Universa Philosophia

On ampliation Soto disputes very fully, 2nd part of the introduction, chapter 4, and Fonseca book 8 from chapter 36, more briefly Toletus, book 2 from chapter 8, most briefly Villalpandus, book 1 chapter 4, whom I wish to imitate. The state of a proposition is said to be when things are taken for the time signified by the verb, whether it be past, present, or future, as Petrus dormiuit, peccat, ludet. I think the reason is that all things signified by those words stand well for that time, for sleep stands with Peter in past time: for they have no opposition. Likewise sin and Peter now stand, nor, for the proposition to be true, is there need to have recourse to the signification of things for other times. To the state is opposed ampliation, e.g. when the terms of a proposition signify things incompatible for the time signified by the verb, then there is need of ampliation, because the subject and predicate do not stand for the same instant, as iustus peccavit, stantes sedent, et vigilans dormiet, justice cannot be with sin in one man: nor sitting with standing, nor sleep with waking, wherefore the just man is amplified to another time different from that which is signified by the verb; for the verb signifies that sin was in Peter, at instant B. at which justice could not be in the same Peter, whence there is need that the just man not be taken for instant B. but either for instant A. or C. and that it render this sense, the just man sinned, that is, he who at instant A. was just, sinned at instant B. Which doctrine is very necessary for avoiding the captious arguments of the sophists: therefore ampliation must be used then, when the predicate and subject cannot be posited together, but the subject must be explained for another instant, for which the predicate is not signified. Ampliation will therefore be the acceptance of a term for a time different from that which is signified by the verb of the proposition; but state is the acceptance of a term for the same time which is signified by the verb of the proposition.

Two observations. The first, that ampliation belongs only to the subject in this our doctrine, because the predicate is signified to belong to the subject at the time which the verb signifies, which always has standing in a true proposition, as iustus peccat, the sin is at the present time, but iustus, which is the subject, is amplified to the past time at which he was just, not indeed to the present, at which by sinning he ceases to be just, and accordingly justice then has no standing. The second observation worthy of note, that in an argument from an ampliated term the incautious can be captiously deluded: as if someone says Petrus erat sedens heri, but Petrus heri stetit, therefore Petrus heri sedens stetit, for a distinction must be made in the consequent: therefore Peter sitting yesterday stood, at the time when he was sitting, I deny the consequence; at another time the consequent may pass, for that is an inference from a divided sense to a composite one.

The Summulists take the ampliation of a term in another sense, Extension from a lesser to a greater signification, as Petrus sedet, they say that Petrum is amplified to him who was, or now is: likewise homo est animal, they say that the word est is amplified to all past, present, future, possible, and imaginary times. But I do not see why that is called ampliation, for what does Petrus cucurrit signify that is opposed to the standing of the proposition? For ampliation is opposed to standing, but Petrum esse modo vel prius fuisse has no opposition to running, by reason of which opposition there would be need of ampliation.

You will say that Petrum, who ran, can now exist. What then? Perhaps he will also exist tomorrow, for if because Petrus after yesterday's run can now exist, Petrus will be amplified not only to the past and the present, but also to the future, in which he will be: the opposite of which the Summulists teach, prescribing ampliation for a proposition about the past and the present, but for a proposition about the future they prescribe ampliation to the present and the future, when nevertheless a proposition about the future can be amplified to the past, as Petrus curret, is taken for Peter who was yesterday, is now, and afterwards will be. Likewise a proposition about the past will be able to be amplified even to the future, as Petrus cucurrit is amplified to Peter who existed yesterday, exists now, and will exist tomorrow.

An ampliated term, then, is one that is signified for a time distinct from that which the verb signifies: but a non-ampliated term is one that is signified for the same time, and establishes the standing of the proposition. Those five times are well enumerated. Imaginary adds nothing beyond possible, except an extrinsic denomination from our imagination, by which we apprehend a possible time as a certain successive interval, capable of real time, as an imaginary place is apprehended as a certain capacity of a real body, of which in disp. 14 of physics and 16 of metaphysics: or say that imaginary time is objective, by which a thing is apprehended in the intellect to be. But those propositions which the Summulists call ampliated, with respect to those five times, are what the Logicians call of everlasting truth, on account of the fatal connection of the subject with the predicate, wherever they are or are conceived.

Restriction is the contraction of a term from a greater signification to a lesser, as omnis doctus est dignus honore. That adjective, doctus, sets bounds to the substantive homo, which by its own institution embraces even the unlearned, whom the adjective excludes from its signification. The Summulists say that restriction is opposed to ampliation: perhaps because ampliated and restricted seem to be opposites; but properly they are not opposed, because omnis homo is not an ampliated term, since only a subject incompatible with the predicate at the time signified by the verb is an ampliated term. Restriction, however, is opposed to the universality of the word to which it is attached, because it limits it from its whole signification to another less universal, or entirely singular, one. Restriction would better be said to be opposed to alienation, because this draws a word beyond its proper signification to an improper one, for homo, as it signifies painted and true men, signifies more than when it signifies only true men; the opposite happens with restriction, which makes a term signify fewer things than without restriction.

A certain kind of restriction is reckoned to be alienation, by which through some added word a term is transferred from its proper to an improper signification, as duo homines picti vaeneunt, for a painting of a man is improperly called homo, and he who adds picti applies a word repugnant to a true and proper man: but one would better call this a species of extension, or (what they commonly call ampliation) better (I say) than a species of restriction, as is clear from the end, §.48. Diminution, however, is the use of a term with an added word by which it signifies not absolutely but in a certain respect, as Aethiops est albus secundum dentes, for albus absolutely signifies a subject imbued with whiteness, but the word secundum dentes is an added diminishing word (as they say), for he who has only white teeth cannot be called white absolutely — in Spanish, a boca llena — but only in a certain respect, as the Spaniards say, en cierta manera. The rules for arguing with these terms are in themselves clear, and are learned by use, even by boys.