letter A signifies a universal affirmative proposition, E a universal negative, I a particular affirmative, O a particular negative; take therefore the two verses.

Simpliciter feci, convertitur Eva per acci.
Asto per contra, sic fit conversio tota.

That is, simply are converted the universal negative and the particular affirmative signified by this word feci. Per accidens are converted the universal negative and the universal affirmative signified by this word Eva; by contraposition, however, the universal affirmative and the particular negative signified by this word asto.

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The definition is converted simply with the defined, as animal rationale with man, and this animal rationale with this man. Likewise a proposition with a singular subject and predicate, as Petrus est hoc album, ergo hoc album est Petrus. You ask, how is this Petrus est homo converted? For it seems to be converted per accidens, as ergo aliquis homo est Petrus, where the quantity of the proposition is changed. Someone will answer that every proposition in which a universal is affirmed of its inferior is converted simply, because the universal is then predicated confusedly: for this Petrus est homo is equivalent to this, Petrus est aliquis homo, because homo is said confusedly of Peter: which proposition is of the same quantity as this, Petrus est homo. On the contrary, because this proposition omnis homo est animal is converted per accidens thus, aliquod animal est homo, therefore similarly the proposition of the argument, because omnis homo est animal is equivalent to this, est aliquod animal. The reason is that the quantity of a proposition is taken from the subject, but the subject of this, Petrus est homo, is of a different quantity from this aliquis homo est Petrus, because the one is singular, the other particular confused; whence that proposition is converted per accidens.

Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.

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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.

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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.

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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.

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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?

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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.

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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.

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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.

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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.

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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.

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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.

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Sectio I. On Definition.

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Sectio II. On Division.

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Sectio III. On Argumentation.

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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.

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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.

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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.

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Sectio VII. On Consequence.

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Some Terms Explained.

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Logic

Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.

Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.

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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.

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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?

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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.

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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.

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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?

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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.

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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.

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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.

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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.

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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.

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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.

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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.

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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.

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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.

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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.

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Subsectio I. The first opinion.

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Subsectio II.

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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.

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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.

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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.

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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.

Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?

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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?

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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?

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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.

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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.

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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.

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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?

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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?

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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.

Sectio I. I Define Genus.

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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?

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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?

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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.

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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?

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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.

Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.

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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.

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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.

Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.

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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.

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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.

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Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?

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Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.

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Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.

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Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.

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Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.

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Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.

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Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.

Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.

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Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?

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Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?

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Sectio IV. Whether the Lowest Difference Differs Specifically from the Subaltern Difference?

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Sectio V. On Property.

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Sectio VI. On Accident.

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Disputatio VII: Disputatio VII. On What Is Common to the Five Predicables.

Sectio I. Whether Predicable Is a Genus with Respect to the Five Predicables.

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Sectio II. On the Number of Predicables.

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