Universa Philosophia

In this part the Summulists are intolerable, burdened with so many rules, divisions, and useless definitions that they seem to accomplish nothing except to devise engines of darkness to defeat the minds of beginners, lest they dare to set foot in such a foul chaos: let him who wishes read Soto laboring sufficiently in dispelling those darknesses. I, with Villalpandus, Toletus, and Fonseca, have judged that these trifles must be abstained from, and that the more frequent and useful species of common supposition must be handed down. Distributive supposition is that by which a common term is supposited, resolvable by descent affected with the conjunction "and," or with the disjunction "neither": as in omnis homo est animal the term is supposited for all men, to whom descent or resolution is made by a legitimate consequence, e.g. ergo Petrus est animal, et Antonius est animal; this is what Soto, Toletus, and Villalpandus intend by their definitions. For if the common term is affected by the affirmative categorematic word omnis, the whole of its universality being retained, certainly the predicate is distributed through the individual inferiors contained under the predicate: for example. Omnis homo est animal is thus distributed, ergo Petrus est animal, et Paulus est animal. Fonseca says that this is to be resolved through various propositions, which is not necessary; for it can also be resolved through one, as ergo Petrus, et ceteri individui homines sunt animal. Likewise if the common term is affected by the negative categorematic word nullus, its universality being retained, the proposition is resolved through the disjunction "neither," as nullus homo est lapis: thus it is resolved. ergo nec Petrus est lapis, nec Paulus, nec ullus individuus homo est lapis. This supposition they call copulative: because in affirmative supposition a proposition is coupled to a proposition, which I shall impugn below. Because it is copulative by which a term is supposited for a copulated or copulative term; for words receive their denominations from the terms for which they are subrogated, but not from the nexus of many propositions.

Before the definition of copulate supposition, repeat §81 of disputation 1, where the copulative term is defined as that which signifies several things taken together in a heap by way of one. Thus copulative supposition is the subrogation of a sensible term in place of a copulative mental term. That this is so is proved first: because spoken words and writings are not supposited by reason of themselves, but by reason of the mental proposition, or if you wish, also by reason of the thing signified. Therefore if the mental proposition consists of a copulated term, the vocal one also consisting of a similar term, and corresponding to it, will be copulate: but if the mental one is not copulate, then neither will the vocal one corresponding to it be copulate, because it corresponds to it in all properties.

Secondly by induction, because common supposition is either particular, by which a term is subrogated in place of a thing, or of a common and particular term: whence this proposition, Pompelona extruxit hanc Pyramidem sancto Ignatio, will be copulate supposition, because Pompelona is a copulated term. Yet it is taken by the Summulists in a somewhat different signification, for they say that supposition is copulate when a name is taken in the plural number to signify several things with a universal sign. Thus Villalpandus: but Toletus, when it is taken for all its significates taken collectively. For example, omnes Apostoli Dei sunt duodecim: the phrase omnes Apostoli is taken together, and the proposition ought not to be resolved distributively, for here the descent is bad, ergo Petrus est duodecim, but all ought to be coupled in the subject, as Petrus, Andreas, et reliqui Apostoli simul sumpti sunt duodecim. If, however, this second definition is rightly weighed, it does not differ from the former, because the Apostles are taken for the Apostolic College, which is a copulated term. For this proposition is the same, tota Pompelona dicat Pyramidem, as omnes Senatores Pompilonenses dicant Pyramidem. Therefore that plural term affected by a universal sign is taken for some aggregate of distinct things signified by way of one: but the word signifying them thus is copulate at least virtually, as omnes Apostoli signifies the same as Collegium Apostolorum: but it is trifling to seek a distinction between copulate and copulatively, no otherwise than if one sought a distinction between sensile and sensibile, distribute and distributively.

Determinate supposition is defined by Villalpandus above as that by which a common term is supposited, affected either by no sign or by a particular sign. For example, homo currit or aliquis homo currit. But not well, for by distributive supposition a common term affected by no sign is supposited, as homo est animal. Toletus lib. and cap. 2 says that it is determinate by which a common term is supposited for its inferiors disjunctively: thus commonly the Summulists, using this example aliquis homo currit, that is, either Petrus currit, or Paulus, etc. But certainly they seem to have abused terms, for a disjunctive descent cannot be determinate but indeterminate, because through it no individual is known determinately: for when I say aliquis homo currit, I determine no man, but indifferently note Peter or Paul: for I determine and put a term to cognition when it is constrained to one determinate object.

