Universa Philosophia

Singular supposition is the substitution of a term to signify one singular thing in the singular, as Petrus, Deus, which others call discrete: because the cognition of a singular thing in the singular is the discretion of its object from all other things (as I show at length in disp. 5 of the Metaphysics). Hence a term subrogated for such cognition is said to supposit discretely, that is, to supposit for a discrete and clear act regarding its object. Likewise I think that particular supposition is singular: because a singular and a particular object are the same. For a particular man is Peter, for he is a part contained under the common object, and it is the same to conceive an object particularly and singularly. But because the Summulists distinguish particular signs from singular ones, say that singular and discrete or determinate particular supposition are the same, but not confused particular supposition.

Toletus lib. 2. cap. 2 says that common supposition is the use of a term for its inferiors. It is not proved, because the use of a common term for the common significate abstracted from the inferiors is also common supposition, as in homo est animal, it belongs not only to the inferiors, but also to man as such abstracted from them. Wherefore Villalpandus lib. 1, 3rd part, c. 1 says that common supposition is that by which the term supposits commonly, that is, for the common significate. But Soto, 2nd part, cap. 1, lect. 4, notable 1, says it is the use of a common term retained commonly. And rightly, because common supposition is substitution for a common term, therefore some common concept is signified as common: for if it is contracted to a singular, it is now not common but singular; and it will be discrete supposition. It is confirmed: common supposition is distinguished from discrete for no other reason than because discrete is put for a singular term, but common for a universal. I have impugned that definition of Toletus as one that distinguishes ad hominem the common immediate significate from the remote significate of singulars; but absolutely it is the same for something to belong to the common account and to all the inferiors confusedly known.

Father Fonseca, lib. 8. cap. 26, invents a certain absolute supposition, namely the acceptance of a name for its immediate significate, not merely the precise significate, as in this proposition homo est animal, the predication belongs to man as such abstracted from singulars, and also to each individual man. Which supposition he calls mixed from simple and personal: for in the part in which it is taken for the immediate significate, it is simple; but personal in the part in which it supposits for singulars. But I showed in §14 that it is personal supposition: because it supposits for a term of the first, and not of the second intention. But Fonseca was compelled to invent this middle supposition in order to protect his definition of simple supposition, so as to defend himself against the Nominalists denying two significates through a common word, the one remote, the other common. It is further impugned: because "to supposit absolutely" is nothing other than to be subrogated absolutely for another; but both simple and personal supposition are absolutely subrogated for another, therefore each is an absolute and absolute supposition. Secondly: because this absolute supposition, as absolute, is also personal, therefore. I prove the antecedent: as absolute it supposits for the common term taken on the side of reality, as in homo est animal, homo supposits according to the predicates belonging to it; but these, as they are in the object, are personal: because they are the very singulars known by a universal and confused act, therefore. Finally, it is not permitted to introduce new definitions, but to accept those received among others, so that in disputations fixed principles are laid down for arguing.