Universa Philosophia

Toletus, lib. 2. cap. 1, and Fonseca, lib. 8. cap. 24 and 25, say that simple supposition is the use of a common name for its immediate and formal significate. As this word homo is taken for the account of man as such abstracted from Peter and Paul, which account it signifies immediately and formally. Personal supposition they say is the use of a name for the thing which it signifies mediately, as in homo currit, homo is not taken for abstract man, but for Peter or Paul remotely signified by the word homo: to which definition Fonseca adheres so closely that in his metaphysics he inveighs sharply against the Nominalists, because they seem to deny it.

The doctrine that I shall set out concerning these two suppositions is best handed down by Soto, 2nd part of the introduction, cap. 1, lect. 3, notable 1 and 5. And first, against Toletus and Fonseca, there is this argument in this proposition: Petrus est individuum subiicibile. The word Petrus supposits simply, and not personally, and in this Petrus currit it supposits personally, and not simply, but in each it has the same immediate significate, and neither has a remote significate: therefore simple and personal supposition are not well distinguished by proximate and remote significate; because without that distinction of objects those suppositions are distinguished. I prove the minor: because Petrus est individuum subiicibile does not belong to Peter according to his own person considered in itself, but by the denomination of a second intellectual intention, because that man is a species belongs to him not by reason of human persons in themselves, but through an act of the intellect; therefore just as in homo est species it supposits simply, and not personally, so also in Petrus est individuum. It is confirmed: every supposition for predicables formally is simple, therefore also for subicibles: because they are versed in the same logical genus. That this supposition is simple Soto openly teaches above, and Toletus, lib. 1, c. 1. That Peter is also supposited personally is doubted by no one. That Peter in each proposition has the same significate is clear; because Petrus signifies only the account of man contracted by Petreity, and signifies nothing else either proximately or remotely—but if not, assign it.

Secondly I argue in this proposition: Homo est species, and in this homo est animal, homo signifies the same immediate object, and in the former it supposits simply, and in the latter personally, therefore. The major is clear: because homo est animal is true not only because its inferiors are animal, but according to the common account of man, abstract man is animal: indeed because that common account is animal, therefore the inferiors are animal.

Therefore simple supposition is the substitution of a term to signify the thing as it underlies second intentions, and from them receives its denomination. Personal supposition, however, to signify the thing according to those things that are in it according to reality independently of second intentions. Thus it is gathered from Soto above, who expounds the common definition concerning the primary and secondary significate in this way. For the common definition says that simple supposition is that by which the term is put for the primary significate, but personal for the secondary. Soto says: For the primary insofar as it is known, but for the secondary when it is taken without such application. But "insofar as it is known" is equivalent to "insofar as it underlies a second intention." It is proved first: because to supposit for a term as it underlies second intentions, and as it is on the side of reality, are diverse suppositions most necessary for the logical institution of predicables and predicaments; therefore they ought to have been handed down by the dialecticians, but no other is handed down besides these, therefore. Secondly by induction through all predicables and subicibles. Thirdly, because (as I showed, §14) many suppositions of this kind cannot conveniently be distinguished except by this account. Fourthly from the etymology of the names: because personal supposition is taken from person, according to what is in it; but simple from the mode of tending toward objects, effecting nothing in them, but considering them precisely.

Hence it is gathered why in universal personal supposition there is place for descent through the inferiors under the same word, but otherwise in simple supposition: for homo est animal has this descent, Petrus est animal, Paulus est animal; but this homo est species does not have this descent Petrus est species, Paulus est species. The reason a priori: because in personal supposition there is signified what belongs to the common account on the side of reality or primarily intentionally. But thus all those things belong to the inferiors contained under that common account, as to every animal it belongs to be sensible, because on the side of reality this belongs to animal as such: but in simple supposition there is signified what belongs to the thing secondarily intentionally from the mode of conceiving; but this mode is different regarding common and particular accounts: because regarding the former it is confused, and regarding the latter clear; but the properties of a confused mode cannot belong to a clear mode. Thus this proposition Petrus est species is false, because the human species supposits for individuals confusedly known, but Peter for an individual clearly known.

Soto notes above that descent can be made through the inferiors by retaining the property by which the common account is known, as homo est species has this descent, hic homo, in quantum cognitus homo, est species. This is true, yet it must be denied absolutely, as the same Soto thinks must be denied, because when we say hic homo, there is already a clear cognition of Peter, of whom thus clearly known it is false that he is a species. But to say hic homo in quantum cognitus homo joins repugnant terms. For hic homo says a clear cognition of Peter, and in quantum homo says an obscure knowledge of the same Peter.

Likewise note, against Fonseca, that from one simple term another simple term is rightly inferred in a different genus, v.g. Animal est genus homini, ergo aliquod animal est species. The phrase aliquod animal supposits simply, not personally, because to be a species does not belong to any animal except as it underlies a second intention. I said "in a different genus": because from generic and predicable simple supposition is inferred simple, specific, or individual subicible supposition. Thirdly note, against the same, that from this twofold supposition it is not gathered that the immediate significate of this word homo is one account objectively abstracted from the inferiors, and that the inferiors are signified remotely; for that is not gathered either.

You ask whether this is simple supposition, Omnis homo est species? It is not true taken absolutely, although it is simple, because the word omnis is a distribution attributing the species to each one in particular, as omnis homo currit attributes running to each individual man. But if it be said, omnis homo confuse cognitus est species, it is simple supposition, and true, because the human species is nothing other than all men confusedly known; but the word omnis is copulative, as omnes Apostoli Dei sunt duodecim. Finally note that simple supposition is set in place of a reflexive term; for example, I say homo est species: this proposition is supposited for another mental one, by which I affirm the same. This mental proposition is reflexive; because it is terminated at the specific character of man, which is an act of the intellect, which specific character that vocal proposition signifies; but it is supposited for the reflexive act terminated at the specific character.