Universa Philosophia

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza

Universa Philosophia

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)

First published 1624

Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.

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Summulae

Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument

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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.

Aristoteles primo Physicorum

Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?

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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.

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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.

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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.

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Signum significativum ad placitum

Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.

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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.

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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.

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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.

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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.

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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.

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Dices categorematicos significare

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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.

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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.

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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.

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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.

Sectio I. On Supposition.

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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.

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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.

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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.

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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.

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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.

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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.

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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.

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On appellation we must appeal to the old Summulists, who sought great distinctions between vidi regem, et regem vidi; amo dulce et dulce amo, Petrus est magnus logicus, et Petrus est logicus magnus. Father Fonseca, book 8, chapters 41 and 42, discusses appellation excellently, or because he hints that he himself is ashamed that there is much in these trifles. Appello is to call, or to impose a name; wherefore appellation (which is what concerns us) is the denomination of one name from another, or the application of what is signified by one name to what is signified by another. For example, homo est species, the significate of the word homo is appellated, or called species; and the significate of the word species is appellated, or attached to the significate of the word homo, whence (if the etymology of the name is inspected) every predicate confers appellation on the subject, as Petrus est doctus, or est homo.

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Sometimes a second intention is predicated of a real being, as homo est species, where the predicate appellates or denominates hominem a species, not man as he is on the side of reality or suppositing distributively, but as suppositing confusedly and simply for all known men. Sometimes something is predicated of things suppositing in the direct case for a supposit, but then the predicate appellates the supposits themselves, as Christus est ab aeterno, for Christ is supposited in the direct case for the divine person, who is eternal. Sometimes something is predicated of the supposit itself that belongs to it in an oblique case, as Deus factus est homo: for the divine person has a humanity united to itself. Sometimes, too, an accident is predicated of the subject itself taken materially, which predicate, because it belongs to the subject, appellates it, as grammaticus est obesus, which predicate does not belong to him by reason of grammar, but by reason of material temperament. Sometimes, however, the predicate does not belong to the subject by reason of itself, but by reason of an accident signified by the name, as Tullius fuit magnus Orator, where that greatness was not Tullius's by reason of himself, but by reason of oratory: for it renders this sense, Tullius habet magnam oratoriam. Therefore that greatness is the excellence of oratory.

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Hence the Summulists seized an occasion for trifling. But briefly I say that the judgment of appellations depends for the most part on the idiom of languages. In general, however, this equivocation arises from the conjunction of two adjectives, as Petrus magnus est musicus, vel Petrus est musicus magnus: when the adjective name (which is the cause of the equivocation, because it can appellate either a substantive or another adjective) is placed on the side of the subject, it appellates the subject itself materially, and applies its signification to it, not by reason of the other adjective, as Petrus magnus, est logicus, that is, Petrus longus, qui est corpore magno, est logicus, for the word magnus is placed as a property of Peter and a distinction from thin or small Peter. But when the appellating name is placed on the side of the predicate, then it appellates the other predicate, and appellates the subject not by reason of itself, but by reason of the other predicate, as Tullius magnus fuit orator, because it is placed there as a co-predicate to signify the excellence of Tullian oratory. But when it is not perceived whether the appellating name is placed on the side of the subject or of the predicate, then prudence is needed: for if the speech is serious about someone's learning or probity, the name appellates with reference to the predicate, as magnus orator Tullius, or magnus Tullius orator, that is, Tullius excelluit maxime eloquentia; but if the speech is jesting or ironical, it appellates the subject itself, as if you say of a stupid tall man, iste est Scholasticus magnus; likewise if the speech is to distinguish one from another, for example, you see two men, and say, ille magnus est musicus, ille parvus est medicus, then magnum and parvum appellate not music or medicine, but the quantities of the men.

Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.

Sectio I. On the Noun.

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Sectio II. On the Verb.

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Sectio III. On Speech.

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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.

Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.

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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.

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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.

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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.

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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.

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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.

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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.

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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.

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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.

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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?

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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.

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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.

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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.

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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.

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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.

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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.

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Sectio I. On Definition.

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Sectio II. On Division.

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Sectio III. On Argumentation.

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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.

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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.

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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.

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Sectio VII. On Consequence.

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Some Terms Explained.

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Logic

Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.

Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.

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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.

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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?

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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.

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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.

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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?

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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.

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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.

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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.

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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.

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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.

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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.

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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.

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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.

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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.

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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.

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Subsectio I. The first opinion.

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Subsectio II.

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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.

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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.

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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.

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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.

Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?

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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?

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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?

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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.

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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.

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Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.

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Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?

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Sectio III. How Are Universals Predicated?

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Disputatio IV: Disputatio IV. On Genus.

Sectio I. I Define Genus.

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Sectio II. Whether the Material Element of Genus Is Common to All Its Inferiors?

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Sectio III. In What Sense Is Genus a Part of Species?

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Sectio IV. In What Sense Is Genus a Whole in Comparison with Species.

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Sectio V. Whether Genus Is Predicated Immediately of Individuals?

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Disputatio V: Disputatio V. On Species and the Individual.

Sectio I. On the Subjectable Species.

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Sectio II. Definition of the Predicable Species.

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Sectio III. Whether the Predicable Species Requires Several Possible Individuals? Subsectio I. The Opinion of the Thomists.

Subsectio I. The opinion of the Thomists.

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Subsectio II. The foundations of his opinion are destroyed.

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Subsectio III. The opposite opinion.

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Sectio IV. Whether Genus Can Be Found in One Species, and This in One Individual?

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Sectio V. On the Individual of First Intention.

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Sectio VI. On the Individual of Second Intention.

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Sectio VII. Whether There Is a Common Account of Individuals.

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Sectio VIII. On the Vague Individual and Its Predicability.

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Sectio IX. The Predication of the Vague Individual.

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Disputatio VI: Disputatio VI. On Difference, Property, and Accident.

Sectio I. I Set Forth the Essence of Difference.

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Sectio II. Whether Difference Is Universal in Comparison with the Species It Constitutes? And Whether Differences Belong to the Concept of Genus?

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Sectio III. Whether Genus and Subaltern Difference Belong to the Formal Concept of the Ultimate Difference?

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Sectio IV. Whether the Lowest Difference Differs Specifically from the Subaltern Difference?

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Sectio V. On Property.

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Sectio VI. On Accident.

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Disputatio VII: Disputatio VII. On What Is Common to the Five Predicables.

Sectio I. Whether Predicable Is a Genus with Respect to the Five Predicables.

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Sectio II. On the Number of Predicables.

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