Universa Philosophia

Aristotle in the first book of On Interpretation, ch. 3, says that a verb is that which in addition signifies time, and is always a sign of those things which are said of another. Those words, in addition, refer to ch. 2, where he had defined the noun. Therefore a verb, according to Aristotle, is: a significant utterance by convention, no part of which is significant separately, finite and direct, signifying with time, as a sign of the predicate. So nearly Peter of Spain, ch. 4, whom Soto defends. This definition falls into the same difficulties as the earlier description of the noun. For satisfacio, circumsedeo, and similar verbs have parts distinct in themselves and signifying in the compound, and retaining in the whole the signification they have outside the whole; for facio signifies in that compound to do or to perform something; but satis there signifies what is enough and more than enough. Indeed the signification of the verb satisfacio is composed of the signification of the verb facio and of the adverb satis. Then, infinitives are also verbs. Moreover, the past and future tenses are truly verbs, from which a perfect sentence and proposition is constructed, while a proposition cannot consist without a verb; finally, there are some verbs lacking present forms, as coepi, odi, from which an affirmation is made.

Therefore a verb is an utterance conjugated through tenses; so Nebrija, book 3, ch. 7, On the Questions of Verbs; the Royal Art, book 3; Augustine, vol. 1, book On Grammar, saying we call verbs those things which we run through with tenses and persons, as clamo, clamas. You will say that these things are defined after the manner of grammarians rather than dialectically. I answer that it is not proper to dialectic to investigate words or verbs, but to construct the arguments of the mind; but in order that this be done more conveniently, it needs a knowledge of the words which it substitutes for concepts, while the attributes and distinctions of words are claimed by the grammarian, by whose laws one must necessarily stand within his province. Some laugh at me because I have treated the verb so grammatically, as a superstitious worshipper of grammatical laws. If this is a crime, they are themselves most free from it, who seem not even to have heard the laws of grammar; and Augustine is to be seen with me, because in defining the verb and the noun he fled not to Aristotle but to the grammarians.

Add that exactly the same signification of one part of speech can be marked out by a noun, a verb, or an adverb; for example, the baseness of life is expressed now by the noun vita turpis, now by the verb vivere turpe; likewise the circumstance of place is expressed now by the adverb hic, now by the noun in hoc loco, Petrus occidit Ioannem hic, vel hoc in loco; see, however, in Aelius, book 3, ch. 13, which parts of speech are substituted for others. The reason a priori: because words signify by institution, and for the same concept we substitute different words, and one word for different concepts; but the distinctions of the noun from the verb and of the other parts of speech are weighed from their various endings, inflections, and other accidents which the grammarian considers.

Note that the verb signifies with time, or co-signifies or consignifies time, which is explained by that part of the definition conjugated through tenses: the verb indicates that its signified is exercised at some time, as ego scribo, writing is signified as exercised in the present time; whence a verb cannot but consignify time. Many nouns signify time, as hora, dies, annus; many connote time, because they signify a thing which customarily occurs at a certain difference of time, as caena; for to connote is to note together, and since dinner occurs after evening, when that word is heard we also conceive under evening; but it is not signified whether dinner is being eaten or not, but only the dining is signified according to itself. But when I say caenatur or non caenatur, I deny or affirm that dinner is being held at this evening time; whence the distinction of the verb from the other parts of speech is clear, and in how different a way the verb is taken from the noun, as when I say displicet mihi tuum vivere, the time at which another lives is not co-signified, but the infinitive is taken in the signification of nouns. But when I say dico te turpiter vivere, then viuo co-signifies time. Likewise the verb consignifies persons. Blessed Augustine, in the passage cited, vol. 1, in the book On Dialectic, calls the first and second persons composite, where he says that they are complex utterances, as curro, curritis, because they bring us into the knowledge not only of the signified through the verb but also of the persons themselves; but I do not sufficiently grasp why he denies the same of the third persons, for although very confusedly, one comes to the knowledge of some person, unless perhaps the most illustrious Augustine said this because of that confusion.

The Conimbricense Fathers, in the first book of On Interpretation, ch. 4, q. 1, art. 4, ask whether the verb is made infinite in a proposition? To make a noun or a verb infinite is, by a prefixed negation, to deny the formal significate of the noun or verb and to affirm another concept from among the infinite things not signified by the verb or noun. For example, in Non homo currit, the subject is made infinite, and the significate man is denied of the one running, and it is attributed to other things distinct from man, but to none determinately; for besides man there are infinite things, to none of which running is determinately attributed; wherefore it is called an infinite utterance. Here note that the sentence consisting of that term is not negative but affirmative, because the negation is not attached to the union but to the extreme; for it yields this sense, aliquid currit, quod non est homo; for running is not denied of man, but it is attributed to something which is not man; and while that runs, that proposition can be true, because while a man runs a horse can run, which is a non-man.

It is asked, therefore, whether the verb is made infinite. And indeed participles are made infinite, as Petrus est non currens, which proposition is affirmative, attributing to Peter something distinct from running. The Conimbricenses above think that the verb is made infinite in a proposition. First, because outside it it is made infinite. Second, because one can at will use an infinite verb, no differently than a noun. Others think the opposite; and indeed if it is made infinite outside a proposition, Conimbrica evidently shows its conclusion, because something can be predicated of a verb thus made infinite, or by it something can be affirmed of another, because it signifies something according to some difference of time.

But this opinion does not please me, because it is against the doctrine of Aristotle, who holds that every proposition consists of a finite verb, and they themselves admit that it is against the consensus of the ancients. The reason is at hand: because a negation attached to the union or copula of the verb makes the proposition negative, as Petrus non currit. Behold for what reason the verb cannot be made infinite: because the word non cannot be taken except negatively. To the first. It is answered by denying the antecedent, because the negation affecting the verb denies it and affirms nothing else, as ne currat, non currit. To the second it is answered that men could have used infinite verbs as they use a noun and a participle, but that they did not wish to, and rightly so. For propositions denying and making infinite would be confused. Nouns and participles produce no confusion, because although they are affected by negation, they leave room for the union to be affirmed, and thus it is clear what is denied and what is made infinite, as Petrus est non currens; but since verbs do not leave room for this distinction, but a negation prefixed to them makes the proposition negative, the distinction between a denied and an infinite utterance would be very ambiguous, as Petrus non currit. You ask why, then, Aristotle excluded infinite verbs. I answer that Aristotle did not do this expressly, but his disciples; but Aristotle added certain things to the definition of the noun — understand this with the appropriate qualifications — or he did it for the sake of greater clarity, or because he wished to, or because he forgot; and since there could be infinite causes, how do I know by which he was moved?