It is confirmed; the vague is opposed to the determinate, as is clear from the terms; but the vague is indeterminate, because it wanders through several things without being constrained to one; therefore the determinate is constrained to one determinately. I showed in disputation 1, §47, that a singular, determinate, and particular term are the same. Hence determinate supposition is the substitution of a sensible sign in place of a singular mental term, which is the same as discrete supposition, as Petrus currit, hic homo dormit. But the Summulists call vague supposition determinate, and in their view it is the acceptance of a common term for inferiors taken disjunctively, as aliquis homo currit.

I think confused supposition is what they call particular: as this, oculus est necessario ad videndum. For oculus is not taken determinately for the right eye in particular, or for the left in particular, excluding the right, but vaguely and indeterminately. For confusion arises from our mode of conceiving, which mode is vague. Nor do I see a difference between these propositions, aliquis oculus requiritur ad videndum, aliquis oculus videt, since they have the same descent and ascent, because there oculus is signified confusedly.

Fonseca, book 8, chapter 31, says that the descent of a confused proposition is disjunctive, for example, oculus est necessarius ad videndum, that is, necessarius est, hic vel ille, non tamen hic est necessarius, vel ille est necessarius. But a determinate proposition has a disjunctive descent, as aliquis homo currit, that is, hic currit, or ille currit. I do not agree, because "the eye is required" can be resolved disjunctively, for either this eye is necessary, or that one. Fonseca says that these resolutions are false, because no eye is necessary: I distinguish, no eye in particular, excluding others, I grant; no eye vaguely, and disjunctively, not excluding others, even confusedly apprehended, I deny: but the proposition does not say that some particular eye is required in particular, but confusedly, which is signified in those resolutions: for just as on the part of the thing vision cannot occur without this or that eye, so this or that eye is necessary: because it is the same thing for the eye to be necessary and not to be able to see without it. It is true that on the part of the thing vision does not occur except in a particular eye, because on the part of the thing no confusion is given, concerning which elsewhere, and in the following section, from §3. Nor indeed is supposition discriminated by the fact that it is exercised on the part of the thing; but from the mode by which the mental term (for which the word supposits) tends toward the object: yet it tends confusedly in this aliquis homo currit, as much as in this aliquis oculus requiritur ad videndum: because it tends confusedly toward both.

Natural supposition is that by which a term supposits for every one of its significates: I would say, that by which a term supposits in entirely necessary matter. For such matter is called natural, as homo est animal. because the predicate belongs to man, in whatever state he is considered, whether in actual, or in potential, or in the intellect, for he is animal either actual or potential, or in the intellect, which propositions are called sempiternae veritatis. This supposition can be discrete, as Petrus est homo: or common, and it is equivalent to a distributive supposition, for homo est animal is just as much as omnis homo est animal: but if it is in remote or repugnant matter, it is also universal, as homo non est lapis: accidental supposition is that by which a term supposits for the difference of time imported in the proposition, as homo currit, that is, tempore praesenti; accidental is taken here not for a true accident, because this is accidental, Petrus existit, and it signifies no accident: and this, Petrus est risibilis, is said to signify an accident, and it is not accidental, but natural. But it is called accidental, that is, contingent.

This can also be discrete, as Petrus currit, or common, as homo currit, which if it is not affected by a universal categorematic term, omnis, or nullus, is equivalent to a particular, or vagae, as homo currit, that is, aliquis homo currit. Enough on supposition; let him who wants more consult Soto and Fonseca. For these are the more frequent, the rest rare, of little use, and learned by practice, as when distributive supposition is said to be for singulis generum, that is, for all individuals contained under some common account, as omnis equus currit, for all individuals of the horse: likewise pro generibus singulorum, that is, not for all individuals contained under the genus, but for some one of it, as omne animal fuit in arca Noë, that is, something from each of the genera, as one horse, and one lion: or two.