Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
§ 37
§ 38
§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
§ 53
§ 54
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§ 56
§ 57
§ 58
§ 59
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§ 62
§ 63
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
§ 67
§ 68
Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
§ 69
§ 70
§ 71
§ 72
§ 73
Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
§ 74
§ 75
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§ 77
§ 78
§ 79
§ 80
§ 81
§ 82
§ 83
§ 84
§ 85
§ 86
§ 87
Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
§ 88
Dices categorematicos significare
§ 90
§ 91
§ 92
Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
§ 93
§ 94
§ 95
§ 96
§ 97
§ 98
§ 99
§ 100
§ 101
§ 102
§ 103
Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
§ 104
§ 105
§ 106
§ 107
§ 108
Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
§ 109
§ 110
§ 111
Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
§ 11
§ 12
Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
§ 18
§ 19
§ 20
Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
§ 21
§ 22
§ 23
Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
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§ 32
Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
§ 33
§ 34
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§ 36
§ 37
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§ 39
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§ 42
Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
§ 43
§ 44
§ 45
§ 46
§ 47
§ 48
§ 49
Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
§ 50
§ 51
§ 52
Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Sectio II. On the Verb.
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
§ 16
§ 17
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Sectio III. On Speech.
§ 19
§ 20
§ 21
Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
§ 1
Aristotle in the first book of On Interpretation, ch. 4, Peter of Spain, book 1, ch. 6, and other Summulists say that a proposition is a sentence signifying truly or falsely. The Conimbricenses, q. 3, art. 2, rightly note that a proposition is better and more profoundly defined by affirmation and negation than by truth and falsity; for a definition is the quiddity of a thing; but truth and falsity are not the quiddity of a proposition, but affirmation and negation, from which truth and falsity arise (as will be clear in disputation 9 on the soul, section 1); therefore a proposition is not to be defined by truth and falsity. And indeed Aristotle in that chapter is wholly occupied with explaining the negation and affirmation of a proposition; but when he defined a proposition in that chapter, he premised the definition as clearer for boys who understand nothing clearly. Second, a definition is not to be given through a disjunction of differences, except to avoid obscurity, but through a common concept; as animal would be badly defined as rational or irrational, but as living1, sensible; so neither is a proposition thus to be defined. Third, because even in apprehension an incomplex truth is found (as I shall show in that disputation 9), although it is not a proposition.
§ 2
A proposition is therefore a judicative act of the intellect: the first part is the genus, by which a proposition agrees with simple apprehension; it does not differ from discourse, because it is also judicative; but it differs from apprehension, which is not inclined to either side, but precisely stops in the representation of the object. Judgment is divided into affirmative and negative: the former affirms one thing of another, or says that both terms are the same, as Petrus est homo, which is signified by the verb est; wherefore the verb is called the copula, or union of extremes, because in the mind they are united intentionally, that is, they are not divided but mutually joined. But adjectival verbs are explained by a participle and the substantive verb, as tu scribis, that is, es scribens. The other judgment is negative, by which one term is denied to agree with the other, as Petrus non est lapis, which is called division, because the union of the verb is denied; but things not united are divided; therefore, because the mind denies the copula of the extremes, the terms are divided in the mind; and on the contrary, affirmation is called composition.
§ 3
A proposition has been defined by me more in the manner of the science of the soul than in the manner of the Summulists; it will be a perfect sentence substituted for a judgment of the mind, or it will be a judicative sentence, or it will be a sentence affirming or denying something; or it will be a sentence signifying truly or falsely. I have already warned in disputation 2 that utterances are substituted for concepts, and that they ought to be explained by comparison with them.