Universa Philosophia

Some propositions are absolute, some depend on something else, e.g. Petrus est homo is an absolute proposition, because its truth or falsity does not depend on anything else, but only on the absolute identity or distinction of subject and predicate: wherefore a proposition of this kind is called categorical. But I have shown in disputation 1, section 9, that a category is a predication, likewise that a categorematic term is perfectly significative by itself and absolutely; whence I infer against some Summulists that a categorical proposition is not interchangeable with a simple utterance, for a complex proposition can be categorical, as Petrus currit, et Ioannes legit is an absolute proposition and perfectly significative by itself. But let an example of a proposition depending on something else be: si Petrus venerit, loquetur; the subject is joined with the predicate not absolutely, but with dependence on Peter's arrival: nor can it be said absolutely that Petrum locuturum aut non, nor that the proposition is absolutely true or false, unless Peter's arrival is awaited, on which both the speech and the truth of the proposition depend.

This proposition can rightly be called syncategorematic, because the copula of the verb does not signify by itself absolutely, but dependently on a condition. Yet it is better called hypothetical. For hypothesis sounds in Greek what in Latin is supposition or condition: wherefore a complex proposition, or one consisting of two, is not interchangeable with a hypothetical, because this Petrus currit, et Paulus loquitur is not hypothetical, since no hypothesis is established in it; therefore a categorical proposition is a proposition absolute, which judges absolutely about its object. But a hypothetical is a conditional proposition, which judges about its object dependently on some hypothesis or supposition, just as an absolute promise is one which does not depend on a condition, as dabo tibi centum, but a conditioned promise depends on a supposition, as si Navis venerit dabo tibi centum. See this teaching in Toledo, book 1, chapter 19, although Peter of Spain, book 1, chapter 15, says that the hypothetical is one composed of two categoricals, but not well, as I have observed, because it is against the etymology of the name and its manifest account.

One conditional proposition is in necessary matter, another in contingent matter. In the first, a conditional is not only enunciative but also illative, to which the note of inference ergo can be joined, e.g. si sol oritur, dies est, or si sol oritur, ergo dies est, which has a place not only in a hypothetical proposition but also in an absolute one, as sol oritur, et dies est, or sol oritur, ergo dies est: the reason a priori, because the note of inference signifies that the consequent necessarily follows from the antecedent, and because day necessarily follows light, therefore those propositions are illative. This teaching is true also in a causal proposition, as quia sol oritur, dies est, where dies est (which is the consequent) follows necessarily from this, sol oritur (which is the antecedent). But the rules of the Summulists with Peter of Spain, book 1, chapter 15, concerning the inference of conditionals are true in this kind of proposition.

Other hypotheticals are in contingent matter, in which the condition or antecedent is required for the effect, as in some way its principle, but from which the effect does not follow necessarily, but contingently: e.g. si Petrus venerit, ei dabo centum: the gift of a hundred depends on Peter's arrival; but it does not follow necessarily from it. Here the hypothetical proposition is not illative but only enunciative, affirming the event. For (as Toledo rightly says, book 1, chapter 19) those propositions are true or false, necessary or contingent, which is clear in absolutes and causals, as Petrus venit, et dedi illi centum: quia Petrus venit, dedi illi centum, where the propositions are true and causal, yet not illative, because inference does not belong to the proposition from the concept of the hypothesis, for absolutes are also illative; but there is a diversity of matter: because in contingent matter the consequent does not follow necessarily from the antecedent, but it does follow necessarily in necessary matter, therefore necessary hypotheticals are illative, contingent ones otherwise. But for the truth of these it suffices that the matter be as is enunciated; yet it is not required that, once the antecedent is posited, the consequent cannot not be: for the antecedent can be together with the consequent and its contradiction, as si disputaveris, dabo tibi librum; once the disputation is posited, the book can be given and not given.

Some are annoyed at this opinion and reproach it as new and never heard by the Summulists: but besides Cardinal Toledo, Soto, a celebrated Summulist, vindicates it from this injury by the text of book 1 of the Summulae, in ch. 16 of Peter of Spain, lecture 3, note 1, where for the truth of conditional promises he does not require that the antecedent necessarily stand with the consequent, but only requires that the consequent be with the antecedent, in which they agree with illatives; they differ however because in illatives the antecedent cannot be without the consequent; let us hear Soto ascribing truth even to those propositions, and evident knowledge of them to God, and asserting that they are not illative. For these authors will recognize this teaching as their own, and as once handed down by the Salamancan Doctor, when there was no contest about the efficacy of grace: behold Soto's words, For the truth of this, if you have won in the disputation, I will give you a book: it is required that you not win in the disputation without my giving you the book; whence it is not required that the antecedent and the consequent be at some time true, and in this a promissive agrees with an illative; nor is it required that it be a good consequence, namely that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent, and in this it differs from an illative; but only that the antecedent will not be true without the consequent: and so it is not required that the opposite of the consequent be repugnant to the antecedent, or constitute an impossible copulative, but that it constitute a copulative which will never be true, in which the difference between a promissive and an illative is made manifest. From this it follows first that a promissive conditional is contingent, for example, if you have won in the disputation, and I have not not given you the book, the said conditional is false; but if I then give it, it is true; it follows secondly that many conditional promises are such that we cannot be certain of their truth, but God alone knows whether they are true or false? and so on. These are Soto's words, which teaching, handed down word for word by Father Ludovico Molina and all the Doctors of our Society later than Soto, they hiss at and reject as supposititious, who inspect it in their Doctor at every moment.

Other propositions are complex, as Petrus currit, et Ioannes loquitur, because it consists of two complete propositions, among which some are copulative, as is clear in the example adduced, whose truth depends on the truth of both; for if one part is false, the whole proposition is rendered false, because it is universal. Others are disjunctive, as Petrus currit vel loquitur, whose truth depends on the truth of one part; for the truth of both is not required, because it is particular, whose truth is found in one object. For if Peter runs, although he does not speak, the disjunctive proposition will be true: indeed Toledo well observes from the old dialecticians, book 1, chapter 19, that a disjunctive is false if each extreme is true, because the disjunction vel signifies one on the supposition that it is not the other. Although this depends much on the manner in which the object is apprehended, and we wish to explain it. For someone could signify that at least one part is true, without excluding the other, as Christ said, where duo vel tres congregati fuerint in nomine meo, etc. But if two and three are gathered, will God not hear them? Then the disjunctive proposition is not rendered false. But when one is supposed for the other, then the disjunctive is false: for both are not affirmed, but one on the supposition that the other is denied, as is clear in a similar case and in the precepts: when the Jews were commanded to offer a pair of turtledoves or pigeons, they were commanded to offer pigeons on the supposition that they would not offer turtledoves, and turtledoves on the supposition that they would not offer pigeons, but they were not commanded both. You ask whether this is complex: si sol oritur, dies est; and this, homo currit, est propositio. They are not. For the former is hypothetical, not composed of two propositions; the second has the first part as its subject. But they are commonly called complex because they are composed of two utterances; see Soto and Toledo above against Fonseca, book 3.