Universa Philosophia

Aristotle in the first book of On Interpretation, ch. 4, says that a sentence is a significant utterance, some part of which taken separately is significant, not as an affirmation but as a word. Fonseca, book 3, ch. 1, rightly says that it was not Aristotle's intention to exclude from a sentence that both parts be significant, but that one suffices to distinguish a sentence from a noun and a verb. But in this way it is not well distinguished, because in this word circumscriptio, if you separate scriptio from circum, it is a significant utterance as a word, although circumscriptio is a noun. Peter of Spain, ch. 5, says that a sentence is whose parts taken separately are significant; but it is understood to be a composite utterance, since parts are in comparison to composition. Wherefore Villalpando, book 1, ch. 1, says that a sentence is several words having themselves congruously. This definition is also received by Toledo, book 1, ch. 16; the Conimbricenses, ch. 4 of book 1 of On Interpretation, q. 3, art. 1; and Soto, book 1, on the first chapter of Peter of Spain, single lecture, note 1.

But it is not without difficulty. First, because it applies to a complex term, as homo iustus; I see that by these authors a sentence is not distinguished from a complex term. Second, these words circumscriptio, circumsessio are not a sentence, and yet they retain two parts wholly signifying therein. For sessio separated from circum has the same significate as when joined, and similarly circumscriptio.

In order to define a sentence, I premise that the grammarians divide the notion or sentence into five parts: into two active, two passive, and a fifth of the impersonal verb; and they admit no sentence except one consisting of a verb; indeed, sentences are distinguished by the difference of verbs alone, and the dialecticians themselves, dividing a sentence into imperfect and perfect, explain the latter by the perfect signification of the verb and the former by the imperfect. A sentence is therefore the congruence of a noun with a verb, or a significant utterance composed of a noun and a verb mutually agreeing. Congruence is the reason on account of which one thing results from two utterances. But if the utterances do not agree mutually, there will not be one sentence, but there will be two disconnected expressions. I am moved both to distinguish a complex term from a sentence, and to explain utterances composed of a noun and a verb, and third, because in explaining a sentence and its parts one must stand by the judgment of the grammarians. For let the craftsmen handle the works of the craft; in the mind's concept the noun always corresponds with the verb, yet in speech the noun is sometimes left unsaid, as amo Deum, but ego is understood; sometimes the verb is rejected, as when someone is introduced speaking, tunc ille, dixit or something similar is understood. An imperfect sentence consists of a verb signifying in an imperfect mode, as si venit; for then a perfect concept of the thing is not formed; sometimes it is perfect, because the verb signifies perfectly, as ego veni; a sentence can be without a proposition, as tu fac, and sometimes with it, because it is a genus which is divided into a non-enunciative sentence and an enunciative one, which is the proposition, about which we must now treat.